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Abstract
Common in political discourse and academic literature is the notion that the inter-
national investment regime is experiencing backlash. At the center of this backlash
is the belief that international investment treaties unduly restrain states ability to
regulate in the public interest, most notably by allowing foreign investors to file in-
ternational arbitration claims directly against governments for a variety of regulatory
acts. The rise of investment arbitration–also know as investor-state dispute settle-
ment (ISDS)–has provoked a regime-wide reassertion of states’ autonomy to regulate
foreign investment under investment treaties. However, states have embarked on this
process in di↵erent ways and to di↵erent extents. While some have become more cau-
tious of how much legal autonomy they sacrifice in the future, others have partially
or completely recovered autonomy lost to previous treaties.
My dissertation explains why states pursue di↵erent policies in the aftermath of
ISDS. I argue that negative ISDS experiences are filtered through ideational lenses
that incline policy-makers to reclaim more or less legal autonomy. Yet policy-makers
face constraints and opportunities when acting on these emerging preferences. Thus,
I also argue that policy outcomes depend on the combination of a domestic and
external variables. Most scholarly attention has been placed on the political behavior
of economic actors, either domestic firms or foreign investors. However, ISDS disputes
also a↵ect a broad and diverse ensemble of local and transnational civil society groups.
These actors have competing interests regarding continuity and change in investment
treaty policies. Thus, I examine the conditions under which their mobilization can
iii
iv
enhance or hinder policy-makers’ ability to implement their desired policies.
I test the expectations derived from this argument using a mixed methods research
design that combines quantitative statistical analysis and qualitative case studies.
Through regression analysis of an original measure of international legal autonomy, I
show that after ISDS claims hit, states are less willing to sacrifice their legal autonomy
and in some cases start to recover it. Further analysis of three original datasets of
treaty signature, treaty content and treaty termination shows these actions are not
equally likely across states. Through within- and cross-case comparisons of investment
treaty policy-making in the United States, Ecuador and India, I show how alternative
combinations of the explanatory variables make a given policy reaction to ISDS more
likely.
Whether states continue to endorse strong treaty protections is a pressing ques-
tion, given the recent rise in the number of governments elected on nationalist plat-
forms. There are also normative stakes in the answers to these research questions.
Policy variation does not simply revolve around technical legal disagreements; it re-
flects fundamental disagreements about the limits of state authority in a globalized
economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 2002 Germany decided to phase out peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The coalition
government of the social democrats and the greens restricted the life of existing nu-
clear power plants to the amount of time it would take them to reach a set volume of
energy output. When a tsunami hit Japan on 11 March 2011 and provoked three core
meltdowns in the Fukushima nuclear plant, over 200,000 demonstrators took to the
streets in the biggest anti-nuclear protests Germany has ever seen. Shortly after, the
German Parliament decided that nuclear energy would be completely abandoned by
the year 2022, however much was left to reach the set output level. Two plants a↵ected
by this measure are owned by the Swedish firm Vattenfall. In 2012, the firm initiated
an international dispute under the Energy Charter Treaty, which both Germany and
Sweden are members of, to obtain compensation for the financial losses that would
result from the shutdown. The Energy Charter includes provisions against expro-
priation without compensation as well as a dispute settlement mechanism in which
foreign investors can initiate legal actions against their host states before interna-
tional arbitral tribunals; a system widely known as investor-state dispute settlement
or ISDS. While details about the arbitration remain scarce -both parties agreed to
strict confidentiality- it is known that Vattenfall is seeking e4.7 billion in compen-
1
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sation and that, as of December 2015, the German government had spent over e3.2
million to defend the case.
The political consequences of the Vattenfall case were vast. The unfolding of
the dispute coincided with negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) with the United States. Investor protections were at the center
of the TTIP debate in Europe, especially in Germany. Businesses from both sides of
the Atlantic believed ISDS should be included in the agreement’s investment chapter.
Investment arbitration, multinational firms like Vattenfall claim, o↵ers an e cient and
neutral forum for the resolution of disputes. Substantive and procedural protections
found in investment treaties increase legal certainty and minimize political risk when
an investor is assessing whether to invest in a particular foreign market. Activists
saw ISDS as a means of corporate control and a threat to democracy. Corporations
would be able to bypass national courts through secret arbitration processes and
government standards for the protection of the environment, health, and consumers -
like Germany’s phasing out of nuclear energy- would be at risk. A pan-European
umbrella group, ‘STOP TTIP’, set up headquarters in Berlin and took over the
coordination of an alliance of more than 500 European civil society organizations.
Thousands of protesters took to the streets in cities across Europe and activists
issued a Europe-wide petition to stop TTIP. By 20 February 2015, the number of
signatures had reached 1.4 million, 860,000 of which were German. As a result of the
public criticism, the European Commission interrupted TTIP talks and launched a
three-month public consultation on the matter, receiving nearly 150,000 responses.
At this point, the EU Trade Commissioner acknowledged, “ISDS is now the most
toxic acronym in Europe.”1
1ISDS: The most toxic acronym in Europe. (17 September, 2015). Politico.
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The European Commission’s response to the public outcry was the adoption of a
German proposal to replace the system of ad hoc arbitral tribunals with a multilateral
investment court. The proposal addressed some of the charges levied against ISDS.
Because decisions from ad hoc arbitral tribunals are criticized for their inconsistency,
the court would include an appeals stage. To correct the issue of secrecy, all proceed-
ings would be open. Since it is argued arbitrators are biased in favor of the firms that
appoint them, judges would be selected under high qualification requirements. Be-
cause critics see ISDS as allowing firms to use the threat of litigation to deter public
regulations, the court would also include mechanisms to avoid forum shopping, paral-
lel proceedings and frivolous claims. The court proposal was a direct response to civil
society mobilization in the aftermath of Vattenfall and yet activists were not pleased.
In their view, the proposal reinforces the one-sided nature of investment arbitration
because, much like traditional ISDS, it still only enables foreign investors to bypass
the national legal system to launch an international claim seeking compensation.
What happened in Germany was not an isolated instance. More than 3,000 bi-
lateral and plurilateral investment treaties are in force at present and most of them
include access to ISDS. Under these treaties, foreign firms have brought lawsuits
against 117 countries. As more and more governments started to experience the costs
of having signed investment treaties -either in the form of expensive international lit-
igation or foregone regulations- the international investment regime has come under
fire. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD), “[t]he question is not about whether to reform or not, but about the ‘what’,
‘how’ and ‘extent’ of such reform” (UNCTAD, 2015, 120).
The policies that governments have introduced in reaction to their own ISDS
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experiences suggests states have widely di↵erent views about the ‘what’, ‘how’ and
‘extent’ of the desired changes. After Vattenfall, Germany devised a proposal to
replace ad hoc arbitral tribunals with a permanent court. Much di↵erently, after
its own brushes with ISDS, Colombia remains a supporter of investment arbitration.
The Colombian government adopted a new treaty model that addresses some of the
problems associated with ISDS by, among other things, increasing precision in the
drafting, enhancing the transparency of arbitral proceedings and including exceptions
and carve outs to protect particular policy goals from being challenged as treaty
violations. This new template is to guide all future negotiations and any eventual
renegotiation of older treaties. Colombia has made it clear, however, that it will
always seek the consent of its partners when it comes to renegotiations and will not
cancel its existing agreements unilaterally.
South Africa has developed a di↵erent approach to Germany’s or Colombia’s. Af-
ter an infamous arbitral dispute in which foreign investors challenged the legality of
a rmative action policies, South Africa became convinced that investment treaties
and the ISDS system that enforces them unduly constrain the space of governments
to implement measures in the public interest. Amid strong criticism from multina-
tional companies and foreign o cials, South Africa adopted a domestic regulatory
framework under which foreign investors only have recourse to domestic mediation
and courts, rather than to ad hoc international arbitral tribunals or a permanent in-
ternational court. Furthermore, the government has unilaterally initiated the process
to terminate its investment treaties. Existing international investment agreements,
according to South Africa, are based on outdated models that are focused on the
interests of investors from developed countries and do not address the issues of con-
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cern for developing nations. In sum, while a ‘rage against the regime’ has emerged
all over the world, states have acted on it di↵erently. This dissertation explains why.
Understanding this variation in policy reactions to ISDS disputes is not only impor-
tant for the international law governing foreign investment; it speaks to fundamental
disagreements about the limits of state authority in a globalized economy. As in-
ternational economic governance faces increasing challenges from dissatisfied states,
the changes undergone by the investment regime can provide valuable lessons for
the future. Most importantly, about the degree to which alternative projects can be
accommodated within existing international institutions.
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 provides a succinct history of inter-
national investment law. Section 1.2 deals with the rise of international investment
arbitration. I provide an account of the main charges levied against ISDS that have
led to the emergence of a ‘backlash’ against the international investment regime. Sec-
tion 1. 3 unpacks the notion of a backlash and o↵ers a novel conceptualization of
policy reactions to ISDS. In doing so, I introduce the puzzle for the dissertation.
Namely, why do states attempt to recover varying degrees of legal autonomy from
the investment regime in reaction to their own experiences with ISDS. Beyond being
empirically puzzling, I also explain why this variation is both politically salient and
normatively important. Lastly, sections 1.4 and 1.5 briefly explain the dissertation’s
theoretical argument and layout.
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1.1 A brief history of international investment law
1.1.1 International investment protections before treaties
That states use international legal instruments to establish what they can and cannot
do to foreign investors operating within their territories is not a recent practice. The
3,300 some investment treaties that have been signed since the 1950’s did not appear
out of thin air. They have their origins in an earlier period when states attempted
to resolve conflicting economic interests through the means that international law
o↵ered at the time (Salacuse, 2015). The regulation of investment across borders
dates from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As former colonies, mostly from
Latin America, started to assert their newly acquired sovereign rights, great powers
needed a new framework of doctrines and rules that would protect their nationals’
property from government authority (Miles, 2013).
One available source of standards for the treatment of foreigners by governments
was the customary law of state responsibility for injury to aliens and their property.
Di↵erently from the investment law of today, this body of customary rules did not
provide a↵ected individuals with a way to assert their claims directly, either before
the host state’s courts -that is, the courts of the country receiving the investment- or
an international tribunal. The only available mechanism was diplomatic protection
from the home country -that is, the foreign investor’s country of origin.2 Great
powers, normally in the position of the home state, grounded the legality of diplomatic
2Although I do not o↵er an analysis of the appropriateness of the category of ‘home state’ every
time I use it; I am aware of the di culties involved in determining the home of an investor given
that corporate ownership structures have increased in complexity. This has, in turn, contributed to
the practice of treaty shopping (Lee, 2015). Thus, when discussing particular arbitration disputes I
do not address whether investors have real ties to their claimed nationality unless the issue became
a salient aspect of the dispute.
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protection on the basis that they had a right recognized in international law to pursue
the claims of their nationals against foreign governments that had injured them and
seek redress on their behalf. International law allowed this right to be enforced
through the use of force, giving way to a period of gunboat diplomacy. While the
most common actions taken by home states were diplomatic claims or supranational
judicial adjudication, unlike today these took place under the shadow of the use
of force. Furthermore, unlike the ISDS system of today, diplomatic protection was
always subject to the willingness of the home country to provide it.
Peripheral nations -the most frequent targets of diplomatic protection- disputed
the validity of these actions which they perceived as illegal a↵ronts to state sovereignty.
Jurists from Latin American and Asian nations toured diplomatic circles contesting
the extent to which diplomatic protection could be justified under international law
(Lorca, 2014). Later on, these rules got caught in two major international processes:
the competition between East and West during the Cold War and the decolonization
process. States from the socialist camp disputed international norms grounded on the
protection of private property while post-colonial states opposed limitations to their
ability to pursue industrialization policies when these a↵ected the interests of foreign
investors. The height of diplomatic resistance to such norms came in the 1970s when
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the es-
tablishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO asserted the
principles permanent national sovereignty over natural resources and states’ right to
regulate their economies for the purpose of development (Sornarajah, 2017). By mid-
twentieth century, investors had little guarantees that their host governments would
not revise their commitments when they so desired. Earlier rules of diplomatic pro-
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tection hinged too much on the willingness of the home country to enforce them and,
with the degree of opposition from the socialist and developing worlds, great powers
had no interest in continuing to employ forceful measures to protect the claims of
private individuals.
Developing nations were not asserting sovereignty over resources and the role of
state intervention for development purely as a matter of principle; they had a substan-
tial interest in implementing economic policies that would end up a↵ecting foreign
investors negatively. Thus, expropriation and forced renegotiation of contracts were
not uncommon (Vernon, 1971). Because the property of their nationals was insecure,
home states started to negotiate international treaties to restrict the behavior of host
countries. These would be superior to customary law in the sense that they would
be clearer, more specific, and most notably, enforceable. These treaty e↵orts took
place at both the bilateral and multilateral levels and gave way to the treatification
of international investment law (Schill, 2009). In 1959 Germany and Pakistan signed
the first international investment agreement.
In agreement with the idea that investment treaties were born to replace the now
unviable practice of diplomatic protection, these were mostly signed between Euro-
pean states and former colonies. While bilateral treaties were slowly emerging, states
were still trying to arrive at a multilateral set of rules to govern transnational in-
vestment within the United Nations. The UN of the 1960s and 1970s was dominated
by developing countries (Luard, 2016). This was the era of the NIEO and, keeping
with that spirit, developing countries wanted rules to control multinational firms and
minimize any negative e↵ects they could have, whether economic or political. De-
veloping countries were virtually absolute capital importers, thus their interest was
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purely to adopt rules for corporations and not the other way around. Developed
nations were in a di↵erent situation. Investment flows between high income states
were already governed by a set of instruments adopted within the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Their investments in developing
countries, however, did not enjoy the same level of protection (Sauvant, 2015). For
this reason, they were more interested in devising a set of rules for host states than
in restricting the operations of firms. With conflicting interests, developed and de-
veloping countries started negotiations for the adoption of the United Nations Code
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations. Negotiations dragged from 1977 to 1992
with no final success. As time passed and consensus remained unattainable, developed
countries concluded the code was outdated. According to a diplomatic memo, the
US position was that “the Code is a relic of another era, when foreign direct invest-
ment was looked upon with considerable concern...Washington agencies have decided
to seek the support of host government o cials responsible for foreign investment
and quietly build a consensus against further negotiations.” (p. 54). At this point
investment treaties were much more common than when negotiations started, and
more importantly, the US treaty program was already in full swing. Because these
instruments provided developed states with the type of commitments they wanted
from host countries in the first place, they lost interest in the Code.
1.1.2 The rise of investment treaties
In the 1980s FDI became the major source of capital for developing countries. Around
this time, market-based approaches to economic development became widely accepted
(Jandhyala et al., 2011). Governments dismantled barriers to FDI and actively
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courted foreign multinationals hoping these investments would generate both eco-
nomic growth and valuable transfers of skills and technology (Pandya, 2014). One
way to signal to foreign investors the attractiveness of a particular location was to sign
investment treaties that would guarantee openness and stability (Bu¨the and Milner,
2009). The network of over 3,000 that is in place today consists mostly of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) but it also includes wider economic agreements containing
investment chapters, like NAFTA or the Trans-Pacific Partnership.3
Investment treaties tend to have a similar structure. They establish standards of
treatment that host states commit to observe in their relations with foreign investors,
like national, fair and equitable, or most favored nation treatment. They also include
substantive obligations for the host state, such as a prohibition of expropriation or
a commitment to provide freedom of capital transfers.4 One of the most singular
characteristics of investment treaties is their investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
mechanism. Investment treaties give a right to foreign investors to initiate disputes
against their hosts states before an international arbitral tribunal. Unlike the arbitra-
tions of the early 20th century that required states to consent to each arbitration on a
case-by-case basis, investment treaties establish the host state’s consent to ISDS ar-
bitration for all future disputes. Furthermore, di↵erently from the dispute settlement
mechanism of the World Trade Organization -where states bring disputes against
other states- disputes for alleged violations of investment treaties are handled solely
between private investors and sovereign states. David Schneiderman (2008) termed
the expansion of international investment treaties as the ‘constitutionalization’ of the
3According to UNCTAD, as of April 2019, 2,932 bilateral investment treaties and 387 economic
treaties with investment provisions have been signed.
4Chapter 3, section 3 provides a detailed account of the structure of investment treaties and the
ways in which alternative drafting choices can a↵ect states’ ability to regulate under a given BIT.
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Figure 1.1: Number of treaties signed by year. UNCTAD.
global economy, because of the limits it places on the capacity of states to negatively
a↵ect foreign investors and the powers it gives to international arbitral tribunals to
review sovereign acts.
Treaty-signing peaked in the 1990s (Figure 3.6). During this period, more than
one hundred treaties were being signed each year. Given the high sovereignty costs as-
sociated with this system, scholars have puzzled about the willingness of governments
to sacrifice their regulatory autonomy by entering into these strict commitments. The
mainstream explanation for why states ‘sign treaties that hurt them’ (Guzman, 1997)
is that they help governments achieve important objectives, in this case, attracting
FDI. By making investors’ rights a matter of international law, states raise the costs
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of infringing on those guarantees. In turn, this credibility-enhancing function helps
states compete for FDI (Elkins et al., 2006). Other explanations see the expansion
of investment treaties as the result of emulation (Jandhyala et al., 2011). Because in
the 1990s BITs became a symbol for economic liberalism, states wanting to project
that image saw signing investment treaties as something they were supposed to do.
Di↵erently, Poulsen (2015) argued that developing states entered into these treaties
because, due to cognitive constraints, they miscalculated the costs and benefits that
would come from them. Governments overestimated the economic gains from signing
BITs and they ignored the risks entirely until they were hit with ISDS claims.
1.2 The ‘backlash’ against investment arbitration
My analysis begins where Poulsen leaves o↵. I am interested in understating the
variety of treaty policies that states put in place after the claims hit. In 1987 a
British shrimp farming firm initiated the first even treaty-based arbitration dispute
against Sri Lanka. As more and more treaties that gave investors’ access to ISDS
were being signed, the number of disputes over alleged violations of these treaties has
grown steadily, with a total of 71 arbitrations initiated in 2018 alone (Figure 1.2).
Although a minimum level of enforcement is required if treaties are to be meaningful
(Bu¨the and Milner, 2009), some are of the view that the system has gone too far
in allowing investors to challenge a much wider array of measures than was initially
intended.
Complaints against the investment regime are not just procedural. That is, critics
do not simply have problems with the treaties’ enforcement mechanism. The sub-
stantive rights and obligations included in the treaties have also been criticized as
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Figure 1.2: Number of new ISDS claims by year. Source: UNCTAD.
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excessively in favor of investors. In fact, the commonly raised problems are caused
by the combination of both aspects -substantive and procedural. For example, the
ability of investors -and only investors- to bring claims against host states is a pro-
cedural aspect. This generates perverse incentives for arbitrators whose (well-paid)
jobs are dependent on there being cases to arbitrate. For a demand for international
arbitration services to exist, investors have to perceive that ISDS serves their inter-
ests in some form. At the same time, substantively, investment treaties give rights to
investors and obligations to states. Existing treaties are, for the most part, vaguely
worded and this has provided arbitrators with great discretion in their interpretation.
As one Argentine state o cial put it, “no state that signed BITs in the 1990’s could
have foreseen what the interpretation of those treaties was going to be in the decade
of the 2000s.”5 It has been argued that at the jurisdictional stage (when arbitrators
consider whether the tribunal has authority to hear the case) tribunals tend to inter-
pret definitions of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ extensively (Van Harten, 2012; Kahale,
2018). Moreover, Pelc (2017) argues the investment regime has gradually moved away
from direct expropriation as the most commonly adjudicated o↵ense towards indirect
expropriation through di↵erent policy measures, including environmental and social
regulations. As corporate lawyers became savvy users of ISDS, governments found
themselves immersed in costly litigation battles for actions like terminating the lease
of an airport duty free store; imposing a tax on soft drinks that use high fructose
corn syrup as sweetener; requiring o↵shore petroleum operators to dedicate a per-
centage of their profits to research and education; and passing legislation to increase
the minimum wage.
The costs associated with ISDS disputes are varied. For starters, sustaining liti-
5Interview I.
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gation e↵orts is expensive. According to a study by lawyers from the firm Allen &
Overy of publicly available cases released up to 2017, the average respondent costs
(i.e. fees and expenses of counsel, experts and witnesses) are USD 4,855,000 (Hodg-
son and Campbell, 2017). If states lose the disputes, awards can be pricey. In the
Occidental v. Ecuador case, for example, the American claimant received 2.3 billion
dollars. While not all awards reach this magnitude, they represent significant amounts
of money nonetheless. There is also evidence that FDI inflows su↵er when arbitral
disputes ensue (Allee and Peinhardt, 2011). Furthermore, there is the potential cost
of foregone regulations. It is argued that the expected financial and political costs of
being immersed in ISDS disputes have a deterrent e↵ect on states, who end up fore-
going regulations when they expect (and in some cases, are explicitly threatened 6) to
be challenged before arbitral tribunals, a phenomenon often referred to as ‘regulatory
chill’ (Tienhaara et al., 2009).
As claims continued to accumulate, a wide array of voices started to express their
dissatisfaction. From Hillary Clinton who in her 2008 campaign promised to “take out
the ability of foreign companies to sue us because of what we do to protect our work-
ers”7; to late Venezuelan President Hugo Cha´vez, who claimed the system worked in
tune with the interests of the American empire.8 These increasingly ubiquitous asser-
tions have made the investment regime one of the most controversial areas of interna-
tional law. As put by Anthea Roberts, “many states view investor-state arbitration
6A government o cial in Ottawa is quoted recounting many instances of legal threats: “I’ve
seen the letters from the New York and DC law firms coming up to the Canadian government on
virtually every new environmental regulation and proposition in the last five years. They involved
dry-cleaning chemicals, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, patent law. Virtually all of the new initiatives
were targeted and most of them never saw the light of day.” Quoted in Investor protections in
NAFTA are one manifestation of a broad, backdoor e↵ort to restore the primacy of property against
society’s broader claims. (15 October 2001). The Nation.
7The Democratic Debate in Cleveland . (26 February 2008). The New York Times.
8Evo Morales plantea buscar fo´rmula para neutralizar el CIADI. (29 April 2007). El Economista.
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as akin to a horse that has bolted from the barn” (2018, 410). A broad discussion is
underway -among governments, civil society groups, international organizations and
scholars- about how the international investment regime can be improved (Puig and
Sha↵er, 2018). This growing backlash, however, has already moved beyond rhetoric
(Simmons, 2014). States have started to be more mindful of the ways in which treaties
constrain their legal autonomy to regulate foreign investment. In some cases, they
have even started to recover some of that autonomy from international investment
treaties.
1.3 What does ‘backlash’ entail?
Common in political discourse and academic literature is the notion that the inter-
national investment regime is experiencing backlash. Furthermore, it is understood
that at the center of this backlash is the belief that international investment treaties
unduly restrain states’ ability to regulate in the public interest (De Mestral, 2017;
Morosini and Badin, 2017; Waibel, 2010; Sornarajah, 2015; Van Harten, 2013). This
raises a simple but crucial question: what does ‘backlash’ actually entail? What kind
of state actions are included under the large conceptual umbrella of backlash? And
given that a concern with states’ ability to regulate is at the center of the discontent,
to what extent do alternative policy reactions a↵ect states’ level of commitment to
the international investment regime?
To answer these questions, I consider policy reactions in terms of their overall
e↵ect on a country’s international legal autonomy to regulate foreign investment. By
international legal autonomy I refer to the degree of legal constraints that interna-
tional investment treaties place on a given state in relation to its treatment of foreign
1.3. What does ‘backlash’ entail? 17
investors in its territory. A state that has never entered into an investment treaty
has maximum international legal autonomy because no treaty creates obligations re-
garding its treatment of foreign investors. As states sign BITs with other countries,
their legal autonomy decreases. However, a country that has signed BITs with abso-
lutely every country in the world has not lost its legal autonomy entirely. Investment
treaties vary substantially in terms of the rights they provide to investors and the
obligations they impose on states. Thus, a country’s international legal autonomy
(ILA) depends on the number of the treaties it has committed to as well as their
content.9
I am interested in understanding how the treaty policies that states put in place
in reaction to their ISDS experiences a↵ect their overall ILA. Recent work in IPE has
found that involvement in investment disputes can lead to a variety of state actions
that a↵ect a country’s legal autonomy in di↵erent ways. For example, Poulsen and
Aisbett (2013) argue that developing states who face arbitration disputes sign lower
numbers of treaties. However, treaties are still being signed. Per UNCTAD figures,
in 2018 states signed 41 investment treaties. At the same time, recent treaties are
di↵erent from the ones signed in the 1990s and early 2000s when arbitral disputes
were not commonplace. According to UNCTAD’s Investment Division, “(t)oday’s
reform-oriented treaty making is in striking contrast to treaty making at the turn of
the millennium” (2018a, 3). Supporting this view, Manger and Peinhardt (2017) find
that treaties have become more precise because states’ have learned from their expe-
rience with ISDS that open-ended and vague provisions can be interpreted broadly
by arbitrators. Furthermore, Haftel and Thompson (2018) argue that states with a
9Chapter 3 expands on the concept of international legal autonomy and presents an empirical
measure of state-level ILA.
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great deal of ISDS experience are more likely to renegotiate their treaties. And when
they do, they tend to replace them with treaties that better preserve their ability
to regulate (Broude et al., 2018). While in general treaty-making preferences have
shifted towards provisions that better safeguard host states’ regulatory space; there
is still significant variation in treaty texts. For example, some new models born out
of states’ experiences with arbitral disputes continue to provide for ISDS (United
States); others do not (Australia); and others severely limit the conditions under
which investor can reach arbitration (India).
While available work on the consequences of ISDS experience is helpful, consider-
ing these actions in isolation cannot tell us whether states’ ILA increases or decreases
as a result and to what extent. For example, states that keep signing BITs in the af-
termath of ISDS disputes continue to lose their ILA to investment treaties. However,
by signing more precise BITs countries lose less ILA than if they sign traditional,
open-ended treaties (Manger and Peinhardt, 2017). At the same time, if these more
ILA mindful treaties are actually replacing old and less ILA friendly BITs (Broude
et al., 2018), states are actually increasing their international legal autonomy as a
result. I improve on this research by o↵ering an alternative -and more empirically
valid- conceptualization of state reactions that accounts for combinations of these
behaviors. In doing so, I join an emerging group of scholars trying to make sense of
the di↵erent state strategies that constitute this backlash (Roberts, 2018; Puig and
Sha↵er, 2018; Langford et al., 2018). My conceptualization probes policy responses
to ISDS on two dimensions. The first dimension is future-oriented and it refers to
what states do about signing new treaties: do they keep signing the old type of pro-
investor BITs, do they adopt new treaty templates, or do they refrain from signing
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treaties. This dimension indicates how much ILA states are willing to compromise in
the future. The second dimension is past-oriented and it refers to states’ preferences
towards their existing treaties: do they keep them or do they get rid of them. This
dimension indicates how much ILA states are attempting to take back from their
existing network of BITs.
So far my treatment of policy variation has been mostly anecdotal. In the rest
of this section, I dive into this variation analytically.10 Before doing so, I should
note that states’ experiences with ISDS will not necessarily be perceived as equally
negative. What counts as negative is subjective. However, by negative experiences
I mostly refer to two situations. (a) When a country has been hit with multiple
ISDS lawsuits in a short period of time. For example, Argentina was hit heavily with
arbitral claims for the emergency measures adopted during its 2001 economic crisis.
The total number of ISDS disputes against Argentina went from 8 in 2001 to 45 in
2005. Or (b) when a country faced a particularly controversial dispute, either due
to the amount of money awarded to investors or because it challenged a particular
policy or regulation that powerful constituencies felt strongly about. The most clear
example of this type of dispute is Piero Foresti v. South Africa. The Italian owners
of a mining firm headquartered in Luxembourg claimed that the black economic
empowerment laws that required the company to divest 26% of its investment was
a violation of South Africa’s international investment treaties.11 This was South
Africa’s first known ISDS dispute yet was enough motivation for the government to
10As scholarly interest on the backlash against investment arbitration spiked in recent years, other
conceptualizations of state behavior have emerged (See for example Puig and Sha↵er, 2018; Roberts,
2018; Langford et al., 2018). There is no correct way to make sense of empirical variation, as it can
be done according to di↵erent criteria depending on specific research questions. That said, existing
work has been done mainly by legal scholars and has remained, for the most part, descriptive.
11Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/01.
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order a review of its entire treaty network and to eventually terminate all of its BITs
(Schlemmer, 2015).12
In my framework, states answer two questions when considering how to react to
costly ISDS disputes. An important reminder, I explain policy reactions to ISDS. I am
interested in how much policies change as a consequence of arbitral disputes. Thus, I
consider post-ISDS policies in terms of how much they deviate from pre-ISDS ones.
The first question is how much legal autonomy are they willing to compromise in the
future in comparison to how much they would be compromising if their current treaty
practice remained in place. Second, how much legal autonomy are they trying to
recover from their current involvement with international investment treaties. States’
answers to both of these questions will guide the scope of changes to existing treaty
policies. To assess those changes, each policy reaction needs to be examined on two
dimensions along which it can fall at some point between continuity and change.13
1.3.1 How much international legal autonomy to compro-
mise?
This first dimension refers to what states do about signing new treaties. To keep
signing the same types of BITs occupies the Continuity end of the spectrum. By ‘old’
12Other examples of controversial disputes are the Philip Morris v. Australia and Philip Morris v.
Uruguay cases for alleged violations of intellectual property rights after both governments adopted
plain packaging laws as part of anti-smoking campaigns.
13I make an important assumption here. The only options for states are to continue their present
policies or to change to policies that provide more international legal autonomy for the state. That
is, I do not consider the possibility of states changing their treaty policies towards more pro-investor
ones. This could be possible in theory and, in fact, China started to sign more pro-investor BITs in
the late 1990s (Schill, 2007). However, this is related to China being a late adopter of the old models
and not a response to ISDS since the first dispute against China was filed in 2011. Since it is highly
unlikely that a state would switch to more pro-investor models in the aftermath of controversial
ISDS experiences, I do not theorize that possibility.
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BITs I refer to the typical treaty from 1990s, the expansion period in the investment
regime. In relation to more recent treaties, these were in general markedly pro-
investor. Among other characteristics, they lacked in precision which meant that
arbitrators could interpret them expansively; they rarely contained exceptions for
state obligations; and they provided unrestricted access to investment arbitration
(Spears, 2010). On the Change end of the spectrum lies the decision to not sign any
new investment treaties.
In between these two extremes, states can continue to sign treaties but basing
them on di↵erent models. Where on this dimension the new models fall depends on
how much of a break from the old BITs they represent. That is, the new models
can include moderate or major changes. Major changes mean the treaty is rid of
fundamental provisions from the older BITs or that it incorporates new elements
that investors dislike strongly. For example, regarding substantive issues, models
that do not o↵er any of the traditional standards of treatment -especially Fair and
Equitable Treatment (FET)- are major breaks from the past.14 Similarly, treaty
templates that include multiple, mandatory and enforceable investor obligations also
represent a substantial change.15
14The obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors is one of the most
common standards of treatment in international investment law (Grierson-Weiler and Laird, 2008);
2,440 of the 2,571 treaties in UNCTAD’s treaty database include it. To date, ISDS claimants invoke
breaches of FET standards more than any other breach in their suits. Of the 553 ISDS disputes
for which alleged breaches are known, 459 list the FET standard among the clauses violated by the
respondent state. FET, in contrast to other standards of treatment like most favored nation (MFN)
or national treatment (NT), has an absolute quality. MFN treatment is determined in relation to
the treatment provided to firms from other nations. NT is measured against treatment provided
to national firms. The terms of FET, however, need to be determined by reference to specific
circumstances. The frequency with which FET has been invoked required tribunals to repeatedly
weigh in on the meaning of the standard and states have been unhappy with the result, claiming
interpretations have gone beyond the intentions of the drafters.
15Discourse surrounding investment treaty reform e↵orts is often talked about as a ‘rebalancing’
of instruments that have traditionally been tilted in favor of investors. Investment treaties are long
lists of investor rights and state obligations and only investors can start ISDS claims. Thus, no
1.3. What does ‘backlash’ entail? 22
Procedurally, a model not providing for ISDS, making it conditional on the ex-
haustion of domestic remedies, or requiring consent to arbitration on a case-by-case
basis would represent a major break from the past. For example, in 2013 Brazil
developed a model which does not include ISDS and only allows for state-to-state
dispute settlement (Maggetti and Choer Moraes, 2018; Campello and Lemos, 2015,
see). Brazil has a fundamental problem with traditional BITs because ISDS gives
rights to foreign investors that national investors do not have.16 Unlike other known
problems of ISDS, i.e lack of transparency or arbitrators’ conflicts of interest, this
cannot be solved through targeted reforms. A treaty either does provide for ISDS or
it does not. “From our perspective, ISDS is intrinsically flawed. No reforms would
be enough to redeem the system...the best solution is simply throw it out of the win-
dow and use something di↵erent,” Brazilian delegates expressed during current talks
about investment arbitration reform (quoted in Roberts and Bouraoui, 2018b).
Conversely, moderate changes do not a↵ect fundamental principles of BITs. Most
importantly, these models maintain direct access to international arbitral tribunals
but introduce an array of definitions, carve-outs, exceptions and limitations that
reduce the scope of state actions that investors can challenge through ISDS. For
example, Canada has tweaked its model BIT in di↵erent occasions yet has never
eliminated ISDS. It has rather addressed problematic issues through targeted fixes like
introducing transparency to arbitral proceedings, developing mechanisms to screen
out frivolous claims at an early stage, and imposing rules on arbitrator conflicts of
interest, qualifications and ethics (De Mestral and Vanhonnaeker, 2017). The EU’s
element could work more towards a rebalancing treaties than the inclusion of enforceable investor
obligations (Bjorklund, 2013; Dumberry and Dumas-Aubin, 2012; Mann et al., 2005). However,
these remain rare and are one of the most resisted elements by firms.
16Interview X (Brazilian diplomat).
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approach started in a similar way but has evolved to a proposal for an international
investment court. Unlike ad hoc arbitral tribunals, this court would be permanent
and would have an established bench of judges. But private investors would still have
access to it directly, making it a form of ISDS (Titi, 2016). In this sense, while both
approaches retain ISDS, the EU would be closer to the Change end of the spectrum
than the Canadian model. In terms of changes to a country’s international legal
autonomy, where a policy falls along this dimension ranges from not sacrificing legal
autonomy any further from compromising as much as it has been done in the past. In
between these two alternatives, di↵erent types of revised treaty models compromise
more or less autonomy depending on their content.
1.3.2 How much international legal autonomy to recover?
The second dimension refers to states’ behavior towards their existing treaties. The
principle of Pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) represents the Continuity
end of this dimension. Logically, the least break with the past is to keep all previ-
ous treaties intact. On the opposite end of the spectrum, terminating all existing
BITs represents the greatest degree of Change. It is possible that states’ behavior
falls somewhere in between if they decide to terminate some treaties and not others.
For example, Venezuela terminated its BIT with The Netherlands in 2008 and left
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 2012 but
has not terminated any other treaties since. These two terminations are significant
nonetheless. The Dutch BIT had been particularly dangerous for Venezuela since
many energy firms routed their investments through corporations incorporated in
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The Netherlands.17 Terminating the ICSID convention, while it does not extinguish
rights contained in BITs, means foreign investors have to take their ISDS claims
elsewhere.18
Another intermediate position is to keep the treaties and either amend certain
clauses or adopt interpretative understandings. Amendments modify the content of
an existing treaty by introducing new provisions or altering or removing existing
ones. For example, Singapore and Australia revised the investment chapter of their
trade agreements to, among other things, add exceptions to ISDS.19 Interpretative
understandings clarify the content of a treaty and narrow the scope of interpretive
discretion of tribunals. For example, Colombia and Singapore issued a joint interpre-
tative understanding that clarified several provisions of their BIT, including the FET
and most favored nation clauses (UNCTAD, 2017, 10).
In relation to states’ actions towards their existing treaties, I should be explicit
about where treaty renegotiation fits within this scheme. States can discard old
treaties in two di↵erent ways: unilateral termination and renegotiation. For states
that are still willing to sign treaties, renegotiation and termination can ultimately
lead to the same result. When this is the case, whether they end up terminating
unilaterally or renegotiating with the consent of the other party generally depends
on the attitude of their treaty partners. For example, if country A in a dyad would
prefer to renegotiate the treaty but country B is satisfied with the terms of the current
agreement, B can simply refuse to renegotiate. For example, after receiving eleven
arbitration notices in 2016, Colombia drafted a new model BIT that would guide
17Venezuela surprises The Netherlands with terminations notice for BIT; treaty has been used
by many investors to “route” investments into Venezuela. (16 May 2008). Investment Arbitration
Reporter.
18See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation of the significance of leaving ICSID.
19Agreement to Amend the Singapore - Australia Free Trade Agreement. 13 October 2016.
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future negotiations but should also replace existing treaties. In this regard, Colombia
opted to take the renegotiation route and “always [look] after the consensus of the
other State in the game.”20 However, while a Colombian o cial noted his government
was working on replacing its two oldest BITs, any progress on that front ultimately
depended on the partners. “One of the countries has been very receptive...The other
one is still pending”, noted the o cial.21
However, if A unilaterally terminates the treaty, then B will have a stronger
incentive go back to the negotiating table because B’s investors in A will eventually
become unprotected and will remain so until a new treaty is signed. For example,
Indonesia was not as concerned as Colombia with first attaining the consent of its
partners when it announced it would end its bilateral treaties before adopting a new
model to replace them.22 In sum, regarding past treaties, renegotiation and unilateral
termination are two ways to no longer be bound by certain BITs. That said, I treat
unilateral termination as more indicative of ‘Change’ because the fact that a country
is not willing to wait for all its partners to accept the renegotiation is a stronger
indicator of a desire to break with the past. Moreover, while states can terminate a
large number of BITs at once, even resourceful governments do not handle more than
a couple treaty negotiations at the same time. Thus, large-scale renegotiation is more
gradual and this also indicates lesser urgency to be rid of BITs. In sum, in terms of
changes to a country’s international legal autonomy, where a policy falls along this
dimension ranges from not recovering any legal autonomy -if all existing BITs remain
20Remarks by Samuel Trujillo (Attorney, Directorate of Foreign Investment and Services, Ministry
of Trade, Colombia) at the 11tˆh Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators held
in Nairobi, Kenya, 2018. P. 21.
21Ibid.
22As Indonesia reconsiders its investment treaties, arbitrators don’t want to slow down mining
case by separating liability and damages phases. (28 April 2014). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
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in place- from restoring it completely -if all treaties are terminated. In between these
two extremes, terminating some BITs but not others or replacing them with updated
treaties (as long as they are more deferential to states’ ability to regulate) translates
into varying degrees of recovered ILA.
Combining these two dimensions it is possible to asses the true impact of policy
reactions on states’ level of involvement with the international investment regime.
Both dimension should be considered together because policies that involve compa-
rable approaches to future treaties can a↵ect a country’s legal autonomy di↵erently
depending on their approach to past treaties. Consider four distinct policies as rep-
resented in Table 1.1. If a country’s ILA could be quantified as ranging from 0 to 1,
policies A and C are identical in terms of approaches to future BITs. Both countries
decided to not sign any more treaties. Policies B and D are also identical. Both
revised their treaty models so that their next BITs would only represent a .2 com-
promise of ILA, instead of, for example .-4 as with their current models. At the same
time, A and C are markedly di↵erent regarding what they decide to do regarding their
old BITs. Policy A involves the termination of a series of BITs, which has a positive
e↵ect on the country’s ILA. In this regard, A is comparable to B. Di↵erently, policy
C leaves the existing treaties untouched and thus has no impact on the country’s
ILA. In this dimension, C is equal to D. The last row indicates the change in each
country’s overall legal autonomy vis a vis international investment treaties as a result
of their policies. It is the combined e↵ect of both future- and past-oriented decisions
what determines the magnitude of the change. Available research on state reactions
to ISDS tends to consider these behaviors in isolation focusing, for example, on the
relationship between ISDS disputes and treaty drafting, the content of renegotiated
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treaties or the number of treaties signed. I improve on this work by o↵ering an alter-
native -and more empirically valid- conceptualization that accounts for combinations
of these behaviors.
A B C D
Future-oriented actions 0 -.2 0 -.2
Past-oriented actions .4 .4 0 0
Resulting ILA change +.4 +.2 0 -.2
Table 1.1: ILA change as a result of policy reactions
1.3.3 The outcome of interest: changes in international legal
autonomy
Considering how policy reactions to ISDS vary along both of these dimensions they
can be placed along a single space representing the change in international legal
autonomy that comes as a result of implementing such policies. Figure 2.1 visualizes
this space. Since I am explaining reactions to ISDS experience, the starting point
is a situation in which states are already embedded in the system of investment
agreements. Otherwise, investors would have not had the legal means to initiate the
claims in the first place.
From this starting point, status quo policies represent a negative change in legal
autonomy. As states preserve their old BITs and continue signing treaties over the
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same pro-investor models, they keep losing autonomy to the regime (- -). Adherence
to the status quo in the face of costly ISDS disputes is rare. While most treaties do
remain in place -of the 2,611 bilateral investment treaties that have entered into force
in UNCTAD’s treaty database, only 265 have been terminated- states have changed
the content of the treaties they have signed over time, even if merely as a result of
demands from the other negotiating party or by mindless emulation as investment
treaty reform became more prominent. Figure 1.4 shows how the content of BITs
signed between 1989 and 2016 scores in terms of how much “state regulatory space”
it provides to its parties. Regulatory space is understood as the ability of a state
to freely adopt policies and regulations that might a↵ect foreign investors without
violating the treaty Broude et al. (2019).23 Higher values represent more ability to
regulate and lower values represent less policy autonomy under the treaty.24 The
shape of the marker indicates ISDS experience. Dots indicate that neither treaty
party has faced any ISDS disputes and triangles indicate that at least one of the
signatories has been sued at least once. The figure suggests an upward trend over
time towards treaties that better preserve states policy autonomy. Yet some treaties
still take values comparable to those of the most pro-investor BITs signed in the
1990s.
On the other end of the spectrum are policies of Exit. By cancelling all their BITs
and not signing new ones, states set o↵ to recover their entire legal autonomy vis a
vis investment treaties. This is the maximum possible positive change (+ +). For
23I calculated regulatory space scores for all treaties in my dataset using Broude et al. (2019)
coding guidelines. The authors have so far only examined re-negotiated treaties; thus, only scores
for that sub-set of treaties are available from their research.
24For example, all else equal, BITs that do not include ISDS score higher than those that do, and
among the latter, those that specify policies that cannot be challenged through ISDS score higher
than those that do not limit the scope of state measures that can be brought before an arbitral
tribunal (see Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of this measure).
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Figure 1.3: Change in international legal autonomy as a result of policy reactions


























Figure 1.4: Regulatory space values for treaties signed between 1989-2016 by parties
with ISDS experience. Calculations are my own using coding guidelines from Broude
et al. (2019).
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example, by 2014, Bolivia had denounced its twenty-one BITs and has not signed
any new ones since.25 Another exponent of this approach is South Africa. After
terminating a dozen investment treaties with capital exporting states, South Africa
adopted a domestic regulatory framework under which foreign investors only have
recourse to domestic mediation and courts.26 Complete exit policies are also rare.
For now, only Bolivia under Evo Morales, Ecuador under Correa, and South Africa
under Zuma fit this label. Even these states still declared at points they were not
opposed to signing new treaties in the future. However, as long as states terminate
all their BITs and do not make e↵orts to sign any new ones, I consider their policies
as exits.
In the middle point are policies of caution. States do not recover legal autonomy
-they keep their treaties in place- but they do not compromise it further either as long
as they do not sign more treaties either (- +). For example, the Kirchner administra-
tions in Argentina proceeded with caution after being hit heavily by investors for the
economic measures taken during the 2001 economic crisis. For as long as they were
in power -twelve years- Argentina did not sign any new BITs and did not terminate
any of its existing ones either.27 An o cial from the Argentine Attorney General’s
o ce illustrated the government’s reaction to ISDS with a common Argentine say-
25The timing of terminations is a complex issue because of two design elements commonly found
in BITs. First, most treaties have initial duration periods during which they cannot be terminated.
Second, they generally include sunset provisions that specify how many years the treaty continues
to have e↵ects after its termination. I focus on the implementation of a policy that will eventually
lead to a termination, even if its legal e↵ects are not immediately felt. For example, while some
agreements that Bolivia took steps to terminate are still binding, what matters is that -in the words
of the Bolivian Deputy Minister for Trade- “our understanding is now that we do not have bilateral
investment agreements” (quoted in Orellana Lopez, 2014).
26Protection of Investment Act, 2015.
27Except for the BIT with Indonesia which was terminated by mutual consent but the initiative
came from the Indonesian government’s own policy of termination en masse.
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ing: ‘if you burn yourself with hot milk, you cry at the sight of a cow.’28 Another
example of caution can be found in Norway. A public consultation on a draft model
investment treaty in 2007 and 2008 ended in the government shelving the text entirely
(Vis-Dunbar, 2009). Since then, Norway has not signed any new BITs.29
The space between these three points is occupied by what I refer to as reformist and
revisionist policies. Because reformist policies imply states continue to sign treaties
but do not seek to get rid of their existing ones, they do not recover or even preserve a
country’s legal autonomy. However, by signing on the basis of reformed treaty models,
less autonomy is compromised than if they had continued to sign BITs under their
previous templates (-). Revisionist states terminate their old treaties and replace
them with significantly more pro-state ones, leading to a recovery of legal autonomy,
albeit not to the degree of states that exit the regime (+). While a revisionist policy
leads to a positive change in legal autonomy and a reformist one represents a negative
change, di↵erent points within each space also imply varying magnitudes of negative
and positive changes.
Most policy reactions tend to fall within the revision and reform sections of the
scale. Proponents of reformist policies tend to acknowledge problematic aspects of
the investment regime but also reflect a conviction that those can be addressed with
targeted reforms and that the overall system is better than the alternatives. Reformist
polices also do not attempt to ‘shake things up’ by terminating large amounts of
treaties at once. Their energy is geared more towards the future. One example
of reformist policy can be found in Nigeria. In 2016, the government developed a
28Interview I.
29Norway has signed several free trade agreements as part of the European Free Trade Association
but these only touch on investment liberalization. Investment protection issues are left to the BITs
of individual states.
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new model BIT that has been used as a template in subsequent negotiations and
is reflected in the 2016 Nigeria - Morocco BIT. In general, the BIT’s substantive
provisions reflect consolidated treaty practice and it also provides access to ISDS
(Gazzini, 2017). However, the agreement also includes novel elements in terms of
investors obligations with respect to, for example, environmental and social impact
assessments, anti-corruption, labour standards, human rights and Corporate Social
Responsibility. But the degree to which these obligations are enforceable is unclear.30
In terms of past treaties, Nigeria has not terminated any of its existing BITs.
Another example of reform comes from Canada. Claims under NAFTA’s ISDS
mechanism have had profound e↵ects on Canadian investment treaty policy (De Mes-
tral and Vanhonnaeker, 2017; Le´vesque, 2007). Treaties have become more precise
over time. The most recent BITs rea rm the host state’s ‘right to regulate’, include
public health, environmental and other public policy exceptions and require all ISDS
proceedings and documents to be public. However, Canada remains a staunch sup-
porter of ISDS.31 At the same time, Canada has not attempted to terminate any of
its past treaties.32
Like reform advocates, states pursuing revisionist policies are not against regu-
lating FDI via international investment treaties. Rather, they have problems with
the specific form of international investment law that has developed under the cur-
30It is not clear who can bring such an action against the investors and if (besides charges of
corruption), other breaches of the obligations can be enforced in the courts of the host State (Nweke-
Eze, 2017).
31During the 2018 International Investment Agreements Conference organized by UNCTAD in
Geneva, the representative of Canada stated in his intervention that “countries that are terminating
treaties are coming forward with models that our investment community does not want. They still
need ISDS to back up commitments included in the treaty.” Field notes.
32The elimination of ISDS in USMCA (the renegotiated NAFTA) was an initiative of the Unites
States. Canada and Mexico agreed to do so because both are members of the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) which o↵ers many of the same
protections accorded to investors under NAFTA.
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rent investment regime. A revision of the regime entails revisiting its fundamental
goals. Investment treaties have traditionally been conceived as mere instruments of
investor protection. Alternative views argue economic agreements should rather be
thought of as instruments of sustainable development. This change is meaningful.
As instruments of investor protection, treaties perform a function which is to restrict
host state interference with the way markets allocate wealth. The goal of sustainable
development might at times require such intervention and BITs, in their traditional
form, hinder states’ ability to do so. Revisionist states do two things. They de-
velop alternative treaty models and they look to replace old treaties with them. For
example, after a costly arbitral dispute with a mining firm, Indonesia adopted a re-
visionist policy. The government announced in 2014 that it would discontinue all of
its existing treaties.33 Then President Yudhoyono referred to the BITs as “contracts
with foreigners of 20 or 30 years ago [that] turn out to be inappropriate and unjust”
(quoted in Price, 2017, 125). The government also announced it would adopt a new
treaty model that would be compatible with pursuing national development goals.
An article authored by the Foreign A↵airs o cial in charge of economic agreements
reported Indonesia was considering excluding the provision on indirect expropriation
and making investors’ access to ISDS subject to case-by-case consent of the host state
(Jailani, 2015).
The distinction between revision and reform is based on both policy dimensions.
Regarding the future, both reformist and revisionists are willing to keep signing BITs.
However, revisionist treaties deviate further from old, pro-investor models than re-
formist treaties. In terms of past treaties, revisionists terminate their treaties unilat-
33According to UNCTAD data, as of April 2019 twenty-six BITs are e↵ectively terminated as a
result of this policy.
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erally, without necessarily waiting for their partners to be on board. The further a
retooled treaty model deviates from the status quo, the greater the gains in terms of
ILA that come from ditching old treaties. Reformists either preserve their old BITs or
replace them gradually through renegotiations. That is, reformists do not act without
the consent of the other treaty parties. This condition makes discarding old BITs a
much lengthier process and, given that reformist models do not deviate greatly from
the status quo, the increase in ILA that might come from a renegotiation is unlikely to
compensate the loss of autonomy that comes from entering into moderately tweaked
BITs.
Within this framework, nothing precludes a country from developing a very pro-
gressive treaty model, for example one that does not provide for ISDS, while at the
same time not terminating any of its existing BITs. This is what Australia did im-
mediately after its disputes with Philip Morris. However, in practice radical new
models tend to be accompanied by large scale terminations, as in the cases of India
and Indonesia. It is logical that they would. If states have urgency in disengaging
from their old BITs to the point that they will not wait until a renegotiated treaty
is agreed to by both parties, they must consider them to be deeply flawed. Thus,
they will not be willing to enter into new treaties unless they find ways to address all
those problems. At the same time, if states think targeted reforms to their models
are enough to fix the perceived problems, then existing treaties must not be costly
enough to make getting rid of them a policy priority.
In sum, in the aftermath of ISDS disputes states can put in place di↵erent policies.
These policies vary in terms of the past-oriented actions -what are states doing with
old, costly BITs- and also in terms of the future -what types of BITs, if any, are states
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willing to sign. This way of thinking about policy reactions improves on available
work because it accounts for meaningful combinations of behaviors that so far had
been studied in isolation. This allows me to compare policies in terms of how much
they deviate from the status quo and thus how much of their lost international legal
autonomy are states attempting to recover. That is, after all, the crucial question for
the future of the international investment regime.
1.3.4 The importance of understanding the backlash
Variation in states’ policy reactions to arbitration is not only empirically puzzling; it
is politically relevant as well. In 2018 only, foreign investors initiated 71 new ISDS
disputes. As the number of claims continues to grow, governments, civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs), firms and the community of arbitration lawyers keep debating
about the future of ISDS in investment treaties. Case in point, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has recently launched multi-
lateral talks over ISDS reform.34 Whether states continue to endorse supranational
dispute settlement mechanisms is a pressing question, given the recent rise in the
number of governments elected on nationalist platforms. At the same time, a move
towards domestic jurisdictions raises another set of relevant questions in light of signs
of political interference with the judiciary, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe.
There are also normative stakes in the answers to these research questions. Policy
alternatives can be traced to divergent views of what the underlying goals and princi-
ples of the international investment regime should be. The international investment
regime of today has been built on two complementary distinctions. The first one is
34In the concluding Chapter I examine these ongoing talks in light of the dissertation’ findings.
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a distinction between the logic of markets and the logic of politics. Starting from
a fundamental “distrust of public authority” (Schneiderman, 2017, 131), decisions
about the establishment and management of foreign investments should thus be gov-
erned by the former rather than the latter. In this sense, the function of investment
treaties was “to depoliticize investment matters by placing the protection of private
investment under an apolitical legal regime” (Vandevelde, 1993, 161). The second
distinction is that between domestic politics and international expertise. Given that
domestic legal regimes could not be trusted to remain apolitical, international experts
are charged with keeping public power in check so that economic forces can operate
freely (Kennedy, 2018). Thus emerged an equivalence: to depoliticize meant to inter-
nationalize. Following this imperative, states began to provide foreign investors with
an exit from domestic legal processes by allowing them to challenge (politically moti-
vated) sovereign acts before international tribunals. Yet the system of international
investment arbitration is anything but apolitical. As put by Martti Koskenniemi,
“ISDS is not only a small (indeed very small) group of experts floating
freely in the international air as ‘neutral’ adjudicators of formally equal
claims but part of a historically specific complex of ideas about govern-
ment and democracy held by influential elites today that has enormous
consequences for the distribution of material values among and between
societies.” (2017, 347)
Thus, for many stake-holders, opposing ISDS is tied to opposing the ‘complex of
ideas about government and democracy’ that gave it rise. In recent years, the value
and the legitimacy of insulating markets from politics has been challenged. The
international investment regime -itself an e↵ort to isolate markets from local political
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contestation over the distributional consequences of those markets- has experienced
these challenges in full force. Once created to alleviate foreign investors’ distrust of
governments, ISDS has fueled public distrust in a regime that allows the conditions of
local lives to be decided by removed experts in faraway rooms and in foreign languages.
Furthermore, especially for developing states, the once-held view that participating
in the investment regime would allow them to attract FDI is now only referenced in
international conferences as a reminder of an unfulfilled promise. Given the political
stakes behind pursuing di↵erent policies, understanding the possibilities and limits of
these alternative governance projects is crucial.
1.4 The argument in brief
In a recent article in the American Journal of International Law, Sergio Puig and
Gregory Sha↵er survey the landscape of reform proposals for investment arbitration
and conclude by warning against one-size-fits-all solutions. They argue that “policy-
makers and scholars should recognize that countries face a range of contexts -in terms
of capital endowment, market size, ideology, institutional development, and historical
legacy- and that these contexts will a↵ect their institutional choice” (2018, 362).
This assessment fits hand-in-glove with my argument. In explaining responses to
investment arbitration, I focus on how the interaction of such factors makes some
policy choices more likely than others.
My theoretical starting point for explaining why countries pursue alternative poli-
cies in the aftermath of negative ISDS experiences are the ideas -worldviews as well
as principled and causal beliefs- held by government actors. I treat ideas as a lens
through which political actors filter their experiences with investment arbitration,
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diagnose what went wrong and develop plans for avoiding similar setbacks in the
future. For example, the set of beliefs that political actors -individual or collective-
hold makes them more inclined to perceive a contrary arbitral ruling as one of three
things. One possible diagnosis is that the respondent state lost because it put up a
bad legal defense in court. Another diagnosis is that the applicable law -in this case
a BIT- favored the investor by, for example, allowing the claimant to import a more
favorable provisions from another BIT through the most favored nation clause. Yet
another possible diagnosis is that the state never had a chance of winning. The sys-
tem is biased in favor of investors because they are the ones who create a demand for
the well-paid services that arbitrators provide. In turn, these diagnoses can lead to
very di↵erent policy prescriptions. The first would lead states to hire better lawyers
or to develop legal expertise in house. The second one would make policy-makers
more attentive to what they write in their treaties and they might, in this example,
stop including a particularly problematic provision in their future BITs. The last
diagnosis, much di↵erently, would lead states to abandon ISDS.
Various ideational frameworks can inform the way in which state actors perceive
their arbitral experiences. Nationalism values autonomy from supranational institu-
tions and this desire can be exacerbated after an international arbitral tribunal rules
national policies to be unlawful. For di↵erent reasons, left-wing policy-makers might
also come to view ISDS in a negative light. Leftist ideologies are suspicious of a sys-
tem that allows corporations to challenge regulations that protect the public interest
when these hurt their profits. That is, strong nationalist and/or leftist inclinations
can lead policy-makers to conclude that the only viable solution to the problems of
the investment regime is to exit from it or to fundamentally change it. Alternatively,
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governments with pro-market and/or internationalist convictions might be less san-
guinary in their assessment and would prefer to preserve the current system and,
instead, introduce targeted reforms.
That said, government actors -whatever their initial inclinations might be- make
decisions in a particular political domestic and international context that imposes
constraints and provides opportunities. Governments face two interested domestic
constituencies: the private sector and the civil society sector. Most scholarly atten-
tion has been placed on the political behavior of firms when it comes to explaining
policies in the realm of foreign investment. While they are crucial for understand-
ing investment treaty policies, they are not the only non-state actor that matters.
Investment treaties and ISDS disputes also a↵ect a broad and diverse ensemble of
local civil society groups like environmental, public health and consumer protection
organizations. For civil society actors, restricting states’ regulatory sovereignty for
the sake of investment protection is seen as a blatant example of ‘corporate rule.’
The terminology that civil society uses to describe investment provisions in inter-
national agreements often emphasizes this aspect, using terms like ‘corporate power
grab,’ ‘corporate attacks’ or ‘corporate hijacking.’ I analyze the role of civil soci-
ety actors through the theoretical lenses of the contentious politics framework (Tilly
and Tarrow, 2015). That is, I focus on how civil society has di↵erent e↵ects when
it is organized as a social movement rather than as an interest group -a distinction
that a↵ects the availability of resources- and when their access to the policy-making
process varies.
On the external front, I theorize the impact of two sets of variables. The first
one induces policy continuity and discourages radical policy changes. It includes the
1.4. The argument in brief 40
pressures of foreign investors and their home governments. Foreign investors are inter-
ested in preserving strong international legal protections. This includes direct access
to ISDS which provides them with a means to demand compensation for government
policies that they deem unlawful. Furthermore, the home governments of those in-
vestors will favor their interests in their foreign economic policy. By manipulating
material benefits -in the form of further FDI and market access for exports- foreign
firms and their home governments can coerce revisionist governments into adopting
more moderate policies instead.
The second set of factors works in the opposite way; they can encourage the
adoption of revisionist policies and discourage limited reforms that do not tackle
the fundamental problems of the investment regime. These are the political support
of like-minded governments and the technical support of international civil society
organizations. Because discontent with the investment regime has emerged in multiple
parts of the world, opportunities for policy coordination have increased. In several
international fora, policy-makers meet with peers from other countries, learn about
how they think about their common problems and assess the extent to which interests
overlap. International civil society organizations are also regular attendees at these
fora where they can engage with policy-makers and o↵er their technical expertise with
the goal facilitating the adoption of radical policies.
The relative availability and intensity of these factors will determine if, for ex-
ample, an originally revisionist government will follow through with its policies or
not. Even the most radical revisionist projects can result in limited reformist policies
if constraints are too powerful. Alternatively, revisionist policies, originally aimed
at promoting alternative institutional projects, might lead to a country disengaging
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from the regime if no other countries are willing to accept its alternative model.
1.5 Layout of the dissertation
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts by reviewing the existing
literature for answers to the puzzle of policy variation in policy responses to ISDS
exposure. The first alternative explanation is based on the influence of international
arbitral tribunals (Alter, 2014). Policy variation is seen as a ‘noise’ during a period
of adjustment to what tribunals say international investment law is, and thus, what
should states’ treaty policies look like in order to comply with that assessment. The
second explanation focuses on firms’ preferences and derives from recent work on in-
vestment protection in New-New Trade Theory (Kim et al., 2019). Since di↵erent
types of firms (i.e. multinational, exporting, domestic) have di↵erent priorities re-
garding foreign investment, resulting policies will depend on the relative influence of
types of firms. The flip-side of a firm-centered argument is a state-centric one. Thus,
I also consider state autonomy explanations (Evans, 1995). Here, policy choices are a
function of the degree to which governments formulate and successfully pursue poli-
cies that are not simply reflective of the demands of societal actors but of the goals
policy-makers set for the state. The last explanation is based on power. The attention
is set on what policies the most powerful states prefer and on the capacity of states
with alternative preferences to sustain the costs of deviating from that path (Gruber,
2000).
In addition to these alternative arguments, the main theoretical foils for this dis-
sertation are two variations of a rational learning argument. I derive these alternative
arguments from the two most prominent accounts of how the investment regime came
1.5. Layout of the dissertation 42
about: the rational competition + rational design approach (Elkins et al., 2006; Kore-
menos et al., 2001) and Lauge Poulsen’s highly influential bounded rational argument
(2015). The rational learning account assumes that states make policy choices based
on the available information at any given point in time while the bounded rational
version also assumes there are cognitive limitations to the ability of policy-makers
to process that information. Once the arbitral claims hit, learning arguments argue,
states find out that investment treaties and ISDS have unforeseen costs. In the pure
rational learning argument, unanticipated costs result from a previous lack of infor-
mation about the future. In the bounded rational argument, the problem is not the
lack of information but the cognitive biases of policy-makers, even when faced with
new information. For this reason, bounded rational actors only learn when the costs
of keeping policies in place become su ciently vivid. Di↵erences aside, both learning
arguments assume states learn from (vivid) experience. Policy-makers now posses
more information than in the past; they have learned a lesson and are expected to
do things di↵erently. Because the only theorized variation in available learning ar-
guments is longitudinal -pre- and post-ISDS experience- these explanations provide
the null hypothesis for my argument, namely that after the claims hit, there are no
di↵erences between states in terms of policy reactions.
The rest of Chapter 2 introduces the concept of international legal autonomy and
develops the theoretical argument. International legal autonomy reflects the degree
to which international investment law restricts a state’s freedom to regulate foreign
investment. Each of the policy types described above impacts a country’s autonomy
vis a vis investment treaties di↵erently. Thus, the outcome of interest for the rest
of the dissertation is the change in international legal autonomy that results from
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the policies that governments put in place in reaction to ISDS experience. That is,
I explain under what conditions states attempt to recover more or less of the legal
autonomy they once lost to the international investment regime. Lastly, I explain
the choice of a mixed methods research design that combines quantitative statistical
analysis and qualitative case studies.
Chapter 3 provides quantitative evidence of the empirical trends introduced in
this Chapter and explores some of the theoretical expectations emerging from Chap-
ter 2. I present an original measure of international legal autonomy (ILA) at the
country level and show that yearly di↵erences in a country’s ILA score are positively
related to ISDS experience. That is, after the claims hit, states are less willing to
sacrifice the same amounts of legal autonomy and might even start to recover some
of it. Yet this transformation is highly contested due to the existence of interests
in favor and against the continuation of previous policies. As a result, the forms in
which this reclaiming of legal autonomy has taken place vary and they leave states in
di↵erent positions vis a vis the regime. The rest of Chapter 3 analyzes three original
datasets of treaty adoption, treaty content and treaty termination. Against the null
hypothesis of common reactions to common stimulus, I find that the e↵ect of ISDS
experience on these behaviors -choices about treaty content, treaty signature, and
treaty termination- are conditional on levels of economic development.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are case studies of investment treaty policies in three countries:
the United States, Ecuador and India. Through within- and cross-case comparisons,
the cases show how alternative combinations of the explanatory variables -namely
policy-makers’ ideas, non-state actors’ mobilization and diplomatic pressures- make
a given policy reaction to ISDS more likely. I provide more details on case selection
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at the end of Chapter 2 and at the beginning of each case-study chapter. Lastly,
the concluding Chapter outlines theoretical, policy and normative implications of the
dissertation’s main findings.
Chapter 2
Literature review and theoretical
framework
As discussed in Chapter 1, the international investment regime is undergoing substan-
tial changes. Although lawyers in the arbitration community downplay the existence
of a backlash against the regime’s institutions (Sweet et al., 2017; Brower and Blan-
chard, 2013), experts and scholars talk plenty of a ‘paradigm shift’ in international
investment law (Hindelang and Krajewski, 2016; Aisbett et al., 2018; Morosini and
Badin, 2017; De Mestral, 2017). Furthermore, a recent wave of research suggests ISDS
experience causes governments to modify aspects of their investment treaty policies.
Poulsen and Aisbett (2013) argue that after arbitral claims, developing states sign
fewer treaties. Manger and Peinhardt (2017) find that states include more elabo-
rate and less ambiguous language in their treaties after getting involved with arbitral
tribunals; a step aimed at reducing arbitrator’s space for expansive interpretations
of the law. Similarly, Broude et al. (2019) argue that states with a great deal of
ISDS experience are more likely to replace old treaties with agreements that better
safeguard their regulatory autonomy. This research has made substantial empirical
contributions. As part of a move towards ‘text as data’, automated text analysis
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tools facilitated the study of di↵erences between treaties (Alschner, 2017; Alschner
and Skougarevskiy, 2016a; Manger and Peinhardt, 2017; Blake, 2013). More recently,
thanks to UNCTAD’s newly available database of hand-coded treaties, Broude et al.
(2019) were able to leverage variation in terms of specific treaty provisions to capture
dimensions that are more theoretically meaningful than just text similarity.
However, theoretical tools to understand these changes are relatively underdevel-
oped. The uncovered correlations between ISDS experience and various state actions
simply suggest that states alter their behavior after their investment treaties impose
high costs in them. Yet, as shown in the previous Chapter, governments are pursuing
a variety of policies in reaction to arbitration disputes that leave them in di↵erent
positions vis a vis the system of investment treaties. This suggest that experiencing
high costs from enforcement is not enough explanation for this variation. Further-
more, current debates around the investment regime do not simply revolve around
technical disagreements; about which of several routes is the most e cient way to
get to the same place. These reflect fundamental disagreements about the limits of
state authority in a globalized economy. By recognizing dissent and the existence of
alternative institutional projects, I bring the politics back into the investment regime.
This Chapter o↵ers a theory to explain why states pursue di↵erent policies in
the aftermath of ISDS. As a starting point, I argue that negative experiences with
investment arbitration are filtered through ideational lenses. Ideas give meaning to
an observable situation, provide a standpoint from which to critique it and allow
actors to develop blueprints for a desired future (Sikkink, 1991). Yet states face con-
straints and opportunities when acting on these emerging preferences. Thus, I also
argue that policy outcomes depend on the combination of a domestic and external
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variables. When constraints prevail, resulting policies will be more moderate than
originally intended. At the same time, when policy-makers are presented with oppor-
tunities to draw support from other actors, they will be better able to stick to their
original policy preferences. The two pillars of the argument -the ideational sources
of policy preferences and the assemblage of constraints and opportunities a↵ecting
their implementation- are not completely independent from each other. After all, the
willingness of states to make concessions and accept punishments is itself a function
of their commitment to the ideas informing policy preferences. The Chapter proceeds
as follows. Section 2.1 presents existing explanations for variation in treaty policies
after ISDS disputes. After discussing existing arguments’ weaknesses and omissions,
I present the theoretical argument in Section 2.2. Lastly, Section 2.3 explains the
research design employed in the dissertation.
2.1 Existing explanations
When trying to explain why states react di↵erently to their experiences with in-
vestment disputes, is it necessary to open up the policy-making process or are final
policies epiphenomenal to predetermined state interests? Moreover, are state prefer-
ences autonomous or are policy outcomes completely determined by the actions and
interests of other actors? I reflect on these questions from the standpoint of diverse
explanations o↵ered by theories of international relations and comparative politics.
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2.1.1 International tribunals
Given that much of the backlash against investment treaties is directed towards the
arbitration tribunals tasked with their enforcement, one must consider how a theoret-
ical approach centered on the e↵ects of international tribunals would explain variation
in investment treaty policies as a reaction to ISDS experience. These theories explain
changes in domestic policies by reference to the legal oversight of international courts
(Alter, 2014). Changing treaty policies are seen as the result of decisions and man-
dates from international institutions that have been given the authority to enforce
and, in doing so, further develop international law. This explanation starts from
a contract theory idea that international legal agreements are incomplete contracts.
Parties cannot write down rules for every single situation that might emerge under
the treaty (Van Aaken, 2009). Tribunals’ enforcement of the treaties reduces legal
uncertainty over time as they interpret and clarify treaty law. In turn, states as
treaty-makers incorporate jurisprudence in their subsequent treaty drafting choices.
In this sense, changes in international treaties are understood as manifestations of a
linear progress through which the legalization of world politics evolves, towards more
precise rules that are better suited to promote international cooperation. Observed
variation in treaty policies, these arguments would thus suggest, is typical of a tran-
sition time. Some states have been more exposed than others to international courts
and tribunals. Alternatively, some states have more technical resources to follow the
latest judicial developments. Nonetheless, international investment law, these argu-
ments would expect, will eventually become more cohesive around the findings of the
tribunals tasked with enforcing their rules.
2.1. Existing explanations 49
Sweet et al. (2017), a collaboration between international legal scholars and prac-
ticing lawyers, have made this argument in relation to international investment law.
They argue that observable changes in the content of investment treaties towards
more state autonomy are not a reaction against bad arbitral decisions but a rea r-
mation of the good ones. To prove this argument, the authors dive into the reasoning
of arbitrators in a way that political science researchers hardly ever do. They ana-
lyze arbitral decisions in which arbitrators explicitly grappled with how to balance
investors legitimate expectations and states’ regulatory interests and they find that
awards generally make explicit reference to the arbitrator’s bona fide e↵orts to con-
sider host state’s right to regulate. Thus, they would argue, the variety of steps
that states have taken in the aftermath of arbitrations should be understood as a
consolidation of ISDS case law. For example, changes to the content of treaties that
emphasize state autonomy -i.e. by introducing exceptions and increasing precision-
are simply picking up the reasoning of a few influential tribunals. In the same vein,
states that terminate or renegotiate treaties would be bringing their outdated com-
mitments in line with what arbitrators have determined international investment law
is.
However, this seamless progression towards a ‘better’ international investment law
is a mischaracterization of international investment politics and does not fare well
against the backdrop of highly critical discourse towards ISDS in politics, academia
and the press (Sornarajah, 2015). This is simply not the language that state actors
use when justifying changes to their treaty practice. Furthermore, if as Stone Sweet et
al. suggest, arbitrators are already interpreting BITs in an unbiased way and mindful
of states’ right to regulate in the public interest, states would not have incentives to
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update their treaties after all. And more importantly, why would states be adopting
changes that are geared towards reducing, or even eliminating, investors’ access to
arbitration? The authors seem to miss an essential point at the heart of the criticism
levied against the regime. States are not hurt as much by arbitrators’ final decisions
but by the onset of disputes, especially frivolous ones (Pelc, 2017). It has been argued
that at the jurisdictional stage, that is when arbitrators consider whether the tribunal
has authority to hear the case in the first place, tribunals tend to interpret definitions
of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ extensively (Van Harten, 2012). Furthermore, legal
expenses are high, even higher than in trade disputes. And there is evidence that
disputes hurt FDI inflows, even when the host state is successful (Allee and Peinhardt,
2011). For these reasons, states have incentives to avoid getting bogged down in
protracted litigation even when they have good chances of coming out victorious.
A prolific strand of international investment law research attempts to determine
whether arbitrators are in fact biased and if so, in which direction (Behn et al., 2017;
Donaubauer et al., 2017; Sweet et al., 2017; Van Harten, 2012; Waibel, 2010). This
type of survey of arbitral behavior is an important exercise. However, if the goal is to
determine whether the regime is experiencing some form of backlash and states are
dissatisfied with ISDS; what matters is not that arbitrators are ‘truly’ biased but that
they are perceived to be so by critical actors. Take the example of the tobacco carve-
outs in the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).1 This provision
prevents investors from using ISDS to counter anti-tobacco regulations, as Philip
Morris did against Australia and Uruguay.2 The tobacco giant lost both cases but the
1Now in force as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP).
2Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2012-12; Philip Morris Brands Sarl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7.
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claims resonated loudly and generated strong reactions. The TPP exception cannot be
understood without this litigation precedent. The Australian government specifically
sought this carve-out; as Trade Minister Andrew Robb declared, “Australia will only
sign up to a TPP deal that includes appropriate safeguard[s] for public health.”3 Even
though general trends in arbitration uncovered by Stone Sweet et al. would suggest
that tribunals were already recognizing states’ right to regulate for the protection
of public health, Australia’s own experience with arbitration generated a need for
reassurances. What mattered was the perception that, independently of the final
decision, the regime failed to protect an important goal for the state by allowing this
dispute to exist in the first place.
Moreover, an account in which it is tribunals who, by engaging in judicial law-
making, carry international law forward by providing their own interpretations and
elaborations leaves states as passive takers of these innovations. While this phe-
nomenon captures much of the way in which international law evolves in di↵erent
issue areas, it is not an appropriate portrayal of the processes underlying recent
changes in the international investment regime. A judicial law-making model better
suits legal development in areas with large, multilateral conventions and permanent
courts tasked with the enforcement of those treaties, like it is the case of human rights
law, international criminal law or the law of the sea (Danner, 2006; Føllesdal et al.,
2013; Schabas, 2008; Teitel, 2015). In these contexts, states have little capacity to
react to judicial law-making by changing the sources of law that tribunals interpret
and elaborate on because it is extremely rare that states terminate or renegotiate mul-
tilateral conventions (Pauwelyn et al., 2014). This puts international judiciaries in a
3Letter from Australian Trade Minister Andrew Robb to Australian newspaper The Age pub-
lished on December 16, 2013. Cited in Chapman and Freeman (2013).
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privileged position to influence the evolution of the law in their issue area. However,
the investment regime of today did not come about as the result of one large instance
of legalization and subsequent moments of judicial law-making. Instead, it resulted
from thousands of moments of mostly bilateral and plurilateral treaty-making over
time. Thus, states can better control the tempo of legalization, as they evaluate
their and others’ experiences with past commitments and, if so desired, revise their
preferences accordingly.
2.1.2 The interests of firms
This explanation attributes the adoption of di↵erent investment treaty policies to the
pressures of powerful economic actors. Recent work from New-New Trade Theory
(Melitz, 2003) -premised under the notion that firms, rather than economic sectors or
industries, are the relevant unit of analysis- argues that di↵erent types of firms have
di↵erent policy priorities regarding investor protection (Kim et al., 2019). Multina-
tional firms and firms embedded in global value chains care about foreign investment
protection, and thus value BITs, while purely exporting or local firms have other
concerns. Variation in treaty policies would thus be understood as a product of the
di↵erential influence of types of firms. Recent research finds that all firms lobby
but also indicates that the biggest firms -multinational ones- are the most politically
active (Kim, 2017; Kim et al., 2019; Blanchard and Matschke, 2015). Thus, if multi-
national firms outspend others in their lobbying e↵orts, then states reactions to ISDS
should not seek to scale down the rights o↵ered to investors in investment treaties.
And if they do, the mobilization of multinational firms should work as a corrective.
There is much that is convincing about this argument. In fact, an important part
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of my argument recognizes the role of multinational firms -either as domestic firms
in developed states or foreign investors in developing ones- in limiting revisionist and
exist policies when these emerge within dissatisfied states. But the interests of firms
do not predetermine policy choices. Rather, they might help contour the space of
possible choices. Firm’s power to threaten or o↵er side-payments enters the equation
in relation to the policy options already on the table, which themselves might emerge
from a variety of considerations or from the influence of alternative actors, like state
o cials committed to revisionist agendas or civil society groups.
A recent example of the limits of multinational firms’ influence is the fate of ISDS
in the recently renegotiated NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA) signed in November of last year. The US government entered negotiations
with the goal of dropping ISDS in the new treaty. Opposition from international
firms emerged immediately. “We urge you to retain strong investment protections
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in NAFTA” claimed four of the largest
business groups in the US in a letter to President Trump.4 Firms even recruited over
a hundred lawmakers to make the case that ISDS should not be dropped and, if
anything, should be strengthened in a new NAFTA.5 Yet despite the mobilization of
American multinational enterprises and their allied lawmakers, USMCA eliminates
ISDS between the US and Canada and seriously restricts US investors’ access to
arbitration against Mexico.6 Given that the US original proposal was to eliminate
4“Associations Letter to POTUS on NAFTA and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).”
Letter from the American Petroleum Institute, the Business Roundtable, the National Association
of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2 May 2018. On file.
5“Congress expects that both the substantive protections and the enforcement mechanisms for
investment commitments will be more or equally robust in an updated NAFTA relative to the
existing agreement,” the legislators wrote in a letter to the USTR. GOP to USTR: Maintain Key
NAFTA Provision. (21 March 2018). United States Senate. Committee on Finance. Available at:
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/gop-to-ustr-maintain-key-nafta-provision
6US investors in Canada will no longer be able to sue the Canadian government before interna-
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investment arbitration altogether, that a form of ISDS remains in place for some
disputes between American investors and the Mexican government was a concession
to multinational firms. However, the resulting arrangement is still far from what firms
originally wanted.
I do not seek to discount the power of economic actors, especially multinational
firms. In fact, there would be no international investment regime if there were no
foreign businesses to protect. More than anything, I want to highlight an aspect
that is less frequently acknowledged when examining the political power of economic
actors. On the other side of powerful firms who successfully lobby for a particular
policy is a state actor that decides not to bear the costs of pursuing an alternative
course of action. That calculation, however, does not need to always go in that
direction.
2.1.3 State autonomy
The flip-side of the previous argument comes from theories of state autonomy. While
there are variations of state autonomy arguments in the literature on economic de-
velopment (Evans, 1995), what they have in common is that the state is at the center
of the analysis. Rather that focusing on a variety of socioeconomic actors and then
asking what is their relative power to dictate policy; the main explanatory variable
is the degree to which the state can formulate and successfully pursue policies that
tional tribunals. For American investors in Mexico, a special annex applies that allows investment
arbitration to continue but subject to significant limitations. For example, established investors
can only bring claims of expropriation and non-discrimination; other USMCA’s provisions are not
enforceable via ISDS. Also, claimants need to first try to resolve issues in domestic courts and can
only afterward bring disputes to the international level. The oil, gas and some public service sectors
are not subject to the exhaustion of local remedies requirement and can bring a wider number of
claims but, in comparison to NAFTA, their access to arbitration is much more restricted.
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are not simply reflective of the demands of societal actors. Thus, states with low au-
tonomy could be captured by foreign capital and thus remain tied to bad investment
treaties even when they have proved costly. But they could also be captured by other
groups like local firms, unions or civil society organizations that might demand the
opposite policies. Di↵erently, states with high autonomy would be seen as capable
of adopting the necessary policies to promote their goals even if they hurt important
constituencies. Thus, in a sense, the less autonomous the state, the more capable are
groups to make the state deviate from the ‘right’ policy path.
State autonomy arguments have limited value for explaining variation in policy
reactions to ISDS. They highlight reasons why, for example, certain states are more
susceptible to the pressures of foreign investors than others but they do not help in
understanding the type of policies that are eventually adopted. In cases of low auton-
omy, much depends on the social and political context. An equally non-autonomous
state would pursue di↵erent policies before di↵erent sets of societal interests. For ex-
ample, as I argue later, civil society sectors vary across levels of economic development
in ways that matter for their influence on treaty policy.
Similarly, in cases of high autonomy, how do policy-makers decide what are the
‘right’ policies to pursue after negative experiences with ISDS? Are policies pre-
ferred by autonomous state o cials necessarily di↵erent than those preferred by some
groups? The state autonomy literature has sought to explain why some states were
able to pursue developmental policies successfully while other were not. Within this
area, the ‘right’ policies are those that would have advanced the economic develop-
ment of the country as a whole. However, applied to other policy areas, these ar-
guments require additional explanations for policy-makers’ autonomous preferences.
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Otherwise, it is impossible to establish a baseline for the policy that the perfectly au-
tonomous state would pursue and against which any deviations should be measured.
State autonomy arguments tell us more about where the ultimate power to dictate
policy resides than about what kinds of policies will those with power pursue.
2.1.4 Power and hegemonic ideas
A power-based explanation for policy reactions to ISDS would focus on which policies
do the most powerful states prefer and would then expect everybody else to follow
suit or otherwise be punished. These arguments, however, have limited value for
understanding why the interests of powerful countries, and their attitudes toward
ISDS, have shifted. They could result from their own processes of reckoning with
the costs of ISDS disputes as receivers of foreign investment. Or they could be a
defensive move against growing dissatisfaction from states lower on the economic
structure. Since multinational firms headquartered in the Global North are frequent
users of this system, wealthy countries could be trying to ‘save’ the regime for its
firms through limited reforms.7 Whatever reasons economic powers might have for
adopting new treaty policies, arguments centered on power would say, these become
the new reference point for less a✏uent countries. Simply put, developed countries
are rule-makers and developing states are rule-takers in international investment law
(Alschner and Skougarevskiy, 2016b).
The observable implications of power-based arguments depend on how power is
conceptualized (Barnett and Duvall, 2004). To narrow down the universe of alter-
native explanations I consider those based on material, economic power and on the
7In fact, as of today, the top five most frequent homes countries in ISDS disputes are the US,
The Netherlands, the UK, Germany and Canada. UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub.
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power of hegemonic ideas. Material power arguments would thus focus on the degree
to which powerful countries can use coercion to make sure others do not deviate from
the acceptable path of reform. A hard form of coercion uses conditionality to bring
recalcitrant states to the fold. They withhold material incentives until states drop
policies that are deemed unacceptable. There is also a softer form of coercion based on
hegemonic ideas. According to Dobbin et al. (2007), “dominant ideas become ratio-
nalized, often with elegant theoretical justifications, and influence how policy-makers
conceptualize their problems and order potential solutions” (p.456). Soft coercion
might not even require a coercive intent on behalf of economic powers. What matters
in these arguments is the degree to which larger countries have “go-it-alone-power”
(Gruber, 2000), meaning their policy choices alter the status quo for others, giving
the latter little choice but to follow suit. Thus, variation in policy reactions, according
to a power-centered argument, results from emerging powers who prefer alternative
policies and can resist the disciplining e↵ects of coercion in its varied forms.
Power-based approaches provide many insights that I find useful. In fact, coercion
by foreign investors and their home governments is an important explanatory factor
in my argument. So is the varying strength of developing countries to resist coer-
cive attempts and their relative gravitational pull when promoting alternative treaty
policies. Yet, there is one gray area in power-based explanations that becomes sig-
nificant when applied to international law. Weaker states are expected to not pursue
alternative policies or to be severely punished for doing so. Those two outcomes are
considered equivalent. But in international investment law, alternative policies imply
terminating treaties or adopting fundamentally di↵erent ones. These are decisions
with long lasting consequences and cannot be easily corrected after the costs of devi-
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ating are felt. Thus, it is necessary to understand the motivations and strategies of
weaker states for overcoming coercive pressures and the conditions under which they
are successful.
2.1.5 Rational and bounded rational learning
The last set of existing explanations includes a variety of learning arguments. In the
simplest terms, learning occurs when governments change preferences after exposure
to new evidence and update their policies as a result (Levy, 1994). Although there
are many approaches to learning in public policy (Dobbin et al., 2007), here I consider
learning arguments that assume some form of rationality on behalf of decision-makers.
I do so in order to engage with two of the most prominent accounts of how the inter-
national investment regime came about: the rational competition + rational design
argument (Elkins et al., 2006; Koremenos et al., 2001) and the bounded rational ar-
gument (Poulsen, 2015). My interest, however, is not on understanding why states
sign BITs but how states process the consequences of having done so and what e↵ects
does this have on their subsequent policy choices. Thus, I engage with learning argu-
ments rooted in both the rational and bounded rational approaches. While increased
available information and overcoming cognitive constraints as a consequence of ISDS
shocks might be enough to predict that treaty policies will change, these variables
alone cannot predict how much they will deviate from the status quo.
Rational learning
The rational explanation that I engage with comes from combining two prominent
arguments: states are rational competitors and designers. Rational competition ex-
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plains why states signed BITs in the first place. Rational states carefully consider the
strategies of countries that they compete for capital with. If by signing BITs -which
make economies more secure and hence more attractive- states are better able to com-
pete for FDI, they start signing treaties when their competitors are doing so as well
(Elkins et al., 2006). Because in this competitive environment the function of treaties
is to make capital more secure, states as rational designers draft them in the most
appropriate way to perform that function. According to the theory of rational design
(Koremenos, 2016; Koremenos et al., 2001), states make decisions about institutional
design based on two related factors. One is the particular problem standing in the
way of cooperation, which actors are attempting to solve by setting up the institution.
The other one is the environment in which designing takes place, specifically the level
of available information.
In the ‘armchair’ rational design model, the design of international institutions
reflects what rational states decide, based on the available information, is the most
e cient way to solve the cooperation problem. In foreign investment, the problem
underlying relations between governments and owners of foreign capital is a commit-
ment one.8 That is, investment treaties fulfill the function of credible commitments
and states tailor the design of these treaties to perform said function. For example,
design choices like including arbitration as the enforcement mechanism and giving
investors, rather than their home states, the ability to initiate arbitral claims are
taken as evidence that BITs are rationally designed.
A rational learning account would explain policy reactions to ISDS experience as
the outcome of Bayesian updating processes. As rational agents, states exposed to
8Because it is hard to guarantee investors their property would be safe from government taking
relying only on contracts enforceable in domestic law, states boost those safeguards by adopting
international treaties that regulate all investments to and from their signatories.
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new information update their prior belief to a posterior belief. Policy-makers will
not necessarily converge on the truth but will converge on the beliefs most consistent
with the newly acquired evidence. For illustrative purposes, the argument would go
as follows. In the past, states built a dense network of BITs under the prior belief
that, by solving the commitment problem, they would attract FDI. Then, investors
launched ISDS disputes under those treaties when they perceived states treated them
unfairly. Through this process, states acquired new information about the overall
value of those BITs, benefits and costs. For example, they learned that investors can
bypass national courts if they have direct access to arbitration and this generates too
many claims which, they also learned, are extremely expensive to litigate and can
drag on for years. Or, they learned that vaguely worded clauses can be interpreted
expansively to include protections states did not mean to provide. Their posterior
belief is that poorly designed treaties come with high costs in the form of ISDS claims.
As rational designers, this updated belief drives states to make di↵erent decisions
about the design of the new treaties they sign onto.
Notwithstanding the significant contributions of rational approaches to the study
of international investment law, these have a harder time trying to explain variation
in policy reactions to ISDS experience. Most importantly, this framework cannot
account for why the same newly acquired information about the problems of older
treaties leads to di↵erent types of responses. That is, what will these inputs of
information lead states to do? Get rid of their old, and now palpably costly, treaties?
Should they draft treaties di↵erently from then on? Or should they avoid signing
them completely? If one wanted to open-up the decision-making process behind
policy updates -that is, the process through which newly available information leads
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to discovering new solutions to commitment problems- a pure rationalist approach
provides few clues as to which actors within the state to emphasize and what factors
into their assessments of each alternative’s costs and benefits.
Bounded rational learning
Bounded rationality does not dispute that states compete for capital or that they
draft their treaties with a goal in mind. The di↵erence with the full rational ap-
proach is that it accounts for the cognitive constraints of the policy-makers in charge
of those tasks. In his widely acclaimed book, Poulsen (2015) explained BIT adop-
tion by developing states as a bounded rational process. Unlike the full rationality
approach, Lauge Poulsen sees decision-makers as constrained not just by the informa-
tional environment but also “by limitations to their own problem-solving capabilities”
(p. 26). For example, when considering signing a BIT, bounded rational competi-
tors do not seek out evidence on whether treaties actually work in attracting FDI.
They rather rely on particularly salient information, for example, cues provided by
developed country governments, lawyers or international organizations. Similarly,
bounded rational designers do not continuously seek to improve the content of their
treaties; they rather anchor excessively on previous BIT templates. These cognitive
constraints led developing states to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the
costs of signing BITs. Even if policy-makers believed that they were acting ratio-
nally in the pursuit of their preferences, Poulsen argues, they engaged in irrational
behaviour when they tied themselves to ‘bad’ treaties.
A learning account born from the bounded rational approach would thus focus
on cognitive limitations. The most important one is salience bias. This means that
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state o cials do not update their behavior until the costs of the status quo become
su ciently “vivid.” That is, until they found themselves on the receiving end of ISDS
claims. States are narcissistic learners. Even then, the extent of that revision depends
on the salience of the disputes for the individual state. Assuming that policy-makers
also have a strong preference for the status quo, arbitral claims with low salience
might lead to small changes. States might simply become less willing to enter into
BITs or they might make minor revisions to their treaty models. Only after claims
have “high perceived impact” could bounded rational actors come to perceive BITs as
dysfunctional and consider significant changes, including exiting the regime altogether
(p. 42). Thus, unlike the full rational learning account, bounded rational learning
does provide an explanation for variation in policy reactions that is based on the
salience of the ISDS experience.
Yet perceiving their own ISDS disputes as very costly is not enough to explain
di↵erent policy choices. For example, it would be hard to argue that Argentina,
Colombia and Ecuador did not perceive their brushes with ISDS as costly. Yet they
reacted to them in very di↵erent ways. For a long time Argentina refrained from sign-
ing new BITs; Colombia drafted a new model BIT in alignment with the preferences
of developed states and went on a treaty making spree; and Ecuador terminated all
of its exiting BITs. As this suggests, there is more going into the way in which states
process their ISDS experience than cognitive biases and Poulsen provides little insight
to what makes an ISDS dispute have low or high perceived impact.
By focusing on how decision-makers react di↵erently to new ISDS experiences,
a bounded rational argument o↵ers a more complex account than the pure rational
learning approach. However, since Poulsen simply assumes cognitive limitations to
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be a state-level attribute -developing states su↵er from them, developed states do
not- this argument is ultimately subject to the same limitations as the pure rational
version. Absent a richer understanding of how policy-makers within the same state
develop di↵erent policy preferences and how those di↵erences are resolved, the theory
cannot fully explain why states chose certain treaty policies over others. In my own
argument I consider how policy-makers’ ideas can incline them to think of ISDS
claims di↵erently -either as the costs of doing business or as an a↵ront to national
sovereignty- and how societal actors can promote alternative readings of the disputes.
While firms stress how essential ISDS is for making capital feel secure and lawyers
claim that direct access to international tribunals is a basic component of the global
rule of law; civil society sees it as indicative of the extent to which state authority
has been compromised in favor of corporations.
Furthermore, Poulsen is unclear on whether states become fully rational when the
costs become su ciently salient or whether they are doomed to permanently jump
between under- and over-reaction. On the one hand, he claims that limitations to
policy-makers’ rationality depend on their levels of expertise and experience and that
developing country o cials were particularly susceptible to these biases (p. 44). This
suggests that policy-makers could get rid of their cognitive limitations as they become
more experienced and knowledgeable. Yet it is unclear how state o cials are able to
accumulate valuable experience or decide to develop expertise if they are constantly
misreading their situation. The bottom line seems to be that either account, rational
or bounded rational, assumes there is one rational equilibrium policy from which
irrational deviations are established. The di↵erence between these accounts is how
easily states can know what that is.
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In sum, a learning account -either in its rational or bounded rational variation-
assumes that at t0 states make policy choices they would otherwise not make if they
had information about how those treaties are going to play out. At t1 states find out
from (vivid) experience, for example, that drafting vague and open-ended treaties
and including certain dangerous provisions allow investors to challenge all sorts of
regulations and arbitrators to interpret the treaties expansively. At this point, states
possess more information than in the past; they have learned a lesson (even if not
the right lesson) and are expected to do things di↵erently. Thus, if states change
their policies through either form of learning process I should observe variation in
policy preferences over time -that is, between a consensus around one (perceived)
rational response before the claims hit and another one after- but not within the same
political moment. Furthermore, I should see political actors making policy decisions
based purely on what insights from recent experience indicate is the best strategy for
alleviating political risk and thus be better able to compete for FDI. For the rest of this
Chapter, I refer to learning accounts assuming some form of rationality in decision-
makers as (bounded) rational learning arguments. When needed, I appropriately
distinguish between the two.
My intention was not to dismiss all the alternative arguments considered but
rather to highlight limitations in their ability to provide complete answers to my
specific research questions: why do states pursue di↵erent policies after negative
experiences with ISDS tribunals? and why are they implemented more successfully
in some states rather than others? These explanations shed light on some important
factors that I incorporate in my explanation -like the mobilization of firms, coercion by
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powerful states and the capacity of states to resist those pressures. While these explain
why it is di cult for governments to follow through with policies that challenge the
status quo, they are silent on why preferences for revisionist policies do not emerge
in all places where the costs of BITs are felt. In the case of learning arguments,
most they can tell us is that after the claims hit (su ciently) states will change their
policies. But they do little to determine, within a set of plausible policy reactions,
which ones are adopted. To understand the choices of states in the aftermath of ISDS
disputes it is necessary to consider the political context in which the decisions of these
tribunals are received, which includes more than firms and either rational, bounded
rational or autonomous policy-makers.
2.2 The politics of ISDS experience
My argument starts from the same premise of learning accounts: exposure to in-
vestment arbitration leads states to rethink their treaty policies. However, I seek to
explain not just the decision to seek a change in policy but also the type of policy that
is adopted as a result. The decision-making process behind these policy choices is a
lot more disputed than what (bounded) rational learning accounts suggest. Variants
of rational choice arguments portray states as having fixed interest and policy choices
varying only according to the available information -and/or the capacity to process
such information- for making the ‘right’ decision about how to attain those interests.
That is, governments would arrive at the same decisions as long as they are exposed
to the same information, independently of who the individual policy-makers making
decisions are and where they are located.
Di↵erently, I argue that who policy-makers are matters in two main ways. First,
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their pre-existing ideas about the role of the state in the economy and about inter-
national legal constraints on states’ sovereignty can lead to alternative conclusions
about the desirability of investment treaties after ISDS disputes. Second, policy-
maker’s ideological position can provide information to interested societal actors in-
terested about which policy-makers would be good allies in working for the desired
change in policy (Hall and Deardor↵, 2006). Where policy-makers are matters as
well. Depending on the domestic and international environment, governments face
di↵erent assemblages of domestic and foreign actors interested in either preserving
the status quo or inducing radical changes to investment treaty policies. In this sec-
tion I present a theoretical framework that incorporates both of these dimensions
that (bounded) rational learning arguments ignore. In doing so, I draw insights from
some of the alternative arguments presented before, particularly those centered on
firms and power. However, their explanatory value for the research question at hand
is enhanced in combination with two elements the literature on investment treaties
generally overlooks: policy-makers’ ideas and civil society mobilization.
In the previous Chapter I discussed four categories of policy reactions to ISDS that
represent varying degrees of policy change. Caution policies preserve existing treaties
but put a moratorium on signing new ones. Alternatively, states can decide to Exit,
a policy in which they not only refrain from signing BITs but also terminate all their
existing ones. States can also adopt Reformist or Revisionist policies. In both cases
states remain willing to sign new treaties. The di↵erence is the models they develop
to that end. Reformist templates do not deviate greatly from their predecessors, most
representative of this change is a retooled model that preserve investors’ direct access
to ISDS but introduce provisions aimed at reducing their potential abuse. Revisionist
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Figure 2.1: Change in international legal autonomy as a result of policy reactions
models scale down the rights and protections provided to investors to a much greater
extent. Most illustrative is a new model that eliminates direct access to international
tribunals. Revisionist states are also much more assertive in rebuilding their BIT
network according to the new model and thus terminate their treaties to this end.
This categorization allowed me to engage systematically with the complex empir-
ical landscape of investment treaty policies. It showed that, to fully understand the
current state of the international investment regime, it is not enough to explain why
states change their policies in reaction to ISDS exposure. We must also be able to ex-
plain the extent of the change that states decide to adopt. With this goal, I consider
policies in terms of their overall e↵ect on a country’s international legal autonomy
to regulate foreign investment. By international legal autonomy I meant the degree
of legal constraints that investment treaties place on a given state in relation to its
treatment of foreign investors in its territory (Figure Figure 2.1).
My initial assumption is that states who face multiple or highly controversial
ISDS claims will reflect on the extent to which their international legal autonomy has
been compromised under their current participation in the international investment
regime. Arbitral disputes bring to the fore that compromising one’s autonomy for
the sake of o↵ering protection to foreign investors can impose great financial and
reputational costs. As a result, policy-makers will choose to change their current
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policy geared at reducing the likelihood of more costly disputes in the future. Thus,
I assume that after ISDS disputes, policy-makers will never choose to remain within
the status quo and will always seek to change policies, albeit to di↵erent extents.
That is, the outcome of interest is not whether states change their policies or not,
but to what extent.9 The rest of this section proceeds as follows. I first consider each
component of the argument separately -namely ideas, domestic firms, civil society,
foreign investors and their home governments. I develop expectations for their e↵ect
on changes to a country’s international legal autonomy and explain the mechanisms
through which they exert that influence.
2.2.1 The importance of ideas
My theoretical starting point for explaining why countries pursue alternative poli-
cies in the aftermath of ISDS experiences are the ideas -worldviews and principled
and causal beliefs- that government actors hold. As put by Goldstein and Keohane,
“individuals rely on beliefs and expectations when they select from a range of viable
outcomes” (1993, 17). Unlike (bounded) rational learning arguments, I do not as-
sume decision-makers within a state to be a homogeneous group. Neither do I see
disagreements about treaty policies as a temporary state which, with enough time
and open conversations, will resolve on the ‘right’ amount of investor protection that
international law should provide. Even when they share the goal of promoting FDI
inflows, I allow for political actors to have di↵erent, even incompatible, ideas about
international economic institutions and for these ideas to inform their preferences
about how to operate within the international investment regime in the aftermath
9Because this is a strong assumption, I test it in Chapter 3 using an original measure of interna-
tional legal autonomy.
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of ISDS disputes. Not much attention is paid in studies of international economic
institutions to the role of political ideas in informing state interests. This is more
prominent in other issue areas, e.g. human rights, where policy preferences are gen-
erally seen as tied to non-material factors like principled beliefs and identities (Risse,
2000; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999).
I treat ideas as a lens through which political actors filter their experiences with
investment arbitration, diagnose what went wrong and develop plans for avoiding
similar setbacks in the future. To have explanatory power on their own, ideas need
to be independent of experiences. Extending the analogy, a lens has to be in place
before the light passes through it. Various ideational frameworks can inform the way
in which state actors perceive their arbitral experiences.
Within a leftist worldview, investment treaties and ISDS can be seen as instru-
mental to the interests of large corporations from core capitalist countries. Thus,
international law should not empower transnational capital to challenge public poli-
cies and regulations adopted in the public interest. This attitude is not simply a
matter of principle. A left-wing economic agenda strives to increase the role of the
state in the economy, either as an economic actor or a regulator. Being tied to invest-
ment agreements that limit the ability of governments to do so is another reason for
changing treaty policy. On the contrary, right-wing causal beliefs about free market as
the most e cient way to allocate wealth can foster the view that, even with problems,
ISDS is still a desirable mechanism. In comparison to the alternatives (i.e. domestic
courts or a state-to-state mechanism) ISDS provides an impartial and depoliticized
system for settling disputes (Vandevelde, 1993).
Nationalism is another framework of ideas that can influence the lessons state
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o cials derive from their brushes with ISDS. Nationalism includes, among other
ideational elements, principled beliefs about what is desirable. A nationalist aspi-
ration is “to mitigate the degree of foreign influence and exercise control over the
members and perceived territory of a nation” (Woodwell, 2007, 16). Nationalists are
not necessarily hostile to trade or foreign investment; rather they value autonomy
and sovereignty. “Nationalists will be most concerned not about the economic in-
fluence of other nations on theirs...but the inability of their nation to take low-cost
actions to mitigate this e↵ect” (Shulman, 2000, 370) Thus, nationalists are distrustful
of embedding the country within a system of treaties that transfers the authority to
rule national policies unlawful to international arbitral tribunals. When states get
hit with investment disputes, and states cannot simply renege the rights they had
granted to foreign investors, a nationalist mindset might be inclined to disassoci-
ate from the regime. On the contrary, internationalist ideas value cooperation and
consensus. Internationalist policy-makers, even recognizing that international insti-
tutions have flaws, prefer to honor their commitments and work within the current
system.
It should be noted, as important as the presence of particular views and beliefs
is, so too is their distribution. That is, the degree of consensus around them. And
when there is plurality of views -across individual policy-makers or state agencies-
the ideas of those in key positions of authority are most important. Thus, the frame-
work of ideas held by policy-makers informs preferences and puts governments on
a policy path to recover greater or lesser amounts of international legal autonomy.
All else equal, two expectations can be derived abut the impact of specific ideational
frameworks:
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E1.a: Leftist and/or nationalist policy-makers will pursue policies that
allow them to recover greater amounts of legal autonomy in response to
ISDS disputes.
E1.b: Pro-market and/or internationalist policy-makers will pursue poli-
cies that allow them to recover smaller amounts of legal autonomy in
response to ISDS disputes.
That said, whatever ideationally-informed preferences policy-makers develop, the
implementation of policies born from those preferences takes place within particular
international and domestic environments. Certain elements from these environments
impose constraints on policy-makers to act on those preferences while others provide
them with support. The di↵erent variables explained in the next section pull govern-
ments into opposite directions, either towards the status quo (greater losses of legal
autonomy) or towards radical changes (greater recoveries of legal autonomy). The
interaction of these factors explains whether governments are able to implement their
original policy preferences or whether they scale them down towards more moderate
changes, or scale them up towards more significant ones.
2.2.2 Domestic variables
Governments face two interested domestic constituencies: the private sector and the
civil society sector. In the study of BITs, most scholarly attention has been placed on
the political behavior of firms. While they are crucial for understanding investment
treaty policies, to view policies as the sole product of economic actors’ varying degrees
of influence is too narrow. Investment treaties and ISDS disputes also a↵ect a broad
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and diverse ensemble of local civil society groups like environmental, development
and consumer protection organizations. Both of these constituencies have ideal policy
preferences for their home governments. Put simply, firms prefer current policies to
remain in place while civil society actors want to see the maximum amount of legal
autonomy recovered.
The private sector: varieties of firms
Following insights from New-New Trade Theory, I consider two types of domestic
firms: multinational firms and exporting firms. Here, the category of ‘domestic’ refers
to the location of the firm’s ownership and not the scope of its operations. Thus,
a multinational firm is a domestic firm that owns at least one foreign subsidiary.10
Exporting firms also have domestic ownership but do not own any investments abroad,
they simply trade their products internationally.11
I make the assumption that domestic multinational firms demand strong invest-
ment treaties because they consider them valuable sources of protection in their for-
eign ventures. The FDI literature has emphasized the role of institutional constraints
and property rights as mitigators of political risk (Jensen, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003).
However, international institutional constraints have been relatively overlooked. They
are either absent from scholarly work or explicitly minimized as insignificant factors
(Wellhausen, 2014). Given the lack of scholarly consensus about the e↵ect of interna-
tional investment treaties on FDI inflows, an often-made assumption is that investors
are not aware, or simply do not care, about the availability of international investment
10These are the firms that, at the same time, are the foreign investors in the countries where their
subsidiaries are. Because I consider foreign investors an external factor, I will address them in the
next section.
11Firm-level scholars have developed wider typologies of firms. See, for example (Kim et al., 2019).
I consider these two types to be the most salient for my research question.
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treaties when evaluating potential sites for investment.12
Yet recent findings suggest that firms are not completely absent-minded about
the provisions of investment treaties when making location decisions (Betz et al.,
2018). New-New Trade Theory scholars have started to pay more attention to the
preferences of di↵erent types of firms regarding international investment rules. Kim
et al. (2019) argue that multinational firms have come to see investment protection
as their primordial policy concern, even over tari↵s and subsidies. Because their en-
tire production process requires the coordination of investments made along multiple
locations, “investment protection will be the most salient issue because a disruption
at any point in the production network is likely to a↵ect the profitability and even
survival of the many firms involved” (Kim et al., 2019, 156).
I do not argue that available treaty protections are the most prominent factor
motivating investors. As put by an arbitration lawyer, “tax structuring is always
more important; tax impacts the investment from day one.” However, in the same
way that states acquire new information about the consequences of the treaties they
signed, multinational firms also become increasingly aware of BITs as sources of
protection. In the words of this same lawyer, “by and large corporates don’t care
about them until they find out they need them or they find out they apply.”13 For
example, the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) argument for keeping NAFTA’s
investment protection chapter intact was based on how well it had worked for energy
firms. “Since 1996, 19 of the 64 cases of natural gas and oil expropriation globally
involved API member companies...For those 19 cases, ISDS was a↵orded by nine
12Surprisingly, little to no academic work has been done that asks foreign investors themselves
whether they take these treaties into account when deciding where, and how, to invest. Exceptions
are (Sofres, 2000; Yackee, 2009)
13Interview XXIV.
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di↵erent free trade agreements or bilateral investment treaties, including NAFTA.
Eleven of those 19 cases were settled or decided in favor of the investor.” They argue,
strong treaty protection “enhances the bargaining and deal-making power of U.S.
businesses, as well as their overall competitiveness in the world” (Green, 2017).
Di↵erently, domestic exporting firms produce locally and primarily care about
access for their products in foreign markets. Exporters are concerned with changes in
the policies of their export destinations that could reduce the volume and profitability
of their trade. For example, governments can impose import quotas or bans, they can
withdraw trade benefits they had granted for political reasons, or they can change
laws or regulations about product quality or characteristics. Regarding the FDI
preferences of domestic exporters, the extant literature would suggest that firms that
produce locally fear foreign companies will drive them out of business. If foreign-
owned competitors raise the cost of labor or are able to produce at lower costs, the
products of domestic firms can become less competitive in foreign markets (Pinto,
2013; Pandya, 2014). Thus, it could be assumed that domestic exporters would
welcome policy changes that might drive foreign investors away. However, it has been
shown that governments can appease recalcitrant domestic industries by selectively
restricting foreign ownership in key sectors (Pandya, 2014). Moreover, when those
restrictions require foreign investors to enter into partnerships with national firms
through joint ventures, investment treaties become valuable for domestic capital as
well because they grant them, through their foreign partner, access to an extra layer
of protection not available to purely domestically-owned firms. That said, the most
important way in which domestic exporters come to care about the fate of investment
treaties in their country are threats of reduced market access. As I explain later in
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the section on external factors, developed foreign governments have a very e↵ective
’stick’ at hand for keeping revisionist states in line. Trade threats mobilize domestic
exporting firms on an issue they might not necessarily care about.
In addition to having preferences on the matter, I assume domestic firms mobilize
in order to obtain and -most importantly for my research questions- preserve invest-
ment treaties that provide ample protections and unrestricted access to ISDS (Kim,
2017; Kim et al., 2019; Blanchard and Matschke, 2015). They do so individually and
they also coordinate political e↵orts. For example, the United States Council for
International Business -representing some of largest American multinationals- makes
recurrent appearances in Chapter 4 as the American government debated changes to
the US model BIT.14 Similarly, Chapter 5 shows several associations of Ecuadorian
exporters arguing against the termination of the BITs due to concerns with trade
access. Given these political e↵orts, I expect their preferences to be highly salient
during the making of investment treaty policies in their home states. Thus, all else
equal, I have two expectations regarding the influence of domestic firms:
E2.a: Countries that are home to greater numbers of multinational firms
will pursue policies that allow them to recover lesser amounts of legal
autonomy in response to ISDS disputes.
E2.b: Countries that are home to greater numbers of domestic exporting
firms will pursue policies that allow them to recover lesser amounts of
legal autonomy in response to ISDS disputes.
14In accordance with NNTT assumptions, these firms come from a variety of sectors and industries.
The Council’s Board of Directors lists executives from firms as varied as Nestle, Chevron, JP Morgan
and Microsoft.
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Domestic civil society
Another domestic sector that has strong preferences regarding BITs is civil society
(Calvert, 2018). With the exception of a few prominent think tanks specifically
dedicated to the issue of international investment, most groups opposed to investment
treaties and arbitration have other thematic agendas and work, primarily, on issues
of environmental and consumer protection, social justice, human rights and public
health (Mann, 2004). At the heart of their opposition is the belief that investment
treaties allow firms to use international tribunals to challenge laws and policies that
civil society actors fought hard to win through democratic political processes at home.
Thus, my second assumption is that civil society actors oppose providing strong
investor protections through BITs, especially by giving investors access to ISDS, and
mobilize to stop their governments from signing more of these treaties in the future
and to get them to drop the ones they had signed in the past. Ideally, civil society
actors would like governments to recover regulatory autonomy from international
institutions they see as favoring corporate interests.
I analyze the role of civil society actors through the theoretical lens of the con-
tentious politics framework (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). Most importantly, I draw on
the distinction between social movements and interest groups. Tilly and Tarrow
define social movement as a “sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated
performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions,
and solidarities that sustain these activities” (p. 11). Social movements combine
sustained campaigning and public performances that display unity and numbers.
Interest groups, while emerging from social movements, achieve a higher degree of
institutionalization; switching from “streets and campuses to direct mailings, educa-
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tional campaigns, and lobbying” (p. 54). I use the term civil society organization
(CSO) to refer to units of social movements that turned into interest groups, mean-
ing their contentious claim-making becomes more conventional and integrated into
established systems of government. In this sense, their tactics might look more like
those employed by firms but they have common grievances with social movements.
Also, CSOs are more professionalized; manned by permanent sta↵ who are experts
on the issue of interest, in this case international investment law.
Di↵erences between CSOs and social movements matter for my outcome of inter-
est insofar as it captures meaningful variation in the degree of institutionalization and
types of resources available to these groups. Social movements and CSOs have di↵er-
ent resources to mobilize (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Social movements have the gift
of numbers. They can carry on disruptive actions in public. CSOs have the gift of
technical expertise on both the subject matter and lobbying and advocacy strategies.
For civil society to intervene in the making of treaty policies, technical expertise in
international investment law is crucial. For example, when a government announces
public consultations over a new treaty model, it is not evident for non-specialists how
to translate their concerns into legal provisions. For the most part, neither CSOs nor
social movements emerge from international investment law agendas. Rather, they
develop awareness of this issue when regulations in their areas -i.e. environmental,
public health or consumer protection- become at risk of corporate challenges through
ISDS. Yet while CSOs have enough human and financial resources to develop legal
expertise, social movements rarely make the leap from their core agenda to more
abstract and complex issues of international investment law. This allows CSOs to
engage with the policy-making process more thoroughly; making specific demands
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about technical aspects of treaty policies as well as calling out governments when
proposed changes fall short from those demands.
This is not to say civil society is powerless unless it is organized as an interest
group but power is relative to the task at hand. Social movements have strength in
numbers and thus the capacity to mount disruptive actions demanding a change in
policy. But if those actions succeed in generating momentum for change, they lack the
capacity to monitor the subsequent policy-making process. Successful mobilization
by civil society requires that networks of interested groups, CSOs and social move-
ments, engage in both. Thus, following the social movement literature suggesting
that, with time and resources, civil society groups evolve from social movements to
CSOs (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), I assume that the existence of CSOs presupposes
an already dense population of social movements. This leads me to expect that, all
else equal,
E3.a: Countries with larger numbers of CSOs will pursue policies that
allow them to recover greater amounts of legal autonomy in response to
ISDS disputes.
2.2.3 External factors
In the same way that firms and CSOs have e↵ects at home, they can also have them in
foreign countries. Multinational corporations are domestic firms in their home country
but they are foreign firms in the countries they invest in. As such, they prefer the
status quo. Similarly, some CSOs are international. They have physical presence in
more than one country and, more importantly, have an interest in promoting their
goals globally (Wong, 2012; Stroup, 2012). Their goal, much like their domestic
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peers, is to see the end of an international legal regime that protects multinational
corporations at the expense of local populations. I also consider how the diplomatic
environment can either dissuade or encourage states to recover greater levels of legal
autonomy.
The foreign private sector: foreign investors and the arbitration industry
Per the discussion of multinational firms in the previous section, I assume that for-
eign investors have an interest in preserving strong international legal protections,
including direct access to ISDS, and that they will mobilize in defense of the status
quo. When their host governments start considering changes to their treaty policies,
foreign firms can exert pressure in multiple ways. Firstly, they can do it directly.
Foreign investors can withhold further investments or other benefits that host states
might want, like technology transfers or worker benefits. In the same way that do-
mestic firms organize to lobby their home government, there are associations that
represent the interests of their member companies before host governments. For ex-
ample, the European Union Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Southern Africa
represents all European investors in the region, that is, around 2,000 companies which
are mostly present in South Africa. As a ‘chamber of chambers’, it coordinates all
South African-based bilateral chambers of commerce of EU member states. When the
South African government announced its plans to withdraw from its existing treaties
and fall back on purely domestic protections, the Chamber was vocal in its opposi-
tion and provided input through the public consultation process and through direct
discussions with the Department of Trade and Industry.15
15Submission by the EU Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Southern Africa on the Promotion
and Protection of Investment Bill, as presented to the Portfolio Committee on Trade & Industry,
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Second, they can enlist the support of their home governments (Wellhausen,
2014). Foreign governments that fear a particular policy would be detrimental to
their multinational companies can coerce host governments into adopting more mod-
erate changes instead. Long before investment treaties, disputes between host states
and foreign investors often had dangerous ramifications, leading in some occasions to
the use of force by the home country of the a↵ected investor (Miles, 2013; Maurer,
2013). The inclusion of ISDS in investment treaties was justified on reasons that
it would avoid such outcomes by removing the home state from the equation. Pri-
vate access to international dispute settlement meant that disputes between foreign
investors and host governments were relegated to legal procedures between commer-
cial lawyers, rather than heated quarrels between diplomats (Shihata, 1986). Yet a
recent analysis of leaked diplomatic cables by Gertz et al. (2018) shows that even
when an existing BIT provides investors with access to ISDS, the US government still
intervenes on behalf of its home companies.
Given the evidence of diplomatic intervention regarding specific investor-state
disputes, I assume that home state governments will also intervene when what is at
stake is not just the outcome of one dispute with one company but the entire system
of international legal protections for all national companies present in a given country.
As mentioned before, trade o↵ers the most e↵ective ’stick’ in the coercion tool-box
of home states. Withdrawing existing preferential treatment or making satisfactory
BIT policies a condition for new trade agreements can link investment treaties with
trade access issues that domestic exporting firms care about. Furthermore, according
to Rachel Wellhausen (2014), foreign firms of the same nationality tend to form
Parliament, September 15 2015. Available at: https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/this-bill-
wont-protect-or-promote-investment–eu-c.
2.2. The politics of ISDS experience 81
a common front and find it easier to apply pressure to their host governments by
diverting new investments or lobbying their home governments for help. Thus, I
expect that, all else equal,
E5.a: Countries with more nationally cohesive and better organized for-
eign investor communities will pursue policies that allow them to recover
lesser amounts of legal autonomy in response to ISDS disputes.
E5.b: When trade access is on the line countries will pursue policies that
allow them to recover lesser amounts of legal autonomy in response to
ISDS disputes.
In addition to manipulating material benefits, a softer form of coercion can take
place through the influence of hegemonic ideas. Countries with bad ISDS records
who want to avoid more setbacks in the future might look to capital exporters for
cues on how to rekindle their treaties. Beyond being preferred by powerful actors
-FDI exporters and foreign investors- an important mechanism for the di↵usion of
hegemonic ideas is that they are also promoted by epistemic communities (Haas,
1990; Slobodian, 2018). The community of international commercial lawyers -who
benefit from serving as arbitrators and counsel in ISDS disputes- resemble some of
the characteristics of epistemic communities (Dezalay and Garth, 1996; Langford
et al., 2017; Sornarajah, 2015). At the same time, international commercial lawyers
and their legal firms are economic actors; they have a financial interest in being hired
to serve as arbitrators and/or counsel. Members of this ‘club’ have reasons to fear
the current backlash against investment treaties if more and more states decide to do
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away with ISDS mechanisms.16 Dozens of publications, international conferences and
blogs hosted on legal firms’ websites provide commentary on states’ treaty policies.
Through these outlets, governments can see how their actions are being perceived by
the community of lawyers that will eventually counsel foreign investors on the status
of legal security in the country. All else equal,
E5.c: Countries with larger concentrations of legal firms will pursue poli-
cies that allow them to recover lesser amounts of legal autonomy in re-
sponse to ISDS disputes.
International civil society
In the same way that the community of arbitration lawyers can support hegemonic
ideas about the value of investment treaties and ISDS, policy entrepreneurs can help
discredit those same ideas. A few resourceful international CSOs have a clear policy
goal of fundamentally transforming the investment regime.17 While domestic CSOs
can take part in transnational networks and coordinate campaigns and actions with
counterparts in other countries, the focus of their work is on advancing a cause at
home. Di↵erently, international CSOs have an interest in promoting their goals glob-
ally.
International CSOs can influence policy decisions in two main ways. One is by
linking directly with policy-makers. In this sense, CSOs are not just passive producers
16Arbitration lawyers from the private sector typically charge several hundred dollars per hour;
at top law firms the hourly fees can be up to US$1,000 (OECD, 2012, 19).
17Attending various events on investment treaties and arbitration, I immediately noticed how
many of the participants in one conference I had seen at previous ones. At one event organized by
the International Institute for Sustainable Development in Geneva, after a member of the audience
identified himself before asking a question, the panelist first noted how pleased she was to finally
‘put a face to the name’. This anecdote simply illustrates that individuals within these networks
know each other and/or read each others work.
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of information hoping state o cials will come across it in their Google searches. They
actively engage with interested governments to provide them with technical expertise
and with opportunities to coordinate with other governments. For example, Southern
African Development Community (SADC) adopted a Model BIT in 2012 after a 18
month process of consultations and drafting among government representatives18 This
process received technical support from one of the largest international CSOs in the
field of investment, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)
and Howard Mann, a senior IISD o cer, was lead counsel during this process (SADC,
2012).
Another way in which international CSOs can a↵ect the incentives facing gov-
ernments is by linking with local civil society. This is particularly important when
domestic civil society is relatively less organized around the issue of international in-
vestment treaties. Per the previous distinction between CSOs and social movements,
when civil society actors resemble social movements -working with less sources of
funding and technical expertise- it is harder to translate e↵orts into clear policy out-
comes (Watkins et al., 2012). By teaming-up with international CSOs, local social
movements acquire some of the expertise that is required to intervene in the policy-
making process successfully. They can make specific demands about treaty provisions
and they can monitor their implementation. Thus, all else equal, I expect that:
E6: Countries with larger presence of international CSOs will pursue
policies that allow them to recover greater amounts of legal autonomy.
18SADC members include Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South-Africa and Zimbabwe. Representa-
tives from Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and the Seychelles also participated in the final drafting
committee meeting of May 2012.
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Diplomatic support
Before I discussed how the home governments of foreign investors can raise the costs of
implementing radical policies for host states. Here I consider how foreign governments
can have the opposite e↵ect. Instead of discouraging large policy changes, other
countries can be a source of support when policy-makers are hesitant to take actions
that might earn them criticism from powerful constituents or from moderate sectors
within their own governments. There are two main ways in which this can happen.
In terms of material support, it is unlikely that like-minded states could cover the
potential losses of FDI and trade that foreign investors and their home governments
warn about. Thus, backing from like-minded states is more symbolic and it is geared
towards a domestic audience. Given that discontent with the investment regime has
emerged in multiple parts of the world, policy coordination can convince reluctant
actors at home that other countries have similar concerns and they would not be the
only ones breaking away. Thus, it helps if revisionist governments coordinate policies
with prestigious countries and other big players in global investment rather than with
small countries or ones that are seen as ‘too ideological.’
However, this creates a problem for policy-makers trying to enlist like-minded
governments that, at the same time, are more palatable to moderate sectors. As
discussed before, government ideology -as a set of worldviews and beliefs- can put
policy-makers onto a revisionist or exit policy path. It is likely that states interested
in adopting similar policies are also ideologically motivated to a certain extent and
reluctant domestic actors might be wary of appearing too close. As I discuss in
Chapter 5, this was an important issue behind Ecuador’s initiative to bring Argentina
into ongoing talks with Venezuela and Bolivia.
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Another way in which the actions of other governments can enable riskier policies is
through demonstration e↵ects. For example, if other countries had successfully exited
the system or adopted alternative models and have not been severely punished for it,
then this weakens the belief that foreign companies will not invest without BITs. In
this sense, revisionist policy-makers often make references to Brazil to justify taking
more radical approaches; a country that did not ratify any treaty with ISDS and still
is one of the largest destinations for FDI. Thus, all else equal, I have the following
expectations regarding the diplomatic environment:
E7: Countries will pursue policies that allow them to recover greater
amounts of legal autonomy when other countries are doing it as well.
2.2.4 Ideas, societal interests and access points
So far I have argued that governments will react to ISDS experiences by trying to
reassert their legal autonomy vis a vis international investment treaties. Doing so
requires a change in treaty policy and what is involved in changing policies can vary.
A policy change can mean that, relative to the current level of involvement in the
investment regime, states will be more careful with how much legal autonomy they
sacrifice in future agreements (Reform). It could also mean that they will stop signing
BITs and thus will preserve their current level of legal autonomy (Caution). Or it
could involve moves towards recovering it, partially (Revision) or completely (Exit).
The resulting treaty policy choice, and thus the extent to which it deviates from
the status quo, is shaped by a variety of factors. The most elemental one is the
government actors’ own understanding of the country’s experience with ISDS; what
went wrong and how to fix it. This, I argue, is heavily influenced by the dominant
2.2. The politics of ISDS experience 86
ideas of policy-makers. Strong nationalist and/or leftist inclinations lead them to to
reclaim the country’s legal autonomy from a system they see as inherently flawed.
Alternatively, governments with pro-market and/or internationalist convictions will
be less sanguinary in their assessment and thus will honor their existing commitments
and, in the future, be more careful with how much autonomy they compromise. That
is, they will refrain from binding themselves to new treaties or they will introduce
targeted reforms.
That said, government actors -whatever their initial inclinations might be- make
decisions in a particular political environment. This environment is populated by
domestic and external actors with their own interests in terms of how much they
want the status quo to change. While some would prefer continuity in treaty poli-
cies, others would like to see changes that allow states to recover as much autonomy
from the regime as possible. The discussion so far has revolved around the varying
presence of specific interests: domestic multinational firms, domestic exporting firms,
civil society, foreign investors. However, the presence of particular interests does not
automatically translates to policy influence. A vast lobbying literature has developed
within IPE that theorizes the conditions under which interest groups are more likely
to lobby successfully. The contentious politics literature has asked similar questions.
A generally accepted idea is that, while the mobilization of resources is important,
social movements’ capacity to generate policy changes comes from favorable politi-
cal opportunity structures; that is, specific characteristics of either the domestic or
international political and institutional environment that facilitate or inhibit social
mobilization (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015).
Here I engage with Ehrlich (2011)’s concept of access points to the policy-making
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process. Any policy-maker who can provide access to interest groups is an access point
but not every policy-maker is an access point. Two conditions are most salient for
my research questions. First, policy-makers must have power in the policy area that
interest groups are trying to influence. Which policy-makers are relevant for a specific
policy varies across countries but also within the same country. One single policy
consists of multiple decisions -for example, adopting a new treaty model requires a
decision to revise the current template, to draft it in a certain way, to make revisions
or not to a draft, and to allow or not deviations from it in subsequent negotiations- and
these can fall on di↵erent agencies that provide more or less access points to interested
groups. Second, policy-makers need to be susceptible to lobbying. In Ehrlich’s theory,
policy-makers that are not elected are not susceptible because they have no incentive
to be lobbied. That is, they have no need for campaign contributions. However,
since lobbying can provide a variety of goods that policy-makers might want, I have
a di↵erent understanding of susceptibility to lobbying. Non-elected policy makers,
i.e career bureaucrats in executive agencies, have incentives to obtain some of the
goods that interest groups provide, especially information and expertise, if they see
them as instrumental to their policy goals. They might be trying to curry favor with
their superiors or develop a reputation within the bureaucracy but -and this could be
the case with elected policy-makers as well- they can also be invested in successfully
implementing specific policies due to personal convictions and ideological inclinations.
There is another way in which ideas, i.e. principles beliefs, come in. Societal
interests will lobby relevant and susceptible policy-makers, but susceptibility is also
a function of policy-makers’ views and attitudes. That is, access points are not
necessarily ‘up for grabs.’ A policy-maker that shares civil society’s concerns with
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how ISDS tribunals constrains the state’s ability to regulate is an access point for
CSOs but not for multinational firms. This view of lobbying is closer to Hall and
Deardor↵ (2006)’s. While their theory was developed to explain policy outcomes in
the US Congress, it provides a clear understanding of the relationship between policy-
maker’s own ideas about policy issues and the interests of societal actors. Lobbyists’
goal “is not to change legislators minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their
own, coincident objectives” (p. 69). A central assumption is that legislators care
about some issues more than others. Ideally, they would want to shape policy in
all those issues they care about, but having influence on policy takes a lot of work
(serving on committees, authoring bills, proposing amendments, etc.) and they have
scarce resources to devote to that work. Interest groups -which unlike legislators are
experts on the issue at hand- provide valuable information that decreases the cost
of working for (or against) a certain policy. Both elements -legislators’ motivations
and interest groups assistance- are necessary for successful lobbying to take place.
Without legislator’s initial preferences, there would be no interest in the lobbyists’
services. Without lobbyists’ services, legislators could not a↵ord to attempt changing
policy. In sum, considering the alternative interests of societal actors explained in the
previous sections together with the notion of access points as relevant and sympathetic
policy-makers, I expect that, all else equal:
E8.a: When the policy-making process provides more access points for
domestic and/or international CSOs, policies in response to ISDS disputes
will allow states to recover greater amounts of legal autonomy.
E8.b: When the policy-making process provides more access points for
multinational firms, exporting firms, foreign investors and their govern-
2.3. Research design 89
ments, policies in response to ISDS disputes will allow states to recover
lesser amounts of legal autonomy.
2.3 Research design
The last section of this Chapter presents the research design for putting the previ-
ous argument to the test. I employ a mixed methods research design that combines
quantitative statistical analysis and qualitative case studies. This choice of design
was aimed at maximizing both the internal and external validity of my arguments.
Through regression analysis of four di↵erent cross-national datasets -including an
original measure of International Legal Autonomy (ILA)- I provide quantitative evi-
dence in support of my expectations above. I show that the rise of ISDS disputes is
associated with a reclaiming of states’ legal autonomy to regulate foreign investment
in international law. Furthermore, the likelihood of states making varying choices
about treaty content, treaty signature, and treaty termination is not uniform across
states with the same level of ISDS experience. I provide detailed descriptions of the
methods and data used in the statistical analysis in Chapter 3.
Through qualitative case studies I trace the casual processes behind these correla-
tions, providing insights into actors’ understandings of their motives and assumptions.
The case studies give a richer sense of the political context that generated the dis-
crete data points that went into the quantitative analysis. Solely relying on statistical
methods would have made it di cult to uncover the mechanisms at work, especially
when a theory is geared towards explaining not just policy outcomes but also policy
initiatives that emerged but did not prosper.
The argument developed here makes claims about causal mechanisms, which spec-
2.3. Research design 90
ify the di↵erent steps leading to policy outcomes. To test claims about causal mech-
anisms I employ process tracing methods that connect stages of the policy-making
process, enabling me to identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular deci-
sion through the dynamic of events (George and McKeown, 1985). Through process
tracing, I should be able to show that the impact of ISDS disputes was perceived
di↵erently by government actors holding di↵erent worldviews and beliefs. What-
ever the idea’s prior cause, a claim of ideational causation necessarily implies that
decision-makers’ beliefs or goals are not fully determined by the material parameters
of the policy choice being explained. I should also be able to connect these ideas
to alternative policy initiatives regarding investment treaties and establish that only
the theorized domestic and external factors were the main sources of constraints and
support during the implementation of those policies.
2.3.1 Case selection
As my argument involves the operation of multiple variables at di↵erent levels of
analysis, it is unfeasible to examine as many cases as needed to observe how each
individual variable relates to the outcome of interest while all others are controlled
for. Thus, striving to obtain as much useful variation in the dimensions of interest
as possible with a manageable number of cases, I selected cases in terms of economic
development. I do not argue that policy choices are a direct consequence of wealth.
Rather, di↵erent levels of economic development make alternative configurations of
the explanatory variables more likely.
First of all, economic development is closely related to a central distinction in
the literature on investment treaties and FDI, that between capital importers and
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capital exporters. Theoretically, capital importers relate to investment treaties and
ISDS from the perspective of the host state that will be sued by foreign investors,
whereas capital exporters are home to the companies suing those states. This is a
logical distinction for theoretical reasons and it actually applies to many bilateral
relationships in which FDI flows only in one direction. But considered as a whole,
states that send out large amounts of FDI also receive substantial foreign capital.
There are many economies -the bulk of the developing world- which can be referred
to as capital importers. However, capital exporters are better thought of as dual-role
states. Developed countries fit this label. In 2017, 64% of the world’s FDI inwards
stock was located in the developed world and 76% of the world’s outward stock came
from the developed world (UNCTAD, 2018b).
This particular position structures political reactions to ISDS di↵erently in de-
veloped states than in developing countries by shifting the significance of some ex-
planatory variables relative to others. Regarding domestic firms, developed countries
as dual-role states are home to multinational firms seeking to preserve the inter-
national investment treaties that provide them with protection. Similarly, the 20
busiest investment arbitration law firms are all based in the global North (Eberhardt
and Olivet, 2012). For the most part, developing countries do not have a compara-
ble indigenous multinational sector. Thus, it is their domestic exporting firms which
become involved in the policy-making process after foreign investors and their home
governments warn about potential economic losses that would come from pursuing
radical policies.
Selecting cases at di↵erent levels of economic development also allows me to ob-
serve significant variation in terms of domestic civil society. In developed states,
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civil society is relatively more institutionalized and better funded than in develop-
ing countries (Salamon, 2010). In terms of the distinction between CSOs and social
movements, the proportion of civil society actors that resemble CSOs instead of so-
cial movements is larger in wealthy countries. In developing states, it is the opposite.
With less sources of funding and technical expertise and working with limited tech-
nologies and weak infrastructures, it may be harder to translate their e↵orts into
clear policy outcomes (Watkins et al., 2012). Thus, Northern CSOs do two things
that can heighten their influence. Because of their common grievances and links to
social movements, they engage in grassroots mobilization and other unconventional
activities. Yet they also have come to resemble political insiders. Organizations such
as the Sierra Club or Public Citizen in the US or the members of the Seattle to Brus-
sels Network in Europe have become a significant and visible presence in Washington
and Brussels politics.19
Di↵erences in economic development also lead to varying exposure to external
pressures. In relation to international investment, state power is related to the scarce
productive factor that all states want to attract. That is, capital. Thus, developed
countries as the sources of most FDI outflows are at the top of the international
hierarchy. External forces should be relatively weaker in a↵ecting policy-making
in powerful states than in less a✏uent ones. Therefore, in developed states I can
observe the interaction of mostly domestic factors -namely policy-makers’ ideas and
the relative influence of domestic firms and CSOs. In developing countries, I can
19According to an o cial from the Dutch chapter of a large environmental CSO, they engaged in
lobbying activities against the free trade agenda and “specifically the ISDS part precisely because of
the fear that companies could sue environmental regulations.” But the organization also worked to
mobilize people and train local activists. “We organized three big marches...the first march was only
like a hundred people...the last two ones were already seven thousand people. For The Netherlands
that was quite a lot.” Interview XIV.
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observe how the external environment -foreign investors and their home governments,
international CSOs and like-minded states- shapes treaty policies in the aftermath of
ISDS disputes.
2.3.2 Case-specific expectations
Thus, with the goal of capturing variation in dimensions of interest, I base my findings
on three case studies of policy reactions to ISDS experience in Ecuador, India and
the United States. In all three cases, negative experiences with ISDS disputes should
provoke some form of reaction among policy-makers; that is, discussion should ensue
about what changes will be adopted and how much will retooled policies deviate from
current ones. Policy-makers should propose larger changes when they hold nationalist
and/or leftist ideas and smaller when they hold market-friendly and internationalist
ideas. However, the three cases should vary in terms of the political environment in
which policy-makers implement their desired policies; an environment populated by
interested actors with more or less access points to the policy-making process.
In the case of the United States, being the world’ top FDI sender and the most
frequently claimed nationality by firms in ISDS disputes20, I should observe American
multinational firms mobilizing to limit the scope of the proposed changes so that their
level of protection abroad is not diminished. Also, given that fifteen of the twenty
busiest firms in investment arbitration are American, I should observe legal firms
involved in international commercial arbitration to mobilize for the same goal as
well. The US is also the world’s largest receiver of FDI. Because American civil
society is one of the largest and better organized -the proportion of economically
20Foreign direct investment, net outflows (BoP, current US$). The World Bank; UNCTAD In-
vestment Policy Hub.
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active Americans that work in the non-profit sector is one of the largest in the world
(Salamon, 2010)- CSOs in the US should have developed both an interest on ISDS
issues as well as technical expertise on matters related to international investment
law and should mobilize to promote as much policy change as possible. Given the
prominent position of the US at the top of the international structure, policy-making
in the US should be mostly a domestic process with little involvement of external
factors. That is, foreign investors in the US and international CSOs should not have
a prominent role. Because foreign investors will not be involved, they will not enlist
the help of their home governments and thus American exporting firms will have
no incentive to mobilize on this issue. Similarly, foreign countries’ policy reactions
to their own ISDS experience should have no bearing on how much legal autonomy
the US attempts to reclaim for itself. Thus, at di↵erent stages of the policy-making
process, domestic multinational firms’ and CSOs’ ability to promote larger or smaller
policy changes should be defined by their relative availability of access points, a
condition that should vary depending on institutional characteristics as well as the
ideological distribution of relevant policy-makers.
The second case-study is of Ecuador. Regarding FDI flows, Ecuador is a capital
importer with only minor FDI outflows. At the same time, exports represent a larger
share of Ecuador’s GDP than of the other two cases.21 This means that interested
economic actors in Ecuador will be foreign firms with investments in the country
and domestic exporting firms while considerations of Ecuador’s interests as an FDI
exporter should be nonexistent. Thus, foreign investors should be observed mobiliz-
ing against drastic policy changes and their home governments putting diplomatic
pressure on the host state. As a result, domestic firms also mobilize under threats
21Exports of goods and services (% of GDP). The Workd Bank.
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of reduced market access. In terms of domestic civil society, according to the latest
CIVICUS report on Ecuador, Ecuadorian civil society is rather weak, with internal
organization being the weakest dimension (Heinrich, 2007). Under these conditions,
domestic civil society groups should not have developed strong interest and technical
expertise on investment treaties. Thus, local social movements should not mobilize
in relation to the country’s treaty policies in comparable ways to the CSOs in the
American case -as providers of information for like-minded policy-makers. At the
same time, scholars of Ecuadorian politics consider the indigenous rights movement
to be fairly powerful, mostly because of its ability to paralyze the country through
political uprisings (Becker, 2010; Mijeski and Beck, 2011). The indigenous movement
should thus be likely to mobilize forcefully against foreign firm’s when their operations
a↵ect issues on their agenda. However when domestic civil society establishes linkages
with international CSOs, their ability to influence the policy-making process should
be enhanced. Moreover, occupying a lower position in the international hierarchy,
the policies of like-minded countries should figure prominently among Ecuadorian
policy-makers who should take advantage of opportunities to coordinate policies with
them.
The last case study is on India. In terms of economic development India is closer
to Ecuador. Thus, India’s civil society, albeit much larger in size than the Ecuadorian,
has comparable low levels of organization. Due to its population size, the civil society
sector in India is immense. According to reports from 2009, around the middle
point of the time period I examine, about 1.5 million civil society groups worked
in India. Yet most groups in India are small and dependent on volunteers; 73.4%
of these have one or no paid sta↵ (Asian Development Bank, 2009). As a result, I
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should not expect high levels of expertise on the subject matter from Indian civil
society and thus, they should not be prominent actors in India’s rethinking of its
BIT policy, unless they are able to form coalitions with international CSOs. At the
same time, in overall economic size, India is much closer to the US. India’s economic
size matters for two reasons. First, recent years have seen an increase of outgoing
FDI. Thus, unlike in Ecuador, the interests of home multinational firms should be a
part of the government’s consideration. However, India is, for the most part, still an
importer of capital. As a consequence, domestic multinational firms should not yield
as much influence as in the US. Second, India’s government should be better able than
Ecuador, but not as much as the US, to implement its desired policies in the face of
external constraints and without enlisting the support of like-minded countries. Thus,
like in Ecuador, I should be able to observe foreign investors mobilizing against big
changes to Indian BITs and enlisting the help of their home governments but these
pressures should not have comparable constraining e↵ects. Similarly, the actions of
other countries considering similar policies should have less salience in the calculations
of Indian policy-makers than in the Ecuadorian’s.
The evidence for the qualitative case studies comes from field research, elite in-
terviews, news archives, o cial documents and legislative records. I attended confer-
ences on international investment agreements in Geneva and New York organized by
international organizations and think tanks which provided me with access to states,
CSOs and firms’ o cial positions on the issue of investment treaty and ISDS reform.
I also recruited most of my interviewees at these events. I conducted interviews with
state o cials and diplomats, o cials from international organizations, representa-
tives of firms and firms’ associations and civil society activists. There are potential
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biases that come with relying on personal testimonies. Individuals’ accounts of past
events might be a↵ected by how they eventually unfolded. Policy-makers might feel
inclined to describe unsuccessful policy initiatives in ways that exaggerate the influ-
ence of factors beyond their control. Similarly, activists might overstate their role in
particularly important policy outcomes. Whenever possible, attempts were made to
corroborate narratives with alternative sources from the time, such as news records
and o cial documents.
In sum, this Chapter presented the theoretical framework used in this dissertation
to explain variation in treaty policies in reaction to states’ experiences with investment
disputes. I consider treaty policies to vary in terms of how much international legal
autonomy states recover as a result of their implementation. Assuming states will
always implement changes in their treaty policies after experiencing costly arbitral
disputes, my argument focuses on the factors leading governments to recover more or
less legal autonomy as a result of those changes. I argue that absent a consideration
of how policy-makers’ ideas inform policy preferences it is not possible to fully explain
variation in treaty policies. The views and beliefs of policy-makers in strategic posi-
tions put them on di↵erent policy paths to recover more or less of the legal autonomy
once lost to BITs. A series of contextual variables can help governments to remain in
that path or deviate from it. While I incorporate important insights from alternative
arguments -namely firm-level interests and mobilization and deployments of material
and soft power- to understand how these variables have independent e↵ects, I also
consider the conditions under which civil society actors -often overlooked in the study
of international economic law- can foster greater changes in states’ treaty policies.
Chapter 3
Quantitative evidence
This Chapter provides systematic evidence of the empirical trends introduced in
Chapter 1 and explores some of the theoretical expectations emerging from Chapter
2. In section Section 3.1, I present an original country-level measure of international
legal autonomy regarding foreign investment (ILA) and show how ISDS experience
is correlated with smaller negative changes and with positive changes between yearly
ILA scores. The rest of the Chapter explains specific policy choices in the aftermath
of ISDS disputes that a↵ect a country’s level of legal autonomy. I consider two future-
oriented actions aimed at managing how much ILA states are willing to compromise in
the future. The first one if their willingness to sign BITs (section Section 3.2) and the
second one are choices about the treaties they sign (Section 3.3). I also consider one
past-oriented choice leading to the recovery of legal autonomy. That is, the likelihood
of treaties being terminated (section Section 3.4). I do so by analyzing three original
datasets of treaty signatures, content of signed treaties and treaty terminations with
the goal of capturing the degree to which ISDS disputes relate to these alternative
policies and under what conditions is each outcome more likely.
This Chapter does not test all expectations born out from Chapter 2. More
specifically, I do not test any expectations regarding the role of ideas. It is debat-
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able whether valid indicators of ideational variables exist, especially ones that would
capture nuances within ideological orientations.1 Moreover, my argument focuses on
the interaction of ISDS experiences with ideational and various contextual variables.
Statistical results with higher-order interactions can be hard to interpret. Thus,
my goals for this Chapter are modest. First, I test my underlying assumption that
ISDS experience leads states to either recover their legal autonomy or to compromise
smaller amounts of it. Second, I seek to uncover general patterns that are suggestive
of more complex processes than a direct relationship between of ISDS experience and
alternative policy choices that a↵ect states legal autonomy.
I find that the probability of signing and terminating treaties as well as the content
of treaties that do get signed -which can preserve more or less regulatory autonomy
for host governments- are all correlated with ISDS experience. Yet these relationships
are more nuanced, since arbitral disputes appear to have varying e↵ects across distinct
groups; that is, developed and developing countries. In terms of treaty signature, I
find that, as ISDS disputes accumulate, developing countries become less likely to
sign BITs while developed countries continue to expand their treaty networks. How-
ever, I do not find that developed countries come out of their own ISDS proceedings
unscathed. From the analysis of the content of treaties that do get signed emerges
that developed states, as their ISDS experience increases, tend to sign agreements
that better protect their ability to regulate foreign investment without violating the
treaty. Conversely, variation in the number of arbitral disputes against developing
states does not appear to be associated with variation at the level of treaty content.
Lastly, patterns of treaty termination also reflect the relationship between negative
1For example, the most widely used indicator of government ideology, the Database of Political
Institutions (Cruz et al., 2016), codes the US under Democratic presidents and Cuba as equally
leftist.
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arbitral experiences and policy decisions is not uniform across states. While they are
extremely rare events -and as such, hard to predict- the analysis of recorded instances
of treaty termination suggests that larger numbers of investment disputes against de-
veloped states does not make their treaties more likely to be terminated. However,
ISDS experience does have that e↵ect on the likelihood of termination when it comes
to treaties signed by larger developing states. In each respective section I elaborate
on the implications of these findings for my theoretical expectations.
3.1 ISDS experience and international legal auton-
omy
Available scholarly literature on international investment treaties paints di↵erent pic-
tures of the international investment regime. On the one hand, New-New Trade The-
ory (NNTT) scholars suggest the regime is expanding (Kim et al., 2019, 2018). As
more, and denser, global value chains emerge linking economic activities in di↵erent
parts of the world, the international investment regime grows in significance. Recent
survey research finds the primary concern of multinational firms to be the stability
of their investments along these production chains (Kim et al., 2019). Thus, global
economic governance -once tasked primarily with maintaining open markets and al-
lowing free flows of goods- is expected to also assist in furthering the globalization of
production by facilitating capital’s access to productive sectors anywhere and miti-
gating the associated political risk. Evidence of this expansion is found not just on
states’ continuing interest in signing investment treaties, albeit at a lower rate, but
also on the increasingly common inclusion of investment provisions within free trade
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agreements (FTAs) and the emergence of larger economic agreements -such as the
CTPP or CETA- that encompass both trade and investment (Kim et al., 2018).
Much di↵erently, scholars that study the enforcement of investment agreements
through arbitration see the investment regime as undergoing a period of unprece-
dented contestation and reform (Pelc, 2017; Broude et al., 2019; Hindelang and Kra-
jewski, 2016; Aisbett et al., 2018; Morosini and Badin, 2017; De Mestral, 2017). This
diagnose is based on two noticeable trends in reaction to the rise of arbitral disputes.
First, investor protection provisions, especially ISDS, has become one the most hotly
debated issues in contemporary international economic negotiations.2 Second, states
have pursued di↵erent courses of action in reaction to their costly experiences with in-
vestment arbitration. After the claims hit, scholars have recently found, states are less
likely to sign new BITs (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013), more likely to renegotiate them
Haftel and Thompson (2018) and replace them with less pro-investors ones(Broude
et al., 2019), and more likely to increase precision in subsequent BITs (Manger and
Peinhardt, 2017).
These two assessments are at odds with each other and yet they are both grounded
on systematic analysis of empirical evidence. The reason for these contrasting views
is that scholars have tended to look at state actions in isolation. For example, adding
an investment chapter to an FTA has a di↵erent legal and political meaning if that
treaty is more deferential of states’ regulatory autonomy than a previous BIT between
the same countries which the FTA is supposed to replace (Broude et al., 2017).
Conversely, a seemingly radical decision to terminate a series of BITs under which
investors have initiated arbitral disputes would be tempered if, at the same time,
2ISDS: The most toxic acronym in Europe. (17 September, 2015). Politico. See also (Buonanno,
2017)
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states remain willing to enter into new agreements that, although they might be
called something di↵erent, they have nonetheless similar protection standards and
enforcement provisions. Moreover, if states engage in multiple of these endeavours at
the same time, it becomes important who they chose each one in relation to. That
is, a state might be willing to terminate a BIT with a small country from which it
receives little to none FDI yet, with its largest capital suppliers, the choice might be
to maintain the old BIT. In sum, if states are constantly adopting new international
legal commitments and getting rid of old ones, what can be made of the current status
of the international law of foreign investment?
In order to consider the e↵ects of all these alternative actions, I developed an
original country-level measure of states’ international legal autonomy (ILA) in rela-
tion to foreign investment. This measure represents the degree of international legal
constraints placed on a given state over its treatment of foreign investors, with low
scores signaling low autonomy (or high constraints) and high scores signaling high
autonomy (or low constraints). I calculate this measure by first giving a score that
ranges from 0 to 1 to each relationship between the observation country and all other
countries in the world in a given year. The value of each bilateral score depends
on whether there is a treaty in force between them or not. The absence of a treaty
can be due to multiple circumstances: either they never signed one, or they failed to
ratify it, or they terminated it. If there is a treaty in force in a given year, the score
depends on the content of the treaty and how it balances investment protection and
states’ regulatory autonomy. I calculate this property for each treaty using Broude
et al. (2019)’s coding scheme which determines, across a range of provisions, whether
a treaty provides for more or less “state regulatory space”, understood as the ability
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of a state to freely adopt policies and regulations that might a↵ect foreign investors
(I explain this indicator in detail in Section 3.3).
Each bilateral score is then weighted by the proportion of world GDP the partner
represents in a given year and then aggregated in a single country-year ILA score.3
The reason for weighting by world GDP proportion is that for any given country,
full legal autonomy in relation to, for example, the US is more meaningful than in
relation to, for example, Suriname.4 A detailed explanation of how I constructed this
measure is available in Appendix A.1.1.
This measure improves on available indicators and contributes to the literature in
three main ways. First, it provides a score at the country level. Available work lever-
aging empirical variation across treaties to study concepts of interest has produced
measures of treaty-level attributes, namely precision (Manger and Peinhardt, 2017),
enforceability (Allee and Peinhardt, 2011, 2014), or freedom to regulate (Broude et al.,
2018, 2017; Blake, 2013). Di↵erently, ILA is an attribute of the state. Second, it is
a composite measure in the sense that it captures the e↵ects on the country’s overall
exposure to the international investment regime of alternative actions that so far have
been considered in isolation. And third, the measure incorporates the significance of
not signing a treaty with a particular partner. With most of the scholarly attention
paid to what makes countries sign treaties and, once they do, how do they manage
the consequences of their past decisions to commit themselves, there is little atten-
tion paid to the decision to remain unbounded by investment treaties with certain
countries.
3The GDP proportion is calculated by adding all individual GDPs except the observation coun-
try’s.
4Ideally, I would have access the yearly data on the national origin of each country’s entire FDI
stock. However, such data does not exist, thus I use world GDP proportion as a proxy, assuming
larger countries send more FDI than smaller ones.
















Figure 3.1: Histogram of ILA scores
The measure is available for 154 countries and it covers the period from 1989
to 2016.5 Following Jandhyala et al. (2011), 1989 represents the beginning of the
largest expansion period of BITs. From then on, investment treaties became “a
global standard or norm about the treatment of FDI by host countries” (p. 1049).
However, the measure still reflects the e↵ects of decisions made before the cut-o↵
year. That is, a country’s score in 1989 is based on the status of its treaty network in
that year, independently of when the valid treaties were signed. This results in a total
of 4,350 observations. Figure 3.1 shows the frequency of each score in the dataset.
The mean ILA value is .71 and while higher values are more common, there is still
considerable variation. For the most part, higher values correspond to earlier years
when countries were starting to sign treaties. Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2 shows how
the distribution of scores becomes more even as time goes by.
5Countries with populations less than 500,000 were excluded.














































Figure 3.2: Average ILA score by year
Countries’ levels of legal autonomy have experienced an overall downward trend.
Figure 3.2 shows the average ILA score, represented by the solid line and the left Y
axis, together with the cumulative number of treaties signed over the years, repre-
sented by the dashed line and the right Y axis. This reflects the expansion of the
international investment regime and how this evolution is inversely related to the
average value of international legal autonomy for all countries. The more treaties
that have been signed, the more constrains placed on states’ legal ability to regulate
FDI. This downward trend seems to support the assessment from NNTT scholars
that the globalization of production is met with increasing commitments to protect
foreign investments. However, looking at aggregate trends hides a substantial amount
of variation taking place at the individual level.
Looking at ILA scores over time for individual countries reveals di↵erent trajec-
tories. The top plots in Figure 3.3 show ILA scores over the considered period for
the United States and Canada. Their scores are, for the most part, above the mean.
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Figure 3.3: Selected country scores
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This reflects the fact that wealthy states have historically entered into binding in-
vestor protection agreements with developing states but have not been equally prone
to do so with other developed economies. That said, the few instances in which they
have done so are reflected in their scores. The vertical line in both plots represents
the entry into force of NAFTA and while the legal autonomy decreases for both,
the dip is larger for Canada because of the relatively larger size of the US econ-
omy. Canada reflects another big dip in 2014 with the entry into force of its BIT
with China. Because the measure is available until 2016, it does not yet reflect the
entry into force in December 2018 of the CPTPP, which includes large economies
like Australia, Japan and Singapore. Another large dip is looming for Canada when
CETA -the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement- signed in
2016 becomes fully binding. The US would have reflected a similar pattern if TTIP
-the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the EU- had prospered.
Similarly, all things equal, an eventual replacement of NAFTA with the USMCA -the
United StatesMexicoCanada Agreement- signed in November 2018 and which drops
ISDS between Canada and the US should increase both countries’ scores, although
not as much as if NAFTA would have been terminated without a replacement. The
bottom plots in Figure Figure 3.3 show the other side of this story. For example,
Poland and Ukraine went on BIT signing sprees while liberalizing their economies
in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1995, 44 BITs entered into force for Poland,
including its BIT with the US. For Ukraine, the most pronounced dip came in 1996
when its bilateral treaty with the United States became binding.
What I have shown so far is still consistent with a view of the international in-
vestment regime aiding the globalization of production and the expansion of capital
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Figure 3.4: Selected country scores
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into the developing world. Yet the countries displayed in Figure 3.4 paint a di↵er-
ent picture. Brazil has traditionally remained an outsider to the regime. Having
signed several BITs in the 1990s, including with large capital exporters like Germany,
France and the Netherlands, the Brazilian Congress failed to ratify them due to con-
cerns with the enforcement provisions included in the treaties (Campello and Lemos,
2015). After adopting a new model in 2013, Brazil started to sign new agreements.
Yet so far these have only been signed with small African nations -like Malawi and
Ethiopia- or regional partners -like Chile and Colombia- and, as of today, only the
BIT with Angola has entered into force in 2017. Thus, these are not likely to make
a dent in Brazilian scores. If current negotiations for a BIT with India prosper, that
would bring its score down in a noticeable amount. However, given that both coun-
tries have adopted markedly pro-state treaty templates, these countries would not be
sacrificing as much autonomy as if they had kept negotiating over the basis of their
old, pro-investor models.
The other three plots are of countries who took steps to terminate large numbers
of their BITs. Indonesia announced in 2014 -denoted with the vertical line- it would
discontinue of all its existing treaties. This policy, which is still being implemented,
has so far led to the termination of 29 BITs, including those with wealthy capital
exporters like the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland. This brought Indonesia’s
score up in the following years. Similarly, South Africa announced it would start to
terminate its treaties in 2012 and rely on domestic legal protections from then on.
So far it has gotten rid of its BITs with countries like the UK, Germany and Nether-
lands. However, it remains tied to its commitments with large partners, like Italy
and China. After several setbacks in international arbitration, Bolivia’s 2009 consti-
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Figure 3.5: Selected country scores
tutional changes outlawed BITs and gave the government a year to start denouncing
the treaties. The steep upwards turn is a result of discarding its BIT with the US in
2012. In coming years Bolivia’s ILA score should keep rising as its denunciation of
the treaties with the UK and Switzerland becomes e↵ective.6
Figure 3.5 shows the ILA scores over time for India and Ecuador, the two case
studies in the dissertation in addition to the US. Both countries follow the typical
trajectory of developing countries. Ecuador’s scores decrease abruptly after the entry
into force of its BIT with the US in 1997 while India’s downward trend is more gradual.
6The capacity of the parties to terminate a treaty at a given time is subject to each treaty’s own
termination provisions. See section Section 3.4 for more details on how treaties can be terminated.
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Since India never signed a BIT with the US, there is not a comparably sharp decline
until its BIT with China becomes binding in 2007. In terms of the policy reactions,
Ecuador is a case of exit and India a case of revision. Either of these are not evident
in these plots. The reason for this is that the measure is available until 2016 while the
most assertive policies these countries put in place to recover their legal autonomy
from the investment regime did not materialize until later. As I explain in detail in
Chapter 5, the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution included a ban on treaties with ISDS.
Quickly after Ecuador discarded a first batch of treaties but these were BITs with
small economies like Cuba or El Salvador -countries from which little investment had
gone into Ecuador- and thus these result only in a very subtle upward movement in
the country’s ILA score. The more meaningful terminations in terms of the economic
size of the partners -namely the US, France and China- did not come until 2017. In
the case of India, the government announced it would terminate all its treaties after
adopting a new model BIT in 2015, yet only the first one -that of its BIT with the
Netherlands- is reflected in the plot. Since then, India has terminated 60 more BITs.
In sum, as more data on the content of new treaties becomes available, I will be able
to extend the time period covered by the measure and recent years should reflect the
latest steps that Ecuador and India have taken to get rid of their old agreements.
3.1.1 Expectations and data
In Chapter 2, I argued that after facing ISDS disputes, states will attempt to pro-
tect their capacity to regulate foreign investors and I provided an explanation for
variation in the policies that states put in place in pursuance of that goal. In this
section, I start by testing the initial assumption that states react to ISDS experi-
3.1. ISDS experience and international legal autonomy 112
ence in this expected way. That is, that investors’ invoking international investment
treaties through arbitration prompts states to recover some of the sovereignty they
had lost to the investment regime. Yet, the foreign investors initiating these claims
are not stateless entities. Rather, they have preferences over the investment treaty
policies of their home governments and they mobilize to influence it (Kim, 2017; Kim
et al., 2019). Thus, I also expect that countries that are home to multinational firms
initiating ISDS claims against their host states will not scale back their participation
in the regime and rather will deepen it. Thus, the main testable hypotheses derived
so far are:
H1: States that have been involved in more investment disputes as re-
spondents, all else equal, are more likely to recover their international
legal autonomy.
H2: States that have been involved in more investment disputes as home
of claimants, all else equal, are less likely to recover their international
legal autonomy.
I am interested in states’ attempts to reassert their legal autonomy. For this
reason, I do not seek to explain a states’ ILA score in a given year. Rather, I focus on
the change in yearly ILA scores as ISDS experience varies. To capture this specific
variation, I use two alternative dependent variables. First, I created a continuous
variable from the di↵erence between a country’s ILA score in a given year and its
score in the previous year. That is, ILAdift1 = ILAt1   ILAt0. In the analysis of
this variable I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with robust standard
errors. The range of values for this variable goes from -0.36 to 0.2 with a mean value
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of -0.01. A negative mean value suggests that, throughout the considered period,
states have compromised more sovereignty than what they have recovered. My second
dependent variable, ILA dif. sign, is a dichotomous indicator that takes a value of 1
if ILA dif. is positive and 0 if it is zero or negative. That is, this variable captures
all instances of states recovering a degree of international legal autonomy. 64 percent
of the observations are 0s and 36 percent are 1s. Being a binary indicator, for this
variable I perform the same analysis using logistic regression models.
These two variables capture related, yet di↵erent phenomena. After facing costly
ISDS claims, states might still be willing to sign new treaties and thus sacrifice some
of their legal autonomy. Yet they might be more careful abut what kinds of treaties
they sign are who they sign them with. In this sense, states overall ILA score will
still decrease yet not as much as it has in the past or in comparison to countries that
have not experienced ISDS directly and are thus more prone to enter into binding
legal commitments. ILA dif is able capture these nuanced shifts in a country’s level
of involvement in the investment regime. At the same time, this variable cannot
distinguish between states that sacrifice less legal autonomy from those that actually
recover it. To capture this specific variation I rely on ILA dif sign as the dependent
variable.
In terms of independent variables, I use four indicators of state involvement in
ISDS disputes.7 The first one is the cumulative sum of known ISDS disputes initiated
against the country (ISDS resp t-5 ). This quantity is lagged five years because ISDS
7In terms of ISDS experience, I recognize that the way these experiences are perceived is subjective
and context-specific. One dispute, because it challenges a particular policy or regulation a state and
its population care about, can feel like much more of an a↵ront than a series of lower profile disputes.
An alternative indicator of severity could be the amount of money claimed by investors or the size
of the monetary compensation. However, this information is only available for a reduced number of
known disputes. I return to this issue during the qualitative analysis when necessary but otherwise
the number of disputes appears to be an appropriate indicator.
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claims can stretch over multiple years and thus their impact might start to be felt
once governments start confronting the financial and reputational costs of litigation.
The rationale for looking at claims initiated instead of claims lost is that scholars
have found that states are not hurt as much by arbitrators’ final decisions but by
the onset of disputes, especially frivolous ones (Pelc, 2017; Gaukrodger and Gordon,
2012; Allee and Peinhardt, 2011). The second independent variable is the cumulative
sum of known ISDS disputes in which the country is listed as the nationality of the
claimant (ISDS claim t-5 ). This indicator is also lagged five years.8
The third independent variable (Pro-Inv sum t-1 ) is the cumulative sum of dis-
putes that have been decided in favor of investors up to the observation year. That is,
the number of arbitral claims the state has lost. In this case, since the award marks
the end of a dispute that has been ongoing for several years, I only lag this quantity
one year. The last independent variable is the di↵erence between the cumulative sum
of ISDS disputes initiated against the country and the cumulative sum of ISDS dis-
putes in which the country was the home of the claimant (ISDS.di↵ t-5= ISDS resp
t-5 - ISDS claim t-5 ). This indicator captures the overall exposure of a given country
to ISDS, negative values indicate the country is mainly participating in this system as
home to claimants; while positive values indicate that the country is mostly exposed
to ISDS as the target of arbitral claims. I also included three standard control vari-
ables. The economic size of the country as measured by real gross domestic product
(GDP t-1 ), the level of democracy (Polity2 t-1 ) and the size of the population.9
8It should be noted that given the possibility of “treaty shopping” (when a firm uses a subsidiary
in a country with a more favorable treaty to file a claim) the true home state of a claimant cannot
always be identified. This is most notable in the case of The Netherlands since Dutch is the second
most common nationality claimed by investors in ISDS disputes.
9I omitted two important control variables for testing hypothesis related to investment treaties.
The models are missing indicators of both inward and outward FDI stocks. I omitted these variables
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3.1.2 Results and discussion
Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show results for six models with both country and
year fixed e↵ects. Country fixed-e↵ect estimators are the workhorse of cross-country
analysis because they significantly reduce the influence of omitted time-invariant
country characteristics. Year fixed e↵ects capture the influence of aggregate trends.
Results for OLS models using ILA dif. as the dependent variable are displayed on
the left columns and results for logistic models using the binary ILA dif. sign can
be found on the right columns. Model 1 suggests that the cumulative number of
arbitral disputes against the country is positively related to the change in yearly ILA
scores. This lends support to hypothesis 1. As states accumulate more experience as
respondents, they seek to recover greater (or give up lesser) amounts of their legal
autonomy. The model suggests that, all else equal, an increment in ISDS resp t-5
by one dispute is associated with an increment of .002 in the di↵erence between one
year’s score to the next one’s. This might seem a small e↵ect but it should be re-
membered the observed values in the dependent variable range from -0.36 to 0.2 and
that the maximum observed value of claims against a country is 54.
The results also suggest that the cumulative sum of claims initiated by domestic
firms is negatively related to the di↵erence in scores. This supports hypothesis 2. All
else equal, states that are home to firms filing larger amounts of ISDS claims against
other states will sacrifice more regulatory autonomy to the investment regime. The
substantive e↵ect of one additional dispute as home state is smaller than for disputes
for three main reasons. First, data is often missing (adding these variables raises the number of
deleted observations from 134 to 940). Second, both variables are highly correlated with each other.
Third, and most importantly, it could be the case that decisions to reclaim or to further sacrifice
legal autonomy make a given country less or more attractive as an FDI destination. If that is the
case, including FDI might introduce endogeneity bias. That said, I estimated the same models
including these variables and the results remained unchanged. See Table A.1 in Appendix A.4.1.
3.1. ISDS experience and international legal autonomy 116
as host country yet the range of observed values is larger, with a maximum of 118
disputes. Model 2 also supports hypothesis 1. In logistic regression models, the sign
of a coe cient can be interpreted directly. A positive coe cient suggests that as the
ISDS record of a state grows, so does the probability of the change in ILA score being
positive. Knowing the magnitude of that change requires calculating odds ratios by
exponentiating the coe cients. The odds ratio for ISDS resp t-5 is 1.038, meaning one
unit increase in the number of disputes increases the odds of the dependent variable
taking a value of 1 by 3.8%. Unlike in the previous Model, the sum of claims lodged
by national firms is not related to the sign of the change in score in a statistically
significant way. This could suggest that home firms are not able to determine whether
their home country keeps compromising its legal autonomy or starts recovering it, yet
they might be able to have a say in the magnitude of that change.
Table 3.2 shows results for the models using the cumulative sum of lost arbitral
disputes as the main predictor for ISDS experience. In model 3, the coe cient has
the expected sign and it is statistically significant. In substantive terms, the results
can be interpreted as an increment of .005 in the di↵erence between yearly ILA scores
per each additional arbitral loss. In model 4, the sign and magnitude of the coe -
cient indicates the odds of the change in ILA score being positive increases by 6.4%
with each additional dispute lost. At the same time, the cumulative sum of disputes
initiated by home firms, however, does not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance when the number of lost claims is added to either model. This suggests
that firms benefiting from these legal protections can still get their home governments
to continue deepening their ties to the investment regime, even in the face of large
numbers of disputes initiated against the state. Yet once arbitrators decide in favor of
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Table 3.1: Results - Models 1 and 2
Dependent variable:
ILA dif. ILA dif. sign
OLS logistic
(1) (2)
ISDS resp t-5 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤
(0.0004) (0.018)
ISDS claim t-5 -0.0003⇤⇤⇤ 0.008
(0.0001) (0.011)
GDP t-1 -0.005⇤ -0.372⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.178)
Polity2 t-1 0.0002 0.054⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.017)





Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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investors, the e↵ects of these losses override other considerations. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that, especially for large countries that can sustain expensive litigation ef-
forts, a negative ruling can have a strong impact. Judge Abner Mikva, a retired DC
circuit court judge that served as one of the arbitrators in the first ISDS case against
the US10, recalls a meeting with o cials from the US Department of Justice (DOJ)
soon after his appointment in which the DOJ o cials warned him about the future
of NAFTA if the US were to lose this case.11
The last two models, shown in Table 3.3, use the di↵erence between the sum
of claims initiated against the country and the sum of claims initiated by home
firms against other states as a measure of overall exposure to ISDS, with positive
values indicating overall exposure from the side of the respondent and negative values
indicating exposure from the side of the claimant. In model 5, exposure to ISDS is
positively correlated with a change in ILA score. One unit change in the predictor
-either by one more claim against the county or one less claim initiated by home firms-
results in an increase of .001 in the di↵erence between yearly ILA scores. Considering
the range of observed values in this predictor goes from -104 to 54, the size of the e↵ect
can reach substantially significant magnitudes. Model 6, however, does not produce
a statistically significant coe cient for the main predictor. This is consistent with
the results produced by the two other logit models. Neither models 2 or 4 found a
significant correlation between claims initiated by home firms and the direction of the
change in ILA scores. There, variation is better explained by the predictors focusing
10Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID (NAFTA) Case No.
ARB (AF)/98/3, Award on Merits (June 26, 2003), IIC 254 (2003).
11“You know, judge,” he was told by the DOJ o cials, “if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA.”
“Well, if you want to put pressure on me,” Judge Mikva replied, “then that does it.” Audiotape:
Symposium on Environmental Law and the Judiciary, Pace Law School (December 6-8, 2004). The
narrative provided on this audiotape is more fully recounted in Schneiderman (2010).
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Table 3.2: Results - Models 3 and 4
Dependent variable:
ILA dif. ILA dif. sign
OLS logistic
(3) (4)
Pro-Inv sum t-1 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤
(0.001) (0.062)
ISDS claim t-5 -0.0002 0.012
(0.0001) (0.011)
GDP t-1 -0.004 -0.366⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.178)
Polity2 t-1 0.0002 0.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.017)





Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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in costs for the country, not benefits for the country’s firms. Thus, it makes sense
that looking at the di↵erence between claims would not be able to explain instances of
positive changes in levels of legal autonomy, because this variable cannot distinguish
between situations in which, for example, states have not faced any disputes against
them from those in which they have but they cancel out with those initiated by their
home firms.
In terms of the control variables, for the most part, economic size as measured
by GDP is negatively related to the change in ILA score. This suggests that, as
economies get bigger they become more interested in diversifying their potential FDI
sources and destinations -thus they want more treaty partners- and they also be-
come more attractive to others as both sources and destinations for FDI -thus more
partners want to sign treaties with them. Di↵erently, the democratic quality of the
regime as measured by Polity2 scores, was consistently positive and statistically sig-
nificant in the logit models explaining the direction of the change in ILA scores.
This relates to theories of international investment treaties as credible commitments.
More specifically, to arguments that see authoritarian regimes as benefiting the most
from investment treaties, since there is a greater institutional deficit in autocracies
for supranational institutions -in this case BITs- to compensate (Arias et al., 2017).
This does not explain why democracies would be more likely to undo some of these
commitments but it suggests that, if particular reasons to do so emerge, they will be
less constrained by the idea that strong international commitments are necessary to
reassure foreign investors.
In this section I presented a novel measure of state international legal autonomy to
regulate foreign investment and found support for two fundamental assumptions of my
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Table 3.3: Results - Models 5 and 6
Dependent variable:
ILA dif. ILA dif. sign
OLS logistic
(5) (6)
ISDS.di↵ t-5 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.005
(0.0002) (0.011)
GDP t-1 -0.006⇤⇤ -0.410⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.177)
Polity2 t-1 0.0001 0.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.017)





Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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theory. First, that states exposed to the costliest aspect of international investment
treaties, ISDS disputes, will attempt to recover some amount of their legal autonomy
or will try to sacrifice lesser amounts of it. Second, that focusing on ISDS purely from
the receiving end of the claims, as most of the existing literature does, is only a part of
the story. The firms behind these legal disputes are some of the largest multinational
enterprises in the world and they often pressure their home governments to pursue
treaty policies that suit their interests. In the next sections, I individually analyze
each of the state actions that can a↵ect a country’s legal autonomy regarding FDI
-signing, designing, and terminating treaties- and test a series of expectations about
how ISDS experience a↵ects these policies across states.
3.2 ISDS experience and treaty signature
So far I have shown that exposure to ISDS leads states to recover -or to become
stingier with- their autonomy to regulate foreign investment under international law.
This section explains one way in which states can a↵ect their overall level of legal
autonomy, and perhaps the most fundamental one, which is their willingness to keep
signing BITs. Refusing to sign more treaties will not increase a states’ legal autonomy
unless it is paired up with more active measures like terminating or replacing old
treaties but it stop it from decreasing further.12
As Figure 3.6 shows, the number of new treaties signed each year has slowed
down considerably since the 2000s. A straightforward explanation for this decreasing
12Given that the dyadic scores that inform the final ILA scores are weighted by the economic size
of each partner, the only scenario in which not signing more treaties could increase a country’s ILA
score is if another state with whom the observation country has yet to sign a treaty experiences
substantial economic growth over time and thus pulls the overall score upwards.
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Figure 3.6: Number of treaties signed by year
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signature rate is that states have already entered into all the treaties they had an
interest in signing (Saban et al., 2010). That is, the network of investment treaties
is saturated and thus states have no more partners to sign meaningful treaties with.
However, there are political reasons for not wanting to sign a treaty that are unrelated
to the economic significance of the relationship. For example, the United States never
signed a BIT with large recipients of American FDI like Brazil, India or South Africa.
Moreover, as I show in Chapter 6, American companies repeatedly expressed their
preference for an investment treaty with India. Thus, I argue the particular evolution
of ISDS adds another layer of political considerations regarding the desirability of
more investment treaties.
3.2.1 Expectations and data
This section explores how has the rise of investment treaty arbitration a↵ected gov-
ernments’ decisions to participate in investment treaties. States can reach two con-
clusions from their involvement in ISDS disputes, depending on the nature of that
involvement. Most attention has been paid to the consequences of states finding
themselves on the responding side of claims, losing millions of dollars in awards and
legal fees. From this side, one logical response from states that want to avoid more
setbacks in the future is to stop signing them. Poulsen and Aisbett (2013) have found
that developing country governments tend to sign lower numbers of treaties after fac-
ing their first ISDS dispute. However, in the same way that host states learn about
the costs of the treaties, investors also learn how these treaties bolster their ability
to impose costs on their host states when faced with policies that hurt them. Thus,
they prefer their home countries keep enlarging the system of international agreements
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that protects them as they expand their own production networks. I expect states to
be exposed to these incentives di↵erently. Developing states are mostly recipients of
FDI, thus ISDS experience will matter mostly from the perspective of the respondent.
Developed countries are both senders and recipients of FDI, thus I expect negative
ISDS experiences as host states to not dissuade them from signing more treaties. As
I examine in the next sections, developed states are more likely to respond to their
own ISDS disputes as hosts in di↵erent ways. The following hypotheses reflect my
expectations about how the di↵erent e↵ects of ISDS a↵ect states’ willingness to sign
investment treaties:
H3.a: The e↵ects of ISDS experience on the probability of treaty signa-
ture varies for developed and developing countries.
H3.b: In developing countries, as the number of ISDS cases against a
state increases, the probability of signing an investment treaty decreases.
In developed states, the number of ISDS disputes against the state has no
e↵ect on the probability of the country signing an investment treaty.
H3.c: In developed countries, as the number of ISDS cases initiated by
domestic firms increases, also does the probability of signing an investment
treaty.
I test these expectations against a dataset consisting of country-year observations
of all states with populations over half a million that have signed at least a total of
five treaties during the period 1989 to 2018.13 This results in 4,192 observations. I
13The rationale for excluding countries that have signed fewer than 5 treaties during the considered
period is that, for idiosyncratic reasons, these might be countries that were already unlikely to sign
BITs in the first place. This decisions only resulted in dropping 14 countries from the original
dataset, leaving a total 139 unique countries.
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also estimate the same models against two subsamples of developed and developing
countries as represented by their status as OECD members or non-members. Based
on UNCTAD’s data base of international investment agreements, my main dependent
variable is a binary indicator that takes a 1 if a country signed at least one investment
treaty in a given year and a 0 otherwise. 49% of the observations are 1s. An alternative
indicator of treaty signature is the count of treaties signed each year. I chose to use a
dummy variable because 40% of the observations for which the dummy variable gets a
1 correspond to years in which the country signed only one treaty. Moreover, focusing
on the willingness to keep signing treaties independently of the amount, rather than
the total number of treaties signed, is a stricter test of the argument. Large numbers
of treaties per year were common during the initial expansion of the investment
regime (see Figure 3.6). As the number of possible partners decreases, it would have
been unlikely for governments to keep sign treaties by the dozen, independently of
the growth in ISDS disputes. Thus, I assume states were already going to sign less
treaties as time goes by (Saban et al., 2010) but they would still face opportunities for
entering into new agreements. Because my dependent variable is a binary indicator, I
use a logistic regression as the estimator. Appendix A.4.2 shows results for additional
models replacing the dependent variable with a binary indicator that takes a 1 if the
country ratified at least a treaty on a given year and 0 otherwise.
My independent variables are the lagged cumulative count of ISDS disputes against
the state (ISDS resp t-5 ) and the lagged count of ISDS disputes initiated by domestic
firms (ISDS claim t-5 ). Regarding control variables, I included economic size prox-
ied by the log of the previous year’s gross domestic product (GDP t-1 ). All else
equal, I expect larger economies to sign more treaties. They are, at the same time,
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more attractive locations to FDI and more interested in diversifying destinations for
their own outward investment. To control for saturation in the global network of
investment treaties, I include the cumulative sum of treaties signed by all countries
in the dataset up to the previous year (World treaties t-1 ). Additionally, I include
the cumulative number of treaties in force for the country up to the previous year
(Country treaties t-1 ). I expect both of these variable to be negatively related to
the probability of signature. I also control for a country’s FDI inflows (Inward FDI
t-1 ) and the democratic character of the regime as indicated by the country’s Polity2
score (Polity2 t-1 ).
3.2.2 Results and discussion
Table 3.4 shows results for three logistic models with country fixed e↵ects. Model
1 is estimated against the entire dataset while models 2 and 3 use the OECD and
non-OECD subsamples respectively. Results support hypotheses 3a and 3b. When
the entire dataset is considered, the record of disputes against the state is negatively
related to the probability of signature in a statistically significant way. Transformed
to the odds ratio, the coe cient indicates that each additional dispute against the
country decreases the odds of signature by 6.4%. In the developing states subsample,
model 3, the record of ISDS disputes against the state is also negatively related to
the probability of treaty signature and the impact is more sizable than in model 1.
Each additional dispute initiated against a developing country decreases the odds of
a developing country signing a BIT by 12.6%. The developed country sub-sample,
model 2, shows no significant e↵ect on the likelihood of signature for the number of
ISDS disputes against the country.
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Full dataset OECD Non-OECD
ISDS resp t-5 -0.067⇤⇤⇤ 0.066 -0.135⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.041) (0.035)
ISDS claim t-5 -0.049⇤⇤⇤ -0.059⇤⇤⇤ -0.026
(0.016) (0.017) (0.101)
GDP t-1 -0.058 -4.070⇤⇤⇤ -0.025
(0.141) (1.317) (0.147)
World treaties t-1 0.0002⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤ 0.0002⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Country treaties t-1 -0.071⇤⇤⇤ -0.075⇤⇤⇤ -0.064⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.015) (0.008)
Inward FDI t-1 0.00003 0.0002⇤ 0.00001
(0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00003)
Polity2 t-1 0.040⇤⇤ 0.174 0.033⇤
(0.017) (0.166) (0.017)
Constant 2.241⇤ 52.700⇤⇤⇤ 1.890
(1.333) (17.206) (1.366)
Observations 3,649 724 2,925
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
At the same time, results do not support hypothesis 3c. Models 1 and 2 produce
unexpected results for the record of disputes initiated by home firms as these appear
to be negatively related to the probability signing treaties in a statistically significant
way. Since this variable does not seem to have statistically significant e↵ects in model
3, it could be assumed most of the e↵ect registered in model 1 is a product of the
developed states in the dataset. The sign and significance of ISDS disputes by home
firms could be reflecting the fact that countries with high values for this variable are
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likely to have multiple treaties in place, which are needed for firms to invoke them
often. That is, this coe cient could be picking up saturation e↵ects. However, the
number of disputes against the country would not be reflecting saturation e↵ects in
the same way since developed countries have been sued, for the most part, under a few
agreements, most notably NAFTA and the Energy Charter. For example, investors
brought all disputes but one against Canada under NAFTA. Yet Canadian investors
brought disputes against other states under eighteen di↵erent BITs. That said, as I
come back to in the concluding section, it is likely that the particular e↵ects of ISDS
experience from the side of the claimant and its e↵ects from the side of the respondent
are di cult to isolate through statistical techniques when they occur simultaneously.
Qualitative analysis of the US experience under NAFTA in Chapter 4 sheds light on
the policy-making process in this particular context.
Many considerations go into deciding to negotiate and sign an investment treaty.
At a fundamental level, considerations are economic. That is, what will be the re-
sulting increase in FDI inflows between the parties and what new sectors will capital
be able to reach. Yet there are also political considerations in terms of how much
sovereignty the parties are willing to give away (Blake, 2013). While states have al-
ways been mindful of sovereignty costs when joining international agreements, findings
from this section suggest direct experience with lengthy and costly arbitral disputes
adds to concerns about state autonomy under international investment treaties. Yet
these heightened sovereignty concerns are not equally powerful across states. Devel-
oping countries think twice before committing to binding and enforceable treaties that
proved costly. Di↵erently, developed states do not become BIT-shy in the aftermath
of ISDS disputes. Investment treaties are still attractive instruments of protection
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for their multinational firms.
3.3 ISDS experience and treaty content
The previous section analyzed how the rise of investment treaty arbitration has af-
fected governments’ decisions to participate in investment treaties and suggested that
not all states are equally likely to sign BITs after experiencing costly ISDS disputes.
Developed states, the previous results suggest, are not less likely to sign investment
treaties as claims against them accumulate. This, however, does not mean their
treaty policies go unchanged. In this section I look at how ISDS experience leads
states to change the content of the treaties they sign and I find that, as exposure to
ISDS grows, wealthy countries tend to sign treaties that better protect their ability
to regulate.
3.3.1 Expectations and data
Understood as hand-tying devices, investment treaties allow states to make credible
commitments to foreign investors that they will treat them fairly and predictably. The
theory of rational design of international institutions sees the content of these agree-
ments as reflecting this basic function (Koremenos, 2016). For example, the reason
why most treaties give investors direct access to arbitration -instead of, for example,
making disputes a state-to-state matter as in the WTO- is that this particular type
of enforcement mechanism is necessary to give risk-averse investors a guarantee that
their investments would be secure. Yet even governments interested in attracting,
and specially retaining, foreign capital might at points face political and economic
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incentives to infringe on investor’s rights (Wellhausen, 2014). Investment treaties, as
any other instrument of international law, involve a trade-o↵. Hand-tying can make
states more attractive to FDI but it also compromises their ability to adopt policies
that might hurt investors’ profits. As mentioned in the previous section, this trade-o↵
is essential to the decision to enter into a BIT. But, as I show in this section, protec-
tion v. autonomy considerations do not end once states decide to commit. They are
also central to decisions about what to commit to. That is, they are central to treaty
design choices.
Because of its focus on varieties of cooperation problems, rational design empha-
sizes similarities among investment treaties -aimed at resolving s specific cooperation
problem- and their di↵erences with treaties in other areas -where problems in the way
of cooperation are di↵erent. Yet there is substantial variation among BITs themselves
in ways that can a↵ect foreign investors’ ability to stand up to harmful government
actions by portraying them as violations of international law (Allee and Peinhardt,
2014; Blake, 2013). The US government, in particular, has been mindful of this in
its treaty choices. US negotiators are aware of the ways in which the content of in-
vestment treaties can encroach on states’ regulatory autonomy and sees themselves
as leaders in the development of regulation-friendly provisions. According to the US
Trade Representative in 2014, “the United States wouldn’t negotiate away its right
to regulate.” Provisions included in the treaties signed by the US:
“are di↵erent - and stronger - than the provisions in many other invest-
ment agreements in which the United States is not a participant. It’s
important to understand how U.S. agreements di↵er from other agree-
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ments that do not meet the same standards.”14
In sum, variation in the design of international investment treaties is neither ran-
dom nor insignificant. Drafting choices reflect the preferences of the negotiating
parties about the extent of rights provided to foreign investors, the scope of invest-
ment to be covered by the treaty, and the exposure of host states to an independent
enforcement mechanism. Di↵erent explanations for this variation are available. For
example, Blake (2013) argues that BITs’ flexibility is a product of time horizons.
Governments with long time horizons expect to govern in the future, anticipate that
conditions may shift over time, and therefore seek institutional designs that will af-
ford them greater freedom to modify policies in response to changing economic and
political conditions. Di↵erently, Allee and Peinhardt (2014) explain di↵erences in the
degree of enforceability across treaties through a mix of rational design and power
politics. They argue that when developed countries sign BITs -that is, countries who
are home to numerous MNEs- those tend to be more favorable to investors than those
signed by developing states. That is, understanding how the design of the treaty can
make it more or less constraining of host states’ regulatory powers, capital exporters
look for treaties that will suit the interests of their firms. I argue, more specifically,
that when their own ISDS experience is accounted for, the relationship is reversed
and developed countries start signing treaties that are relatively less favorable to
investors.
Broude et al. (2019) analyzed the relationship between ISDS experience and treaty
content from a learning perspective. They argue that being involved in arbitration
disputes informs governments’ assessments of the costs and benefits of their legal
14United States Trade Representative, The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (March
2014).
3.3. ISDS experience and treaty content 133
commitments and prompts a search for greater autonomy. They show this by analyz-
ing a sample of replaced BITs and comparing their content with the content of their
replacements.15 I line with my expectations, Broude et. al. find that experience with
ISDS leads to greater regulatory autonomy in renegotiated treaties. However, their
analysis considers ISDS experience as the total amount of disputes between both par-
ties and does not di↵erentiate between them in any meaningful way. Di↵erently, I do
not expect ISDS experiences to have homogeneous e↵ects across groups of countries.
For historical reasons, developed states are rarely considered in their role as hosts
to FDI in the investment treaty literature. Treaties were originally North South
devices, part of an e↵ort reduce political risk beyond the developed world and thus
facilitate the expansion of capital in that direction. Yet, developed states are better
described as dual states; capital importers and exporters. Thus, dual states are caught
between two competing interests when it comes to BITs. From the position of FDI
receivers, they have incentives to ditch treaty provisions that can be used to challenge
domestic regulations. From the position of being home to multinational firms, they
also face demands from these powerful constituents who prefer ample and enforceable
protections they can invoke to challenge regulations that hurt their own investments
abroad. Thus, I expect that once developed states get hit with arbitral claims, rather
than stop signing BITs -as shown in the previous section- or terminating their BITs
-as shown in the next section- they innovate in their treaty drafting. They produce
treaty texts that better protect their regulatory space, even if this means that their
own national investors will be hurt by the increased expansion of their treaty partners’
ability to regulate. The following hypothesis follows:
15They also consider instances in which treaties were terminated with no replacement. In that
case, the balance between investor protection and policy autonomy changes to maximum autonomy.
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H4.a: As the number of ISDS disputes initiated against developed states
increases, they will sign treaties that better protect their regulatory powers
than those signed by developing states.
H4.b: The record of ISDS disputes against developing states has no bear-
ing on the content of the treaties they sign.
Existing work by Manger and Peinhardt (2017) has found evidence in support
of this hypothesis. Capital-exporting states tend to include more elaborate and less
ambiguous language in their treaties after their involvement with ISDS tribunals as
respondents. In their view, this is due to the fact that figuring out how to increase
precision requires substantial state capacity -i.e. technical expertise and coordina-
tion between multiple state agencies- in order to carefully draft each provision in
the light of past tribunal decisions. While relative abundance of technical resources
might be important for states to act on their incentives to review their treaty models;
an account purely based on the availability of expertise misses much of the political
contestation that ISDS disputes generate within developed states. The most vigorous
opposition to international investment treaties and ISDS are civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs). For CSOs working on environmental, social justice, consumer pro-
tection and public health issues, investment treaties allow firms to use international
tribunals to challenge laws they fought hard to win through democratic political pro-
cesses at home. Thus, I expect the size of the organized civil society in a country to
have some impact on the policy-making process. However, I expect this relation to
be conditional on ISDS experience. CSOs are better able to have an influence when
the country itself has been directly hit with ISDS claims than when they warn about
potential legal consequences that have not yet materialized.
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H5: As ISDS experience increases, states with larger number of CSOs
will sign treaties that better protect their regulatory powers.
I perform the analysis on a dataset of 2,288 bilateral investment treaties signed
between 1989 and 2016 by 170 unique countries. Each row in the dataset is a treaty
and each column provides information either about the treaty’s content, the parties
or the dyad. Data on the content of each treaty comes from UNCTAD’s Investment
Division Mapping Project.16
3.3.2 Dependent variable
To capture variation in treaty content regarding the degree of regulatory autonomy
reserved for host states, I leverage di↵erences in the content of investment treaties. I
consider di↵erences that a↵ect the degree of protection o↵ered to foreign investors as
well as the ability of investors to challenge actions by their hosts states that hurt their
profits. Appendix A.3 provides a more detailed description of each set of provisions,
their function within treaties and how they relate to host state regulatory autonomy.
Recent years have seen an increase in scholarly interest on variation in investment
treaty content. Scholars have looked at di↵erent aspects of treaties, like delegation,
enforceability, precision, and concern with state regulatory space. ? create a measure
of delegation by looking at whether the treaty indicates none, one, or more arbitration
venues. In their 2014 paper, they expand this analysis to include two more provi-
sions: whether the treaty includes ISDS and whether blanket consent to arbitration
16This project involved the coding of over 2,500 international investment treaties
signed between 1959 to 2016. Treaties are coded by Law students and pro-
fessors from forty-five universities around the world following common guide-
lines. UNCTAD’s Mapping Project Description & Methodology. Available at:
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Mapping%20Project%20Description-
%20and%20Methodology.pdf.
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is already provided in the treaty. They then create a measure, based o↵ the coding
of these three provisions, of how enforceable treaties are. While these studies exhibit
important things about drafting choices, I am interested in how a much larger number
of provisions relate to one another. For example, states can consent to arbitration
for all disputes arising with investors covered by a given treaty. This blanket consent
is an important indicator of how much a state is willing to let investors challenge
its policies through ISDS. However, the states can also include provisions qualifying
the scope of that consent, like excluding certain policy areas from ISDS, as Australia
pushed for during TPP negotiations regarding anti-smoking regulations.
Manger and Peinhardt (2017) consider a large number of provisions, but are only
concerned with their presence or absence as this indicates varying levels of precision.
They use text-matching tools to count how many provisions are present in each treaty
and find that precision has increased over time -which they argue- is a result of learn-
ing from experience ISDS disputes. This assumes that more precision means states are
more concerned with limiting arbitrators’ ability to make expansive interpretations
that provide investors with greater rights than what was intended by the signatories.
This means their measure of precision may be reflecting a changing concern with
preserving policy space. While I agree with this proposition, I do not consider all
provisions to be equally significant in relaying information regarding policy space.
Treaties are collections of individual provisions. A treaty might have some pro-
visions that are deferential to host states and at the same time include others that
are more protective of foreign investors. For this reason, I use a measure that al-
lows me to capture the degree to which the treaty as a whole restricts or safeguards
states’ regulatory space, understood as the ability to freely legislate and implement
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regulations in given public policy domains under the given treaty. In order to pro-
duce such measure, I calculate a policy space score for each treaty in my dataset
applying Broude et al. (2018)’s coding guidelines.17 The guidelines include forty-two
indicators which can obtain di↵erent values between zero (0) and one (1) with lower
values representing less deference to states’ regulatory space and higher values repre-
senting more. The value of each indicator is determined by the absence, presence or
specific combinations of di↵erent provisions that any investment treaty could have.18
Each treaty’s score is calculated by adding values for all individual indicators and
then re-scaling the resulting number so that the lowest observed value equals 0 and
the highest observed values equals 1, with a mean observed value of .28. Figure 3.7
shows the relative frequency of observed regulatory space values. Being a continuous
dependent variable, I use ordinary least squares regression as the estimator, with the
added advantage of making for a straightforward interpretation of the coe cients.
3.3.3 Independent and control variables
The previous hypotheses establish relationships between attributes of states -economic
development, ISDS experience and CSO presence- and the content of the treaties they
sign. Because each treaty considered has two parties, there are two of each state-level
indicators. Thus, I make distinction between the parties by calculating which of the
17The authors developed these guidelines to compare renegotiated treaties with the ones they
replaced. I applied the guidelines to all bilateral investment treaties and some FTA investment
chapters included in UNCTAD’s content database.
18The inclusion of the di↵erent provisions is not valued equally. For example, including in the
preamble a reference to environmental protection (worth .25) does not carry the same legal weight as
an exception for policies adopted for the protection of the environment (worth .5). Thus, including
either of these provisions does not contribute to the treaty’s final score in the same way. For the
complete coding guidelines see section Appendix A.3.4 in Appendix A.3


















Figure 3.7: Histogram of observed regulatory space values
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parties would be the host and home state in that particular FDI relationship.19 This
distinction, however, fails to capture nuances in the relative level of development of
the treaty partners. For example, Venezuela is coded as a home state in relation
to Bolivia in the same way the United States is. To account for these di↵erences,
in addition to using the full sample of treaties I also I conduct the analysis against
two sub-samples of treaties. The first one includes only North-South treaties, that is
treaties in which the party identified as the home state belongs to the OECD and the
second one includes only South-South treaties in which none of the parties belongs to
the OECD. Following hypothesis 4, I expect the ISDS experience of the home state
in the North-South sub-sample to be a better predictor of more policy-space minded
BITs than the ISDS experience of home states in the South-South sample.
As in the models shown before, I use two indicators of each treaty partner’s ISDS
experience. The lagged cumulative sum of ISDS disputes against the country (ISDS
resp t-5 ) and the lagged cumulative sum of ISDS disputes initiated by home firms
against other countries (ISDS claim t-5 ). In Appendix A.4.3 I include models using
the cumulative sums of ISDS disputes lost by each treaty partner and the combined
number of ISDS disputes initiated against both treaty partners. For an indicator of
CSO presence I use a count of organizations focusing only on environmental issues.
The count is calculated from data gathered by the Yearbook of International Orga-
nizations.20 Even in countries with well organized civil societies, not all CSOs are
equally likely to mobilize around investment treaties and ISDS and, more importantly,
19The identification of home and host states follows guidelines used by Allee and Peinhardt (2014).
The country with the highest GDP is coded as the home except when the country with the lowest
GDP is an OECD member and the partner country is not and when the GDP per capita of the
country with the lowest GDP is more than three times that of the partner country.
20These data are available from The Yearbook of International Organizations, at
http://www.uia.org/ybio. For other articles that use this measure see (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui,
2005).
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not all have equal expertise on international investment law. For example, Argentina’s
civil society organizations have been highly influential for the adoption of progressive
human rights laws but there is not a comparable organized movement in the area
of foreign investment disputes. While CSOs with anti-ISDS platforms have wider
interests than environmental issues, qualitative evidence of CSO mobilization shows
that environmental organizations have been among the earliest to mobilize against
ISDS during international negotiations. A common fear among ISDS detractors is
that MNEs will invoke investment treaties to portray environmental regulations that
hurt their profits as unfair and discriminatory acts.
As control variables I include, for each party, the log of the GDP as an indicator
of economic size (GDP t-1 ) and a measure of FDI inflows (Inward FDI t-1 ). It is
important to control for the potential e↵ect of these variables since, otherwise, ISDS
disputes could simply be reflecting the fact that states with larger economies and more
FDI are more likely to be sued because they host larger numbers of foreign firms. I
also control for the level of democracy from Polity (Polity2 t-1 ). Also, Latin American
countries like Ecuador and Bolivia were some of the earliest to criticize the invest-
ment regime and the United States and Canada have been prominent advocates for
reform since their experience under NAFTA. To control for the influence of regional
trends I add a dummy variable that scores 1 if at least one treaty party is from the
Americas, and 0 otherwise (Americas). All models include year fixed e↵ects. How-
ever, to account temporal trends and the di↵usion of relatively state-friendly treaties
(Hindelang and Krajewski, 2016), in Appendix A.4.3 I include a model without year
fixed e↵ects and with a moving average of the policy space score of all treaties signed
the year before.
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3.3.4 Results and discussion
Table 3.5 shows results for three models with year fixed e↵ects and robust standard
errors.21 The models vary in terms of the sample used which is identified at the top
of each model column. According to hypotheses 4a and 4b, ISDS experience is not
equally received across levels of economic development. It is developed states who
react to being hit with claims by foreign investors by drafting more host state-friendly
treaties. Considering the models together lends support to expectations that negative
ISDS experience by itself is not enough explanation for variation in treaty content.
As expected, the model using the full sample (model 1) does not produce statistically
significant coe cients for the number of disputes against either the home or host state
in each treaty. This reflects the fact that, when all observations are considered, the
countries identified as home states are not necessarily developed countries. However,
when the same model is estimated using a sub-sample of only North-South treaties
in which home countries are developed states (model 2), the coe cient for the sum
of disputes against the home state becomes positive and statistically significant but
the same indicator for the host state does not.
In substantive terms, the magnitude of the change in the treaty’s regulatory space
value for each additional arbitral dispute is .009. Given the concentration of ob-
served values along a small range (Figure 3.7), as disputes accumulate the e↵ects
can become sizable. Furthermore, the model using the sub-sample of South-South
treaties (model 3) does not produce statistically significant coe cients for ISDS ex-
21To keep tables clear, I did not report the year dummies. However, I should note the results
suggest the presence of temporal trends, with coe cients for years 1993 to 2004 being negative and
statistically significant -although not in the South-South sub-sample- and the coe cients for the
years 2015 and 2016 being positive and statistically significant. In a similar vein, models reported
in Appendix A.4.3, Table A.3 include the average policy space score of treaties signed in the year
before instead of year fixed e↵ects. This variable is also positive and statistically significant.
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perience as a respondent for either party in the treaty. Additional models reported
in Appendix A.4.3 Table A.4 use the sum of lost ISDS cases as the main independent
variable. These models produce similar results; only the count of disputes that ended
with a pro-investor ruling for the home state in the North-South sub-sample obtain
a positive coe cient that is statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly,
models reported in Table A.5 look at the e↵ects of the combined ISDS experience of
both parties on treaty content. The total number of arbitral disputes for both parties
is positive and statistically significant only when North-South treaties are considered.
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(Full sample) (North-South) (South-South)
ISDS resp t-5 home 0.003 0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
ISDS resp t-5 host 0.003 -0.004 0.015
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014)
ISDS claim t-5 home 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ -0.016⇤
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009)
ISDS claim t-5 host -0.004 -0.014 -0.016
(0.004) (0.025) (0.020)
GDP t-1 home 0.002 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
GDP t-1 host 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Inward FDI t-1 home -0.00000⇤ -0.00001⇤⇤⇤ 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Inward FDI t-1 host 0.00000 -0.00001⇤ 0.00001⇤
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001)
CSO t-1 home -0.001⇤⇤⇤ -0.0004⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001)
CSO t-1 host -0.003⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤ -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Polity2 t-1 home -0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.006 -0.001
(0.0003) (0.004) (0.0005)
Polity2 t-1 host 0.00000 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Americas 0.046⇤⇤⇤ 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 0.226⇤⇤⇤ 0.124 0.272⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.082) (0.080)
Observations 1,777 933 789
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.417 0.233
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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The positive and statistically significant e↵ect of ISDS claim t-5 home in models
1 and 2 is surprising, yet it is consistent with findings from Broude et al. (2019).
Their analysis of renegotiated treaties indicates that, when parties decide to discard
an old treaty, countries with higher numbers of ISDS disputes by home firms tend
to replace those BITs with instruments that provide them more policy space. I find
that states whose investors are avid users of ISDS tend to sign treaties with less
investor-friendly content in general, not only when they are replacing older BITs.
Broude et al. assume this is a product of demands from these states’ partners. For
example, that any country re-negotiating a BIT with the US, whose investors had
filed more arbitral disputes than any other country, might require more safeguards
against potential claims by American investors than when negotiating with countries
with less litigation-prone firms. While this is a logical proposition, I argue this is not
simply a defensive move by countries negotiating with developed states but rather
a product of their own reckoning with the consequences of ISDS, both as home to
claimants and as respondents themselves. For example, as I show in Chapter 4,
American CSOs started campaigning against the possibility of including ISDS in a
multilateral investment treaty before the US faced its first dispute, using the 1997
Ethyl v. Canada NAFTA case -which was initiated by an American company- as a
cautionary tale.
Regarding control variables, GDP t-1 host is positively related to treaties’ regu-
latory space value in a statistically significant way when either all or just the North-
South treaties are considered. The GDP of the host indicates how unequal both treaty
parties are and these results suggests that, all else equal, wealthy countries are able
to impose more pro-investor treaty terms to smaller partners. Additionally, there is
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evidence of regional trends since at least one treaty partner being from the Americas
results, in average across the three models, in a .04 increase in the dependent variable.
Turning to Hypothesis 5 and the e↵ect of CSOs, models in table ?? show that, by
themselves, the presence of civil society organizations does not lead to more policy
space-minded treaties. In fact, the coe cients for both CSO terms are negative. This,
most likely, is driven by observations from the earlier years of the analyzed period,
before the rise of ISDS. 73% of the treaties in the dataset were signed before 2003.
States with dense civil society sectors also tend to be the home of large numbers of
multinational firms, thus before ISDS disputes start accumulating, the main interest
of these governments is to provide their firms with the strongest protections available.
Table 3.6 shows the interactive e↵ects of ISDS disputes and the number of CSOs in
the country for the sub-sample of North-South treaties. Model 4 focuses on the
interaction between ISDS experience and CSOs in the home country -which in this
sub-sample are developed countries- and shows that, as expected, the positive e↵ect
of CSO presence on treaties’ policy space scores is conditional on ISDS experience. In
terms of marginal e↵ects, Figure 3.8 represents e↵ect of a one unit increase in ISDS
resp t-5 home on the coe cient of CSO t-1 home. What is most interesting about
this plot is how, at very low levels of disputes, the e↵ects of CSOs is negative. This
represents the conditions under which domestic multinational firms are most powerful
and unrivalled in their influence on their government’s economic diplomacy. Yet, as
experience with arbitral disputes accumulates, the e↵ect of CSOs becomes positive,
suggesting that CSOs are better able to obtain policy changes when they can make
credible arguments about the threat of ISDS.
This section examined variation in the content of signed treaties to illuminate the
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ISDS resp t-5 home 0.009⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003)
ISDS resp t-5 host 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
CSO t-1 home -0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001)
CSO t-1 host -0.003⇤⇤
(0.001)
ISDS resp t-5 home*CSO t-1 home 0.0002⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001)
ISDS resp t-5 host*CSO t-1 host -0.0004
(0.0005)
ISDS claim t-5 home 0.0001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
ISDS claim t-5 host -0.010⇤⇤⇤ -0.004
(0.003) (0.004)
GDP t-1 home 0.004 -0.004⇤
(0.003) (0.002)
GDP t-1 host 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.002)
Inward FDI t-1 home -0.00000 -0.00001⇤
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Inward FDI t-1 host -0.00002⇤⇤⇤ -0.00001⇤⇤
(0.00001) (0.00001)
Polity2 t-1 home -0.002⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)






Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure 3.8: Marginal e↵ect of CSO presence conditional on ISDS experience
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relationship between ISDS disputes and states’ choices regarding the inevitable trade-
o↵ between investor protection and regulatory autonomy in their BITs. Using newly
available data on the degree of state regulatory space in about 2,200 agreements, I find
that developed states tend to sign treaties that preserve more regulatory autonomy as
they acquire more experience with ISDS disputes, a correlation that is not observed
for developing countries alike. Regarding the mechanisms propelling legal innovation,
in Chapter 2 I argued the mobilization of progressive CSOs against the constraining
e↵ect of BITs on public regulation is behind the incentives that governments face to
update their treaty models after negative ISDS experiences. This section tested this
argument and finds that as the record of ISDS disputes increases so does the impact
of CSOs on treaty content.
After foreign investors started to sue developed country governments in investment
arbitration, BITs became the target of heavy criticism by organized civil society
fearing ISDS disputes would deter regulations in the public interest. At the same
time, BITs remain important sources of protection for multinational firms. Unable
to ignore the negative aspects of these treaties and adopt a ‘BITs as usual’ approach,
developed states choose the course of option that is most favorable to their home
firms. In sum, investors will be hurt less by progressive BITs than by no more BITs,
or worst, no BITs at all. The next section examines the latter; states’ decisions to
get rid of their existing treaties in the aftermath of ISDS disputes.
3.4 ISDS experience and treaty termination
The two policy options considered in the previous sections -not signing more BITs or
signing less constraining treaties- are forward-looking and, as such, they do not have
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e↵ects on the treaties that made arbitral disputes possible in the first place. For this
reason, terminating existing BITs is the most radical course of action available for
states seeking to shield themselves from more disputes. The termination of a treaty
eliminates the rights owed to investors and the obligations assumed by states under
that particular instrument of international law. Thus, it is the most feared course of
action by foreign investors.
Terminations are also extremely rare. According to UNCTAD’s treaty data, of the
2,611 bilateral investment treaties that have entered into force, only 265 have been
terminated. When terminations do happen, however, they are politically salient.
Simply manifesting the intention to put an end to a BIT sends arbitration lawyers
running to publish short pieces in specialized outlets going over the implications of
such measures and the options still available for investors.22 In this section I examine
the relationship between exposure to investment arbitration and the probability of a
treaty being terminated.
3.4.1 Expectations and data
My hypotheses about treaty signature and ISDS experience in Section 3.2 and about
ISDS experience and treaty content in Section 3.3 proposed that exposure to arbitra-
tion has di↵erent e↵ects across developed and developing countries. My hypotheses
regarding ISDS experience and treaty termination fit within this larger set of ex-
pectations. For example, I argued that negative ISDS experiences do not dissuade
developed countries from signing more treaties -who thus continue expanding the net-
22Termination of BITs and Sunset Clauses - What Can Investors in Poland Expect? (29 February,
2017). Kluwer Arbitration Blog; Indonesia’s BIT terminations: not the end of the story. (1 Novem-
ber 2017). Global Arbitration Review; Opciones ante las denuncias de los TBI/Options available
upon the termination of BITs. (5 October, 2017). LALIVE.law.
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work of protections available to their home multinational firms- yet they do lead them
to adjust the content of the treaties they sign. Along this line of argument, developed
states should be less likely to terminate their treaties. These agreements provide their
investors with valuable protections, even when firms from other countries have used
those treaties against them. Much di↵erently, developing states, who tend to receive
considerably more FDI than what they send out, have strong incentives to get rid of
treaties that have hurt them.
Yet treaty terminations are costly political decisions. Foreign firms and their home
governments generally mobilize to express their dissatisfaction when terminations
are announced and threaten to withhold further investment and trade benefits if
recalcitrant states were to follow through. In this context, the relative economic
power of developing countries a↵ects their ability to resist these pressures and carry
on with treaty terminations. For example, emerging economies are relatively more
attractive to foreign investors than smaller developing economies, thus they might
feel confident to call foreign firms’ blu↵s of withholding further investments. They
might also posses stronger institutions than less a✏uent countries so they might be
able to o↵er strong domestic protections in lieu of BITs. Thus, I expect that wealthy
countries will be more successful at keeping smaller economies engaged in their treaties
than relatively larger ones. Three testable hypotheses emerge from this discussion,
H.6.a: When treaties do not include developed countries as signatories,
the likelihood of terminations increases with the number of ISDS disputes
initiated against the parties.
H.6.b: Larger numbers of ISDS disputes against developed countries do
not make their treaties more likely to be terminated.
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H.7: The likelihood of a treaty being terminated is inversely related to
the di↵erence in economic size between the parties.
I test these hypotheses against a dataset of 1,829 bilateral investment treaties with
the observation being the treaty-year. The earliest year considered is 1989 and and
treaties enter the dataset once they become ‘elegible’ for termination. This means
that, first, they have to enter into force. Second, they need to be past their initial
duration period. Duration provisions establish the length of time during which the
treaty shall remain in force and cannot be unilaterally denounced. Most treaties -78%
of the treaties in the dataset- have initial duration periods of ten years after the treaty
enters into force. The treaties leave the dataset the year after they are terminated.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes a 1 if the treaty was
terminated in a given year. Of the 1,829 treaties in the dataset, 202 have been
terminated. Treaties can come to an end in di↵erent ways (Helfer, 2005). They can
be terminated when the parties replace them with a new treaty. In this case, the date
in which the new treaty enters into force marks the termination date for the older
BIT. They can also be terminated without a replacement with the mutual consent
of the parties. Or they can be terminated unilaterally by one of the signatories.
Most of the terminated BITs in the dataset (60%) were unilaterally terminated. The
rest were replaced with a new treaty (33%) and terminated by consent (7%).23 The
appropriate estimator for a binary dependent variable is logistic regression. Yet in this
case, positive outcomes are extremely rare thus I employ rare events logistic regression
23A fourth way for a treaty to come to an end is the expiration of its initial duration period. I do
not include these treaties in my dataset because expiration is unrelated to the willingness of either
or both of the parties to terminate the treaty. Moreover expiration is extremely rare (only 3 treaties
in UNCTAD’s database have terminated in this manner) because most agreements have renewal
clauses built-in to them.
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(King and Zeng, 2001). This estimates the same model as standard logistic regression
but corrects for the bias that occurs when the number of observed events is small in
relation to the size of the sample.24
In terms of independent variables, I use the lagged cumulative sum of ISDS dis-
putes against each treaty party (ISDS resp t-5 ) as an indicator of ISDS experience.
As in the previous section, treaty parties are identified as the home and the host state
in each particular relation. Furthermore, to aid in the interpretation of this distinc-
tion, I include the di↵erence in economic size between the home and the host state,
calculated by subtracting the GDP of the host from the GDP of the home country
(GDP t-1 di↵.). The higher the di↵erence, the more unequal the relationship between
the parties. This variable can even take negative values. For example, in the 1997
India - Switzerland BIT, Switzerland is coded as the home state in spite of India’s
larger economic size. Additionally, I estimate the models using the full sample as well
as sub-samples of North-South and South-South treaties.
As control variables, I include the lagged cumulative sum of disputes initiated
by domestic firms against other countries for each treaty party (ISDS claim t-5 ).
I expect these variables to be negatively related to the probability of the treaty
being terminated. I also include two dummy variables. EU takes a 1 when at least
one party is a EU member. Countries acceding to the EU had to replace some of
their older BITs to bring them in line with EU guidelines. Latam is an indicator
of at least one treaty party being a Latin American country. Because a few leftist
Latin American governments terminated several of their treaties and the problems
24A di↵erent way to approach these questions is through survival analysis. Cox proportional
hazards regression models could estimate how di↵erent factors a↵ect the time until termination.
One assumption of survival analysis is that all units will eventually experience the outcome of
interest but will take di↵erent amounts of time to get there. This characterization, however, does
not fit BIT terminations.
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of investment arbitration were regularly discussed in regional forums, I control for
the possibility of treaty termination being mostly a Latin American response to their
own ISDS troubles. Additionally, I control for the age of the treaty, represented by
the number of years that have passed since the treaty entered into force (Treaty age).
I expect states will be more likely to terminate older treaties if they the conditions
under which the treaty was signed changed or if the parties want to update the treaty
to their latest models. Lastly, I control for temporal trends by including the number of
treaties terminated in the previous year (Yearly terms. t-1 ). Assuming states would
prefer to take costly actions when others have done so as well, I expect these variable
to also be positively related to the probability of a treaty being terminated. In models
shown in Appendix A.4.4, I employ alternative indicators of ISDS experience. I use
the sum of lost arbitral disputes for each treaty partner and the total number of
arbitral claims initiated under the observation treaty only.
3.4.2 Results and discussion
Table 3.7 shows results for three rare events logistic regression models. Model 1
uses the entire sample while models 2 and 3 use the North-South and the South-
South sub-samples respectively. Results o↵er support for the expectation, captured
in hypotheses 6.a and 6.b, that experience with investment disputes is more likely to
be associated with treaty termination in developing than developed states. When the
entire sample is considered, both coe cients for ISDS experience as a respondent are
positively related to the probability of termination at a statistically significant level.
However, these models cannot pick up the hypothesized nuances in this relationship
unless the same models are estimated using the two sub-samples. Model 2 shows the
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number of ISDS disputes against either party has no e↵ect on the probability of a
treaty being terminated when the party identified as the home is a developed country.
Di↵erently, the termination of South-South treaties becomes more likely as the parties
accumulate more arbitral disputes. Considered as odds ratios, results from model 3
can be interpreted as the odds of the treaty being terminated on a given year increase
by 3.4% and 4.6% respectively per each additional dispute.
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(Full sample) (North-South) (South-South)
ISDS resp t-5 home 0.021⇤⇤⇤ -0.019 0.034⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.035) (0.010)
ISDS resp t-5 host 0.021⇤⇤ 0.010 0.045⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
GDP t-1 di↵. -0.148⇤⇤⇤ -0.316⇤⇤⇤ 0.071
(0.039) (0.051) (0.063)
ISDS claim t-5 home -0.002 0.016⇤⇤⇤ -0.029⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.006) (0.014)




Latam -0.123 0.465 -0.751⇤
(0.228) (0.310) (0.387)
Treaty age 0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤ 0.017
(0.009) (0.012) (0.019)
Yearly terms. t-1 0.014⇤⇤ 0.003 0.019⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant -4.925⇤⇤⇤ -5.206⇤⇤⇤ -5.343⇤⇤⇤
(0.217) (0.354) (0.361)
Observations 18,299 8,757 9,559
Log Likelihood -1,036.177 -490.494 -526.640
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,092.354 1,000.987 1,071.281
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Turning to hypothesis 7, results also support the expectation that treaties with
highly unequal partners are less likely to be terminated. The coe cient for the size of
the economic di↵erence between the parties is negatively related to the probability of
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termination and reaches conventional levels of statistical significance in both models
1 and 2. This suggests developed treaty parties are better able to resist demands
from weak partners to end or replace a BIT than from larger economies. Yet, as
model 3 shows, di↵erences in economic size do not matter when only South-South
treaties are considered. Additional models reported in Appendix A.4.4 Table A.7
yield interesting results. For example, models using the count of ISDS disputes lost
as an indicator of ISDS experience are, for the most part, not positively related to the
likelihood of termination in a statistically significant way. This confirms arguments
made elsewhere that the onset of disputes hurt respondent countries independently of
the result (Pelc, 2017). Another interesting finding that emerges from the additional
models is that the number of ISDS disputes emerged under each particular observation
treaty is not related to the probability of that BIT being terminated at statistically
significant levels. This suggests that, for the most part, governments that chose to
terminate their treaties do so not because they perceive particular problems with a
specific BIT or with a specific nationality of investors. Rather, they see problems
with the substantive provisions and the enforcement mechanism that is common to
most treaties, regardless of whether investors have had the chance to invoke them or
not. Moreover, it could be assumed that the fewer the claims initiated under a treaty,
the less significant that treaty is for foreign investors, thus reducing the marginal
political cost of ending that agreement as well.
The control variables yield interesting results as well, especially comparing across
models. That Treaty age is positively related to the probability of termination in
the North-South sub-sample but not in the South-South one suggests that -per the
analysis of treaty content in Section 3.3- developed countries might be more willing
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to get rid of old treaties if they see this as an opportunity to bring those treaties
inline with their more current treaty models. At the same time, the number of
treaty terminations in the previous year is only positively related to the likelihood
of a treaty being terminated when either the full or the South-South samples are
used. This suggests that developing countries might prefer to take costly actions like
terminating BITs when others are doing so as well yet treaties signed by developed
states are not susceptible to these trends. Lastly, while the results lend support to the
expectations contained in hypotheses 6 and 7, the predictive power of these models
is low. In this case, the low number of positive outcomes is not a product of data
collection. Treaty terminations are, in fact, extremely rare events which are hard to
predict independently of modelling choices. This analysis, however, reveals interesting
patterns regarding treaty terminations that I further explore in the qualitative case
studies.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter examined a series of propositions that I introduced in the previous
Chapters regarding the impact of ISDS experience on state policy. In doing so, I
build on a burgeoning literature on the rise of investment arbitration and its con-
sequences for both the investment regime as a whole and individual states’ policies.
Although scholars have found evidence of exposure to ISDS leading to lower amounts
of treaties signed, higher precision in BITs, treaty renegotiation, and more state au-
tonomy in replaced BITs (Manger and Peinhardt, 2017; Broude et al., 2019; Haftel
and Thompson, 2018; Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013), little systematic evidence has been
brought to bear on the question of what motivates states to pursue these alternative
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policies.
Using an original measure of state international legal autonomy to regulate foreign
investment I find support for the motivating assumption of this dissertation. States
that have contracted out their legal autonomy by entering into investment treaties
and have been brought before arbitral tribunals for alleged violations of those treaties
will become more cautious with their legal autonomy. Governments will compromise
lower amounts of legal autonomy after ISDS claims hit or even will actively recover
it. Yet this is only the beginning of the story. In the aftermath of ISDS, states can
implement alternative policies that end up a↵ecting their overall participation in the
international investment regime. Through three datasets created for this dissertation,
I uncover nuances in the relationship between ISDS experience and the di↵erent
policy options facing dissatisfied states. With the extant literature, I find exposure
to investment arbitration correlates with lower probabilities of singing BITs, with
treaties that are more deferential to states’ regulatory autonomy, and with treaty
terminations. However these findings are not uniform across groups of countries.
Developing countries become less likely to sign BITs as their ISDS record grows
larger because they perceive these agreements to be more costly than when they first
signed them. While wealthy governments are also exposed to this new information
after facing their own disputes, multinational firms headquartered in their countries
continue to demand the protection these treaties provide as they expand their op-
erations abroad. Leaving capital to the fate of domestic legal protections in new
destinations is not a viable option for advanced economies. At the same time, to
continue entering into the same treaties that gave rise to controversial disputes is
equally di cult. Well-organized civil society sectors in developed countries demand
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treaty policies that do not compromise the ability of governments’ to adopt regula-
tions in the protection of, for example, the environment or public health. The solution
to these competing demands is to continue signing treaties but draft them so that
the balance between investor protection and regulatory autonomy is struck relatively
closer to the latter. For the same reasons that developed countries do not become
BIT-shy after the claims hit, they are less likely to terminate their treaties. However,
treaty termination is not equally available to all developing countries as a strategy.
Being a politically costly move, results suggest, larger developing economies are more
likely to overcome pressures by foreign investors and their home states and get rid of
their old BITs.
In the following Chapters I evaluate these findings against the backdrop of three
case studies of one developed state (the US), one developing state (Ecuador) and an
emerging economy that straddles the distinction between those two (India).
Chapter 4
United States
In 1992, former American chief BIT negotiator Jose Alvarez, opened a panel on the
development of the investment regime with the following remarks:
“Let us suppose that the NIEO (New International Economic Order) e↵ort
is dead and that the North won the battle. Capitalism reigns supreme and
international law regarding investment is now free to grease the wheels of
capitalism. If this is so, those looking for the text that has replaced the
General Assembly’s 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
need look no further than today’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
especially the current [1984] U.S. model draft” (1992, 532).
Twenty years later, his view of the 2004 American model BIT, which introduced
a series of provisions aimed at protecting states’ regulatory sovereignty, led him to
conclude that “if the United States led the charge in favor of investor protections, it
now appears to be leading the drive in the opposite direction” (2011, 231). As Al-
varez noted, in 2004 the US switched to a model that, in relation to its predecessor,
was more deferential to state’s regulatory autonomy. In terms of policy types, the
US put in place a ‘Reformist’ policy. Its new treaty template, among other features,
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emphasized states’ rights to protect health, safety, and the environment; narrowed
the definition of investment; and included a more expansive “essential securty” ex-
ception. The American approach, at the same time, continued to rely on ISDS as the
preferred dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, the US did not seek to terminate
or renegotiate its existing BITs to bring them inline with the new model.
I explain this shift by examining the consequences of the American experience with
ISDS disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). After
Canadian firms started to sue the US for alleged violations of NAFTA, policy-makers
concurred that the American approach to investment treaties needed some tweaking.
However, the American experience with ISDS in NAFTA developed in parallel to their
own investors’ experience suing foreign countries. As NAFTA’s arbitration docket
grew, so did the number of ISDS disputes around the globe, the majority of which
were initiated by American firms against developing states. In fact, as of today, the US
is the most common nationality of ISDS claimants. Given this competing incentives,
my goal in this Chapter is to understand why and how objections to investment
arbitration emerged and eventually informed American treaty policy along the way.
More importantly, I explain why government actors made particular policy choices
when alternatives that would have reasserted American autonomy vis a vis BITs to
either a lesser or greater extent were also being considered.
4.1 The argument
The politics of ISDS in the United States are structured by its dual status as both a
substantial sender and receiver of FDI. Dual-role states have competing incentives. In
abstract terms, in the aftermath of ISDS disputes, a state that is an absolute capital
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exporter does not have incentives to deviate from the status quo; it should keep its
existing treaties in place and keep drafting future ones in the same way. Since it will
only be involved in ISDS as home to a claimant, the only legal autonomy compromised
under those treaties would be the partner’s. A net capital importer, however, does
face strong incentives to change its current approach for policies that better protect
its autonomy to regulate foreign investment without being dragged into expensive
litigation. Thus, the relative salience of these competing incentives will give way to
alternative policies that deviate more or less from the status quo. The question is,
then, what a↵ects this balance.
Per my argument, policy-makers have initial inclinations to act on either of these
incentives based on their own worldviews and beliefs. For example, leftists should be
inclined to emphasize the perspective of the capital importer because they understand
ISDS as a tool of corporate influence at home; while right-wingers would emphasize
the perspective of the capital exporter because protecting national firms from abuse
by foreign governments is a more salient goal. In this particular case, I make an
initial simplifying assumption that Democrats and Republicans policy-makers have,
as a group, di↵erent views on a fundamental issue that ISDS disputes bring to the
forefront: the role of government as a regulator of the economy.1 How do these incli-
nations matter? In Chapter 2 I used a metaphor of ideas as lenses through which ISDS
experience is filtered. When a foreign firm sued the US before an arbitral tribunals
alleging an environmental law was violation of NAFTA’s rules against expropriation,
the views and priorities of Democrats and Republicans would predispose them to have
1Ideological homogeneity is a strong assumption, specially for the Democratic party (Grossmann
and Hopkins, 2016). Thus, within groups, some individuals might have stronger views than others
on this matter. Similarly, the more moderate policy-makers within each group should stake positions
that are indistinguishable from each other, even though they identify formally as Republicans and
Democrats.
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di↵erent reactions to this dispute. While Democrats should go up in arms about this
a↵ront to the government’s ability to protect the environment; Republicans should
shrug, and assume that for one lawsuit against the US, American investors initiate
ten against foreign governments.
But policy-makers have limited energy, resources and time to influence policy on
all the issues they could go up in arms about. This is where the second part of
my argument comes in: firms and CSOs. Policy-makers do not make decisions in
a vacuum. Rather, they operate in an environment filled with groups that mobilize
so that one of these competing incentives gains salience. In the case of the US, as
a wealthy, dual-role state, I should expect two domestic actors to become politically
active on this issue: American multinational firms and domestic civil society. Do-
mestic firms with overseas investments will emphasize that from the perspective of
the home state, existing treaties have been beneficial in allowing firms to sue their
host governments. Thus they should be kept in place, untouched. That corporations
have power to influence most aspects of policy-making in US is a known reality for
political scientists (Schlozman et al., 2012; Lavergne, 2014; Baldwin, 1989). Thus,
one possibility is that neither policy-makers’ ideas nor CSOs mobilization matter for
explaining government decisions regarding BITs and ISDS in this period. Rather, the
content of treaty policies is predetermined by the interests of multinational firms who
have vast resources to spend in lobbying activities. If this is the case, once they mobi-
lize, firms should be able to revert any policy proposal that does not fit their interests.
While I do expect them to become politically active with the goal of stopping any
changes to American BITs in the direction of greater regulatory autonomy for states,
I don’t expect their influence to be purely determined by their own behavior. Dif-
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ferently, I show that policy choices were defined through political contests between
interested firms and civil society. Moreover, mobilization around BITs will likely
trigger counter-mobilization from actors with opposing interests. Investment treaties
regulate protections for domestic firms abroad and foreign firms at home. Thus actors
on both sides have strong interests to become politically active. International invest-
ment treaties are a hard case for arguments about the role of non-economic actors.
For this reason, I devote more attention in the empirical analysis to actions of CSOs
than firms. Furthermore, since I analyze changes to the American approach to BITs,
CSOs require more attention because they are the ones challenging the status quo.
Conversely, firms’ mobilization enters the equation insofar they become defensive of
existing policies.
Civil society will emphasize that from the position of the US as host state to foreign
firms, existing treaties are costly because they can use them to challenge domestic
regulations. As such, they should be abandoned and/or substantially altered. Civil
society in the US, relative to the other two cases, is populated by a large number
of highly organized and well funded organizations that are regularly involved in the
policy-making process. Thus, given that they have the resources and expertise, I
should expect their policy influence to be a factor mostly of access points and not of a
failure to mobilize in the first place. CSOs are valuable to like-minded policy-makers
as experts. This is particularly important in Congress where the same legislator
works in multiple issues at the same time. Here I also examine other instances where
policy-makers are members of the executive, e.g. the US State Department and the
US Trade Representative (USTR). Relative to legislators, executive agencies care
about a smaller number of issues. Their agenda is set by their mandates. For this
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reason, relative to legislators, executive agencies have more expertise at hand. This
would reduce the need for interest groups’ expertise and thus decrease their ability
to influence policy. Yet there is still room for interest groups to influence the work of
federal agencies (Furlong and Kerwin, 2004). Federal agencies are required to solicit
and take into account the views of interested citizens before promulgating rules and
investment treaty policy is no exception. The State Department and the USTR
subject aspects of treaty policy, like subsequent iterations of the US Model BIT, to
inter-agency review, public notice and comment, and expert consultation processes
(Johnson, 2012). Thus, much like in the legislative arena, expert information is a
primary currency for lobbying policy-making in the executive branch (Nelson and
Yackee, 2012).
One important aspect that varies when either firms or CSOs attempt to influence
policy in the legislative and executive branches is the existence of access points.
As a reminder, in Chapter 2 I explained that a policy-maker counts as an access
point for a particular group not just by having authority in a given policy area.
Receptivity to the group’s goals is also necessary. Congress, relative to the executive,
provides more access points. Interest groups can choose which legislators to work
with based on the existence of common goals. Federal agencies do not o↵er that
option. They are controlled by the executive, whose preferences set limits for the
possible policy outcomes. That is, while CSOs were able to appeal to like-minded
Democratic Senators during the passing of the Trade Act, the subsequent drafting of
the 2004 Model BIT by federal agencies from the Bush administration limited their
influence and enhanced the capacity of firms to revert some of the changes required
by the Trade Act.
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The main candidate for an alternative explanation comes from (bounded) rational
learning arguments, as derived from the theory of Rational Design and Poulsen’s
bounded rationality theory (Koremenos et al., 2001; Poulsen, 2015). According to
Poulsen argument, cognitive biases constrained policy-makers from developing states,
not from developed countries. Thus, both the rational and bounded rational learning
arguments would explain policy changes in the US solely as a result of variation in the
information environment. That, assuming states’ underlying interest has not changed
-they remain interested in solving a commitment problem- ISDS experience generates
changes by providing new information about the costs and benefits of maintaining the
status quo vis a vis alternative policies. In the US case, I should observe variation in
policy preferences across time -that is, between a consensus around one (perceived)
rational response before disputes emerge under NAFTA and another one after. I
should not observe variation of preferences across political actors within the same
strategic context. To test this alternative explanation, I pay attention to di↵erences
in how state o cials talk about the way BITs and ISDS have worked for the US;
what -if any- is the problem and what should be done about it.
The time period covered -1995 to 2004- also allows me to reject alternative expla-
nations that would view this reassertion of state autonomy in international investment
law simply as part of system-wide trends. While arguments against the free flow of
capital will appear later in core capitalist states, with the onset of the 2008 global
financial crisis (Andenas and Chiu, 2013), such ideas are not observed during the
period examined here.
The rest of the Chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, I explain the failed ne-
gotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) within the OECD. After
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NAFTA, this marked the first instance in which developed states negotiated a treaty
including ISDS and served as a key moment triggering CSO mobilization against in-
ternational investment treaties. Also, at this point the US had not experienced any
ISDS disputes. In Section 4.3, I cover the issuance of a series of interpretative notes
by the three NAFTA members aimed at countering expansive arbitral decisions. This
is the first reaction from NAFTA countries to ISDS involving changes to an existing
treaty, albeit a tame one. Section 4.4 shows how anti-ISDS concerns made their way
into the US Senate during the negotiation of the 2002 Trade Act and how they ended
up a↵ecting the drafting of the 2004 model BIT. Lastly, Section 4.5 compares the
negotiation and outcomes of the US-Uruguay BIT and the Australia-US FTA, the
first two agreements modeled after the 2004 model BIT. Taking the perspective of
Uruguay and Australia during these negotiations, I demonstrate that the factors in-
fluencing policy-making in relation to ISDS in the US and Canada were also present
in the case of Australia, where civil society mobilized strongly about ISDS, but not
in the case of Uruguay. In each section, I show how the three components of my
argument -civil society mobilization, opportunity structure and receptiveness of state
actors- interacted to produce the considered outcome.
4.2 ‘Who are these guys?’ Civil society and the
failure of the Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment
A Financial Times article published in May 1998 opened with a reference to a famous
scene in Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid in which the main characters come un-
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der fire by a posse of men on horseback. “After failing to shake o↵ their mysterious
pursuers, one of the hunted men asks despairingly: ‘Who are these guys?”’2 ‘These
guys’ were civil society groups and their target was the Multilateral Investment Agree-
ment (MAI) being negotiated at the OECD. The anti-MAI campaigns mark the first
time that civil society organizations mobilized against investment treaty provisions.
These groups, based mostly in the Global North, developed an interest in investment
treaty disputes that has informed their subsequent activism. While civil society mo-
bilization did not killed MAI on its own -shifts to the left in governments of major
European states, particularly France and Germany, dealt the final blow- negotiating
parties readily acknowledged that it transformed the conditions in which economic
diplomacy takes place.
That Northern CSOs became interested in investment treaties and ISDS was al-
most accidental. For the most part, developed country governments had conceived
BITs as tools to regulate fairly unidirectional flows of capital to the developing South
(Vandevelde, 1993). Historically, developed countries did not found it necessary to
adopt binding international rules for the protection of foreign investment between
themselves (Kinnear and Hansen, 2005). One exception to this pattern was NAFTA.
The US and Canada had signed a treaty on trade and investment liberalization in
1987 that -unlike what both countries were signing with developing countries at the
time- did not give investors direct access to arbitration. When Mexico was brought
into this scheme with the creation of NAFTA, however, the parties considered it nec-
essary to provide for ISDS given Mexico’s history of expropriation (Heindl, 2006).
That is, the US and Canada decided to include ISDS because of their interests as
home countries to investors in Mexico. Yet this also meant that, as hosts to Cana-
2“Network Guerrillas.” Financial Times. 30 Apr. 1998: 20.
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dian and American investors, they themselves could now be brought before arbitral
tribunals. Canadian civil society started to pay attention to investment treaties af-
ter an American company Ethyl Corporation sued Canada over a ban to a gasoline
additive.3
In this section I trace the origins, negotiations and failure of the MAI. It was
the first attempt by developed states since NAFTA to bound themselves to each
other through a treaty with the same characteristics of older BITs, particularly the
inclusion of ISDS. The fact that this was a treaty negotiated between developed states
structured interests di↵erently than in the case of North-South BITs. States paid
more attention to the implications of the treaty as capital importers. Civil society’s
arguments resonated better in this North-North setting, in which every party is both
host and home to foreign investors. At the same time, negotiations took place before
the US experienced its first ever ISDS disputes under NAFTA. American negotiators
did not start talks with plans to deviate from the dispute settlement system they had
included in NAFTA. The case of MAI represents, most importantly, the emergence
of an “unprecedented coalition of antiglobalists” (Mavroidis, 2011, 98). Anti-MAI
mobilization has not received as much scholarly attention as other instances of anti-
globalization activism, namely the 1999 Seattle protests during the WTO Ministerial
Conference. Yet one of the main factors mobilizing opposition in Seattle was the
perception held by many CSOs that the investment agenda that failed to take hold
in the OECD would be transferred to the WTO (Walter, 2001).
3Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL.
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4.2.1 The origins of MAI
In May of 1995 and without much fanfare, the Council of Ministers of the OECD
held its annual meeting in Paris. As usual, attendees received a series of documents
to discuss. One of them was a joint report from two sections within the OECD;
the Committee on International Investment (CIME) and the Committee on Capital
Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT). The document was entitled A Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Investment and it noted in its opening paragraph that the
time was ripe for adopting a multilateral investment treaty. The report a rmed “the
foundations have now been laid for the successful negotiation of such an agreement
building on OECD’s existing instruments and expertise.”4 The Council of Ministers
agreed and gave a mandate to both the CIME and CMIT to set up the negotiation
process.
MAI was a first attempt to establish multilateral binding rules that would regu-
late both the liberalization and protection of foreign investment, including a dispute
settlement mechanism. FDI was growing at a faster rate than trade in goods and
services5 and yet investment lacked a multilateral framework of rules like what the
GATT and the WTO provided for trade. MAI was, however, building on a dense net-
work of bilateral investment treaties. By the end of 1994, 988 BITs had been signed.
Regional and multilateral investment agreements of a smaller scale, were also in place,
most notably NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), both of which had suc-
ceeded in establishing the type of standards that MAI was pursuing. Additionally,
4OECD, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and
Invisible Transactions (CMIT), Paris, 1995.
5From 1973 to 1995, FDI outflows multiplied more than 12 times, while the volume of exported
merchandise multiplied 8.5 times (WTO, Annual Report 1996, p. 46)
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the international trade regime had produced some rules touching on investment; par-
ticularly the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) that
was concluded under the GATT. Originally, the US goal was to include the issues
that MAI would regulate within TRIMs, as the US agenda for the TRIMS negotia-
tion was much larger than the resulting text (Devereaux et al., 2006, 145).6 In 1995,
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) entered into force within the
framework of the WTO. GATS included rules touching on investment that takes the
form of international services transactions but it failed to fully address the concerns
of investors.7
Having failed to include a much larger set of investment issues within the frame-
work of the GATT and the WTO, the US insisted on developing MAI within the
OECD. Negotiating at the WTO meant bargaining with over a hundred member
states. At the OECD, drafting a text within a smaller group of like-minded states
(i.e. large capital exporters) would avoid watering-down the agreement for the sake
of consensus. At this point, most horizontal restrictions to foreign investment had
disappeared within OECD member (Geiger, 1998, 468). But one aspect that was
missing in the available OECD instruments was a dispute settlement mechanism; ei-
ther a state-to-state system like the one at the WTO or an ISDS scheme like the
one provided for in BITs. More importantly, MAI was never meant to be for OECD
members only. Rather, it would set high standards that would eventually be accepted
by (or imposed on) developing states. As stated by a USTR o cial involved in MAI
6TRIMS ended up mostly establishing a prohibition on local content requirements. As indicated
by its name, it applies solely to trade-related investment measures, therefore it precludes governments
from adopting investment policies that would generate trade distortions.
7Most notably, performance requirements were not outlawed in GATS and the National Treat-
ment standard applied to only the sectors included in the agreement, instead of being accepted as a
general standard of treatment for all foreign investment, like in the case of most investment treaties.
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negotiations, Joseph Papovich,
“Developing countries weren’t willing to agree to the kinds of investment
protection that should be provided to investors. The United States sug-
gested to the Europeans that it would be a good idea to try to reach an
agreement of likeminded countries on investment that was at a very high
level, similar to what we seek in our bilateral investment treaties, [that]
might then be used as a model for negotiating a multilateral investment
agreement with developing countries” (quoted in Devereaux et al., 2006,
151).
In fact, the International Chamber of Commerce, the largest transnational organi-
zation representing the interests of multinational firms, recognized that “most of
the problems addressed under the agreement occur outside the OECD membership”
and that it was “crucial that many non-OECD countries as possible accede to the
agreement” (quoted in Beder, 2012, 179). While the negotiating parties were mostly
dual-role developed economies; the prospect of extending it to developing states -with
which OECD members would have unidirectional, outward capital flows- remained in
the background.
4.2.2 Negotiations and contentious issues
MAI negotiations started in September 1995 with a deadline established for May 1997.
Negotiators met in Paris every 6 weeks.8 There were several sources of contention.
Some were grounded on disagreements between the parties while others resulted from
8Negotiations were attended by all OECD member states as well as a group of observing states:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Hong Kong, China, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic.
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the many objections that civil society groups raised.
Contentious issues among states
Even though OECD members were already on the same page regarding many issues of
investment liberalization and protection, problems emerged regarding the scope of the
national treatment (NT) provision. Although this standard of treatment is generally
included in international investment treaties, states nevertheless squabbled about its
scope because MAI was supposed to regulate both pre- and post-establishment stages
of foreign investment; that is, all aspects of the operation of an investment before and
after its entry. Applying NT to pre-establishment matters could result in an unlimited
right of entry and its application to the post-establishment stage could eliminate the
capacity of governments to subsidize domestic firms.
The NT standard became a serious obstacle in the negotiations, especially because
of its potential e↵ects on cultural industries.9 This issue pitched Europe and Canada
against the US and Japan and ended up becoming an essential reason for France’s
eventual decision to leave the negotiation process. In an attempt to bridge this gap, a
solution emerged by which the treaty would include two lists of exceptions to NT, lists
A and B. List A would include non-confirming measures, that is existing regulations
and policies that would be in violation of the agreement but that states would like to
keep in place.10 List B would include types of measures that would be exempted in
9Some delegations proposed from the onset that cultural industries should be excluded from the
scope of the MAI. The treatment of cultural industries has been a di cult issue in practically any
international economic negotiation involving states with strong film industries. European States,
Canada and India, among others, argued that films and other audiovisual productions are part of
a nation’s cultural expression and should not be subjected to the same terms as tradable goods.
The US, with Hollywood’s best interest in mind, held the opposite view and denounced references
to ‘cultural expressions’ as attempts to mask protectionism for local film and television industries
(Footer and Graber, 2000).
10Furthermore, the draft agreement did not include obligations to eventually rollback those mea-
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general, like those granting preferential treatment to minorities or to national cultural
enterprises. This solution prompted states to enter numerous exceptions to List B
both for prudential reasons, since the final text was still being negotiated, and for
strategic purposes, since they could serve as bargaining chips in exchange for other
concessions later on.
Contentious issues for civil society
Civil society organizations had two main problems with MAI. First, there was a
substantive concern with the detrimental e↵ect that it would have on states’ ability
to regulate and provide public goods, particularly because of ISDS. The second was
a procedural problem rooted in the lack of transparency with which the negotiations
were carried out. A rule of thumb for civil society groups is that if a process is secret,
the outcome will be bad.
State parties and OECD o cials had perceived the dispute settlement mechanism
of the future MAI to be a relatively easy issue to deal with. After all, OECD members
had been providing for ISDS in their BITs for decades (UNCTAD, 1999, 24). How-
ever, civil society groups were extremely concerned about the proposed mechanism.
The draft mirrored the dispute settlement provisions included in most BITs and in
NAFTA. Precisely because the MAI would include ISDS, provisions about indirect
expropriation or regulatory takings provoked serious debate outside the negotiation
room. Opponent groups were convinced that indirect expropriation clauses would be
interpreted to mean that any regulation by a host state that had the e↵ect of limiting
the profit-making capacity of an investment could be challenged as an act of indirect
expropriation and give way to an arbitral dispute. To make their case, American
sures, just an expressed intention to drop them during future rounds of liberalization negotiations.
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and Canadian groups frequently invoked a 1997 NAFTA arbitral dispute in which
the American firm Ethyl Corp. challenged the legality of a Canadian ban of a toxic
gasoline additive.11 The Canadian firm Appleton & Associates, who provided counsel
for Ethyl during their arbitral dispute, was later on commissioned by Canada’s largest
watchdog group, the Council of Canadians, to provide a legal opinion on MAI. It’s
major partner rea rmed the view of the CSOs by concluding that “the current word-
ing of the MAI is problematic as it will unduly limit the ability of the government to
take actions to protect a number of key governmental functions.”12 Similarly, a brief-
ing from Public Citizen and Friends of the Earth, two major American organizations
opposing MAI, asserted that Ethyl showed how international economic agreements,
like NAFTA and the proposed MAI, are a threat to national sovereignty because they
“replace the provisions of constitutional law with the authority of international panels
established primarily to defend investors’ “rights.””13
Another major problem for CSOs was the secrecy of the negotiations. Secrecy only
confirmed how detrimental MAI would end up being for their interests. The lack of
transparency in both the negotiation of investment treaties and ISDS proceedings will
be a recurrent objection raised by critics of investment arbitration. A January 1997
op-ed by the Preamble Center for Public Policy published in The Nation denounced
that “few Americans have even heard of the agreement. Trade o cials are treating
[MAI] information like nuclear secrets, the mainstream media are oblivious.”14 While
OECD o cials disagree that negotiations were conducted in secrecy (Geiger, 1998),
11Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL.
12Wording of MAI seriously flawed. (27 November 1997). The Toronto Star.
13Ethyl Briefing Paper, Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada: Now Investors
Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental. Retrieved from: https://www.citizen.org/our-
work/globalization-and-trade/ethyl-briefing-paper.
14Nova, Scott, & Sforza-Roderick, Michelle. (1997). M.I.A. culpa. The Nation, 264(2), 5-6.
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this idea was reinforced by the fact the first full draft of the agreement became public
in January 1997 only after the Canadian delegation leaked a confidential copy to the
Council of Canadians, who then distributed it among the network of CSOs.
Civil society groups mobilize against the MAI
Mobilization against MAI originated in the US and Canada. During the negotiation
of NAFTA, labor, environmental and consumer groups had expressed concerns only
in relation to trade issues and did not make much of ISDS provisions in Chapter 11.
After NAFTA became a reality, these groups turned to MAI. However, they did not
let go of their NAFTA concerns. Their campaigns constantly made the connection
between the two agreements using terms like ‘the next NAFTA’ (Beinart, 1997) or
‘NAFTA on steroids’ (Graham, 2000). European groups also mobilized against MAI.
It was the issue of protection for cultural industries that particularly troubled the
French opposition. They campaigned against the agreement with the slogan “L’AMI
c’est l’ennemi” (The friend/MAI is the enemy) given that in France MAI was referred
to as AMI (textitAccord Multilate´ral sur l’Investissement), the same word in French
for friend. Although with varying degrees of intensity, there was mobilization across
all members of the OECD.
This network of opposition groups counted around six hundred environmental,
development, labor, consumer, church and women’s organizations from at least sixty-
seven countries. It included large groups like Friends of the Earth, the Third World
Network, Oxfam, Amnesty International, the Sierra Club, and Public Citizen but also
hundreds of much smaller and localized organizations like the Kansai NGO Council
from Japan, the Christian Ecology Link from the UK and the Minnesota Fair Trade
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Coalition from the US. Labor unions were also part of the coalition, like in the case of
the Canadian Labour Congress, as well as the Green parties from various countries,
including Austria, Germany, and the UK.15
The level of coordination these groups demonstrated was unprecedented and the
scale of their mobilization took state and OECD o cials by surprise. Many stories on
mainstream newspapers and magazines pointed to anti-MAI campaigns as signs of the
relevance of the internet for political and social mobilization; something that is now
taken for granted. For the Financial Times, they evidenced how interest groups were
changing the nature of international economic negotiations through the internet.16
The Chicago Tribune described them in the following manner:
“They operate from cluttered o ces and the conference rooms of airport
hotels. The Internet is their weapon, and indignation often is their fuel.
Few people have ever heard of them, but they are beginning to reshape
the rule-making for the global economy.”17
Campaigners themselves recognized the internet was essential for forming a coali-
tion. Being the late 1990s, the internet was functional not so much as a platform for
disseminating information to the wider public, which is something they did mostly
o↵-line, but to communicate with other groups. Communication was crucial for the
coordination of street actions, like the ones that took place during the ‘International
Week of Action’ in February 1998. On this particular week, activists took the streets
15“The following non-governmental organizations endorse the NGO Joint Statement on the MAI”.
Public Citizen. Retrieved from: https://www.citizen.org/article/following-non-governmental-
organizations-endorse-ngo-joint-statement-mai.
16“Network Guerrillas.” Financial Times. 30 Apr. 1998: 20.
17ACTIVISTS ON INTERNET RESHAPING RULES FOR GLOBAL ECONOMY. 7 Jul. 1999.
Chicago Tribune.
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with full force (Kobrin, 1998; Bonanno and Constance, 2008). For example, in Wash-
ington DC, demonstrators gave handcu↵s to members of Congress as a symbol of the
restrictions MAI would impose on their regulatory capacity. Michigan Representative
David Bonior, second-ranking Democrat in the House, gave a speech at the rally.18
Dutch activists occupied the entrance to the o ce of the Dutch o cial serving as
Chairperson for the MAI negotiating group. They also entered into the Ministry
of Economic A↵airs and built a factory of cardboard boxes in the building’s main
hallway. Spectacular actions took place elsewhere as well.19
However, campaigners have recognized that the internet, and the instant com-
munication it allowed for, was also instrumental in their lobbying e↵orts against
MAI because it provided information about what negotiators from their country were
telling, or being told by, other parties. As Lori Wallach from Public Citizen recog-
nized “it’s really hard for anyone...to go almost any place in the world that we don’t
have a friend.”’20 Similarly, Mark Weisbrot of the Preamble Center recalls “[w]e had
a joint MAI listserv, with 2,000 people on it. If there was a discussion over dinner
in Geneva, there would be something on the listserv the next morning.”21 Wallach
o↵ered a clear illustration of how instrumental was this ability to know almost in real
time what state o cials were saying:
“so that when the U.S. negotiator has said, “Don’t worry, Congress; I
18“OECD Governments Launch ”MAI Charm-O↵ensive.” May 1998. Public Citizen. Retrieved
from: https://www.citizen.org/article/oecd-governments-launch-mai-charm-o↵ensive-0.
19Martin Khor. “NGOs Mount Protests Against MAI.” Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from:
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209-bwi-wto/43217.html.
20Wallach’s Road to Activism: Trade Agreements and Con-
sumer Protection. No date available. PBS. Retrieved from:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/intloriwallach.html.
21ACTIVISTS ON INTERNET RESHAPING RULES FOR GLOBAL ECONOMY. 7 Jul. 1999.
Chicago Tribune.
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would never go for an investment agreement”...and meanwhile [the nego-
tiator] goes o↵ to Japan, which wants this agreement ... before that person
has even walked out of the agriculture minister’s o ce in Tokyo, there’s
an e-mail across here...it’s translated, and we send it o↵. And the member
of Congress is calling that negotiator on a cell phone saying, “Hey, I un-
derstand you had something to say di↵erent than what you’re saying for
domestic consumption.” So now there’s that kind of accountability going
towards negotiations.”
Beyond coordinating and exchanging information on-line, civil society campaigns
had a large o↵-line public information component. The Preamble Center, with fund-
ing from the Ford Foundation, held debates in twenty American cities between pro-
ponents and detractors of MAI.22 The publication of the leaked draft by the Council
of Canadians was e↵ective for increasing media coverage of the negotiations (Beder,
2012). For the vice president of the United States Council for International Business
(USCIB), representing around three hundred of America’s largest multinational firms,
this was something to be regretted, “the media often become the unwitting tool of
activists determined to stop these negotiations in their tracks.”23
MAI in the US Congress
The main way for civil society groups to a↵ect negotiations was through the US
Congress. This institutional setting provided more openings for lobbying groups to
persuade legislators than to influence USTR of State Department negotiators. “We
got commitments from members of Congress, who then got commitments from the
22Building a global economy. (11 January 1998). In These Times.
23Investment e-paranoia. (7 January 1998). The Journal of Commerce.
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negotiators,” said Lori Wallach from Public Citizen.24 Civil society groups were suc-
cessful in getting the attention of Congress particularly by alerting legislators about
what was being negotiated in Paris. Showing their crucial role as suppliers of informa-
tion, some Congress members first heard about MAI from the CSOs (Hoedeman et al.,
1998). Having been left in the dark by the executive did not sit well with Congress.
In November 1997, a bipartisan group of House Representatives sent President Clin-
ton a letter asking how it was possible that the President had almost wrapped up
MAI without any consultations with Congress.25 The MAI issue crept into Congres-
sional debates that had little to do with this particular agreement. For example, on
26 September 1997 the House passed an amendment to an appropriations bill intro-
duced by Democrat Representative from Vermont Bernie Sanders that would allocate
1 million dollars to the USTR o ce to investigate and report to Congress the impli-
cations for laws adopted by American states of decisions by WTO panels. In their
discussion of how WTO disputes had challenged American legislation, Democratic
Representatives Peter DeFazio from Oregon and George Miller from California linked
this problem to MAI. “Now let me point to the latest, and perhaps most egregious,
example of how our laws can be held hostage by foreign-owned corporations,” said
Miller, “a little-known item called the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” These
o↵-topic proclamations would have been unlikely without civil society organizations
blowing the whistle on MAI.26
As MAI became more salient, Congress got more interested. On 5 March 1998 the
24Wallach’s Road to Activism: Trade Agreements and Con-
sumer Protection. No date available. PBS. Retrieved from:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/intloriwallach.html.
25‘Fast Track’ a NAFTA replay Clinton in tough trade fights again, but outcome may di↵er this
time. (7 November 1997). Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
26AMENDMENT PROCESS FOR H.R. 1127, NATIONAL MONUMENT FAIRNESS ACT OF
1997. House of Representatives - September 25, 1997. Pages H7873-H7879.
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Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives held a hearing on the status of MAI. The
witnesses to the hearing were Alan Larson (US State Department) from the executive,
Lori Wallach (Public Citizen) and Scott Nova (Preamble Center) from civil society
and Willard Berry (European-American Business Council) and Stephen Canner (US-
CIB) from the business side. The hearing dealt with the ISDS issue directly and
the positions of civil society groups and multinational firms crystallized as expected.
According to Larson, the dangers of investment arbitration were being blown out of
proportion. “No arbitration cases have ever been brought against the United States
under our BITs or under the NAFTA investment chapter.”27 At this point, the US
had not been sued before arbitral tribunals.
CSOs disputed the analogy highlighting that BITs were signed with developing
states with which the US had unidirectional FDI flows. Instead they used NAFTA
claims against Canada as a more appropriate picture of what could happen under
MAI. The business representatives stressed the implications of strict investment pro-
tection rules for the US as a capital exporter; “this is an agreement about inwards and
outwards investment, and the door swings both ways,” they said.28 At the end of the
hearing, Republican Representative Lindsey Graham from South Carolina adopted
a conciliatory tone; much more conciliatory than the two Democrats discussing the
Sanders amendment. Graham told private sector representatives “you want to go do
business with the least political constraint as possible...But, this is a big step for the
country to take, and some of the arguments raised here today need to be thought
27Multilateral Agreement on Investment, win, lose or draw for the U.S.?: hearing before the Sub-
committee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, second session, March 5, 1998, p. 5.
28Ibid. p. 26.
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of.”29 Congress made things extremely di cult for the executive regarding MAI.
When Clinton requested fast-track authority to negotiate trade agreements, Congress
not only ended up voting against it; it had also amended the bill to say that the trade
authority delegated to the President would not apply to the negotiation of MAI.30
Without fast-track, the MAI would have not made it through Congress intact.
Negotiators take notice
Negotiators and OECD o cials repeatedly called CSOs concerns an overstatement. A
few years later, USTR o cial and MAI negotiator for the US, Joseph Papovich, opined
that activists “were grossly exaggerating or even distorting the situation” (quoted in
Devereaux et al., 2006, 165). In a letter published in The London Guardian in re-
sponse to a critical article by the paper’s Economics Editor, the British Minister of
Trade and Industry, Lord Clinton-Davis, expressed “I can assure your readers that
your assertions are nonsense. The MAI will weaken neither environmental regulation
nor worker protection.”31 In a more conciliatory tone, the Canadian Minister of In-
ternational Trade, Sergio Marchi, lamented that “[t]he mai has become a shopping
cart into which people are dropping all their anxieties.”32 Some time after negotia-
tions concluded, various OECD o cials published their own accounts of the process.
Rainer Geiger, former Director for Fiscal, Financial and Enterprise A↵airs, denies
that negotiations were secret (1998) and David Henderson, former Head of the Eco-
29Ibid. p. 33.
30RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENT AUTHORITIES ACT OF 1997. House of Representa-
tives - September 25, 1998. P. H8781. Fast-track gives authority to the executive to negotiate free
trade agreements that Congress can either vote up or down but cannot amend or filibuster.
31Cited in a subsequent Guardian article. Retrieved from:
http://www.monbiot.com/1998/01/01/secrets-or-lies/.
32THAT SINKING FEELING The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment may be dead
on arrival, thanks to political bungling and a growing backlash against globalization. The Globe
and Mail (Canada). (April 24, 1998).
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nomics and Statistics Department, maintains that “some leading arguments brought
against the agreement were worthless or highly debatable” (1999, 26). Voices from
within business were not gentle; the Financial Times called civil society activists “a
horde of vigilantes”33 and the USCIB referred to them as “Flat Earth Society meets
the black helicopter crowd.”34
That negotiators considered accusations by civil society organizations unmerited
but still had to address them is evidence of the latter’s e↵ectiveness. The initial
response from state and OECD o cials was to tackle the secrecy issue by opening
the MAI process to civil society groups. In May 1997, which was the initial target date
for the MAI, states decided to extend it for another year and gave special instructions
to the negotiating group to consult civil society; a decision lamented by businesses.35
In October 1997, the OECD held informal consultations with representatives of about
fifty organizations. Public Citizen, however, saw these measures as part of a “MAI
charm o↵ensive,” aimed at appeasing the agreement’s critics by o↵ering them “seats
near the table.”36
In relation to more substantive objections, negotiators started to consider a series
of reformist elements. That is, ways to safeguard some regulatory autonomy but
without fundamentally altering the treaty’s design. For example, they developed a
proposal to include provisions on not lowering labor and environmental standards.37
The business lobbyists, who had expressed their support for the earlier draft, op-
33Network Guerrillas. Financial Times [London, England] 30 Apr. 1998.
34Investment e-paranoia. The Journal of Commerce. 7 January 1998. Guest opinion
35World business calls globalization a powerful force for economic progress. Business Wire. 18
June 1997.
36OECD Governments Launch “MAI Charm-O↵ensive.” May 1998. Public Citizen. Retrieved
from: https://www.citizen.org/article/oecd-governments-launch-mai-charm-o↵ensive-0.
37Pushed by the United States, Austria, and Britain, labor and the environment became major
issues by the end of 1997. Opponents to incorporating these matters into the MAI included Australia
and New Zealand as well as South Korea and Mexico (Devereaux et al., 2006, 170).
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posed the inclusion of these provisions.38 In a letter to USTR Charlene Barshefsky,
the President of the USCIB warned against turning “this agreement into a vehicle
for achieving environmental and labor objectives.”39 Similarly, the President of the
International Chamber of Commerce and CEO of Nestle´ argued that “MAI is not
the right place in which to set specific levels of environmental protection” (quoted in
Beder, 2012, 182).
In terms of dispute settlement provisions, there were proposals to grant third
parties, which would include CSOs, the right to intervene before an arbitral tribunal,
either personally or in written form. There was also discussion about the possibility of
including an appeals procedure, something that is not provided for in BITs, although
there was little discussion about the form said procedure would take. In the end, con-
cessions to civil society groups were not su cient, given that a specific demand was to
eliminate ISDS altogether.40 In an email from Public Citizen’s campaigner, Chantell
Taylor, to the wider coalition she communicates that unless their demands are met
in full, “we will each return to our home countries and launch massive campaigns to
kill the MAI.”41
4.2.3 The end of MAI and its implications
Obstacles in the way of successful negotiations ended up being insurmountable. In
February 1998 USTR o cial Charlene Barshefsky called the MAI “unbalanced” and
38USCIB Issues Statement on Administration’s Fast Track Proposal. Business Wire , 1:18 PM
GMT, 19 September 1997.
39Building a global economy. In These Times. January 11, 1998.
40Joint NGO Statement: 600 International Organizations Oppose the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI). Public Citizen. 27 October, 1997.
41Email communication from Chantell Taylor. Published by Ngaa Kaiwhakanekeneke. New
Zealand. Retrieved from: http://sisis.nativeweb.org/global/nov12mai.html.
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“prejudicial”, saying it would require “very substantial work to make it something
the US will sign.”42 At the same time, OECD Secretary-General Donald Johnston
appeared to be in denial: “I’m sure these rather small, parochial issues that are on the
table will be worked out.”43 A few months later he was confronted with the reality of
the situation. On 14 October, a week before talks were scheduled to resume, Prime
Minister Jospin announced that France would not be returning to the negotiating
table following the recommendations of the Lalumiere Report.44 Following France,
other European states withdrew their support and without them, there was no MAI.
On 3 December, the OECD o cially communicated that negotiations on the MAI
were longer taking place.45 Civil society groups, while celebratory, remained vigilant
of any attempts to move MAI talks to the WTO.46
A change in the make-up of governing coalitions in many of the negotiating par-
ties contributed to bringing about MAI’s demise. Halfway through the negotiations, a
left-wing coalition came to power in France and two of its members, the French Com-
munist Party and the Green party were particularly vocal against MAI. In Germany,
the Social Democratic Party in coalition with the Greens won the 1998 Bundestag
elections. The German Greens were listed as signatories on the multiple petitions
42US shies away from accord on investment. Nancy Dunne. Financial Times. 14 February 1998.
43Global Investment Accord Put on Hold; France, Worried About Perceived Threat to Its Culture,
Seeks ‘Pause’ in OECD Talks. Anne Swardson. The Washington Post. 29 April 1998.
44In May 1998, Jospin appointed a special commission headed by Catherine Lalumiere, Member of
the European Parliament and a liated to the Radical Left Party, and Jean-Pierre Landau, Inspector
general of Finances, to conduct an examination of the MAI and provide recommendations. The com-
mission concluded that France should only continue negotiations if a series of conditions were met,
including that “the dispute settlement provisions be confined to interstate disputes.” (Muchlinski,
2000, 1049).
45O cial OECD Statement, Informal Consultations on International Investment, OECD, Paris, 3
December 1998. Retrieved from: https://www.citizen.org/our-work/globalization-and-trade/mai-
deep-freeze-oecd.
46Call to Reject Any Proposal for Moving the MAI or an Investment Agreement to the WTO, Pub-
lic Citizen, 20 November 1998. Retrieved from: https://www.citizen.org/our-work/globalization-
and-trade/call-reject-any-proposal-moving-mai-or-investment.
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circulated by CSOs. Also, in strong federal states like the US and Canada, some
subnational units were opposed to MAI as well. Three Canadian provinces said they
would not recognize the agreement if signed by the federal government.
The goal of this section is not to argue that civil society on its own was responsible
for the failure of the treaty. Disagreements between states were equally, or perhaps
more, challenging. From the outset there were marked di↵erences regarding the lib-
eralization of certain industries and the extent to which government would be able to
subsidize them. These might have proved insurmountable independently of civil soci-
ety mobilization. What civil society accomplished, however, was to raise the profile of
investor protections and ISDS issues within the MAI, something OECD governments
did not have original disagreements about.
Moreover, this first instance of civil society mobilization against investment treaties,
and ISDS in particular, will have consequences for future attempts by these same
governments to establish new international rules in the domain of foreign investment.
According to a trade diplomat quoted in the Financial Times, “[t]his episode is a
turning point.”47 For civil society groups, fighting MAI was necessary not just be-
cause of the particular implications of the provisions in the text of the agreement
but because they saw it as “the next battleground in an intensifying campaign to
institutionalize corporate dominance.”48 As I show next, for the CSOs, this will be a
battle to be fought on multiple fronts.
47Network Guerrillas. Financial Times [London, England] 30 Apr. 1998: 20. Financial Times.
48Nova, Scott, and Michelle Sforza-Roderick. M.I.A. culpa. The Nation, 13 Jan. 1997.
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4.3 Early reformist signs: reinterpreting NAFTA
MAI was dead, but NAFTA was still alive and kicking. Kicking in the form of a
few but highly controversial ISDS disputes. In comparison to MAI, NAFTA posed
a much greater challenge for ISDS opponents. Success in the case of MAI meant
blocking its adoption altogether. In the case of NAFTA, it was the status quo that
was the problem. I examine how the US government had its first reformist moment in
the recognition that there was a problem with ISDS in NAFTA. The NAFTA parties
adopted a series of interpretative statements aimed at reducing arbitral discretion in
the interpretation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard and increasing
transparency in arbitral proceedings. NAFTA highlights how patterns of FDI flows
structure interests di↵erently for states parties. The interests of the US regarding
the desired level of investment protection are di↵erent in its relations with Canada
than with Mexico. FDI flows between Mexico and the US are mostly unidirectional,
reproducing the North-South model found in early BITs, but between Canada and
the US FDI flows are much more even and this provokes a tension between each
state’s interest as importers and exporters of FDI in relation to ISDS.49
This section coincides with the beginning of Methanex v. United States. While
this was the second dispute lodged against the US, it was much more controversial be-
cause it involved a Canadian firm challenging a environmental state law. This should
propel government actors, on their own initiative, to start considering changes to
treaty policy. However, policy-maker’s own inclinations will inform the scope of those
intended changes. With the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration,
49In 2015, the stock of American FDI in Mexico was 5.6 times bigger than Mexican FDI in the US.
This contrasts with the American FDI in Canada, which is only 1.3 times bigger than Canadian FDI
in the US. USTR Resource Center. Retrieved from: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/.
4.3. Early reformist signs: reinterpreting NAFTA 188
I should observe more moderate proposals emerging from the executive. In fact, the
interpretative statements fell considerably short of what CSOs demanded. In terms
of civil society strategies, this section shows anti-ISDS groups from the two wealthier
parties focusing solely on their domestic lobbying e↵orts and foregoing transnational
mobilization. Logically, the location of decision-making processes dictates the mobi-
lization strategies of civil society groups.
4.3.1 Fair and Equitable Treatment
The obligation to provide FET to foreign investors is one of the most common
standards of treatment in international investment law and ISDS claimants invoke
breaches of FET standards more than any other breach in their suits. The frequency
with which FET has been invoked required tribunals to repeatedly weigh in on the
meaning of the standard and states have been unhappy with the result, claiming that
some interpretations have gone beyond the intentions of the drafters. UNCTAD rec-
ognized this as problematic in its 2012 report (2012b, 139). FET provisions have thus
become the most controversial standard of treatment in investment arbitration. The
controversy revolves around whether FET is limited to customary international law
or whether it has an autonomous meaning that can be influenced by the decisions of
arbitral tribunals.50 It is assumed that linking FET to customary international law
results in a more limited scope of protection and one that is more deferential to state
legal autonomy to regulate investors.
As I show in this section, the now commonplace idea that expansive arbitral
50For example, the tribunal in the Occidental v. Ecuador case decided that Ecuador violated the
investor’s right to a stable and predictable legal environment and this was an “essential element” of
FET. Final Award, paras. 180-92 (July 1, 2004).
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interpretations of the FET standard are dangerous and need to be checked is not
new. Ten years before the recognition of this issue by UNCTAD, the parties to
NAFTA were dealing with the same problem. In an op-ed published in a Canadian
newspaper, International Trade Minister Pierre S. Pettigrew recognized that “several
recent NAFTA tribunals have made errors when dealing with certain Chapter 11 cases,
often overstepping their authority and taking unusually broad interpretations.” He
also warned that “these misinterpretations, if not corrected, could be used to thwart
important public policy objectives.”51 Of the three NAFTA member states, Canada
was the most interested one in addressing this issue and had lobbied for it for three
years.52 At that point, Canada had faced three Chapter 11 cases: it had lost one,
settled another before it reached the hearing stage and won the third one. Canadian
civil society organizations had been very active regarding these disputes. On the
other end was Mexico, who was opposed to introducing any changes. Somewhere in
the middle was the US.
The US position, however, changed after Methanex v. United States.53 This case
garnered strong interest from environmental groups which saw it as “the latest at-
tempt to use NAFTA as a tool for rewriting domestic environmental laws” and as
evidence that “[s]omething is seriously wrong with the way the NAFTA investment
51We need to ’clarify’ NAFTA to fix tribunal ’errors’: Controversy is building around the Chapter
11 investment section of NAFTA. National Post, 23 March 2001, Pierre S. Pettigrew.
52Prime Minister contradicts Trade on Chapter 11: Clause ’working well’: Provision allows com-
panies to sue governments. National Post, 24 April 2001.
53Methanex was a Canadian producer of methanol which is a component of MTBE (methyl tertiary
butyl ether), an additive to gasoline. In March 1999, California banned the use of MTBE on health
and environmental grounds after MTBE was found in water supplies. According to Methanex, that
regulation was tantamount to expropriation of the investment and therefore a violation of NAFTA.
Methanex also charged that the motive behind the ban was to favor ADM, an agribusiness giant
that produces ethanol (a rival additive to methanol), who contributed to the governor’s election
campaign. In July 1999 Methanex notified the US about the arbitration. The case advanced to the
merits stage where the tribunals ruled in favor of the US in 2005.
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chapter is working.”54 State-level politicians also took notice. Republican Califor-
nia State Senator Dick Mountjoy was astounded; “[i]t is incredible Nafta gives an
international tribunal the authority to interfere in a decision made by California’s
governor and California’s legislature.”55 Within the Clinton administration the issue
of Chapter 11 generated divisions between agencies. An EPA o cial John Audley is
quoted describing this situation in a way that contradicts the expectation of rational
policy-makers as rational updaters who coalesce around a new consensus in light of
new information:
“Inside the government, the divisions were clear and painful...Some agen-
cies were saying, ‘We got it wrong in NAFTA and we have to change
it.’ The others were saying, ‘No, we don’t accept that interpretation. In
fact, we like Chapter 11 so much, let’s negotiate it again.’ The substan-
tive di↵erences were pounded out through horrible meetings and fifty-,
seventy-five-page documents. We simply couldn’t work it out.”56
Heated debates within the Clinton administration reflect the ideological hetero-
geneity of its cabinet. Divisions within the US government diminished with the arrival
of the more ideologically homogeneous Republican administration of George W. Bush
in 2001 (Bertelli and Grose, 2011). Given the pro-business stance of the administra-
tion, ISDS was not a critical issue. However, there was concern that the CSO-fostered
54David Schorr, director of the World Wildlife Fund’s, quoted in Enviros claim NAFTA needs a
rewrite: Groups latch on to Methanex lawsuit to voice concerns. National Post , 23 June 1999; and
in Billion Dollar NAFTA Challenge to California Drinking Water Protection Goes to Trial. Ascribe
News , 12 September 2000.
55Canadian Firm’s Suit On Gas Additive MTBE Raises Questions On Nafta. Dow Jones Business
News , 9:48 PM GMT, 14 September 1999.
56The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century – INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
IN NAFTA ARE ONE MANIFESTATION OF A BROAD, BACKDOOR...The Nation, 15 October
2001
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backlash against Chapter 11 could get in the way of obtaining fast-track authority
from Congress to negotiate new trade deals. Thus, one way to appease domestic
NAFTA critics was to give in to Canada’s insistence (and disregard Mexico’s unwill-
ingness) and issue a binding and immediately e↵ective interpretation of Article 1105.
This is the article through which NAFTA grants FET as a minimum standard of
treatment. The meeting of the Free Trade Commission of 31 July 2001 issued a note
establishing that Article 1105 must be interpreted according to customary interna-
tional law and it also stated that the breach of another provision of NAFTA does
not in and of itself constitute a breach of FET.57 This was the first time the NAFTA
parties attempted to rein in some of the authority delegated to arbitral tribunals
under Chapter 11, yet it was a much more timid response than renegotiation or even
an amendment.
4.3.2 Transparency
The second issue that the NAFTA parties decided to address in relation to ISDS
was the question of transparency in arbitral proceedings. Di↵erently from the MAI
talks, during NAFTA negotiations there was no consideration of whether documents
and proceedings from Chapter 11 should be public, therefore tribunals followed the
prevalent norm in international arbitration of keeping them private. CSOs, the main
beneficiaries of those stipulations, had not brought that issue up before ISDS disputes
became a reality. Once they became interested in the issue they realized how opaque
the system was by design. The tribunal in Loewen, the first case against the US,
57Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions. NAFTA
Free Trade Commission. July 31, 2001. Retrieved from:
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding e.asp.
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denied a request to disclose the case filings.
Similar to the issue of FET, Canada was the first and most interested party in
addressing the lack of transparency. As early as 1998, right after its first dispute, the
Canadian government issued a unilateral note interpreting Chapter 11 as permitting
both greater transparency and the disclosure of information related to claims. How-
ever, being a one-sided act, this action did not have much of an e↵ect on the practice
of subsequent tribunals (De Mestral and Vanhonnaeker, 2017). After Methanex, the
US also developed an interest in enhancing transparency. This issue became much
more pressing duringMethanex due to the mobilization of environmental groups. The
Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund was only able to follow the proceedings through the
filing of periodic freedom of information requests that forced the US to release the
documents.58 These groups not only wanted permanent access to the disputes but
also the ability to intervene. Consequently, the US government told the tribunal
that CSOs should be permitted to submit amicus briefs and be able to observe the
hearings but the claimant disagreed. In the end, the tribunal decided in favor of
accepting amicus briefs but based that decision on the subject matter of the dispute
itself, an environmental regulation, and not on a judgment on how Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings should be conducted in general. The Methanex tribunal, however, did not
grant access to the hearings to third parties.59
O cials from both Canada and the US saw increasing transparency as a defensive
strategy; it could help improve the declining reputation of arbitral tribunals. The in-
terpretative note from July 2001, besides dealing with the FET problem, recognized
58Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say.
The New York Times. 11 March 2001.
59Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL. Decision on Authority to
Accept Amicus Submissions. 25 January 2001.
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that “nothing in NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing
parties.”60 On this occasion, the parties also committed to make all documents pub-
lic, including the claimants’. Subsequent pronunciations from the parties addressed
pending question in relation to transparency. In October 2004, Canada and the US
issued a statement during NAFTA’s tenth anniversary on the issue of amicus briefs.
While it did not order Chapter 11 tribunals to generally accept amicus briefs, it rec-
ommended procedures for determining when to accept them.61 Finally, in July 2004
the three parties allowed hearings to be open to the public.62 Given that civil society
organizations are the entities directly benefiting from enhanced transparency, these
changes to NAFTA cannot be understood without their mobilization. In the context
of NAFTA, CSOs were able to make the implications of ISDS for the US as a recip-
ient of FDI in relation to Canada to gain salience, even over a highly asymmetrical
relationship with Mexico.
At the same time, that changes stopped short from addressing larger issues speaks
to the importance of having receptive actors in positions of power. The Republican
administration allowed for the interests of firms to become e↵ective backstops against
the changes demanded by ISDS opponents. Noting the salience of the issue and
the problems it could bring for obtaining fast-track authority from Congress, an
interpretative note was intended to be seen mindful of the objections raised by ISDS
opponents yet without disrupting protections for multinational firms. Civil society
organizations, naturally, were not content. Groups like the International Institute
for Sustainable Development (IISD) and Friends of the Earth warned that there was
60Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions. NAFTA
Free Trade Commission. July 31, 2001. Retrieved from:
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understandinge.asp.
61NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Joint Statement, Celebrating NAFTA at ten, October 7 2003.
62Statement of the NAFTA parties. July 16, 2004.
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still much to be done since transparency and FET where not the most problematic
aspects of NAFTA.63 Democratic legislators sympathetic to their cause, now on the
side of the opposition, brought their grievances into Congress during the negotiations
of the 2002 Trade Act.
4.4 Consolidating changes: the 2002 Trade Act
and the 2004 model BIT
4.4.1 The 2002 Trade Act
While MAI negotiations ended before any agreements reached Congress and NAFTA
reinterpretations were managed by the executive, the Trade Act was an exclusively
legislative matter. The Bush administration’s first objective in the area of economic
diplomacy was to obtain Congressional approval of the 2002 Trade Act. The Act
would give the President authority to negotiate a Free Trade of the Americas Agree-
ment, a NAFTA for the whole hemisphere, which was the most ambitious of the
administration’s trade goals. Acts granting fast-track can also include a set of guide-
lines for the USTR to follow in future negotiations. The specific issue of investment
treaty negotiation guidelines was discussed in the Senate. Thus, relative to the pre-
vious two instances, CSOs interested in seeing drastic changes to the US negotiation
guidelines had more access points in Congress, where they could lobby receptive
policy-makers. At the same time, because these guidelines would a↵ect all future
treaties, any changes would enhance the autonomy of the US government to regu-
63Note on NAFTA Commission’s July 31, 2001, Initiative to Clarify Chapter 11 Investment Pro-
visions. IISD. Retrieved from: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade nafta aug2001.pdf; Pressure
eased on Nafta governments over investor protection. Financial Times, 2 August 2001.
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late foreign investors as much as the autonomy of foreign government to regulate
American investors in their territory. For this reason, domestic multinational firms
have strong incentive to counter-mobilize. Debates within the US Congress about
the 2002 Trade Act show the tension between the interests of the US as a capital
importer and exporter. Legislators adopting one position or the other come to very
di↵erent conclusions about ISDS.
Republicans introduced a bill to the House first as an extension of Andean Trade
Act, where it passed by one vote. During its consideration by the Senate the Act
changed substantially. It was now a broader trade legislation package including fast-
track authority as well as negotiating guidelines for the USTR in the implementation
of that authority. The American experience with NAFTA’s Chapter 11 made Senators
deal with issues that had not been addressed before in discussions about economic
agreements. Supporting my assumption that exposure to ISDS leads policy-makers
to introduce policy changes in the direction of greater legal autonomy, there was
consensus among Senators on the need to add specific guidelines about investors’
ability to challenge domestic laws. However, legislators were not on the same page
about how much should the guidelines deviate from current treaty practice.
The negotiating guidelines with respect to foreign investment resulted from an
amendment introduced by Democratic Senator from Montana Max Baucus and co-
sponsored by Republican Senator from Iowa Chuck Grassley, referred to as the Baucus-
Grassley amendment. It dealt mostly with dispute settlement provisions; or according
to Senator Baucus, “the ‘chapter 11 question’ as it has come to be called.”64 Baucus
recognized concerns about the impact of ISDS on states’ right to regulate. “Interna-
tional agreements,” he argued, “must not become a back door for expanded protec-
64Congressional record, Senate. May 13, 2002. S4267.
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tion of foreign investors at the expense of protection of our environment, health, and
safety.”65 He also noted that this was a concern expressed at di↵erent levels of gov-
ernment and by civil society organizations. In his remarks, Baucus cited a resolution
from the National Association of Attorneys as well as communiques by the US Con-
ference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties. He also quoted a letter
to the Senate from a coalition of environmental organizations, including Friends of
the Earth and the Sierra Club, as well as a letter to US Trade Representative Zoellick
from the National Wildlife Federation. In their letters, these organizations expressed
concern with ISDS and requested Congress to address this issue in the Trade Act so
that new treaties negotiated by the US would not generate the same problems that
emerged from Chapter 11.
The adoption of Baucus-Grassley meant that in future negotiations the US would
improve ISDS by finding mechanisms to eliminate and deter frivolous complaints and
establish a single appellate body that would review arbitral decisions and provide in-
terpretative consistence. However, this was a mere suggestion and not a mandatory re-
quirement. The amendment also included several provisions relating to transparency.
All proceedings, submissions, findings, decisions and hearings would be made public
and amicus submissions from businesses, unions, and CSOs would be accepted.66 On
14 May 2002, the Senate approved the amendment unanimously. American firms with
interests abroad seemed satisfied as well. “We think Baucus-Grassley gets it about
right,” said an executive from Procter Gamble.67
While nobody opposed the amendment, some legislators were of the view that
Congress should impose further restrictions on the President’s ability to negotiate
65Ibid.
66Congressional Record, May 10, 2002. S4230.
67The Trade Bill’s ‘Huge Can Of Worms’. (21 March 2002). CongressDaily/A.M..
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treaties with ISDS. The main voice within this group was Democratic Senator from
Massachusetts John Kerry. He introduced an amendment with two very innovative
elements. First, it would limit expropriation provisions by establishing that minor
loss of profits resulting from regulatory acts of the state would not be compensated.68
Second, and even more drastically, the Kerry amendment would make investors’ ac-
cess to arbitration dependent on the consent of their home state.69 While Kerry
presented this wording as a mere replication of mechanisms in place domestically, as
a provision within investment agreements this would have meant a radical departure
from established practice and a return to the bygone practice of diplomatic protection.
For Baucus, Kerry’s proposal was going too far. While both Kerry and Baucus
are Democrats, Kerry is much further to the left that Baucus (Lewis et al., 2019).
These two positions showcase the fundamental source of tension for the US and other
developed states regarding investor protections and ISDS. Whether to adopt the per-
spective of a capital-exporting state or a capital-importing one leads to di↵erent
conclusions about how much power should be granted to investors to challenge host
state regulatory measures. In Kerry’s narrative, it is the US government that will
su↵er from foreign firms using arbitration, or threatening to use it, to fight back
against regulations they dislike. According to Kerry, ISDS cases “create expensive
litigation. Just the threat of the litigation is, in and of itself, a chilling e↵ect.”70
The ’chilling’ terminology undoubtedly came from the CSOs. He also made multiple
references to Methanex and to Philip Morris threatening Canada with a Chapter 11
68The amendment would limit the propensity of firms to sue “by ensuring that payment of com-
pensation is not required for regulatory measures that cause a mere diminution in the value of private
property.” CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE. May 17, 2002. S4529.
69“a claim by an investor under the agreement may not be brought directly unless the investor
first submits the claim to an appropriate competent authority in the investor’s country.” Ibid.
70Congressional record. Senate. May 21, 2002. P. S4595.
4.4. Consolidating changes: the 2002 Trade Act and the 2004 model
BIT 198
dispute if they decided to move forward with an anti-smoking regulation. In his view,
Baucus-Grassley was not doing enough to avoid this happening in the future because
it did not establish a mechanism to weed out frivolous claims.
Baucus considered ISDS from the point of view of American investors abroad. His
concern was that restricting access to arbitration for foreign firms operating in the
US meant that future treaties would do the same for American investors abroad:
“if we create that almost impossible burden for foreign investors in the
United States, other countries can do the same. This means that other
countries, under the guise of public health and safety and environmental
protection, could discriminate against the United States in a very subtle
way.”71
Opponents to the Kerry amendment not only thought it went too far; it was also
unnecessary to do so since the US had been signing BITs with ISDS for decades
without any problems. As Republican Senator from Texas Phil Gramm noted, Kerry
“fails to point out that never, ever, have we lost a case since these 45 treaties have been
in e↵ect. But every day these same treaties protect American investments in Central
and South America, in Africa, in Asia, in the developing world.”72 Republican Senator
from Virginia George Allen made the same point and reminded other Senate members
that American firms want ISDS: “Many U.S. companies and major trade associations
tell us that these provisions are extremely important to protecting Americans against
abuses in other countries.”73 Gramm went so far as to note that ISDS was actually
a civilizing force in the developing world. “Through the Cold War, where we did not
71Congressional record. Senate. May 21, 2002. P. S4602.
72Congressional record. Senate. May 21, 2002. P. S4596.
73Ibid. P. S4597.
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have these agreements in place, American businesses had no choice but to pay o↵
corrupt local governments,” he noted, “[w]e negotiated these agreements to put an
end to those problems and instill the rule of law worldwide.”74
To be noted, Baucus, Allen and Gramm were not advocating for the status quo,
that is, for a replication of NAFTA’s Chapter 11 in future deals. In fact, Allen cited
demands from environmental groups and, in reference to the interpretative statement
adopted by the three NAFTA parties in July 2001, he praised the Bush administration
for “working with all interested parties in an e↵ort to address these concerns for
NAFTA and future investment agreements.”75 At this point, the reality of ISDS
claims against the US had shifted the terms of the conversation. The adoption of
Baucus-Grassley had successfully introduced language regarding ISDS into the Trade
Act. The disagreement in the Senate was about how far to take it. For Kerry it
was indeed appropriate to include an a rmation in the Trade Act of the notion that
foreign investors should not be a↵orded greater protections than domestic investors,
as done by Baucus-Grassley, but the problem was that “it is preamble language...It
has no teeth.”76 In the end, a motion by Baucus to table the Kerry amendment was
approved by 55 votes to 41, a vote that followed party-lines almost perfectly. On 23
May 2002, the Senate approved the Trade Act.
In sum, while defeated, the fact that Kerry had introduced such a radical amend-
ment, the way he defended it and that it received substantial support from other
Democrats speaks to the receptiveness of these legislators to the arguments of civil
society groups. Finally, as expected by the argument, a Republican controlled Senate
was relatively more aligned with the preferences of firms, who did not want their right
74Ibid.
75Ibid. P. S4599.
76Congressional record. Senate. May 21, 2002. Page 8302.
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to use ISDS to be diminished by the Kerry amendment, and ended up rejecting it in
favor of more moderate changes.
4.4.2 The 2004 model BIT
There was yet more debate to come. The 2002 Trade Act issued directives for the
negotiation of future BITs and investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs).
The FTAs with Singapore and Chile, signed respectively on 6 May and 6 June 2003,
reflected many of these guidelines in their investment chapters, especially in terms
of transparency requirements for ISDS procedures. Throughout 2003 and 2004 the
State Department and the USTR -under Republican control- conducted a review of
the 1994 US model BIT with the goal of updating the instrument to conform to the
requirements of the Trade Act and to reflect the changes introduced to the investment
chapters of the latest round of FTAs. Nonetheless, the review process also included
new consultations with the private sector and civil society organizations.
In 2003, the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy to the State
Department77 convened a stakeholder meeting to discuss a draft of the new model.78
In this meeting, the expected division emerged between representatives of firms on
one side and environmental, consumer and development organizations on the other.
While firms wanted protection against unreasonable measures that would diminish
the value of their investments abroad, civil society groups wanted reassurances that
77The State Department’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy (ACIEP) serves
the US Government in an advisory capacity by providing a forum for discussion of issues in inter-
national economic policy. Committee membership consists of representatives of US organizations
and institutions, including from business, organized labor, environment, state and local government,
academia, legal consultancies, and non-governmental organizations.
78Subcommittee on Investment of the U.S. Dep’t of State Advisory Comm. on International
Economic Policy (ACIEP), Report Regarding the Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2-3 (Jan.
30, 2004)
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foreign investors in the US would not be able to resist legitimate regulations under
the guise of investment protection. These disagreements, however, were larger than
the di↵erences expressed by Baucus and Kerry during their debates in the Senate.
Representatives of firms at the consultations expressed that, in their view, there
was no need to update the 1994 model at all. That is, they saw this consultation
process as an opportunity to prevent even the more moderate changes ordered by
Congress under Baucus-Grassley. Because the recent FTAs with Singapore and Chile
already reflected these guidelines, representatives on investors argued that “adapting
the model BIT to the investment chapters of recent FTAs serves only to perpetuate
a downward trend in protection for U.S. investors.”79
CSOs thought the draft model was not good enough either, although for the op-
posite reasons, and pressed for further changes. To intervene in this discussion CSOs
need to be able to evaluate how each provision in the model advances, or falls short
from advancing, their goals and to propose workable alternatives. This requires a
high level of technical expertise that not all civil society groups have. CSOs, as
experts in the subject matter, are in a better position to participate in this process
relative to less resourceful social movements. Among other issues, there was bickering
about the definition of investment, which for CSOs and labor should exclude portfo-
lio investment while for representatives of the financial sector it should include even
additional forms of financial assets. There was also disagreement about the NT stan-
dard. CSOs warned that, as it stood in the draft, there were not enough safeguards
against tribunals interpreting it as a prohibition of regulatory acts that result in de
facto discrimination, even in the absence of intentional discrimination. They wanted
explicit language limiting claims of NT violations to be limited to measures enacted
79Ibid. p. 2.
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for a primarily discriminatory purpose. The representatives of firms, di↵erently, ar-
gued that requiring claimants to prove that discrimination was a primary purpose of a
given measure would render the national treatment obligation worthless.80 Similarly,
the FET provision included in the draft was at the same time too open-ended for
labor and CSOs and too restricting for firms. In relation to ISDS, labor and CSOs
wanted, among other things, provisions allowing state parties to block arbitral claims
involving health, public safety, the environment, and workers’ rights; a requirement
for investors to exhaust local remedies before reaching arbitration; and the creation
of an appellate mechanism. The firms’ representatives, naturally, opposed all of these
proposals.81 In the conclusion section, where the report gathered the areas of con-
sensus, there was not much more than a recognition that it is a good idea for the US
to have a model BIT.82
The final model did not change much from the draft discussed during these con-
sultations. In relation to ISDS, labor and CSOs did not obtain what they wanted
because investors retained the ability to initiate disputes on their own. There was no
exhaustion of local remedies requirement either. Also, treaties negotiated according
to this model would not create an appellate mechanism but would only include a
reference to a future appellate body that might or might not be set up by the par-
ties.83 However, the objections of firms were not fully accommodated either. This is
evidenced by the fact that, in the view of the business community, there was no need
to change standing negotiating practice in the first place. While the resulting model
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departed substantially from NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and other negotiated BITs to this
date. “There is no greater evidence of the changing dynamics and shifting ideologies
of some investment treaties over time than the changes to the U.S. Model,” said Jose
Alvarez, chief negotiator of US BITs from 1984 to 1987, about the 2004 model (2010,
8). Less favorably, former ICJ judge, regular investment arbitrator and legal eminence
Stephen M. Schwebel, wrote that “the 2004 Model was an exercise in the regressive
development of international law.” In relation to the FET provisions, he made a
similar argument than what firms expressed during the consultations, “providing for
such a minimalist meaning...leads to the question of why that provision in a bilateral
investment treaty is found at all” (2009, 519520). Considering that FET breaches are
the most frequently claimed and found violations of international investment treaties
by ISDS tribunals, modifications to this standard are not insignificant.
The key point to take away from this process is that, while civil society groups were
in the end unable to impose their preferences completely, the changes introduced into
the 2004 US model BIT cannot be explained without their continuous mobilization.
“reflect at least a decade of pressure by numerous NGOs, some of which
were involved in the successful e↵ort to unravel the negotiations for the
OECDs [MAI],” and more importantly, “who remain convinced, rightly
or wrongly, that the network of BITs and other investment agreements
threatens the rights of federal, state, or provincial governments to regulate
in the public interest” (2010, 9).
At the same time, the model BIT was being drafted by a Republican State Depart-
ment and USTR. The pro-business stance of the Bush administration was a major
reason why the interests of firms prevailed in many other regards.
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4.5 The 2004 model in action: the US-Uruguay
BIT and the Australia-US FTA
So far I have traced the emergence of civil society’s interest in investment treaties, and
ISDS in particular, to the combination of two factors in the mid 1990s. First, a series
of early NAFTA cases against Canada raised awareness of this otherwise unknown
dispute settlement mechanism and cemented the view that firms were not just using
ISDS to get justice for the taking of their property by dictators in faraway countries.
They were using ISDS to counter sensitive regulations at home. A second factor
helped make the ISDS danger more real. The launching of negotiations for a NAFTA-
like multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) among OECD members meant that
most foreign firms within each of these countries would eventually have access to
ISDS. NAFTA showed ISDS was dangerous, MAI showed the danger was pressing.
MAI eventually failed and CSOs achieved their goal. But it was only the first battle
in their war against corporate rule. Not only the MAI agenda moved to the WTO,
but also the same provisions they fought in MAI were already present in thousands
of BITs around the world and countries kept adopting them in new treaties. Thus, as
opportunities to influence their governments’ treaty policies opened up, either during
domestic processes (like in the US Trade Act) or during treaty negotiations, CSOs kept
pushing their anti-treaty and anti-ISDS goals. Moreover, anti-MAI e↵orts resulted
in a dense network of like-minded CSOs. These connections proved valuable when
Australia began FTA negotiations with the US. While Australia had not experienced
ISDS cases directly, Australian CSOs were already well attuned with its potential
implications.
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I also showed that -as expected due to the dual position of the US as a host
and home state- there was not consensus about the form this rethinking should take.
Policy-makers emphasizing the perspective of the US as a home state suggested much
smaller changes than those proposed by policy-makers stressing risks for the US as
a host. While rational learning arguments predicts rational actors in the same infor-
mation environment will arrive at the same solution for the commitment problems
they face, the processes examined so far suggests policy-maker’s views about the
severity of the problem vary substantially depending on which of those two perspec-
tives becomes more salient. This, in turn, is a function of their ideological positions.
The first move of the pro-business Bush administration was an interpretative note of
NAFTA. As a matter exclusively managed by the executive, the note did not intro-
duce radical changes. Yet as opportunities for influence opened up, CSOs mobilized
to obtain as much of a change as possible while firms counter-mobilized to limit those
changes. One such opportunity was the passage of the 2002 Trade Act leading to the
drafting of the 2004 US model BIT. Being this a legislative issue, there was space
for alternative views and arguments as well as multiple points of access for lobbying
groups. As expected, Democrats, more in line with the interests of CSOs, pushed
for a fairly radical changes in US treaties. Most notably, making investors’ access
to ISDS dependent on the consent of their home state. Republicans, generally more
attuned to the perspective of US firms, opted for more limited changes like preserve
direct access to ISDS but increasing transparency and precision. While still resisted
by firms, the outcome of this rethinking during a unified Republican government was
a moderate reform that left the fundamental principles of the regime untouched. The
2004 US model BIT reasserted the legal autonomy of host states in a considerably
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less significant way than of the Kerry amendment would have been adopted.
The last empirical section compares two negotiations the US undertook after
adopting its 2004 model. The first one was for a bilateral investment treaty with
Uruguay and the second one was a free trade agreement with Australia, which in-
cluded a chapter on investment. Uruguayan and Australian treaty policies would
be, at this time, outside the scope of my argument because neither country had yet
faced any ISDS disputes directly. That said, my intention with this brief comparison
is to examine at to what point can civil society mobilization raise awareness among
allies in government of the dangers of ISDS, even before direct exposure. For this
reason, during the empirical narrative I take mostly the perspective of Uruguay and
Australia. Consistent with the brand new US model, both negotiations started with
ISDS on the table. But only Australia demanded that it was taken o↵.
For many reasons, resistance to ISDS provisions and the overall impact of the
treaty on the state’s ability to regulate should have emerged in Uruguay more than
in Australia. First, in relation to the US, Uruguay was exclusively in the position
of the host state. Di↵erently, the relationship between Australia and the US was
more equal, albeit still in favor of the US. By 2002 figures, US FDI in Australia
was $36.3 billion and Australian investment in the US was $24.5 billion.84 Second,
while neither country had been subjected to an ISDS dispute directly, Uruguay was
neighbors with an Argentina that at the time had been sued forty times (and mostly
by American firms). Third, while the Uruguayan BIT was negotiated by a center-
right government, the government that had to decide whether to send it to Congress
for ratification was a leftist coalition. In Australia, it was the Liberal party who was
84Summary of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement. February 2004. O ce of the United
States Trade Representative. Retrieved from: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-o ces/press-
o ce/fact-sheets/archives/2004/february/summary-us-australia-free-trade-agreement
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in power. Thus, because of these three reasons one could expect that of both US
partners, it would have been Uruguay who would have raised concerns with ISDS
in its treaty. However, the main di↵erence between both was the dense network of
civil society groups that was present in Australia that had links with their American
counterparts forged during the anti-MAI campaigns. This mobilization raised the
salience of the negative aspects of ISDS for opposition MPs from the Labour party.
The Uruguayan leftist coalition -while it exhibited some of the traditional ideological
traits of the Latin American left- did not take issue with the treaty’s potential impact
on Uruguay’s ability to regulate.
4.5.1 Negotiating with Uruguay
The ‘Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Uruguay Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment’ (US-Uruguay
BIT) was the first agreement negotiated after the adoption of the 2004 American
model BIT. On the Uruguayan side, the treaty was negotiated during the center-right
government of Jorge Battle and signed on 25 October 2005, a week before presidential
elections. With the victory of a leftist coalition headed by Socialist Tabare´ Va´zquez,
it was unclear whether the new administration would send the new BIT to Congress
for ratification. “We don’t know the content of that treaty, we don’t know what is in
it,” said Va´zquez during his campaign, avoiding making any promises about the fate
of the treaty that could alienate both his leftist base or foreign capital.85
The Uruguayan administration was internally divided. Moderates occupied the
Ministry of Economy while the hard-liners inhabited Foreign A↵airs, which was con-
85“No conocemos el texto de ese tratado, no sabemos lo que contiene.” Eventual gobierno de
izquierda propondr´ıa refere´ndum sobre aborto en Uruguay. Agence France Presse, 29 October 2004.
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trolled by the Socialist Reinaldo Gargano. However, on 23 December 2004, and coin-
cidentally while having lunch with the board members of the Uruguay-United States
Chamber of Commerce, the incoming Minister of Economy Danilo Astori announced
the President would ask Congress for the ratification of the US-Uruguay BIT.86 Di-
visions emerged also in Congress. Curiously, the most contentious issue proved not
to be ISDS or the risk of regulatory chill; even at a time when neighboring Argentina
was being swamped with ISDS claims. It was the Denial of Benefits (DoB) clause
included in Article 17. The DoB clause is a common element in international invest-
ment treaties and it relates to the issue of complex ownership structures of many
multinational enterprises. The DoB clause establishes that a party to the treaty can
deny its benefits to an enterprise from the other party if it is ultimately controlled
by nationals of a non-party state with which the denying party has no diplomatic
relations. For some members of the Uruguayan left, this was a problem because of a
long-standing tradition of Uruguayan support for Cuba. There were concerns that en-
tering into a treaty with the US including a DoB clause would imply a tacit approval
of the Cuban blockade. The Communist Party, also a member of the ruling coalition
but holding only one seat in the Senate, was the only one to bring up concerns about
ISDS. Interestingly, the statement in which the Communist Party rejected the treaty
traced the roots of the “asymmetric and anti-democratic essence” of the treaty to the
“failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment.”87
The further-left members of the governing coalition stalled the ratification of the
BIT. With the goal of breaking the stalemate in Congress, President Va´zquez re-
86Gobierno electo de Uruguay mantendra´ tratado de inversiones con EEUU. Agence France Presse,
23 December 2004.
87Partido Comunista del Uruguay rechaza tratado de inversiones con Estados Unidos. La Repub-
lica, 9 December 2005, Noticias Financieras.
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quested the American government to renegotiate three problematic aspects of the
treaty during a trip to the US in September 2005, to which the they agreed. Accord-
ing to the President, he managed to “introduced variations that...have improved the
bilateral agreement substantially.”88 However, the government was trying to make
these concessions appear much bigger than what they actually were. In terms of the
DoB clause, the change was the introduction of reciprocity. In the earlier BIT, it
was the US who retained the right to deny benefits to certain enterprises while the
renegotiated version granted these right to both parties. This change, however, did
nothing for the concern over its implications for Cuba. Uruguay also included an
interpretative declaration to stipulate that the MFN treatment would not apply to
Uruguay’s commitments as a part of the Common Southern Market with Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay.89 This caveat was already included in Annex I of the origi-
nal BIT. And lastly, the revisited treaty introduced a change in the designation of
arbitrators for the case of financial disputes. Following standard practice, ISDS tri-
bunals are composed of three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and the third
appointed by agreement. But the newer BIT stipulated that, in the case of disputes
over financial services, if the parties do not agree to the constitution of the tribunal,
the remaining appointments will be made by ICSID’s Secretary General. These were
hardly substantial changes. It is likely that, if this process would have been scruti-
nized by CSOs with technical expertise on international investment law, they would
have been able to call on the government and explain to legislators how meaningless
these changes were.
88“hemos podido introducir variantes que nos parece que han mejorado sustancialmente este
acuerdo bilateral.” Va´zquez: “en poco tiempo” se firmara´ nuevo tratado con EE.UU. El Pais,
27 October 2005.
89Comparando tratados. El Pais, 21 November 2005.
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However, they appeared to have worked to break the impasse. Both chambers
of the Uruguayan Congress approved the treaty by the end of December 2005 amid
mobilization from groups associated with the Communist Party, who, reasonably,
deemed the modifications to the treaty insu cient. These concerns only emanated
from the fringes of the governing coalition and proved too little and too late to coun-
terweight positive views of the treaty based on the expectation of increased American
FDI flows. For ISDS to become a salient issue for Uruguayan politicians, it will
have to wait until Philip Morris launches a case against Uruguay for its anti-tobacco
policies. Uruguay will then start putting a lot more thought into the drafting of its
treaties.
In the United States Congress, the approval of this BIT was uncontroversial. With
a unidirectional flow of capital between both states, there was no concern among
policy-makers for the potential impact of the treaty on the US capacity to regulate.
The interest was solely on its implications for American firms. At a hearing of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the State Department Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic and Business A↵airs was only questioned about the reception of
the treaty in the private sector. Moreover, the institutional framework of this nego-
tiation did not provide access for CSOs to raise complaints. The Assistant Secretary
explained that, while the BIT is based on the 2004 model and this resulted from a
consultation involving both the private and civil society sectors, when it comes about
particular negotiations with a potential treaty partner, consultations only involve the
input of firms through the Industry Trade Advisory Committee.90 If the other party
requests to depart from the US model text, the Committee would be consulted.91 The
90Business associations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Council for
International Business are part of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee.
91109th Congress 2d Session. January 3-December 9, 2006. Senate Executive Reports. Nos. 9-19.
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treatment that the BIT with Uruguay received in the US Congress shows how -when
flows of investment are purely unidirectional- there is little space for ISDS opponents
to push the problems of investment arbitration into the debate by emphasizing its
negative consequences on host countries.
4.5.2 Negotiating with Australia
Di↵erently, the investment chapter of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (AUSFTA) signed on 18 May 2004 departed from the US model BIT in a very
substantial way: it excluded ISDS. This section shows how civil society mobilization
can raise the salience of the potential impact of ISDS on the host state’s right to reg-
ulate during treaty negotiations, even when the country has not faced ISDS disputes
directly and before the issue of treaty reform became a global concern.
Initially, the US insisted that ISDS be adopted under the AUSFTA. However,
opposition emerged from both sides. On the US side, seven Democrat legislators sent
a letter to US Trade Representative Zoellick opposing the inclusion of ISDS from
the onset.92 However, there was no interest from the USTR in deviating from the
new model. On the other side, there was a negotiating partner very di↵erent from
Uruguay. Australian labor and CSOs had mobilized considerably against the partic-
ipation of Australia in MAI negotiations at the OECD (Capling and Nossal, 2001).
When the Liberal government of John Howard began negotiating an FTA with the
United States, the same issues reemerged. There was concern about the potential im-
pact of AUSFTA on Australia’s capacity to retain content regulations for audio-visual
P. 17.
92US support over trade hitch. The Australian Financial Review. By Allesandra Fabro. 15
January 2004.
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media and price controls for pharmaceuticals. The question of whether the agreement
would include the same ISDS provisions from NAFTA and MAI also generated in-
tense controversy. Australian unions and CSOs were making the same arguments
their North American counterparts had been making about NAFTA’s Chapter 11.93
According to one organizer, “[f]ifty-nine prominent community organisations...called
for the exclusion of an investor-state dispute process, arguing that it would be a
dangerous weakening of governments’ ability to regulate for social and environmen-
tal goals” (Ranald et al., 2006, 44). These groups coordinated positions through the
Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET) and connected with their
peers in the US to coordinate their lobbying activities (39). The largest union federa-
tions in both countries adopted a joint statement asserting that “[t]he U.S.-Australia
FTA must reject [the NAFTA] model and preserve each country’s authority to reg-
ulate foreign investment in the public interest.”94 Additionally, as it had also been
the case in the US and Canada, governments of subnational units expressed concerns
with the prospect of AUSFTA including ISDS (Capling and Nossal, 2006, 158).
After the fourth round of AUSFTA negotiations, Australia’s chief negotiator
Stephen Deady appeared before the Senate’s Committee on Foreign A↵airs. In
his questioning, Labor’s shadow trade minister Stephen Conroy brought up a 2000
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 case in which UPS challenged subsidies provided to Canada
Post.95 He wondered, “would FedEx be able to take the Australian government or
Australia Post to this independent dispute settling?” Deady’s response suggests that
93Free Trade Leads To Torrent Of Trouble. The Age, 23 August 2003, David Elias.
94Joint Statement on the Proposed U.S.- Australia Free Trade Agreement. The Australian Council
of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the American Confederation of Labour and Congress of Industrial
Organisations (AFL-CIO) August 10, 2003. Retrieved from: https://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/aflausftajointstatementmay2004.pdf
95United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1.
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Australian negotiators were, at this point, considering including ISDS. He replied that
even if subsidies to Australia Post were in breach of the treaty’s NT provisions, by in-
cluding a reservation excluding postal services from the scope of the treaty, investors
would have no case. Conroy countered with the fundamental objection ISDS detrac-
tors have: the propensity of arbitrators to interpret provisions expansively. “That is
what you think the definition [of the reservation] would be but you would not be the
final arbiter anymore.”96
On November 2003, the Australian Senate’s Committee on Foreign A↵airs pub-
lished its report on AUSFTA.97 The report mentions a submission by AFTINET to
the Committee and particularly cites a passage warning that if ISDS is included in
the agreement, “the almost inevitable outcome will be a reduction in the capacity of
all levels of Australian government to regulate.”98 Furthermore, it notes that the US
proposals looked a lot like “the ill-fated OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment
that drew broad, hostile and e↵ective community criticism during the late 1990s.”99
Finally, the report recommends that “no investor-state provisions be included in the
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement” (p. 135).
The final round of negotiations took place in January 2004. Australia finally
communicated to the US that it could not accept ISDS and argued that such a
mechanism will not be necessary because the legal traditions regarding investment
were very similar in both states and there was no danger of unfair treatment of
96Parliament of Australia. Senate Estimates. Budget supplementary estimates 2003-2004
(November 2003). p. 139.
97Voting on Trade: The General Agreement on Trade in Services and an Australia-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. Canberra, November 2003.
98Ibid. p. 132.
99Ibid. p. 135
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foreign investors in Australian courts.100 Although American firms were not happy,101
the US accepted Australia’s position and AUSFTA ended up not including ISDS.
This counters my expectation that, if American treaties were to exhibit revisionist
traits, these would come from domestic processes rather than from demands from its
partners. This was, however, the only negotiation during this period in which the US
deviated from its model to such an extent.
That Australia -who had not been sued once by foreign investors at this point-
adopted a radical position by demanding the absence of ISDS in AUSFTA goes against
a central expectations from my argument, namely that states will become more mind-
ful of their international legal autonomy after negative ISDS experiences. However,
Australia’s radical position did not extend beyond this specific negotiation with the
US. Two months after signing AUSFTA, Australia concluded another FTA with Thai-
land whose investment chapter did include access to ISDS. Without a treaty model,
Australia approached negotiations on a case-by-case basis. In talks with the US,
the perspective of the host state was much more salient than in negotiations with
Thailand. Thus, the Australian case suggests that direct experience with investment
arbitration might not be the only conduit for awareness about the constraining e↵ects
of ISDS. However, even in these cases, direct experience with investment disputes still
has its own e↵ects on treaty policy and the extent of these changes is also related to
the ideologicsl inclinations of those in power. After a controversial 2011 ISDS claim
that Philip Morris initiated for a anti-smoking regulation, the leftist coalition govern-
ment of the Labor and the Greens took an even more radical position and decided
100Congressional Research Service Report RL32375 The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement:
Provisions and Implications. January 12, 2005. William H. Cooper. Specialist in International
Trade and Finance Foreign A↵airs, Defense, and Trade Division.
101Ibid.
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that Australia would not include ISDS in any of its future agreements (Trakman,
2012). After the Liberals went back to power in 2013, the Center-Right government
reverted course and decided that in future negotiations, the inclusion of ISDS would
be decided on a case-by-case basis.
4.6 Conclusion
The American model BIT changed substantially after Canadian investors started to
bring the US before international ISDS tribunals for alleged breaches of NAFTA’s in-
vestment rules. The 2004 version of the model was much more precise in its definitions,
included several exception for public policies and increased the overall transparency
of arbitral proceedings. Yet the US remained a staunch supporter of investors’ right
to sue sovereign governments directly in international tribunals. Thus, its reaction to
its first ISDS disputes falls within the reformist policy zone. The US became more
cautious about the way in which its future treaties will constrain its legal autonomy
but did not try to actively recover it from its existing treaties by terminating or rene-
gotiating NAFTA. In this Chapter I linked this outcome to the mobilization of civil
society organizations and the counter-mobilization of firms as well as to the ideolog-
ical disposition of policy-makers that made them more receptive to the arguments of
either group.
While this Chapter focused on how the American, and to certain extent Canadian,
experience with NAFTA triggered a rethinking of its approach to investment treaties;
similar processes have eventually taken place elsewhere, particularly within Europe.
The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty was born out of investment opportunities in the
energy sectors of former soviet countries and provided similar protections as NAFTA
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and most BITs, including ISDS (Hobe´r, 2010). Much like the US and Canada in
NAFTA, Western European countries adopted these protections as home states to
the firms that were going to invest in Post-Communist Europe, yet in doing so they
provided the same guarantees to other Western European investors in their territory.
A few controversial claims had profound e↵ects, even though Western European firms
had been using ISDS provisions in BITs much more often against foreign governments.
European environmental organizations were enraged after a Swedish energy company
brought a claim against Germany for its decision to phase out nuclear power in
2012.102 The social mobilization against ISDS that followed made it impossible for
the EU to keep providing direct access to international arbitration in its investment
treaties.
Moreover, although I finish my analysis in 2005, the issue of ISDS in US treaty
policy was far from settled. During the drafting of the 2012 model BIT and in TPP
and TTIP negotiations, CSOs kept asking for the complete elimination of ISDS and
multinational firms kept trying to limit the scope of the changes implemented at this
stage. Much like in the MAI negotiations, the issue of ISDS was particularly salient
during TPP and TTIP talks because many of the countries involved were capital
exporters as well. At this point, it was the Obama administration who was in charge
of the negotiations and -highlighting the role of policy-makers own ideas- the most
fervent opposition to investment arbitration provisions came from the Left of his
own party; from progressive Democrats like Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth
Warren, who much like the CSOs view ISDS as a tool of corporate rule.103
The importance of ideas held by policy-makers, however, is never more clear than
102Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany (II).(ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12)
103Democrats urge o cials to leave out investor-state dispute provisions in major trade deals. (18
December 2014). The Hill.
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in the renegotiation of NAFTA. The most revisionist decision ever taken by the US
regarding ISDS came from the Trump administration, especially US Trade Represen-
tative Robert Lighthizer. NAFTA 2.0, o cially known as USMCA, will not include
ISDS between the US and Canada and severely restricted between the US and Mexico.
Unlike Warren and Sander’s, however, Lighthizer’s critiques of ISDS come from a na-
tionalist point if view.104 In the concluding Chapter I revisit the recent renegotiation
of NAFTA in light of the dissertation’s findings.
104USTR Robert Lighthizer’s testimony before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of




By the end of his presidency in 2017, Rafael Correa had severed all ties with the
international investment regime. That is, Ecuador adopted an Exit policy aimed at
recovering its full legal autonomy from investment treaties. Exits are extremely rare.
Not only are governments seldom inclined to break away from international regimes;
even when they are, the costs of doing so can be large. By dissecting the process
culminating in the termination of Ecuadorian BITs it is possible to observe how
ideationally motivated actors pursue their policy preferences while facing a variety
of constraints and opportunities, both domestic and international. Furthermore, it
becomes clear why exiting the regime is such a rare event. The limiting factors
keeping Ecuador in check for ten years are observable in full force and this highlights
the importance of strong ideological commitments for governments to tolerate the
costs of walking out from their treaties.
5.1 The argument
In Chapter 2 I argued that states who face multiple or highly controversial ISDS claims
will attempt to reclaim a degree of the legal autonomy to regulate foreign investment
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they had lost to the international investment regime. I also argued that the form
in which this reclaiming takes place -thus the amount of autonomy recovered as a
result- is a↵ected by a multiplicity of variables. In this Chapter, I examine the case
of Ecuador, a developing country with marginal outwards FDI, during the 1999 to
2017 period. Foreign investors started to sue Ecuador before ISDS tribunals in 2002.
Based on the argument, the first element to consider in explaining treaty policies
throughout this period is policy-makers’ ideas. In this regard, the considered period
allows for a ‘within-case’ comparison between the pro-market consensus of the ruling
coalition until 2007 and the ensuing leftist-developmentalist government of Rafael
Correa. Thus, given the ideological configuration of the ruling coalition, I should
expect radical policies to emerge from Ecuadorian policy-makers after 2007, but not
before.
In light of this expectation it could be assumed that Correa’s Ecuador was an
easy case for a full Exit. It was, at that point, one of the most heavily sued countries
for alleged violations of investment treaties and the ideological make up of the gov-
ernment was prime for taking a radical approach (Conaghan, 2011). Central to the
political economy of the government was a re-assertion of state property over natural
resource extraction and this would set Correa on a collision course with the foreign
firms in extractive industries (Rosales, 2013). In fact, as a presidential candidate he
had already been vocal about the problems of the investment regime. Yet it took
the government of Ecuador (GoE) ten years to exit; two full presidential mandates.
Opening up Ecuador’s withdrawal shows a much more drawn-out process than what
Correa’s combative rhetoric might have suggested. A process that at multiple times
risked stalling indefinitely or even rolling back.
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I argue this lag is not the consequence of slow bureaucracies; it is theoretically sig-
nificant. As I show, the GoE could have terminated all the treaties as soon as it came
to power and before the enactment of the new constitution that required legislative
approval to terminate a treaty. In fact, eight treaties -all with small economies- were
terminated at that point. They delay in terminating the more politically salient BITs
responds to other reasons. Governments do not make policies in a societal vacuum.
Di↵erent domestic and external actors have incentives to mobilize when policy-makers
start discussing policies that can a↵ect their interests. The most fundamental dif-
ference in terms of the United States and Ecuador cases relates to the influence of
societal actors. For a variety of reasons, the external context -as a source of con-
straints and opportunities- should be more relevant for explaining policy-making in
Ecuador than in the US. This brings into consideration three variables that were ab-
sent in the previous Chapter: foreign investors, international CSOs, and diplomatic
coordination.
As explained in Chapter 2, foreign investors’ threats to withhold investment and
treaty partners’ threats to reduce market access for domestic exporting firms can check
radical policies. This is another important di↵erence between the US and Ecuador.
As a net capital importer, the relevant domestic firms in Ecuador are not multina-
tional firms but domestic exporting firms who have incentives to mobilize when their
exports are on the line. Thus, at points where the process of withdrawing from the
regime stalled or veered towards more moderate approaches in line with Revisionist or
Reformist policies, I should observe foreign firms and their home governments engag-
ing in this type of coercion and, as a result, I should also observe domestic exporting
firms raising concerns about the fate of BITs.
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In the previous Chapter I showed how domestic CSOs mobilized in favor of radical
policy changes in the US. American CSOs became interested on investment treaties
after NAFTA claims started to hit and developed technical expertise on the matter.
As interested experts, they mobilized when favorable opportunity structures provided
openings, mostly in terms of access points and availability of allies. In Ecuador, the
landscape of civil society is di↵erent. Per the discussion in Chapter 2, Ecuadorian
civil society actors are closer to social movements than CSOs. The indigenous and
environmental movements, while capable of disruptive actions, lacked expertise in
the subject matter. Thus, I have two expectations for Ecuadorian domestic civil
society. (1) They should be more likely to mobilize around issues that a↵ect them
directly -like the environmental and social impact of firms’ operations- than around
investment treaty policy. (2) When the mobilize, they should be better able to mount
disruptive actions than to intervene in the policy-making process. Thus, in this case,
considerations of opportunity structures become secondary to civil society’s ability to
take advantage of them. I test these expectations through a within-case comparison
of civil society’s role in two important policy decisions. The first one was the expelling
of the American oil firm Occidental. The second one was the decision to terminate
all of Ecuador’s investment treaties. While indigenous and popular movements were
determinant for the former, their organic interest in the latter was marginal.
In Chapter 2 I argued that international CSOs can compensate for the lack of
technical expertise found in domestic civil society and thus lend support to policy-
makers with radical agendas. I should expect that once Ecuador starts to show
signs of dissatisfaction with how costly its BITs turned out to be, large Northern
CSOs will become involved in this process as suppliers of expertise. This, in turn,
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should strengthen the position of radical policy-makers vis a vis moderate actors. I
also argued that, for relatively less powerful states, the diplomatic environment can
make governments more or less likely to pursue radical policies, for example through
demonstration e↵ects or policy coordination. This leads me to expect developments
in the diplomatic front to correlate with moments in which the process of withdrawing
from the regime cleared obstacles and moved forward.
While I argue the international dimension is crucial for explaining the GoE’s poli-
cies, I do not make a ‘second-image reversed’ argument in which domestic politics are
determined by international forces (Gourevitch, 1978). Without the ideological com-
mitment of the government, foreign pressures would have not emerged and Ecuadorian
o cials would have not attempted to coordinate policies with other states. More im-
portantly, external factors’ influence depends on the availability of domestic allies. A
group of radical government o cials had a clear vision of Ecuador getting rid of its
treaties but they faced resistance from both the opposition parties as well as mod-
erate sectors within the GoE itself. Depending on the balance of influence between
those two sectors within the GoE, the Ecuador appears closer to the reformist policies
of developed states or to the radical approaches of countries like Bolivia, Brazil and
South Africa.
Lastly, I should note the Ecuadorian political system di↵ers from the US system
of the previous Chapter in ways that might have aided the GoE in the implemen-
tation of its desired policies. Authority is much more centralized in Ecuador as a
result of being a unitary country with a single legislative chamber. In terms of ac-
cess points, this presents those interested in reverting those policies with a smaller
number of potential allies.1 Furthermore, the traditional political parties of Ecuador,
1Although the constitutional reform of 2008 increased access points relative to the previous system
5.1. The argument 223
which could have acted as veto players, became more marginalized as a result of the
various political crisis in the years prior to Correa’s victory. Economic conditions
also favored the ability of the president to concentrate power, especially rents from
natural resources (Mazzuca, 2013). Exceptionally high oil prices funded a massive
explosion of public expenditure -from 26.3 percent of GDP in 2006 to 40.8 percent by
2012- on cash transfer programs, public sector jobs as well as health care, education,
and infrastructure (Sanchez-Sibony, 2017).2
Regarding alternative explanations, Ecuadorian resilience sheds light onto a gray
area in the expectations of power-based theories. According to these arguments, weak
countries either do not seek to challenge norms sanctioned by more powerful states or
they are heavily sanctioned for doing so. In the realm of international law, these two
outcomes are not equivalent. Terminating a treaty is a rare event and one with lasting
consequences. It is thus necessary to understand the reasons why states persist in
their defiance of an international legal regime in the face of sanctions.
Focusing only on the outcome, pure rational learning arguments derived from Ra-
tional Design seem to find support. After all, Ecuador drastically altered its policies
after enforcement of its BITs provoked an influx of new information about the treaties’
costs and benefits. Furthermore, this case also appears to support the bounded ra-
tional learning argument advanced by Poulsen (2015). Due to cognitive constraints,
during the 1990s Ecuador entered into very unfavorable BITs without much consid-
eration of potential costs, especially in terms of eventual ISDS claims. Later on, a
number of early arbitrations in the oil sector that had high perceived impact led the
GoE to rethink its stance. While increased available information and overcoming
by requiring congress approval for terminating international treaties, this advantage has little e↵ect
once the ruling party obtains a majority.
2The price of oil increased by 81% from the time he came to o ce to the year 2013.
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cognitive constraints as a consequence of ISDS experience might be enough to predict
that treaty policies will change, they cannot predict how much they will deviate from
the status quo.
Di↵erently, I find the reasons for Ecuador’s initial radical stance to be ideologi-
cal. The country’s own experience with investment arbitration was filtered through
policy-maker’s ideational lenses and the resulting perception gave way to a specific
set of policy preferences. This can be observed during one of the first acts from the
GoE: a constitutional ban on treaties with ISDS. The debate on this constitutional
provision shows legislators from di↵erent parties expressing alternative understand-
ings of Ecuador’s recent ISDS experience and of what should the country do to shield
itself from more setbacks.
This Chapter is divided in three parts, each addressing a specific question. Part
A explains the origins of Ecuador’s radical stance by opening up domestic politics
before and during its first ISDS disputes. Before and after the arrival of Correa,
the GoE was not equally inclined to revise its treaty network. Part A also shows
the ruling coalition was not ideologically homogeneous. While radical sectors were
initially dominant within the Correa government, moderates within the GoE became
more influential as the radical stance of Ecuador started generating strong reactions
from foreign investors and their governments. Part B explains the role of external
factors in this shifting balance of influence between radicals and moderates within the
GoE and how this resulted in the complete stalling of the treaties’ cancellation. Part
C explains why Ecuador ultimately was able to follow trough with the termination
processes by looking at two factors: (a) domestic public support for radical policies
-which radical sectors within the GoE fostered through public campaigns- and (b) an
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enabling international environment -defined as the perception within the GoE that
similar questionings of the regime were taking place elsewhere.
PART A: the origins of Ecuador’s radicalism
The first part of this Chapter explains why Ecuador developed radical preferences
under the Correa government. I focus on the interaction between the country’s recent
experience with ISDS disputes and the ideological make-up of the ruling coalition.
Part A starts with an overview of the events leading up to the arbitral between
Ecuador and the American oil firm Occidental. Understanding how this dispute came
about is important for two reasons. First, it provides an importunity to contrast the
degree of mobilization of indigenous movements when it came to fighting firms on
the ground with their mobilization on the issue of BIT termination. As I show in
Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, their specific demands were for the oil firm to leave
Ecuador and for the GoE not to sign an FTA with the US. Indigenous and popular
movements were not demanding that Ecuador foregoes its BITs, if they have had a
more precise understanding of the links between treaty protections and the limited
ability of governments to regulate them, they would have demanded Ecuador foregoes
its BITs as well.
Second, this controversial case led to a rethinking of Ecuador’s place with the
investment regime. Yet there was no agreement between political actors on how to
avoid similar setbacks in the future. This highlights the blind spot of the alterna-
tive learning arguments. Once they disputes impose vivid costs, I should observe
longitudinal variation in policy preferences, that is, between a consensus around one
response before the ISDS disputes and a revised one after. Section 5.4 and Section 5.5
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provide evidence against these two alternative arguments by analyzing disagreements
within the GoE regarding BIT policy and between assembly members during debates
around a ban on treaties providing for ISDS in the 2008 constitution.
As my arguments predicts, Part A also shows foreign firms threatening to with-
hold more investment and foreign governments warning about limiting market access.
Every time there was gesturing towards a decision the US would not like, Ecuado-
rian firms made it clear this could a↵ect their exports. Furthermore, the Ministry
of Foreign A↵airs and the trade negotiators, which were in direct contact with the
American government thus worked as transmission belts of information about the
American preferences, were the agencies pushing for an outcome that would please
the US.
5.1 Background
In 1985 Ecuador opened up oil exploration and production activities to foreign com-
panies. The motivating factor for this change was a worrisome forecast that Ecuador
-a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) with 70%
of its export earnings coming from oil sales- would have run out of reserves by the end
of the decade.3 One of the firms that went into Ecuador’s oil fields was Occidental,
an American company, also known as Oxy because of its ticker symbol. Being an
economic activity so tied to the land, the GoE constantly faced demands from indige-
nous groups over land ownership, environmental preservation and profit distribution
(Kimerling, 2001). By the end of 1992, Sixto Duran Balle´n -from the Right-wing
Social Christian Party -assumed the presidency of Ecuador. As many of his regional
3Oil Companies Return To Ecuador. (1985, January 30). Financial Times.
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colleagues at the time, he implemented a series of market-oriented reforms -fiscal aus-
terity, open markets, foreign investment liberalization, land reform- with the goal of
modernizing the Ecuadorian economy (Hey and Klak, 1999). During his presidency,
Ecuador became a member of the World Trade Organization and signed more than
half of Ecuador’s international investment treaties. In June 1994 the President signed
a new Agrarian Reform Law that made it harder for peasants to obtain legal own-
ership over unoccupied and unproductive land. An Indian uprising followed which,
among other things, blocked access to oil fields. The executive declared a state of
emergency and deployed soldiers to ensure the oil activities were not a↵ected.4 This
uprising was a sign of a dormant conflict in Ecuadorian politics, one that will emerge
much more forcefully in the coming years.
In 1999, Occidental signed a contract wit the state-owned company Petroecuador
to develop and operate two fields. Alleged violations of this contract will lead to
Occidental’s exit of Ecuador and then to the controversial ISDS dispute that sits at
the heart of Ecuador’s exit from the investment regime. In 2000, the Canadian firm
Alberta Energy Corporation (AEC) acquired 40% economic interest in Oxy’s fields.5
Although the deal was reported in the specialized press and neither the GoE nor
Petroecuador expressed concerns, a crucial part of this operation was that Occidental
never notified the Ministry of Energy about the transaction. A few years later the
government would contend the lack of notification amounted to a violation of the
contract.6
4Ecuador uprising eases; oil operations normal. (1994, June 27). Platt’s Oilgram News.
5Occidental Petroleum Corporation v The Republic of Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11 (Oct. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Occidental v. Ecuador].
6Article 16.1 of the contract establishes: “Transfer of this Participation Contract or assignment
to third parties of the rights under the Participation Contract, must have the authorization of the
Corresponding Ministry.” Occidental v. Ecuador.
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In sum, Ecuador was heavily dependent on oil exports and, since the 1980s, it
became heavily dependent on FDI for oil exploration and production. Successive
governments welcomed foreign capital into extractive industries and entered into a
series of bilateral investment treaties that o↵ered protection for such investments.
This commitment to an extractivist economy, however, generated several clashes with
the indigenous movement. The biggest one was yet to come.
5.2 The turning point: Ecuador v. Occidental
With the goal of promoting exports, a 1999 Tax Law o↵ered companies a refund
on the 12% value-added taxes (VAT) paid for purchasing or importing goods used
in manufacturing export products. Because Occidental exported oil produced in
Ecuador, it decided to apply for the VAT refund. The Servicio de Rentas Internas
(Internal Revenue Service) (SRI) granted the first refund that Oxy -as well as other
oil firms- had claimed. But when the company applied for the refund in the next tax
period, the SRI denied it. The SRI denied all further reimbursements to oil firms
and required that previously granted refunds were returned to the state.7 With the
goal of getting the GoE to intervene in its favor, Oxy warned a planned $808 million
investment deal would not see the light of day as long as the issue was not resolved.
“Legal protections to invest in Ecuador,” said the head of Oxy, “would determine
whether Occidental’s planned investments will ultimately materialize.” Oil firms
also took the issue to local courts hoping to recover around $150 million. Oxy’s
7Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, Award, LCIA Case
No. UN3467.
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legal options went beyond the national courts of Ecuador8 as it announced it was
considering initiating an ISDS dispute under the 1993 Ecuador-United States bilateral
investment treaty.9
The US government intervened on behalf of Occidental and other American firms
claiming VAT refunds. O cials from the Embassy in Ecuador reportedly met with
the head of the SRI and the US Assistant Secretary in the Department of Commerce
visited Ecuador looking for a resolution to the dispute. “Last fall I was told this issue
would be resolved,” he said, “[a]nd we’re disappointed it’s not yet been resolved.”
The US government did not just express its concerns, it also attempted to hold back
trade benefits for Ecuador under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) and this
prompted Ecuadorian companies to get involved.10 As the VAT issue was ongoing, the
deadline was approaching for the US to make a decision about Ecuador’s eligibility for
these benefits. Fearing restricted market access for their products, the president of the
Chamber of Commerce of Quito demanded the government paid the VAT refund to
the firms. In the end, the US renewed trade benefits for all the countries but Ecuador.
Similarly, Canada -who had started talks with Andean countries for a potential free
trade agreement- warned that a deal was not possible without a resolution to the
VAT matter.11
In October 2002, Occidental formally informed Ecuador that unless the dispute
8The head of Occidental in Ecuador, Paul MacInnes, described the actions the SRI as “illegal,
arbitrary and discriminatory;” all heavy words in international investment law. Dispute a threat to
oil investment. (2002, September 12). Financial Times.
9Ecuador Tax Dispute With Oil Cos Threatens Trade Benefits.(2002, September 3). Dow Jones
Global Equities.
10The Andean Trade Preferences Act granted Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru duty-free
access to the American market in exchange for cooperation in the war on drugs. ATPA was later
expanded and names the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
11Ecuador Tax Dispute With Oil Cos Threatens Trade Benefits. (3 September 2002). Dow Jones
Global Equities News; Andean Nations May Lose ATPA Tari↵ Relief,US O✏ Warns. (6 September
2002). Dow Jones Global Equities News.
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was resolved immediately they would pursue international arbitration under the
Ecuador-US BIT. This would have not been the first ISDS claim filed against Ecuador;12
but at this point the government had no experience with arbitration proceedings. In
a nod to the exporting sectors, it was nevertheless assured a decision would be made
on the matter before the upcoming talks for the Free Trade Area of the Americas in
1 November.13 The Ministry of Foreign A↵airs sent a letter to Robert Zoellick, the
US Trade Representative, outlining how Ecuador was planning to resolve the dispute,
including a willingness to submit the issue to arbitration.
In 11 November 2002, Oxy formally started arbitration proceedings against Ecuador.
The chosen venue was the London Court of International Arbitration. Di↵erent parts
of the GoE were sending contradictory messages about the dispute. On 12 December,
the o ce of the AG concluded that submitting the VAT dispute to arbitration was
not legally viable. The Deputy Attorney General justified it as a matter of scope,
arguing that the Ecuador-US BIT did not apply to tax matters: “tax issues aren’t
a reason for arbitration. The agreement isn’t applicable because it talks about in-
vestment, this isn’t about investment.”14 Yet ultimately, the decision about the legal
viability of an ISDS dispute was not up to Ecuador but to the arbitrators in their
ruling about jurisdiction and admissibility. The next day Oxy sent a letter to the AG
giving Ecuador time until 22 December to designate its pick for one of the tribunal
members.15 The day after the ultimatum, the outgoing Attorney General announced
12Ecuador first ISDS dispute involved the American company IBM. IBM lodged the claim on 6
September 2002 but the first session of the tribunal was not held until June 2003. This dispute
involved a much smaller amount of money -$4.7 million claimed- than what was being requested by
oil companies as a VAT refund.
13Ecuador Atty Genl To Study Intl Arbitration In Tax Dispute. (23 October 2002). Dow Jones
Global Equities News.
14Ecuador rejects tax arbitration bid by Occidental. (12 December 2002). Reuters News.
15In ISDS proceedings, each party selects one arbitrator and those together select the third which
serves as tribunal’s president. Occidental Insists In Intl Arbiter In Ecuador Tax Dispute. (17
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the government had changed its mind and now wanted to participate in the proceed-
ings to fight Oxy’s allegations. The move was presented as the best way to defend
Ecuador’s interests: “we can sustain our objections before the tribunal, once it is
formed,” Jimenez said.16 That is, the GoE was willing to work within the existing
institutions. Although the arbitral dispute would proceed, Oxy continued its work
and found two new oil fields in Ecuador.17
The lack of a decisive position from the executive was also related to the fact that
Ecuador was in the middle of presidential elections. On 24 November, Lucio Gutie´rrez
defeated Alvaro Noboa in a runo↵ with 54.7% of the votes. The new government took
power in January and soon started to feel pressures from the US government and from
Oxy itself. In April Gutie´rrez received a visit from the US Secretary of the Treasury,
John Snow. In his remarks, Snow singled out the VAT dispute as an obstacle to
foreign investment in the oil sector.18 At the same time, Occidental indicated it was
withholding further investment in Ecuador until the issue was settled. “There is only
so much exposure that we would want to accept,” Oxy’s spokesman reckoned, “until
there is some indication that this issue will be resolved in some way that’s fair.”19
By April 2004, Ecuador was set to start talks for a bilateral free trade agreement
with the US and the VAT dispute loomed large. The lead negotiator for Ecuador met
with members of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court and requested moving the lawsuits
through more quickly.20
December 2002). Dow Jones Global Equities News.
16Ecuador agrees to arbitration in Occidental dispute. (2002, December 23). Reuters News.
17Oxy discovers two fields in Ecuador’s Block 15 (20 February 2003). Platts Oilgram News.
18Ecuador - US Treasury Secretary Sees Oil Tax Dispute Discouraging American Companies. (25
April 2003). WMRC Daily Analysis.
19Sales tax dispute clouds Oxy bidding plans. (2003, April 28). Business News Americas
20Ecuador trade negotiator asks courts to resolve oil tax dispute. (12 February 2004). Platts
Commodity News.
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The ISDS dispute was slow but ongoing; during this time Ecuador appointed three
di↵erent arbiters.21 Legal disputes were also following their course in domestic courts.
In addition to Oxy’s, there were fifty other legal cases against the SRI arising from
denied VAT refunds. In July 2004, the arbitral tribunal issued its final decision on
the case in favor of Occidental, awarding the claimant $75 million in compensation
for denied VAT refunds.22 The GoE announced it would appeal the decision. That
is, its first reaction was to question the result but not the legitimacy of the process.23
According to the rules governing this particular arbitration, awards could potentially
be set aside by domestic courts at the seat of arbitration, in this case, the United
Kingdom.24 As the first ruling came out, the Supreme Court of Ecuador arrived at a
decision on Occidental’s domestic lawsuit and awarded it $360,000 in compensation,
a sum that amounted to little in comparison to the $75 million that arbitrators had
granted.25
With a negative arbitral ruling on its shoulders, the GoE needed leverage. The
state-owned company Petroecuador informed Oxy that it was considering terminating
its contract based on a violation from 2000 when Occidental sold a portion of its
interest to the Canadian firm. Petroecuador gave Oxy thirty days to present evidence
to the contrary.26 Petroecuador would issue a report on the question and in charge
of assessing the evidence was the Energy Minister, who would determine whether the
21Govt. appoints new arbiter in Oxy case. (8 July 2003). Business News Americas.
22Occidental Exploration Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador. Final Award. London Court
of International Arbitration Administered Case No. UN 3467. For an analysis of the award see
Franck (2005).
23Ecuador Plans To Appeal Arbitration Loss To Occidental. (13 July 2004). Dow Jones Interna-
tional News; Ecuador says won’t heed Occidental arbitral ruling. (20 July 2004). Reuters News.
24For further details on why are some arbitral decisions reviewable, see Part B Section 5.1.
25Ecuador court rules Occidental gets partial rebate. (20 July 2004). Reuters News.
26El Estado pide a la Occidental justificar faltas a su contrato. (17 September 2004) El Universo.
Retrieved from: www.eluniverso.com
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contract should be revoked. Yet, the final report would not be made public until the
London Court decided wether to allow the $75 million award to be revisited in a UK
court.27 The specialized media doubted the government would follow trough with
the termination. This was seen mostly as a blu↵, using the threat of termination
to get oil companies to drop domestic lawsuits and arbitration proceedings over the
VAT rebates. Pronunciations by government o cials matched this assessment. “In
a lawsuit or administrative process, it is always possible that the parties withdraw
an action, and that this occurs as part of a negotiation,” said Attorney General Jose´
Mar´ıa Borja, who also announced he was looking into contracts with other energy
companies and asserted that most of them had violated their terms.28 There were
already signs that parts of the Ecuadorian government were questioning not just
this particular ISDS dispute but the larger system of treaties that made it possible.
According to the AG, “I am studying whether it is convenient for this treaty [the
Ecuador-US BIT] to exist because if a poor country like ours is going to be constantly
subjected to arbitration, we don’t have enough money to defend ourselves.”29 Just an
isolated announcement of this potential outcome prompted five Ecuadorian business
chambers to publish a joint statement warning that terminating the treaty could
result in Ecuador losing preferential trade status in the US.30
To sum up the situation at this point, Occidental had two judicial decisions in
its favor, one by an international arbitral tribunal for $75 million and another by
27Ecuador Pres:Govt Aims To Revise Contract With Occidental. (9 March 2005). Dow Jones
International News.
28Ecuador could negotiate solution to Oxy dispute. (17 September 2004). Reuters News;
Ecuador’s Procurator-General Says Most Oil Companies Violated Contracts. (22 September 2004).
WMRC Daily Analysis.
29Ecuador unhappy with US investment treaty. (2004, September 17). Reuters News.
30Ecuador Business Chambers Say Govt Should Respect The Law. (22 September 2004). Dow
Jones International News.
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the Supreme Court of Ecuador for $360,000. In response, Ecuador had requested a
British court to set aside the arbitral award, passed a law denying future VAT re-
bates to oil companies, and started to consider terminating Oxy’s contract. Foreign
oil firms threatened to withhold further investments and the American government
intervened on behalf of its company by making market access conditional on a sat-
isfactory resolution of the dispute. At this point, the United States had launched
joint free trade talks with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. This move prompted sectors
within the GoE to press for a resolution that would please the US. Ecuador’s top trade
negotiator announced the country was close from being left out of the negotiations if
“Ecuadorean authorities fail to take actions to respect international agreements and
to resolve the conflicts.”31 Similarly, the Foreign A↵airs Minister called for a nego-
tiated solution rather than the unilateral termination of the contract. “The drastic
application of patriotism, or the law, or aspirations or whatever appears to be, on
both sides, doesn’t tend to end well,” he claimed.32 Ecuadorian business expressed
concerns about the e↵ect that terminating the contract could have on FTA negoti-
ations with the US. “Just the possibility that [Occidental] could be forced out has
generated an unfavorable environment in Washington” expressed the president of the
main business association of Ecuador, “[w]e businessmen in Ecuador have asked...to
seek a resolution to the conflict with Occidental.”33
31Ecuador O cial:Disputes With US Cos Threaten Trade Ties. (30 September 2004). Dow Jones
International News.
32Ecuador Anticipates Sealing US-FTA by February 2005. (1 October 2004). IHS Global Insight
Daily Analysis.
33Ecuador: Salida Occidental Afectar´ıa Pacto Comercio EEUU. (5 August 2005). Dow Jones en
Espanol.
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5.3 Fuera Oxy! : social unrest and the end of Oxy’s
contract
By 2 May 2005, the London Court of International Arbitration accepted Ecuador
request to revisit the decision, a task that fell on a commercial court of the Queen’s
Bench Division of the High Court of Justice. The main argument of Ecuador was that
the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction by allowing a dispute over tax issues
to go forward while Article 10 of the BIT says that tax matters are outside the scope
of the treaty unless they fall within three areas: expropriation, transfers of funds
abroad, or the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or
authorization.34 While for Ecuador the VAT issue did not fall into any of these three
areas; the arbitrators had considered it did. On March 3, British judge Sir Richard
Aikens rejected Ecuador’s challenge of the arbitral award and concluded the tribunal
did not exceed its powers by accepting to hear this particular tax dispute.35 Ecuador
would appeal one more time before a British court of appeal but its second request
to set aside the award would be again rejected in July 2007.36
With his popularity plummeting and amid accusations of corruption, the Ecuado-
rian Congress removed Lucio Gutie´rrez from o ce on 21 April 2005 and named his
vice president, Alfredo Palacio, as the new President. Waiting for Aiken’s decision,
the new government was making moves. From the AG’s o ce came out a proposal
for Occidental to drop the ISDS claim in exchange for $49 million. Oxy’s general
manager in Ecuador reckoned they “could withdraw the complaint in London” but
34Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment. Article 10.
35Challenge to Arbitral Award, [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm), dated 2 March 2006.
36Challenge to Arbitral Award (Appeal Court), [2007] EWCA Civ 656 dated 4 July 2007.
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only if they could “find a way that benefits both sides.”37
The government was negotiating with Occidental to avoid terminating the contract
against the backdrop of general strikes and protests in oil producing provinces.38 By
25 August Congress had lifted the state of emergency and the executive had reached
an agreement with the political and social leaders of the two a↵ected provinces. The
deal included giving back to the provinces a percentage of the taxes paid by the oil
companies; building 160 miles of roads in the area; and hiring more local workforce
in the oil industry.39 But these concessions were not enough. Protests and demon-
strations were also taking place in Quito and in November the national association
of indigenous groups, CONAIE, called for a new wave of popular mobilization and it
specifically announced the goal of these actions was to get the government to do three
things: walk away from an FTA with the US; reject participating in Plan Colombia;
and expel Occidental from the country.40 Meanwhile, the US kept pressuring through
its Embassy in Quito and Oxy threatened to take Ecuador before ISDS for a second
time if it revoked its contract.41
In February 2006, the government declared the state of emergency in the provinces
of Orellana and Sucumbios. Representatives from these provinces travelled to the
capital -where they were joined by other social movements- to make their demands
to the President: “we will not allow a negotiation with Oxy; a company that violated
37Occidental Open To Negotiated Deal With Ecuador Government. (5 May 2005). Dow Jones
International News.
38Gobierno negocia 13 para´metros a OXY para no declarar caducidad de contrato.(2005, August
17). Ecuador Inmedia´to. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
39Se acabo´ el paro en Sucumb´ıos y Orellana. (2005, August 25). Ecuador Inmedia´to. Retrieved
from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
40CONAIE exige al Gobierno No al TLC y presenta Amparo Constitucional. (2005, November
17). Ecuador Inmediato. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
41Ecuador warned clash with oil firm threatens U.S. trade deal EFE News Service, 16 December
2005; Petrolera de Ecuador suspende renegociacion de contrato con Oxy. (2005, December 23).
Ecuador Inmediato. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
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thirty state regulations when they sold in 2001 (sic) 40 percent of their shares to the
Canadian firm Encana without giving notice to the government.”42 The following days
saw similar demands from FETRAPEC, the union of oil workers, and the professional
association of oil engineers.43 By mid-March indigenous movements declared strikes
in the provinces of Cotopaxi and Tungurahua, blocking major roads and paralyzing
economic activity. Their demands were the rejection of the FTA with the US and the
termination of Oxy’s contract but there were no references to international investment
treaties in their pronunciations.44
Occidental was trying to avoid being forced out of Ecuador and, in order to per-
suade the government, it proposed further investments which would include setting up
a fund for health, work and education projects in the Ecuadorean Amazon.45 Yet the
government rejected the proposal.46 The Ecuadorian government was in a complex
position given the linkages between the FTA and Oxy’s contract. The government
knew the US would not approve a trade agreement without a satisfying conclusion to
the Occidental conflict and export-oriented sectors were demanding better access to
the US market. But few in the government were willing to stick their necks out for a
US company while mass protests were happening throughout the country. The fate
of Oxy’s contract had become an emblematic cause for popular sectors in Ecuador.
42Marcha amazo´nica reclamo´ salida de petrole´ra de Ecuador. (7 February 2006). Ecuador In-
media´to. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
43Trabajadores petroleros exigen caducidad de contrato con OXY. (8 February 2006). Ecuador In-
media´to; Colegio de ingenieros: Sera´ facil demostrar delito de la OXY. (10 February 2006). Ecuador
Inmediato. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
44Provincias anuncian radicalizacio´n de protestas desde man˜ana. (13 March 2006). Ecuador
Inmedia´to. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com.
45U.S. Oxy Proposes Investments to Ecuador Govt To Avoid Contract Cancellation. (2006, March
17). Latin America News Digest; Ecuador: Oxy makes suggestions to end face-o↵ with Ecuadorean
government. (2006, March 17). El Universo.
46Petroecuador rejects Oxy proposal to end legal dispute. (2006, March 20). Business News
Americas.
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The e↵ect of Ecuador’s actions was already evident on the diplomatic front. In
May, the US Trade Representative declined an informal request from Ecuador to
continue negotiations for an FTA insisting Ecuador should first resolve the pending
investment disputes.47 An opportunity to do so opened up when Occidental ap-
proached the government with a new proposal to give Ecuador half of its windfall
profits and suspend lawsuits against Ecuador.48 The main obstacle for the govern-
ment to accept this o↵er was the position of indigenous and social movements as well
as some leftist political parties whose position was set on terminating the contract
and Occidental leaving the country. However, the government was making overtures
in the direction of accepting a renegotiation.49 Fearing a negotiated outcome, an
array of civil society groups threatened to start a general uprising against Occiden-
tal. Rafael Correa -who in February had announced he would run for president in
the coming October elections- supported the action and called the entire citizenry to
“stop this huge insult [the renegotiation of the contract] to national sovereignty.”52
On 9 May, 5,000 Ecuadorians marched against Occidental. A week later, on 15 May,
Ecuador terminated the contract with Oxy and its assets were now owned by the
state. Celebrations erupted in the Ecuadorian Amazon.53
47U.S. REBUFFS ECUADOR ON RESUMING FTA TALKS OVER INVESTMENT DISPUTES.
(28 April 2006). Inside U.S. Trade.
48Ecuador seeking fair compensation from Occidental. (5 May 2006). Reuters News; When
economic conditions allow firms to experience above-average profits.
49Attorney General Jose Maria Borja backed the renegotiation of the firm’s contract.50 Borja’s
pronouncement was met with anger on behalf of various civil society groups who gathered around
the building of the AG o ce chanting “¡Caducidad es dignidad!” (termination is dignigty) and
“¡Renegociacio´n es corrupcio´n!” (renegotiation is corruption) and called for a mobilization from the
Amazonic provinces to the capital on 9 May.51
52Rafael Correa llama a la resistencia civil para impedir negociacio´n con OXY. (15 May 2006).
Ecuador Inmedia´to. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com
53Gobierno declara caducidad del contrato con petrolera estadounidense Occidental. (2006, May
16). El Comercio; Manifestaciones de alegra en amazona por salida de Oxy. (16 May 2006). Ecuador
Inmedia´to. Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com
5.3. Fuera Oxy! : social unrest and the end of Oxy’s contract 239
The US government -in a meeting between US Under Secretary of Hemispheric
A↵airs Charles Shapiro and Ecuadorian Foreign A↵airs Minister Francisco Carrio´n
and through a phone call from the US Ambassador the President refused to pick up-
expressed its objections to the decision and called the termination an act of expropri-
ation and a violation of the bilateral investment treaty.54 The US also told Ecuador
that FTA negotiations could only continue if Oxy’s contract was reinstated.55 For
this reason, the termination infuriated export-oriented sectors -the Chamber of Com-
merce of Guayaquil, the Industrial Business Coalition and the Association of Flower
Exporters expressed their discontent- because the prospects of a trade pact were now
dim. “The FTA with the US is buried,” lamented the head of the Ecuadorian Business
Committee.56
What emerges from the politics surrounding the termination of the contract is
that indigenous and social movements in Ecuador had clout. As the multiple at-
tempts to find a negotiated solution suggest, the GoE did not want an adversarial
outcome. Yet indigenous movements and popular sectors -as they intensified their
mobilization- left little room for a negotiated settlement. The anti-Oxy movement
had started in Amazonian provinces where the firm operated but it eventually be-
came a nation-wide issue. Indigenous and environmental groups tapped into general
dissatisfaction with neoliberal reforms -the same dissatisfaction that had removed
Gutie´rrez from o ce- through their portrayal of Occidental’s activities. Their target,
however, had generally been individual multinational firms and not the system of
54EEUU pide explicacio´n a Ecuador por ca´ıda del contrato con petrolera Occidental. (17 May
2006). El Comercio.
55Interview with Ecuadorian o cial II.
56Empresarios lamentan negativa de Petroecuador a negociar con OXY. (15 May 2006). Ecuador
Inmedia´to; Empresarios se lamentan por caducidad de la OXY. (16 May 2006). Ecuador Inmedia´to.
Retrieved from: http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com; Ecuador accuses US of ’blackmail’ as trade, oil
dispute worsens. (17 May 2006). Agence France Presse.
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investment treaties that protects them. That BITs were not mentioned by activists,
even when Oxy had already sued Ecuador and was threatening to do it again if the
contract was terminated, indicates that Ecuadorian civil society groups failed to con-
sider how treaty protections could a↵ect their ability to capture a larger portion of
FDI’s benefits from firms.
Oxy wasted no time and on 17 May filed another arbitral claim against Ecuador
for violations of the US-Ecuador BIT, this time it chose the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as the venue and was asking for $1
billion in compensation. The President’s spokesman minimized the lawsuit. As the
government saw it, the claim had no “basis because Ecuador has applied the law.”57
The GoE will again learn that was not a decision to be made by Ecuadorian o cials
in Quito but by international arbitrators in Washington DC.
5.4 Between radicals and moderates: The Correa
government and the investment regime
Simultaneous legislative and presidental elections took place on 15 October 2006. The
right-wing candidate A´lvaro Noboa came in first place with 27% of votes. Correa came
in second with 22%. The runo↵ took place on 24 November and Correa won with
57% of the vote. He assumed the presidency on 15 January 2007. It was no secret
that Rafael Correa was critical of the international investment regime. In fact, he
had already pronounced himself on the issue during his campaign.58 However, there
57Ecuador shrugs o↵ challenge to $1bn oil seizure. (18 May 2006). Financial Times.
58The end of the campaigns coincided with the deadline for Ecuador to designate an arbitrator
in the newest ISDS dispute against Oxy. Correa heavily criticized the outgoing government for
considering naming an arbitrator; doing so would legitimize the proceedings. Correa retom]o´ tema
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were diverging views inside the administration on how to protect Ecuador from more
investment disputes. For the moderates, Ecuador should work within the system
and with its partners in replacing its old treaties for ‘better’ ones. For the radicals,
attempting to work within the regime was pointless. The parameters of treaty reform
that developed countries were promoting were not enough of a change to accommodate
their policy goals. That is, a treaty that would satisfy the radicals within the GoE
would most likely not find any takers among capital exporters. In this section, I
link these diverging positions within the GoE to two factors: the diverse ideological
make up of the ruling coalition and the di↵erential exposure of government agencies
to pressures from foreign firms and governments.
Within the ruling party -Alianza PAIS- coexisted forces from the center-right -
closer to export sectors and domestic manufacturing- and a variety of leftist organiza-
tions, including the traditional leftists parties as well as environmentalists, indigenous
movements, unions, and rights groups. Correa was the unifying force, yet he did not
emerge from any these sectors. He was a technocrat and within his close associates
was a strong developmentalist sentiment. The economic model that emerged from the
Secretariat of Strategic Planning and Development (SENPLADES) had a vision for
lifting Ecuador out of its dependency on oil exports through targeted import substitu-
tion, ecotourism, and ‘responsible’ mineral and oil extraction. It was a state-centric
model. The state would not only direct private investment to these strategic sec-
tors but it would also lead the way with heavy public investment. In order to finance
‘Oxy’ en su campan˜a. (11 September 2006). El Universo. Because not naming an arbitrator
would not stop the proceedings -it would be ICSID who would appoint her instead- the outgoing
government considered it was better to comply with this deadline and thus be better prepared to
present a defense against Oxy’s accusations. “Is it right to stand with a megaphone and a group
of friends and yell ICSID has no competence!?” wondered the head of Petroecuador, “I don’t think
so...these matters I have to discuss at ICSID.” Presidente de Petroecuador desea un a´rbitro. (23
September 2006). El Comercio.
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public investment, the model was, at least in the short to medium term, highly depen-
dent on revenues from extractive industries. This would bring problems for the GoE
from both the left and from the right of its own coalition (Conaghan, 2011). On the
right, Correa would have to convince capital, foreign and domestic, that it was safe
to invest in a state-centric development model. To appeal to the left and the popular
movements, Correa would increase funding for social programs, mainly education and
health and the funding for such programs would come from extractive revenue. This
created a tension. While social reforms would benefit indigenous peoples and other
marginalized groups, extractive projects might at the same time threaten territo-
rial and ethnic rights championed by the indigenous movement (Albuja and Da´valos,
2013). The relationship between Correa and indigenous and environmentalist move-
ments would eventually deteriorate due to disagreements regarding the exploitation
of natural resources (Becker, 2013).
The GoE’s ideological diversity crystallized at multiple points during the rethink-
ing of Ecuador’s relationship with the international investment regime, sometimes
taking more radical stances and sometimes becoming more cautious. As I show in
the rest of this Chapter, Ecuador’s policy was heavily disputed from within. The rad-
ical camp included a combination of leftists and developmentalists figures within the
GoE. The left was very critical of an ISDS system that worked in favor of foreign cap-
ital, and more specifically, that protected foreign companies while they profited at the
expense of the local population and the environment. Developmentalists within the
GoE were not so much motivated by an anti-capitalist attitude but were nonetheless
interested in recovering the governments’ autonomy to regulate foreign investment.
In this sense, they opposed BITs and ISDS because they would allow foreign investors
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to challenge their new economic policies. According to a close collaborator of Correa,
“The terms of the BITs were not convenient for us from the standpoint
of our project. What was in mind was a widespread nationalist policy in
all domains, not just oil...we knew that as we advance in our development
plan, those policies could fall due to the arbitrations. Thus the decision
was not just to make a political signal but we were seriously worried about
the impact this could have on our development strategy.”59
The radical camp had its home mostly at SENPLADES. While they advocated
for a strong role of the state in the economy, they were by no means against pri-
vate, foreign investment. Their position was specifically against treaties, insofar they
could render that role meaningless. According to a SENPLADES o cial, BITs “are
blank checks that only generate rights for one party and obligations for the other
one.”60 They were willing to provide foreign companies with access to arbitration
but only under the terms of contracts, not treaties. Unlike BITs, contracts establish
obligations for both parties, the firms and the state, and both parties could eventually
enforce those obligations trough arbitration. Moreover, the applicable law for arbi-
tral disputes under these contracts would be Ecuadorian law, not treaty provisions.
Much di↵erently, sectors within the ruling coalition that were linked to capital and
domestic manufacturing had a more moderate view of the treaties’ impact.61 They
were particularly interested in securing investment and market access for Ecuadorian
products through FTAs and thus were against adopting any policies regarding BITs
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The strength of radical ideas at the beginning of the new government can be
observed in one of Correa’s first moves. Still as president elect he notified the Attorney
General -the o ce handling the arbitral dispute with Oxy- that Ecuador would not
designate an arbiter because ICSID had no jurisdiction over the dispute.62 This
was a legal consideration as much as a political move; in Correa’s view, appointing an
arbitrator amounted to recognizing the legitimacy of the arbitration system. However,
the balance of influence in favor of the radicals at this stage is most clearly observed
in the drafting of the new constitution.
5.5 Investment arbitration in the 2008 constitu-
tion
As a presidential candidate, Rafael Correa had promised a constitutional assembly.
The 2008 Montecristi constitution was not a direct reaction to Ecuador’s treaty prob-
lems; it was a part of a larger scheme of changes envisioned by the new government.
But for the radicals, this presented an opportunity to lock-in their desired outcome.
If treaties providing for ISDS were made unconstitutional, there would be no choice
for the GoE but to terminate them. This section explains the aspects of the new
constitution that were central to Ecuador’s exit from the investment regime.
Correa’s party had not presented legislative candidates in elections of 2006. How-
ever, he planned to reform the constitution and this would require elections for a new
government. In 2007 called for a referendum on the creation of a constitutional assem-
bly, in whic the ‘yes’ won with 81%. Months later, another election determined the
62Presidente electo cree que no cabe arbitraje por demanda de petrolera Occidental. (15 December
2006). El Comercio.
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composition of the Assembly. PAIS won 70% of the seats. The institutional details of
the transition between constitutions is important because the executive’s control of
the legislature varied through this process. The new constitution entered into force in
October 2008. From then until new presidential, provincial and legislative authorities
elected in April 2009 take power, executive functions would continue to be performed
by those in power and legislative functions would be performed by a Legislative Com-
mission, also known as Congresillo (’little congress’) due to its reduced size. The
interim legislature had 76 members, chosen by the constitutional assembly itself in
proportion to its membership. Of those, 46 were members of the ruling party. That
is, for this short period of time, Correa had legislative majority. Nonetheless, he lost
is in the 2009 election, where he won the presidency comfortably but failed to reach
a majority in the unicameral congress. This lack of legislative majority will impose
limitations on the GoE’s ability to advance the termination process since it increased
access points for foreign investors and representatives of foreign governments seeking
to avoid Ecuador from following through with its radical policies.
Two new features of the Montecristi Constitution will become central for the fate
of Ecuador’s treaties. The first one was article 422, establishing that Ecuador will
not enter into treaties or international instruments through which the state transfers
jurisdiction to international arbitral tribunals to resolve controversies arising from
contracts or commercial issues.63 Not all political forces thought this constitutional
restriction was as a logical response to Ecuador’s encounters with ISDS.
Both the developmentalists and the leftist members of the ruling coalition sup-
ported the ban. For the former, the ban was rooted in the particular economic and
development model of the new government. According to a GoE o cial, for the
63Constitucio´n de la Repu´blica del Ecuador. Art. 422.
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Constitution “to be compatible with the Ecuadorian development project we could
not have international instruments with international investment arbitration.”64 For
the latter, there are fundamental biases in investment arbitration that work against
developing countries. According to one Assemblyman from a far-left party in alliance
with Correa’s party, the spirit of article 422 was to
“not put the state, and therefore the people of Ecuador, in a defenseless
position against the power of these institutions, created precisely within
the World Bank, and in conditions in which, we already now beforehand,
it is not the interests of the majorities, of the impoverished, which will
prevail.”65
The debates from the floor of the constitutional assembly also reflect the existence
of strong dissident voices among the opposition parties who did not agree that the
lesson to be learned from the ISDS disputes is to forego arbitration altogether. One
opposition Assemblywoman argued the problem is that “we do not know how to
defend ourselves in an international arbitration and we do not always hire the best
lawyers, that is why we su↵er the consequences, the arbitral clause it not bad per se,
it is bad how we have been applying it in Ecuador.”66 Another Assembly member
challenged the notion of a bias within arbitration. Noting that the first ISDS dispute
with Oxy involved rulings from arbitral tribunals but also from British Courts as
well, he claimed “one cannot honestly pretend all these places...are sold in favor of
multinational companies. We lost because we did things wrong, but be forget when we
win.”67 Others made arguments against the constitutional ban based on the need for
64Interview XIX.
65Asamblea Constituyente, Acta 038, 22 April 2008. p. 146. On file.
66Ibid. p. 139.
67Ibid. p. 144.
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arbitration to attract investment -“what...businessman will sign a contract...without
the guarantee of international arbitration?”68 See Appendix B.1 for excerpts from all
interventions in relation to investment arbitration.
Before the vote on Article 422, the drafters included an important exception for
treaties that allow for arbitration in regional arbitral institutions. Radicals were not
completely against investment arbitration. They were against keeping Ecuador within
the existing ISDS system, which they saw as controlled by Northern commercial legal
firms and had proved to be biased against their interests. According to an o cial
from this group, “our vision was not so much juridical, but more political in the sense
that having [investment arbitration] in a regional setting, with arbitrators working
in international public law rather than commercial law and of South American na-
tionality...that for us was enough to change the correlation of forces.”69 While such
an institution did not exist at the time, Ecuador would invest substantial diplomatic
energy in setting it up within the framework of the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR).
The second significant change was article 419. With the goal of constraining fu-
ture governments from denouncing potential treaties that the new government could
enter into, article 419 established that both the ratification and termination of certain
treaties -for example those transferring competences from the internal juridical order
to international institutions- would require the approval of the National Assembly.
Under the previous constitution, termination could be carried out solely by the exec-
utive. This provision ended up being crucial since the multiplication of access points
provided foreign firms and their home governments with more opportunities to drag
68Ibid. p. 133.
69Interview XIX.
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out the process. Moreover, the ruling party only had legislative majority in the ‘little
congress’ that lasted from the enactment of the new constitution in October 2008 to
the inauguration of the new legislature in July 2009. Correa’s party would not have
a two-thirds majority in congress until 2013.
Part A explained the origins of Ecuador’s radical stance regarding investment
treaties and arbitration. Like rational and bounded rational arguments, I recognize
the role of particular experiences with ISDS as catalysts of review processes during
which states reassess their place within the international investment regime. Yet un-
like those two alternative arguments, I stress the importance of the ideological lenses
through which government actors filter those experiences. In Ecuador, ideological
di↵erences, both between ruling and opposition parties as well as within the ruling
coalition, align with di↵erent policy preferences regarding the future of Ecuador’s
BITs. I also showed that while indigenous and social movements were powerful in
Ecuador -powerful enough to force the GoE to terminate the contract with Oxy- the
agenda of these groups did not include specific demands in relation to investment
treaties. This aligns with my expectations about the di↵erential role of civil society
at varying degrees of organizational capacity and technical expertise, as typified by
the categorization of civil society actors as either CSOs or social movements. CSOs,
while pursuing the same agendas as social movements (environmental, public health,
consumer protection, etc.), once they learn how investment treaties a↵ect those agen-
das have more resources to invest in developing expertise in international investment
law. That expertise was not present in Ecuadorian civil society, thus the impetus
for a change in treaty policies came mostly from ideologically motivated government
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actors.
Coming out of the constitutional assembly, the balance of influence was in favor
of the radical position. The next step in their plan involved acting on the new
constitutional mandate and removing Ecuador from all international treaties that
provided for investment arbitration. Part B shows the systemic pressures trying to
keep Ecuador from carrying out this radical agenda and how these change the balance
of influence between radicals and moderates within the government.
PART B: implementing a radical agenda
Part B of this Chapter explains why, if radicals were initially in the driver seat, it
took the GoE ten years to exit both the ICSID convention and the existing BITs.
This delay is not the product of overworked bureaucracies. In fact, from Correa’s
inauguration in January 2007 to the enactment of the new constitution in October
2008, the GoE could have terminated all the treaties with just an executive decision.
I show how external forces -pressures by foreign firms and their home governments-
kept Ecuador from executing radical policies for a long time. These forces were
e↵ective in two ways: (a) by mobilizing the opposition legislators in congress when
the ruling party did not have a majority and (b) by shifting the balance of influence
within the GoE in favor of the moderates. The treaty policy-making process was an
iterative one, in which each subsequent decision feeds-o↵ the e↵ects of the previous
one. The di↵erential exposure of parts of the GoE to the reactions of firms and
foreign governments intensified the existing disagreements about policy and gave more
weight to the moderates. Since most warnings and threats from foreign governments
came from diplomatic channels, the foreign service of professional diplomats generally
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pushed for negotiated outcomes. While the position of Minister of Foreign A↵airs
Ministry during the Correa government was generally entrusted to individuals with
strong opposition to the investment regime, the permanent body of diplomats tended
to emphasize the need for consensus with treaty partners, especially in the face of
possible retaliations by the US and the EU.70 Similarly, when policy decisions required
the approval of congress, legislators became the focus of foreign pressures and this
increased the resistance to the terminations in the National Assembly. The ministries
of Production and Strategic Sectors were the ones dealing with foreign firms, thus
they were hearing first hand from those companies that unless the treaties remained
in place, they would not go through with the investments.
The evidence that emerges from opening up the termination process also coun-
ters alternative explanations. According to a rationalist argument, if actors explore
a course of action but decide not to pursue it, the reason should be that recently
available information points in a di↵erent direction. That is, I should observe gov-
ernment o cials arguing for and against new policies by making references to how
insights acquired from recent experience point towards more appropriate ways to solve
commitment problems and I should not observe them dismissing certain policies for
fear of retaliation. Moreover, government o cials -as (bounded) rational actors fur-
nished with high levels of information post-ISDS experience- should exhibit a degree
of consensus around a final, and hence rational, course of action.
While Part B focuses on external factors, I do not argue the domestic political
process is determined by international forces. The domestic politics of Ecuador are
not irrelevant for explaining the observed policy outcomes. Foreign firms and their
home governments would have never applied this level of coercion if the GoE would
70Interview XVIII.
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have never been inclined towards a radical approach in the first place. External
factors a↵ect policy outcomes by putting pressure in specific domestic political actors
and thus tilting the balance of influence between radicals and moderates in favor of
the later. Part B is divided in 2 sections. Section 1 covers Ecuador’s exit from the
ICSID convention. Section 2 traces the first stage of the termination process after
which only the ‘easy’ BITs were terminated.
5.1 Leaving ICSID
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an organ of
the World Bank, is one of the many venues in which legal disputes between investors
and their host states can be resolved but it is the most frequently chosen by investors.
As of June 2019, of the 942 known ISDS cases, 594 were litigated at the Centre. The
administering institution has no direct influence on who serves as arbitrator in each
case,71 but certain institutional features of ICSID could make it more favorable for
investors. In the case a non-ICSID tribunal renders an award of poor quality, this
could potentially be set aside by the domestic courts of the country where the dispute
took place, as Ecuador sought to do in the first Oxy dispute over the VAT rebate. This
adds an additional level of scrutiny.72 ICSID tribunals operate under a self-contained
regime that does not allow for awards to be set aside by state courts. They can only
can be annulled on a limited number of grounds by an ad hoc committee appointed by
the Chairman of ICSID’s Administrative Council.73 Another di↵erence that might
71Unless one of the parties fails to designate an arbiter.
72This review process could considerably extend the lengths of ISDS disputes as the parties appeal
each decision. In BG Group PLC v. Argentina the case reached the US Supreme Court.
73As of today, only 99 of the known 594 ICSID disputes have had a form of follow-on proceeding.
In 39 of those, the initial decision was upheld.
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make ICSID more favorable for investors is the enforcement of the awards. While
ICSID awards are to be treated as final judgments of the court of their member
states, non-ICSID awards may still be refused recognition and enforcement under
certain grounds.
After Occidental chose ICSID as the venue for its second dispute against Ecuador,
the government adopted a markedly anti-ICSID -and not necessarily anti ISDS- dis-
course. Yet the GoE did not criticize ICSID because of its institutional design. The
criticism was about political biases. Correa’s first Minister of Foreign A↵airs backed
his decision not to designate an arbitrator for the dispute noting it was pointless; US
investors win the majority of the cases. “You lost the fight from the start. You go to
defend your rights in a dispute settlement system where you don’t have any possibility
of winning.”74 On a similar note, according to one of Correa’s foreign policy advisers,
“underlying ICSID is a clear intentionality of protecting investors above national and
international public law.”75 Rhetoric aside, the GoE was divided on what to do about
ICSID. The initial approach of the GoE was to remain in ICSID but exclude from
the Centre’s jurisdiction disputes over investments in natural resources. Only after
the ICSID system showed that was not a viable strategy by accepting new disputes
of this kind is that the GoE denounced the convention as a whole.
In any case, any measure taken regarding ICSID would not a↵ect the seven dis-
putes that had already been lodged before the Centre. But the GoE had a forward-
looking motivation for limiting their exposure. In October 2007 the GoE issued decree
662 increasing the state’s share of oil windfall profits from 50% to 99%.76 This change
74Ecuador es pesimista en arbitraje con Oxy. (19 May 2007). El Universo.
75Un nuevo acto de soberan´ıa: Ecuador denuncia al CIADI. (9 July 2009) Decio Machado [blog
essay].
76PRESIDENTE DECRETA QUE EL 99% DE LAS GANANCIAS EXTRAORDINARIAS DEL
PETRO´LEO VAYAN PARA EL ESTADO (6 October 2007). Ecuador Inmediato.
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annulled existing contracts and forced firms to renegotiate new ones. According to a
state o cial, the reason for the decree was that “one of the major problems President
Correa had proposed to solve was the distribution of oil profits.”77 As expected, firms
threatened to start arbitral proceedings against Ecuador.78
5.1.1 Partial exit
There were disagreements within the GoE regarding the best way to avoid more ICSID
arbitrations in the future. The radical camp preferred to leave the Centre altogether.
In fact, on 29 April 2007 the ALBA group -in which Ecuador was participating as ob-
server until it became a full member in 2009- had agreed to jointly withdraw from the
ICSID convention. Moderates pushed for a partial exit. The foreign service insisted
on working within the system through the adoption of exceptions and reservations
to the Center’s jurisdiction. According to an o cial from teh radical group, “there
was a huge opposition from the internal bureaucracy, the foreign service did not agree
with the exit”79 The moderate approach prevailed at first and the GoE sought to take
disputes arising from investments in the exploitation of natural resources, like gas,
oil and minerals, outside ICSID’s jurisdiction. Thus, on 27 November 2007 Ecuador
notified ICSID it will not consent to the Center’s jurisdiction over disputes regarding
natural resources. Ecuador invoked article 25 (4) of ICSID’s convention that allows a
state party to notify the Center which kinds of disputes will not fall under its jurisdic-
77“The oil contracts inherited from the previous regime established a distribution scheme under
which the transnational [firms] took more than 70% of the benefits...one of the pillars for recovering
social policies was to recover oil profits.” Interview XXI.
78Repsol buscara´ un arbitraje ante el Ciadi si no logra un acuerdo. (16 November 2007). El
Comercio; Francesa Perenco recurrir´ıa al arbitraje si no logra renegociar su contrato. (10 December
2007). El Comercio.
79Interview XIX.
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tion.80 Ecuadorian o cials expected the notification to shield them from new claims,
although investment law scholars generally agree that article 25(4) notifications do
not impose strict jurisdictional limits when consent to any eventual arbitration is still
present in the applicable treaties (Schreuer, 2009; Cole, 2013, 342).
Another attempted strategy to shield Ecuador from future lawsuits was through
contracts between foreign firms and the state. After Correa issued the decree chang-
ing the distribution of profits, the GoE invited the oil sector to renegotiate the con-
tracts. Under the new terms, companies would waive their rights under the applicable
treaties, including their right to initiate disputes before ICSID. “We are not convinced
about ICSID, which is ideologically charged,” said the Minister of Mining and Oil,
disputes should be resolved in “a space of larger neutrality.”81 Instead, the contracts
would include their own dispute settlement provisions that allowed for disputes to be
solved either in domestic courts or in regional arbitrations centers, most commonly
the Center for Arbitration and Mediation in Santiago, Chile, and the applicable law
would be Ecuadorian law. They would also exclude from arbitration issues arising
from taxes and contract terminations by the government. These contracts were mod-
eled after a series of contracts o↵ered to foreign firms in the telecommunications
sectors.82 Some oil firms accepted to renegotiate their contracts on this model but
others rejected the proposal. According to a lawyer in one of the a↵ected firms, “[w]e
consider the contract unacceptable...The international arbitration clause is sort of a
joke.” And regarding the two exclusions, “[t]hose are precisely the only grounds for
arbitration that companies are interested in the most.” Moreover, critics were skep-
80Letter from Mar´ıa Espinosa Garc´ıs, Ecuador’s Foreign Ministry, to Ana Palacio, ICSID’s
Secretary-General (cited in Cadena and Montan˜es, 2008).
81Ecuador renegocia contratos con petroleras privadas. (21 January 2008). Dow Jones en Espanol.
82Interview XXIII.
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tical of the proposed regional arbitration institution.83 That said, the e↵ectiveness of
this strategy was also questionable as long as the old BITs remained in place. It was
unlikely that ICSID arbitrators would decline jurisdiction over a dispute arising from
such a contract when a treaty exists that still lists ICSID as a possible arbitration
venue (Cadena and Montan˜es, 2008; So¨derlund and Burova, 2018).
5.1.2 Full exit
ICSID would show the moderate approach was ine↵ective because by April 2008,
Ecuador had been sued before ICSID by three di↵erent energy firms who preferred
not to renegotiate their contracts over the new model. Instead, they alleged decree 662
violated Ecuador’s BITs with the US and France. One state o cial sees the full exit as
a result of ICSID tribunals giving course to these new disputes when the GoE thought
that the partial exit would have blocked investors in the energy sector initiating
disputes in ICSID: “what motivated the next step, the complete denunciation of the
ICSID convention...was this response from the arbitrators, expanding the clauses and
accepting new disputes. We did the partial denunciation in 2007 and in 2008 we now
have cases over oil and mining.”84 During his 30 May 2009 sabatina -a weekly TV
and radio address taking place on Saturdays- Correa announced Ecuador was leaving
ICSID.85
Thus, Correa requested the legislature to terminate Ecuador’s membership and
on 12 June it approved the request.86 At this point in time, the new constitution
83Ecuador’s new service contracts ‘unacceptable.’ (3 September 2010). Global Arbitration Review.
84Interview XXI.
85Correa anuncia que Ecuador se retirara´ del Ciadi. (30 June 2009). TeleSUR.
86Asamblea Nacional resolvio´ aceptar el pedido del Presidente de la Repu´blica de salir del CIADI.
(12 June 2009). Ecuador Inmediato.
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was in place, meaning treaty terminations required legislative approval. However,
the decision to leave ICSID took place at a favorable moment for the ruling party
becasue it was during the short tenure of the transitional ’little congress’ where the
ruling party had a majority. A month later, the termination of ICSID might have not
been possible under a divided government.On 2 July, Correa signed the execution of
congress’ decision and six months later -the period stipulated in the convention after
which denunciations become e↵ective- Ecuador was no longer a member of ICSID. US
diplomatic cables o↵er a record of the immediate impact of this decision. For example,
the French Commercial Attache is reported as “very concerned about this, and is
afraid the GOE will subsequently pronounce the French BIT invalid and request that
France negotiate a new BIT, based on a new Ecuadorian model.” While the French
forecast was ultimately accurate, it would take eight more years to materialize.
Ecuador sought to legitimize their departure by prompting other countries to do
the same. At the 39th General Assembly of the Organization of American States,
Foreign Minister Fander Falcon´ı underscored the need for a general withdrawal from
ICSID and noted that while “OAS has created instances to safeguard human rights,
it has not instituted mechanisms to solve conflicts between international capital and
states, which due to their social e↵ects could a↵ect human rights.” The Minister
also announced there was consensus within UNASUR for the creation of a regional
advisory body for investment disputes which would be the first step in the creation
of a judicial alternative to ICSID.87 Yet coordination e↵orts did not yield any results
beyond Bolivia and Venezuela, the only two regional neighbors who also terminated
their ICSID membership.
In sum, Ecuador’s exit from ICSID was not predetermined. As one o cial notes,
87Ecuador pide que se sustituya al CIADI. (2 June 2009). Ecuador Inmediato.
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“I am critical of positions that portray the Ecuadorian attitude as radical rupture...the
truth is that Ecuadorian decisions interacted with the system.”88 In reality, radical
and moderate sectors within the GoE were divided on the issue from the start. It was
the system’s response, by proving the partial exit ine↵ective, that gave sustenance to
the radical position. “In the foreign service there was this attitude of ‘ok, let’s not
leave ICSID, let’s rather say ‘no’ to energy issues or ‘no’ to tax issues’, trying to adopt
reservations and exceptions that evidently did not work.”89 However, leaving ICSID
was less problematic for the moderates than the termination of the BITs. Investment
treaties generally allow investors to chose the arbitration institution; even if they are
no longer able to select ICSID, they can still pursue the cases elsewhere. “Thus what
followed [from the moderates] was ‘ok, let’s leave ICSID, but not the BITs.”90 The
next section traces the disagreements between radicals and moderates regarding the
termination of the existing treaties.
5.2 The termination of the BITs
The most crucial component of the radical agenda was the cancellation of Ecuadorian
BITs. This section carefully examines the di↵erent stages of this process. I do so to
show that deep disagreements about the need to terminate the treaties existed not
only between government and opposition but also within the ruling coalition. I also
highlight the di↵erent ways in which external actors put pressure on sectors of the
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In 2008 the GoE carried out a review of Ecuador’s investment treaties.91 An
inter-ministerial group, including ministries of Foreign A↵airs, Economic Policy and
Production, considered each treaty in terms of existing investments in Ecuador and
the prospects of new investments.92 When word got out that Ecuador was considering
getting rid of its BITs, including the one with the US, there were immediate reactions.
The US BIT was by far Ecuador’s most dangerous one. The US was Ecuador’s main
source of FDI and eight of out of its ten ISDS disputes had been initiated by American
firms. But the US was also the main destination for Ecuadorian exports and as
soon as this was announced as a possibility, export-oriented sectors raised concerns.
The President of the largest business association in Ecuador -Comite´ Empresarial
Ecuatoriano- said the announcement “took them by surprise,” warned that following
trough would “constitute a setback in e↵orts to renew preferential trade benefits.”93
On a similar tone, the President of Expoflores -the organization representing the
interests of flower exporters, who send 40% of their exports to the US- expressed
concerns with the implications of terminating the BIT on two fronts. The extension
of preferential trade benefits with the US and the arrival of more foreign capital in
the flower industry.94
Table 5.1 below shows the di↵erent fates of each BIT. The shaded cells represent
the stage at which each termination encountered obstacles. While most made it
through the PAIS-controlled foreign a↵airs commission, only the first treaties debated
91Canciller: ‘Ecuador no tiene ninguna posibilidad de ganar a OXY en el CIADI.’ (18 May 2007).
Ecuador Inmediato.
92According to one of the participants, the analysis was not very rigorous. It involved looking
at the national FDI statistics together with the BITs that Ecuador had signed in order to identify
which countries were sources of significant amounts of investment. Interview XIX.
93Empresarios ecuatorianos temen por fin de acuerdo con EEUU. (8 May 2007). AP Spanish
Worldstream.
94Acuerdo de proteccio´n de inversiones con EEUU tiene vigencia hasta el 2017. (8 May 2007). El
Comercio.
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in the plenary -except the one with China- were approved. Fearing more negative
outcomes, the ruling party preferred to wait until the next legislative elections in 2013.
Yet the slowdown was not simply a product of disagreements between government and
opposition. As shown by the stalling of the four European BITs whose termination
had received approval in Congress, the executive was equally sensitive to pressures
from firms and treaty partners. The rest of this section explains why some treaties
were easily cancelled while others took the GoE eight years to get rid of.
5.2.1 The ‘easy’ BITs
By January 2008, the review process had come to its first conclusions. Of the twenty-
six treaties analyzed, it was determined that nine of those were not protecting sig-
nificant levels of investment and thus could be terminated immediately. These were
treaties with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay. Since no investment had come to Ecuador from
these countries, there was no opposition to the terminations. Moreover, the decision
to cancel these BITs happened before the new constitution was enacted thus the
executive on its own was able denounce the treaties without the need for Congress
approval. The termination of the ‘easy’ BITs highlights the contested quality of this
course of action. If the GoE would have been unified in leaving the investment regime
from the start, it would have taken advantage of the much favorable institutional re-
quirements at this time. Rather, there was caution about the fallout of terminating
the remaining sixteen BITs. These were the ones with developed states and larger
regional economies. Among others, these included treaties with the US, Canada,
Germany and Spain.
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5.2.2 The ‘hard’ BITs
The termination of the remaining BITs, specially those with wealthy capital exporters,
was a completely di↵erent process. There was a general consensus on the desirability
of new and improved treaties but not on how to achieve that or at what cost. Moder-
ates in the GoE wanted to keep the BITs in place and use the threat of termination
to jump start negotiations. Moreover, the ministries with authority over extracting
industries were concerned about losing potential investments over the BITs. For the
radicals, first and foremost, the treaties needed to go. Only then Ecuador should try
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to negotiate new agreements. They expected, however, that due to the constitutional
ban on treaties with ISDS the di↵erences with capital exporters would be too large
for any future treaty to eventually be agreed upon.
The cancellation process was drawn-out and all three branches of government
became involved at di↵erent points. Like the exit from ICSID, this was also not a
predetermined outcome. At multiple points the process stalled and even appeared
to begin to roll back. The rest of this section is divided according to the five stages
of this process: (1) the President’s termination request to the National Assembly,
(2) the Constitutional Court’s rulings on the constitutionality of the BITs, (3) the
debate in the Foreign A↵airs Commission in congress, (4) the debate in the plenary
of the National Assembly and (5) the execution of the termination by the President.
At each stage, I show how foreign firms and treaty partners attempted to influence
the process and how susceptible both opposition legislators and moderates within the
GoE were to these pressures.
The Presidential request
The process of terminating the remaining BITs started in late 2009. This time, the
procedure would be governed by the new constitution. This meant two things. First,
the decision to terminate treaties was no longer an executive prerogative and now
required approval by the legislative commission on foreign a↵airs and then by the
plenary of the National Assembly. This could work against the termination because,
while the ruling party controlled the commission, it did not have majority in the
plenary. But at the same time, due to the existence of article 422, the GoE could
now denounce the treaties not just as unfair or costly but also as unconstitutional.
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According to the Ecuadorian law on constitutional control, when the constitutional
tribunal rules an already ratified treaty unconstitutional, the treaty has to either be
terminated, renegotiated or amended.95 Thus, the process kicked o↵ on 29 September
2009 with Correa requesting Congress to terminate the remaining treaties on grounds
that they were unconstitutional.
US diplomatic cables show how this initial termination request elicited strong
negative reactions from the representatives of the treaty partners. They also show
that government actors in these interactions were inclined to put on a more moderate
face, presenting Ecuador as willing to stay within the regime and simply seeking to
update its commitments to the new constitutional framework. For example, the Vice-
Minister of Foreign A↵airs, a senior career diplomat, called in the US Ambassador
to inform her of what he portrayed as a “decision to replace all its existing BITs
with a less formal “model” investment agreement that complies with Ecuador’s new
constitution.”96 Pozo was going to make similar announcements to other Embassies
but wanted to deliver the message to her first because “the GoE did not want the
U.S. to hear it first from the press.” Another career diplomat in charge of the North
American Division of the Ministry was also present at the meeting and he later
confided with the Ambassador that he had not heard about the termination until this
meeting. The Ambassador raised her concerns. She said “it was ironic that other
GoE o cials were pressing her and the [US Government] to increase U.S. investment
in Ecuador, while at the same time the GoE was pursuing a policy that would likely
deter it.” She also noted that it was a rare event for a country to terminate its BIT
95LEY ORGANICA DE GARANTIAS JURISDICCIONALES Y CONTROL CONSTITU-
CIONAL. Art 112.4.
96ECUADOR’S PLANS TO TERMINATE ALL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES.
Date:2009 October 27. Canonical ID:09QUITO905a.
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with the US because they are regarded as “seals of approval” that reassure investors
of the operating environment. Lastly, she lamented the poor timing of the decision
“given that [the US] Congress would soon be reviewing whether to renew or extend
both ATPDEA and GSP trade preference programs.”97 Shortly after, the Ambassador
also met with the President of the National Assembly Fernando Cordero to raise her
concerns about the prospect of a termination. Cordero called “the GOE’s decision
inappropriate and [highlighted] the need for renegotiation before termination” and
he also “promised he would discuss concerns over [the] termination of the BIT with
President Correa the following week.”98
Around the same time, Minister of Foreign A↵airs Fander Falcon´ı organized a
meeting with the Embassy representatives of the a↵ected countries. He was less sym-
pathetic. He reminded them the new constitution “was forcing the government’s
hand.” The representative of the EU challenged this view, and “[w]hile noting re-
spect for Ecuador’s sovereignty, he opined that provisions of the Constitution repre-
sent internal issues and should not a↵ect bilateral treaties.” Falcon´ı “took pains to
emphasize that foreign investment was protected in Ecuador” and that “arbitration
was recognized as a valid mechanism for dispute resolution, as long as it was con-
ducted in a national or regional forum.” He announced the GoE was preparing a
new model BIT -which would allow for ISDS before regional arbitration forums- and
that he expected negotiations would start in January 2010. However, Ecuador did
not have an alternative model at this time and will not have one until 2012.99 To
97ECUADOR’S PLANS TO TERMINATE ALL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES.
Date:2009 October 27. Canonical ID:09QUITO905a.
98NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT CORDERO’S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR.
2009 November 12. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USTR BENNETT HARMAN. E.O. 12958:
DECL: 2019/11/12.
99Interview XXIII.
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this, the Canadian Ambassador “pointed out that it would be impossible to negotiate
a new investment agreement calling for regional arbitration when these regional dis-
pute settlement bodies do not yet even exist.” US diplomats were not optimistic yet
they still noted that “[t]here may be a window of opportunity in which the [US Gov-
ernment] and like-minded countries can reason with the GoE regarding the negative
repercussions that are likely should they follow through with their plan.”100
5.2.3 Constitutional court
After Correa’s initial request, the Assembly replied that a ruling was due from the
Constitutional Court confirming the unconstitutional character of the BITs.101 On
6 January 2010, the President requested the Constitutional Court to sanction the
unconstitutionality of all the remaining treaties. This was not a necessary step; the
executive could have simply requested the Assembly to terminate the treaty on other
grounds and not have the judiciary involved. Yet an unconstitutionality ruling, which
the executive knew it would get because “the Court had at that point ideological
positions close to the left and the developmentalists,”102 would do two things for
the GoE. First, it would tie the hands of the government and make the threat of
termination much more believable to foreign audiences. Second, given PAIS did not
have absolute majority, it would force opposition legislators to go along with the
termination. Somewhat naively, the GoE expected it to be “almost a natural step
100GOE “EXPLAINS” TERMINATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES Date:2009 November 17.
Canonical ID:09QUITO973 a.
101INFORME SOBRE EL PEDIDO DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA, DE APRO-
BAR LA DENUNCIA DE TRECE ACUERDOS BILATERAIES DE PROTECCION RECIPROCA
DE INVERSIONES, SUSCRITOS POR EL ECUADOR. COMISION ESPECIALIZADA PERMA-
NENTE No. 5, DE SOBERANIA, INTEGRACION, RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES Y SE-
GURIDAD INTEGRAL. QUITO, DM, 4 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2009. Oficio No. 206 GV-AN.
102Interview XXI.
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that the Assembly would give way to the terminations.”103
One by one, the Court analyzed how the di↵erent provisions included in these
treaties related to the new constitution. As part of the constitutional control process,
tribunals allowed citizens to make interventions defending or countering the constitu-
tional character of each treaty. The Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Ecuador
sent letters to the Court arguing ISDS was not unconstitutional and that President
Correa was reading article 422 incorrectly. The Federation thus requested the tri-
bunal to refrain from deciding on the constitutionality issue and instruct the GoE
to renegotiate the treaties instead.104 While some treaties fared worse than others
in their constitutionality, they all included ISDS provisions. In the end, the Court
granted the President’s request and decided all treaties were in conflict with article
422.
5.2.4 Congress I: the Foreign A↵airs Commission
The process went back to Congress. The Foreign A↵airs Commission would consider
the termination request from the executive -now furnished with unconstitutionality
rulings- and would either dismiss it or allow it to move to the plenary. While the
ruling party did not have absolute majority in Congress, it did dominate the com-
mission. Six of its ten members, including its President, were PAIS legislators. The
treaties were considered on an individual basis and debates allowed presentations by
interested parties. O cials from either the Ministry of Foreign A↵airs or the Min-
istry of Production attended almost all sessions, except those for the treaties with
Canada and the US. In these instances they requested the commission to approve the
103Interview XIX.
104Corte Constitutional. DICTAMEN N. 023-10-DTI-CC, CASO N. 0006-10-TI. p. 11-2.
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termination and argued the newly adopted law of production was enough guarantee
for foreign investors.
Representatives of firms and foreign governments also attended the sessions (see
Table B.2 in Appendix B.2 for a record of all attendees). They urged the Commis-
sion to consider a renegotiation or partial amendment instead. The theme of these
comments was that treaties and specifically ISDS provisions were not insignificant
elements for investors and that Ecuador was hurting itself by unilaterally removing
them. The Canadian Ambassador, for example, argued domestic protections were not
enough, as they do not o↵er the same level of protection and do not necessarily remain
in place after changes in government.105 The representative of the German Chamber
mentioned investors want access to international arbitration and that terminating
the treaty would send “the worst signal to investors.” Similarly, according to the the
Dutch o cial, “companies that want to come to Ecuador from The Netherlands take
into consideration these bilateral investment treaties.”106 The few opposition legis-
lators in the Commission raised similar concerns. In the discussion of the US BIT
-whose report was twice as long as every other- they warned about potential e↵ects of
a unilateral termination on market access for Ecuadorian exports.107 However, with a
majority of legislators from the ruling party, the commission approved all termination
105Informe de Comisio´n sobre el pedido de aprobacio´n de la denuncia del ‘Convenio entre el Gob-
ierno del Ecuador y el Gobierno de Canada´ para el fomento y la proteccio´n rec´ıproca de inversiones.
22 June 2011. N. 236-GV-AN. p.5
106Informe de Comisio´n sobre el pedido de aprobacio´n de la denuncia del ‘Convenio para la pro-
mocio´n y proteccio´n rec´ıproca de inversiones entre la Repu´blica del Ecuador y el Reino de los Pa´ıses
Bajos. 14 February 2011. N. 073-GV-AN. p. 7.
107“The United States is the destination of a large percentage of Ecuadorian exports, from which
thousands of families and Ecuadorian investors depend...rather than terminating this treaty, the
Ecuadorian authorities should start a renegotiation with their American counterparts to harmonize
this international instrument and the constitutional norms.” Informe de la Comisio´n referente a
la denuncia del ‘Tratado entre la Repu´blica del Ecuador y los Estados Unidos de Ame´rica sobre
promocio´n y proteccio´n rec´ıproca de inversiones. 29 Abril 2013. N. 129-CSIRISI-FB-2013-GV-AN.
p.3-4.
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requests.108
5.2.5 Congress II: the plenary of the National Assembly
The Commission approved the termination of sixteen treaties between 2009 -when
Correa first requested the termination- and 2014. The next stage was a debate and
vote in the plenary of the National Assembly. Only the first nine treaties approved
by the Commission were debated by the entire legislature. After a few successful
votes for the GoE, the Assembly stopped reaching the necessary votes to approve the
terminations. Fearing more setbacks, the ruling party stopped sending the termina-
tion requests to the plenary. During the debates that did take place, the arguments
made by the opposition mirrored what was discussed in the Commission. Legislators
from opposition parties were concerned about the e↵ects of the terminations on two
fronts. First, access to trade benefits under the ATPDEA. There were reports that
both the US Chamber of Commerce and Chevron -who was in the middle of an ISDS
dispute with Ecuador- sent letters to the US Congress and the USTR encouraging
them to take into account the termination of the treaties when evaluating whether to
extend the trade benefits.109 Second, the FTA negotiations with the EU. For example,
according to Assemblymen Luis Almeida,
“The problem is the gesture. [Correa] will be travelling in November and
what is he going to say...to the President of Germany? ‘I come here to
negotiate with you as a sovereign and on equal footing’... And what are
going to be the guarantees for deals they would want to conclude?”110
108With the exception of the Italian BIT, which was not discussed in the Commission at this stage.
109Ecuador politics: Renewal of US trade perks uncertain. (1 November 2010) Economist Intelli-
gence Unit - ViewsWire; Mayor presio´n para revisar la Atpdea. (29 September 2010). El Comercio.
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In addition, legislators had more personal concerns in mind, as the US Embassy
threatened to remove the American visas of those who voted in favor of the ter-
mination of the US BIT.111 As a result of these mounting pressures, the Assembly
quickly lost its initial steam. Of the nine treaties that were debated in the plenary,
congress only approved the termination of the BITs with Germany, the UK, Finland,
France and Sweden but failed to reach the necessary votes to approve cancelling the
treaties with China, The Netherlands, Chile and Venezuela. From then on, the GoE
instructed its legislators to stop debating the terminations altogether.
5.2.6 Executive
While most of the seventeen treaties that Correa had requested congress to terminate
were stuck at some stage in the legislature, five had made it through: Germany, UK,
Finland, France and Sweden. If the termination of the BITs would have been pre-
determined simply by the ideological tenets of the Correa government, the executive
should have terminated all of these five agreements at this point. However, it became
clear that the GoE was not in agreement about the terminations. And it was not the
case either that they were waiting to terminate all the treaties at once, because the
President did cancel the BIT with Finland right away.
At first, the GoE’s reason to delay the execution was that they were waiting for
a new production law to take e↵ect in late December 2010.112 The law of production
was central for the radicals. Their plan was for Ecuador not to sign any more treaties
LUIS ALMEIDA.flv. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-
7km8ZEVfclist=PL1FC951FEEB626328index=4
111Interview XIX.
112Co´digo Orga´nico de la Produccio´n, Comercio e Inversiones. Registro Oficial Suplemento 351 de
29-dic.-2010.
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and rather relate to foreign investors through individual contracts. The government
could have a lot more control over the content of a contract that the content of a BIT
and the 2010 law of production would establish the basic structure of those contracts.
The drafting of the law, like all other issues, became a battleground for radicals and
moderates. Radicals wanted the law to reproduce the model of the contracts used after
the decree nationalizing 99% of oil profits. Most importantly, they wanted companies
to resign to the protections o↵ered by any applicable treaty and resort to the dispute
settlement mechanisms provided for in the contract. They were willing to provide
for international arbitration in a regional forum but the applicable law would be
Ecuadorian law instead of what they saw as vague and expandable treaty provisions.
Moreover, they saw a much better chance to impose obligations on investors via
contracts than through treaties.113
The law ended up including a series of investor obligations, like complying with
national labor, environmental, tax and social security laws. It also established a
series of sanctions as a way to enforce those obligations. The dispute settlement
mechanisms provided for in the law included some progressive traits, for example,
arbitrators would apply Ecuadorian domestic law, tax issues could not be subject
to arbitration and investors would have had to exhaust local remedies first. Yet -
due to the insistence of the moderates mostly in the Ministry of Production- the
dispute settlement provisions made important concessions for investors as well. The
law allowed for international arbitration anywhere, not just in regional institutions.
More importantly, instead of requiring that investors renounce to the protection of
113BITs are one-sided instruments that generally create rights to investors and obligations for
states. CSOs and scholars consider investor obligations to be the most progressive treaty provisions
for rebalancing investment treaties. For that reason, they are also the most heavily resisted by
investors.
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applicable treaties as the radicals wanted, article 27 included the words “according
to valid treaties Ecuador is party of.”114 According to an o cial from the radical
camp, the goal of this wording was to maximize the validity of the BITs as long as
they remained in force and for the sunset periods after that. “We knew this was
problematic,” said this o cial, “and I lobbied against it, I sent letters through my
superiors at that moment but we did not win.”115
The new production law took e↵ect in December 2010. Yet the executive still failed
to terminate the four European treaties the Assembly had approved for termination.
The moderates within the GoE had Correa’s ear because Ecuador had launched FTA
negotiations with the EU. According to a witness account,
“the President was ready to sign them, in fact I saw the [termination]
decrees. We had a meeting to discuss the issue and there [a high-level
o cial from the Foreign A↵airs Ministry]...tells him ‘look, our trip to
Germany is next week. It would not be a good signal that we terminate
the treaty with Germany before the trip’.”116
Because the treaty would only regulate mutual trade, Europe wanted the old
network of BITs to continue governing investment flows.117 If Ecuador terminated
the BITs, the EU would end the FTA talks and if the talks failed, Ecuador would
lose preferential tari↵s.118 Because of a few controversial ISDS cases against European
countries, the EU was not completely unsympathetic. The plan was that the BITs
114Co´digo Orga´nico de la Produccio´n, Comercio e Inversiones. Registro Oficial. An˜o II - Quito.
29 de Diciembre del 2010. N 351. Art. 27
115Interview XXIII.
116Redacted to preserve anonymity. Interview XIX.
117The EU negotiating mandate was from before the European Commission had acquired compe-
tences over investment.
118“without an FTA they would raise the tari↵s on bananas, fish, shrimp...and there could be a
national catastrophe” Ibid.
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would remain in place until the signature of a new and improved investment agreement
with the entire EU.119 However, with ongoing negotiations for TTIP with the US and
CETA with Canada, an investment agreement with Ecuador was hardly a priority
for the EU. The radicals saw this indefinite plan as the confirmation of why Ecuador
needed to terminate old treaties first and negotiate new ones later. Insisting on
renegotiation instead of termination would result in the continuation of the status
quo.
Part B explained the reasons why, coming from a strong radical start with the
constitutional ban and the subsequent rulings of unconstitutionality, Ecuador did not
follow trough with the terminations beyond a few ‘easy’ treaties with small economies.
By tracing the progression of each individual BIT through the termination process,
I showed at which institutional stage obstacles emerged. Most terminations faced
opposition in congress where the ruling party did not have majority yet I also showed
the executive was hesitant to conclude the termination of its BITs with European
countries while trade negotiations with the EU were ongoing. The theorized exter-
nal limiting factors -pressures from foreign firms and treaty partners- operated as
expected. I showed how these pressures were e↵ective on opposition legislators -who
did not share the ideological inclinations of the government- and on the units within
the GoE that managed relations with firms and foreign governments -mostly the Min-
istry of Production and diplomats- where moderate approaches prevailed. Moreover,
developed treaty partners were able to mobilize domestic exporting sectors through
the threat of limiting market access for Ecuadorian products. The last part of this
119Ecuador ofrece a la UE negociar un tratado de inversiones; UE ECUADOR. (22 March 2012).
Agencia EFE.
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Chapter, Part C, explains the final decision by the Ecuadorian government to follow
through with the cancellations and exit the international investment regime. In doing
so, I focus on both the weakening of some of the external limiting factors as well as
the emergence of both domestic and international enabling factors.
PART C: cutting ties with the investment regime
The last part of this Chapter explains why and how, after eight years, Ecuador was
able to overcome these limitations and conclude the termination processes. Part A
shows the radicals in a strong position, obtaining a crucial constitutional provision and
setting the terminations in motion. Much di↵erently, Part B makes visible the shifting
balance of influence within the government in favor of moderate voices, resulting in
the termination processes coming to a halt. In Part C this balance shifts back in
favor of the radicals and Ecuador finally exits the investment regime. To explain
this final shift, I focus on both domestic and external factors. I show how radical
actors within the GoE were proactively trying to produce an enabling domestic and
diplomatic environment. In the same way that social mobilization forced the previous
government into terminating the Oxy’s contract, radicals attempted to regenerate
similar public interest in the termination of the BITs by setting up a commission
to conduct a public audit of Ecuador’s investment treaties. A campaign against the
firm Chevron, although not specifically geared towards promoting the terminations,
also helped increasing the salience of the issue because Chevron had sued Ecuador
through ISDS.
By focusing on the enabling function of the international environment, I also show
how external forces are not exclusively limiting factors. Radicals within the GoE also
5.2. The termination of the BITs 274
attempted to counter the influence of the moderates through policy coordination with
like-minded countries. However, the most ambitious aspects of these radical initia-
tives got entangled in the disputes with the moderates who were prominent in the
diplomatic service. While they failed at coordinating policies with states beyond
other far-left South American governments, the perception that other countries were
questioning the investment regime in similar ways was important for convincing Cor-
rea that he had to terminate the BITs before leaving o ce. Furthermore, radicals
benefited from a wane in the external limiting factors. The successful conclusion of
the FTA with the EU meant market access could no longer be used as a stick.
A purely external explanation would suggest states are passive recipients of inter-
national influences, be those limiting or enabling. I show radicals in the GoE were
not looking for available policy examples from other countries but rather searching
for partners to create policy alternatives with; I show them actively trying to foster
similar policies in other like-minded countries.
Unlike what I argue is the case when civil society organizations have high levels
of expertise and specific preferences regarding international investment law- I expect
civil society in Ecuador to be less mobilized around this issue. As the events leading
to the termination of Oxy’s contract detailed in Part A of this Chapter show, civil
society in Ecuador was not powerless. They had a strong presence in the oil-rich
regions and they mobilized intensely against the specific firms that operated there
but -unlike Northern CSOs- they did not have equivalent interest in treaties thus
they lacked technical expertise on the matter.120
Part C is divided in four sections. Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 examines two ini-
120According to an Ecuadorian o cial’s recollection of the level of civil society’s mobilization around
the terminations, “there were some remnants...some social groups still raised the issue of Oxy, but
only a few; nothing comparable to 2006 [when Oxy left the country].” Interview XXIII.
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tiatives from the GoE helped increasing the salience of BITs in the domestic political
debate and public opinion as well as legitimizing the terminations before foreign au-
diences. The first was a public audit of investment treaties that was the brainchild
of the radicals. The second was a campaign against the oil firm Chevron, which did
not emerge from this group, but contributed to putting the issue on the agenda. Sec-
tion 5.3 analyses the di↵erent diplomatic initiatives the GoE undertook during this
period with the goal of coordinating treaty policies within and beyond the region.
Lastly, Section 5.4 explains the the final decision to go through with the cancellations
in light of two changes in the external front: the ratification of the EU FTA and the
emergence of strong criticism against BITs and ISDS in the international system.
5.1 CAITISA: auditor´ıa ciudadana
In 2013 the GoE tasked a commission of independent experts and public o cials -
known as CAITISA for its initials in Spanish121- with a review of Ecuador’s investment
treaties. It is common for states to put in place such review process after facing
controversial ISDS disputes.122 In fact, the GoE had conducted a much less thorough
review of the BITs before terminating the first batch of treaties in 2008. Yet what
was unique about this process was its public character; it was meant to be a ‘citizen
audit’ (auditor´ıa ciudadana). It was conducted openly by nine independent experts
and four government o cials, rather than only bureaucrats behind closed doors, and
the entire process was publicized, not just the outcome. As a public process, the
audit had to primary audiences. First, CAITISA was meant to send a message
121Comisio´n para la Auditor´ıa Integral Ciudadana de los Tratados de Proteccio´n Rec´ıproca de
Inversiones y del Sistema de Arbitraje en Materia de Inversiones.
122See Chapter 6 for India’s review process.
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outwards, especially to Ecuador’s BIT partners, that the terminations were grounded
on fundamental problems of the investment regime. The report would show these
problems were real, not ideological tendencies, and that similar questioning processes
were taking place elsewhere. The second audience was domestic. The report would
dig into the history of the BITs and uncover how they were signed. In this sense,
CAITISA had a blame-assigning function.123 The audit would connect something
remote like these international legal instruments to more tangible consequences on
the ground, be that on the form of environmental damage by the firms initiating the
demands or the size of the awards and legal fees Ecuador had to a↵ront.
The idea for the audit emerged from a radical stronghold, the Secretary of Strate-
gic Planning and Development (SENPLADES). To their frustration with the slow
pace of the cancellations added a sense that other parts of the GoE were making
too large concessions to foreign investors. On 5 March 2012, the Minister of Natural
Resources signed a large-scale mining contract with a Chinese firm.124 The standard
procedure after contracts were signed was that an interministerial Council of Pro-
duction had to verify them. SENPLADES was part of that Council. When they got
the text of the contract, they saw it included access to international arbitration as
established by Ecuadorian BITs. That was, according to SENPLADES, in contradic-
tion with the GoE’s entire policy, especially at a time when the termination processes
123According to one CAITISA member, “on the one hand it would promote public debate, this was
part of the strategy, to explain society why that decision [to terminate] was being made. Second,
[the goal was] to connect what was going on in Ecuador with what was going on in other countries.”
Interview XVII. One of the architect of the audit saw one of the goals as identifying “who where
the ministers, presidents, legislators that approved these treaties...who were the Ecuadorian lawyers
defending the corporations...how were the appropriate procedures skipped [to facilitate signing the
treaties]” Interview XIX.
124The 2008 constitutional assembly had issued a mining resolution terminating around 800 mining
concessions that returned to the state. Some of those termination led to ISDS disputes.
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were losing steam.125 Thus, they objected the deal and took the issue to a Cabinet
meeting where the Ministers decided to put the contract on hold. The radical camp
understood their limited power to move the terminations along a Congress they did
not control but they were outraged when it was other units of the executive who
started to make decisions against the work that had been done in the previous years.
With the goal of swaying more cautious voices within the GoE, the radicals at
SENPLADES organized a closed-door workshop on BITs and ISDS. The workshop
was attended by the o ce of the attorney general, the legal secretary of the Pres-
idency, SENPLADES and some legislators, including the president of the foreign
a↵airs commission. The Vice President of Ecuador and the Minister of Strategic
Sectors attended part of the workshop as well. The presence of strategic sectors was
significant since their position was against terminating the treaties becasue they had
been warned by specific firms that a valid treaty and access to arbitration was a
condition for seeing some investment projects through. The subject matter of the
workshop was vast. It went over the content of the existing BITs and the ISDS cases
against Ecuador.126 It also discussed the bigger picture; what are the international
trends in investment treaty reform and what are the problems of the wider system
of investment arbitration. To that end, the workshop organizers relied heavily on a
report titled ‘Profiting from Injustice’ (2012) produced by a Dutch think-tank, the
Transnational Institute (TNI).127 The organizers realized the subject matter exceeded
125According to a SENPLADES o cial, President Correa had not been aware about these specific
contract provisions.
126According to a workshop organizer, most of the day-to-day handling of the arbitral disputes was
left in the hands of private law firms and there was little political supervision. Interview XIX.
127“we used that report a lot to show that in our [ISDS] cases there were conflict of interests”
Interview XIX. In fact, the o cial from SENPLADES that read the report contacted one of the
authors directly and she ended up taking part in drafting the decree through which Correa established
the auditing process and later became a member of the Commission. Interview XVII.
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what could be properly analyzed in a single day workshop.128 That is how the idea for
a public audit came about. There was the precedent of the 2008 audit of the public
debt.129 A similar process for the BITs would show the wider public how widespread
conflicts of interests are within investment arbitration, how treaty provisions threaten
developmental policies, who had signed the BITs and why. Thus, the audit would
provide greater legitimacy to the termination of the BITs in the same way that the
public debt audit legitimized the decision to partially default on the debt.130 The
President agreed with this proposal and on May 2013 signed an executive decree
creating the auditing commission.
The implications of the theorized di↵erences between CSOs and social movements
can be observed in the composition of CAITISA. First, one of the ministries that were
invited to take part in the process was the Coordinating Ministry of Policy, which
housed the Secretary for Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation. This
was meant to be the link between the audit and civil society and, according to one of
CAITISA’s ideologues, its inclusion had the goal of fostering social pressure around
this issue.131 This contrasts with the previous Chapter’s description of anti-MAI
campaigns. There, it was the CSOs who organized public events to raise awareness
and interest in the public about the legal implications of the agreement. Second, the
guiding criteria for selecting members from Ecuadorian civil society and international
experts was having a background on researching and campaigning against BITs and
128“Our intention with this workshop was to make these issues visible but we saw that the subject
matter was huge, impossible to cover in a workshops of 4 or 5 hours.” Interview XIX.
129The audit commission for the public debts had included Ecuadorian and foreign economists,
lawyers and representatives of civil society organizations. The final report concluded that a large
proportion of the public debt was illegitimate. The GoE ended up defaulting on 70% of its debt.
Within the GoE this audit was considered successful in legitimizing the default.
130Interview XVII.
131Interview XXIII.
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ISDS but specific expertise on investment treaties and arbitration was not widely
available in Ecuador.132
Moreover, the Commission’s membership also responded to the radical’s goal of
coordinating policies with like-minded countries. The organizers wanted to include
academics and political personalities from Latin America because they wanted the
audit to be a replicable process in other countries facing similar problems.133 For
example, one of the members was Osvaldo Guglielmino, the former Attorney General
that had managed the bulk of the investment arbitrations against Argentina. The
chair of the Commission was entrusted to Carlos Gaviria, a prominent Colombian
politician.
The Commission had two main tasks. The first one was to conduct the audit. To
this end, the commissioners met regularly at SENPLADES to discuss three themes:
(1) The content of all BITs signed by Ecuador and whether each of them would have
passed a constitutional control at the time of signature; (2) the system of international
investment arbitration and the specific cases against Ecuador, and (3) the relationship
between BITs, FDI and development. That is, whether the treaties resulted in FDI
flows, what types of investment were made by the firms suing Ecuador and what have
been their social and environmental e↵ects (CAITISA, 2017). Regarding this third
theme, the head of SENPLADES emphasized that, given that one of the political
aims of the GoE is to extend its ability to regulate, the Commission would evaluate
whether and if so how could BITs limit that ability.134 The second task was to ensure a
132According to a Commissioner, “the only way to make this public and make it relevant inter-
nationally was to take it outside the sphere of being purely governmental exercise...they convened
[international experts] mainly because the expertise was not there in Ecuador” Interview XVII.)
133“We wanted to include people from countries that had been critical [of the investment regime];
people that could have good relations with the governments of those countries so that this experience
could serve to spark political processes in those countries as well.” Interview XIX.
134CAITISA. Bulletin. Auditor´ıa a TBI avanza en sus tres ejes de trabajo. 8 March 2014.
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Figure 5.1: CAITISA illustration. Translation: ‘Let’s play in your court but I bring
the referee, the ball and I tell you how we split ticket sales.’ -‘If you don’t like it
we’ll find another team with a winning mindset.’ Source: Secretar´ıa Nacional de
Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
form of citizens’ participation in the process. To achieve this, the Commission would
issue periodic reports and its members participated in ‘socialization and di↵usion
workshops,’ as they were o cially termed, throughout Ecuador.135 The Commission
prepared illustrated materials to be used in these encounters (see Figures 5.1 to
5.6). “This is, sadly, a very ethereal subject, hard to communicate. We had to look
for popular ways to bring this to the public,” said one of the audit’s organizers.136
Goverment o cials involved in the audit also promoted the initiative in international
forums like UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreements conference in 2014 the
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment’s conference on invetsment treaties in
2015.
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Figure 5.2: CAITISA illustration. Translation: -‘Let’s reach an agreement to guar-
antee investments in your country’ -‘Do I sign here?’ Source: Secretar´ıa Nacional de
Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
Figure 5.3: CAITISA illustration. Translation: -‘We have to warn people about the
risks of tobacco’ -‘That’s fine, but if that hurts our profits we will sue you in ICSID.’
Source: Secretar´ıa Nacional de Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
Figure 5.4: CAITISA illustration. Translation: ‘What about the laws of my country?’
Source: Secretar´ıa Nacional de Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
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Figure 5.5: CAITISA illustration. Translation: Countries like South Africa and Aus-
tralia agree these agreements had made states more vulnerable. Source: Secretar´ıa
Nacional de Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
Figure 5.6: CAITISA illustration. Translation: With regional unity we will stop
the abuse of unfair arbitration systems that BITs impose on us. Source: Secretar´ıa
Nacional de Planificacio´n y Desarrollo.
The periodic reports, media appearances and presentations by Commission mem-
bers anticipated the content of the final audit report. The main ideas that emerged
135Interview XXIII.
136Interview XXIII.
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throughout the audit period were that BITs had not attracted investment and that
investors had won in 67% of ISDS cases against Ecuador. Because of these disputes,
Ecuador had already paid approximately $1.5 billion, which amounted to 31% of the
education budget, 62% of the health budget and housing for 239.000 families. Re-
garding the origin of the treaties, the audit found no trace of any discussion among
negotiators of their content and that many BITs were not approved in accordance
with the valid laws of the time. Finally, Commissioners recommended completing
the termination processes and -if Ecuador decides to eventually sign new investment
treaties- that these should be modeled after alternative texts that, among other ele-
ments, include investor obligations and exclude ISDS. CAITISA had a clear radical
stance.
The Commission’s findings stretched over seven hundred pages. The first full draft
of the report was ready in June 2015 but the publication was delayed. As most initia-
tives related to BITs, CAITISA got immersed in the disputes between radicals and
moderates. According to a participant, within moderate sectors “there was fear that
the moment the report was made public, the President would run out of options be-
cause he would have to comply with what the report said.”137 But trade negotiations
with the EU were ongoing. The frustrations within the Commission with the GoE’s
inaction led to the resignation of its Chair -Colombian politician Carlos Gaviria- in
December 2014. In an open letter to President Correa, he grounded his departure
on the government’s reticence to terminate the pending BITs.138 Furthermore, he
137Interview XXIII.
138The explicit reason given was: “The reticence, on behalf of the Government, to carry out the
process of denunciation of several bilateral investment treaties, which is pending only of a political
decision; even when the experience of the country with international arbitral tribunal has been not
only costly but disastrous.” Letter from Carlos Gaviria Dı´az to Rafael Correa Delgado. 28 November
2014. Quito, Ecuador.
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explicitly attributed this unwillingness to the ongoing negotiations with Europe. In
Gaviria’s words, the announcement of trade talks with the EU “was premonitory of
our final report finding its destiny in the trash can.”139
A similarly frustrated Commissioner leaked the draft report to the press.140 One
of the largest legal firms in Ecuador -which is signaled out in the audit as one of the
local firms that have aided foreign investors in fighting pubic regulations through ISDS
(CAITISA, 2017, 59)- published a critical analysis of the Commission’s findings. The
firms’s associates, who are regular contributors in international arbitration outlets,
warned about the impact of the report on EU talks and predicted the final report
would not likely see the light of day.141 They were not wrong. Although the work of
the Commission was publicized broadly, the final presentation of the report -handed
personally to Rafael Correa during a press conference on 8 May 2017- would have to
wait until after the political decision to terminate the treaties was made.142
The experience of the public audit has implications for (bounded) rationalist learn-
ing arguments. The audit could be seen as part of the process through which states
acquire further information that leads them to alter their policies. It seems, however,
that the ideational context in which this learning processes takes place will have a
strong impact on its outcome. The policy-makers that launched this initiative had
specific goals and those determined who was invited to join the Commission. What
139Ibid.
140Diagonal hace pu´blico los resultados de la auditor´ıa sobre tratados de inversio´n en Ecuador. (24
January 2016). Diagonal.
141“[A]ny politicized report stating how evil foreign corporations are or how capital-exporting
countries bully capital-importing countries could jeopardize the future of any trade agreement.”
(Bedoya, 2016); “the final report has purportedly been finished. However, it has not been published
by any public entity and there are doubts that said publication will be circulated” (Jijo´n-Letort and
Marcha´n, 2016).
142Only a shortened version of the findings -of around 100 pages- was published. I have a confi-
dential copy of the entire report on file.
5.2. The Chevron campaign: La mano sucia de Chevron 285
kinds of lessons were going to be derived could have been predicted from its mem-
bership. The final report would have drawn very di↵erent lessons if, for example, the
GoI would have invited experts from the arbitration community.
5.2 The Chevron campaign: La mano sucia de
Chevron
In 2013, the GoE also launched a campaign called ‘The dirty hand of Chevron’ to
raise national and international awareness of the environmental damage caused by
the oil firm Texaco, later bought by Chevron. This campaign was a response to
Chevron’s own actions against alleged interference by the GoE in the judiciary, which
included launching an ISDS dispute. It was also related to a strong push by Ecuador
within the UN Human Rights Council towards the creation of a legally binding human
rights instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations.143 Unlike
the audit’s, the focus of the campaign was one specific foreign firm -Chevron- not
the entirety of the international legal system that protected it. However, the natural
overlapping between the two matters also raised the visibility of arguments against
the BITs.
When Texaco ended its operations in 1992, it disposed of its waste by dumping
crude oil into unlined waste pits and releasing oil-laced produced waters straight into
streams and lakes. In 1995, the GoE signed an agreement with Texaco to remedy
the situation and clean up the area. Through the agreement, Ecuador relinquished
its right to bring further legal action once the cleanup was completed, which the gov-
143See Ruggie (2014); Lopez and Ben (2016)
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ernment certified to have happened in 1998. Indigenous organizations, who had been
campaigning against Texaco’s pollution, protested the agreement claiming their gov-
ernment had sold them out. In 1993, they brought their own lawsuit against Texaco
in the Southern District of New York on behalf of 30 thousand a↵ected individuals.
In 2001, Chevron took over Texaco and two years later, the District Court dismissed
the case on grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing the case should be heard in
Ecuador, not in the US. Thus, in 2003, the legal battle continued in Ecuadorian
courts. As proceedings appeared to veer against Chevron, the company sold all of its
remaining assets in Ecuador. In the case of an eventual loss, this would have barred
the claimants from collecting damages and would have forced them to start legal ac-
tions in other countries where the Chevron still had operations. Finally, in 2011, the
local court ruled in favor of the a↵ected population. After a series of appeals, the
final decision from the Ecuadorian highest court was that Chevron had to pay them
$9.5 billion.
Chevron did not limit itself to putting up a judicial defence in Ecuadorian courts.
After reports that its stock pricing was falling due to the pending dispute, it also
launched a publicity campaign to counter the allegations of environmental damage.
It ran large ads in print, on television, and online boasting about its social and en-
vironmental conscience. Additionally, in 2009 it launched ISDS proceedings against
Ecuador in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and under UNCITRAL
rules. Chevron claimed the GoE had violated its BIT with the US by unduly influ-
encing the judiciary and thereby compromising judicial independence.144 In 2011,
144The irony in this case is that since the opening of proceedings in the New York court, it had
been Texaco who had fought to have the lawsuit tried in Ecuador. The plainti↵s preferred American
courts because they feared corruption in the Ecuadorian judicial system but Texaco continuously
argued Ecuadorian courts were independent and impartial (Erichson, 2012).
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the arbitral tribunal issued an order in favor of Chevron ordering Ecuador to sus-
pend enforcement of the domestic judgment and it awarded Chevron $96 million in
compensation. Following UNCITRAL rules, Ecuador challenged the award in Dutch
courts.
The campaign was an attempt at improving Ecuador’s chances in fighting the
award by casting the Chevron arbitration as more than a legal dispute. “If it is only
managed between experts and lawyers...it stays there and people do not realize how
much is at stake. The idea was to raise the visibility of this dispute, take it from
the legal sphere to the political, social and media spheres.”145 President Correa was
personally involved in the campaign, which gave it high domestic visibility. On its
external dimension, the campaign involved coordinating actions with environmental
groups from all over the world146 as well as enlisting regional and international public
personalities and taking them in “toxi-tours” to the a↵ected area where they were
encouraged to stick their hands into the waste pits. As hands would come out cov-
ered in oil, the black hand became the symbol of the campaign. The campaign was
well covered by the media and found out to be e↵ective in raising awareness of the
issue among the Ecuadorian public (Salas and Armenda´riz, 2017). Given that one
element in the Chevron saga were these arbitral decisions, the ‘dirty hand’ campaign
contributed to linking a more concrete problem -like oil filled ponds- and its direct
cause -multinational corporations- with the more abstract issue of international in-
vestment treaties.147 Moreover, this was a dispute litigated at the Permanent Court
145Interview XXIII.
146CSOs, scholars and legislators created Solidarity Committees with Ecuador in multiple countries,
for example, Belgium, France, Germany, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Spain, United States, Uruguay
and Venezuela.
147“It helped give it visibility...The level of understating in the public of these concepts is pretty
low; people understand there is injustice but they don’t fully capture what is a BIT or who to get
out of them.” Interview XXIII.
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of Arbitration in the Hague and this helped cement the idea that the problem of the
international investment regime was larger than ICSID.
5.3 Diplomatic coordination
For the radicals, diplomatic coordination was essential, both globally and regionally.
“It has always been clear that these types of actions are not strong enough to change
the fundamental structure of the system unless they are taken in bloc.”148 This sec-
tion explains the diplomatic dimension of Ecuador’s radicalism. By considering both
successful and failed initiatives, even some which have not been documented before,
I show the true breadth of the radicals’ plans as well as the limitations encountered
in their execution.
5.3.1 Global coordination
Ecuador was a frequent participant in UNCTAD’s investment conferences. Yet they
were generally not featured as main speakers, a role that was generally reserved for
South Africa, India or Brazil.149 “For them it was risky to put us on the front page,
they generally looked for actors closer to the mainstream,” reflected a government
o cial,
“My goal [in those meetings] was to move the center [of the debate],
because otherwise the center ended up being small reforms, like increasing
transparency [in ISDS proceedings]; minimal things that don’t accomplish
148Interview XIX.
149Interview X.
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anything. We played that role on purpose.”150
Bilateralism held more promise for the radicals since discussions did not have to be
watered down to the lowest common denominator. They found substantial common
ground with South Africa. After a controversial ISDS dispute involving its black
economic empowerment laws in the mining sector, the South African government had
adopted a strong position against the international investment regime.151 Given their
common critical stance, o cials from Ecuador and South Africa coincided at multiple
forums, like UNCTAD meetings in Geneva or the Forums of Developing Country
Investment Negotiators of the IISD. During one event in Geneva in August 2013,
an Ecuadorian o cial approached Xavier Carim from South Africa’s Department of
Trade and Industry.
“we were coordinating the possibility of terminating the treaties simulta-
neously...I proposed the idea, I consulted with Quito, I got the ‘ok’, he got
the ‘ok’ from Pretoria. This initially had the backing of President Correa
and he directed the pertinent entities to move forward but it got stuck
in the diplomacy...this would have been wonderful, it would have sent a
strong message.”152
The foreign service failed to follow through with this command -as mentioned before-
due to concerns with the impact of the terminations of the FTA talks with the EU
and South African ended up cancelling its treaties on its own.
150Interview XIX.
151For an overview of South Africa’s own review process see Schlemmer (2015).
152Interview XXIII.
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5.3.2 Regional coordination
In regional forums Ecuador had more salience. It helped that some of the most highly
sued countries in the world are South American nations. “At the regional level we had
more influence and less stigma. We could sit down with Brazil, with Argentina or with
Chile and have a serious debate.”153 The ideological a nity between the Venezuela
of Chavez and the Bolivia of Morales made them easy allies. Ecuador became a full
member of ALBA in 2009 and within this forum is that Ecuador coordinated the
exit from ICSID. However, they needed a wider group of allies if they wanted their
arguments to be taken seriously and not dismissed as ideological pronunciations.
To this end, Ecuador attempted to bring Argentina into the ALBA forum. They
saw Argentina as a natural ally; the most sued country in ISDS and, at the time,
under a center-leftist administration. Argentina had similar concerns but instead of
joining Ecuador in ALBA, they preferred to bring the issue of investment arbitration
to the wider South American forum of UNASUR. According to an Ecuadorian o cial,
“to get into UNASUR with this issue the key link was Argentina...and the [Workers’
Party] was in Brazil and Brazil was very much against arbitration. We saw that
was a good direction.”154 Ecuador took the lead within UNASUR and promoted the
creation of an arbitration center. This project sat well with both radicals and mod-
erates within the GoE. As mentioned earlier, radicals were not opposed to any form
of international arbitration; their objections were not juridical but political. They
could tolerate regional arbitration, conducted by South American lawyers applying
domestic law. For the moderates, it would allow them to approach their interlocutors
-foreign governments and firms- with a proposal that still gave investors access to
153Interview XIX.
154Interview XXIII.
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ISDS, albeit only in a regional venue.
The problems of international investment arbitration had been discussed within
UNASUR since 2008. There was an o cial Working Group that met nine times from
March 2008 to January 2010, attendees were mid level diplomats. According to the
report of the Group’s first meeting, there were three working areas: (1) the creation
of a legal advisory body for countries facing ISDS disputes. This topic was headed
by Peru. (2) The development of a system of dispute resolution rules of UNASUR.
These would be analogous to UNCITRAL rules and could be administered by dif-
ferent institutions. Bolivia took on this matter. (3) The most ambitious topic was
the creation of UNASUR’s own dispute resolution center. This one was taken up
by Ecuador.155 Reports of subsequent meetings show considerable more interest in
developing the legal advisory body than either the dispute resolution rules or center.
Member countries even agreed to invite o cials from the WTO’s Advisory Centre
and from UNCTAD’s investment division to consult on this matter.156 Regarding the
other items in the agenda, the reports generally say that work will continue. Even
discussions for the least controversial of the three initiatives exhibit some disagree-
ment, especially from Colombia who had a much less critical view of the system of
investment arbitration than most other UNASUR countries. There were, for exam-
ple, discussions about the scope of the membership of the advisory body; whether
it should be open to just UNASUR members, to all Latin American and Caribbean
countries, or as Colombia preferred, whether it should it be open to any nation that
wanted to join.157
155Report. I Meeting of the Working Group. ‘Mecanismo de solucio´n de controversias en materia
de inversiones en el marco de UNASUR.’ 12 March 2008.
156Report. III Meeting of the Working Group. ‘Mecanismo de solucio´n de controversias en materia
de inversiones en el marco de UNASUR.’ 21-22 August 2008.
157Report. VII Meeting of the Working Group. ‘Mecanismo de solucio´n de controversias en materia
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The report of the last meeting of the Working Group shows that Ecuador had gone
at great lengths trying to foster some type of consensus. At this meeting Ecuador
was making a proposal for the advisory body that was based on a series of bilateral
talks that Ecuador had sought out with Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Argentina and Chile.
The attempt to please all the parties was evident. For example, in terms of the dis-
puted issue of the membership, Ecuador proposed to expand the body’s membership
progressively. First it would be open just to UNASUR countries; at a second stage
it would be open to countries from Latin America and the Caribbean; and then it
would become universally open.158
Even after this attempt to move things forward, the advisory body was still far
from ready. The GoE was frustrated. The prospects for the regional arbitration
center did not look promising if countries could not even agree on the design of a
legal advisory body. During one of his November 2010 Sabatinas, Correa lamented it
had been hard to make progress in UNASUR because middle rank o cials kept raising
obstacles. “The Presidents have the political will to go to these regional arbitration
centers but the middle ranks stop it,” Correa decried, because they adhere to a
“third-world mentality.”159 That is, they “keep believing that our countries are not
capable of instrumenting arbitration mechanisms that comply with world standards
and can constitute a respectable alternative to those already established by developed
countries.”160 The regional arbitration center was not simply a political aspiration for
Ecuador. The GoE had promised its treaty partners and foreign firms that after the
de inversiones en el marco de UNASUR.’ Lima, Peru. 14-15 April 2009.
158Report. IX Meeting of the Working Group. ‘Mecanismo de solucio´n de controversias en materia
de inversiones en el marco de UNASUR.’ Quito, Ecuador. 27-28 January 2010.
159Correa admite obsta´culos para crear centro de arbitraje. (20 November 2010). AP Spanish
Worldstream.
160Correa pide a Unasur acelerar creacio´n de centro de arbitraje internacional. (11 March 2011).
Agence France Presse.
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treaties were terminated they could still have access to international arbitration in a
regional institution. Regional arbitration is even mentioned in the new Constitution.
There had been considerable skepticism about the viability of the center, expressed
in di↵erent occasions by foreign embassies161 and arbitration lawyers.162
Frustrated with the lack of progress made by middle-ranking o cials, Ecuador
-who was at the time holding the chair of UNASUR- pushed for the creation of a new
Working Group, this time its members would be experts designated by the Presidents
directly.163 The first meeting of the High Level Working Group took place in Quito
in May 2011. Ecuador used the momentum of this new setting to shift the discus-
sion from creating a legal advisory body to instituting a dispute settlement center.
The GoE even presented a proposal for a statute. Disagreements emerged among the
UNASUR countries. The most important contentious issue was the degree of judicial-
ization of the Center. That is, would it be an arbitration or mediation institution?
Or would it resemble more of a court? Would it have an appeals mechanism? Would
it have a permanent ‘bench’ of arbitrators? Brazil has been historically opposed to
investment arbitration thus they made clear they would not join the Center if it only
o↵ered arbitration services. Bolivia was also critical of ISDS and had recently left
ICSID; their view was that another supranational arbitration institution was unnec-
essary and that foreign investors should resolve their disputes in domestic courts.
Colombia, on the other hand, demanded binding arbitration.164 Argentina -who had
161GOE “EXPLAINS” TERMINATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES Date:2009 November 17.
Canonical ID:09QUITO973 a.
162“It is one thing to make political statements, it is a di↵erent thing to create a new legal regime
that implements those statements.” Ecuador’s new service contracts ‘unacceptable.’ (3 September
2010). Global Arbitration Review.
163Decision to Analyze an Investment Dispute Settlement System in UNASUR. Georgetown,
Guyana. 26 November 2010.
164An o cial recalls conversations with the Ecuadorian envoy to these meetings, “he would tell
us there was a lot of trouble with Brazil on one hand, because they simply did not want anything,
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issues with the limited annulment procedures available in ICSID- made a proposal
that would have brought the Center closer to a permanent court by adding an appeals
and annulment stage.165 Ecuador worked hard to find consensus. “We were the most
flexible ones regarding any type of rules with the aim of reaching an agreement.”166
Eventually it was decided that the Center would o↵er both mediation and arbitration
services and that states would opt in the type of mechanisms they would be willing
to o↵er investors.167 However, after the second meeting almost the entire text of the
Center’s statute was still in brackets.168
In 2013, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign A↵airs organized the first Ministe-
rial Conference of Latin American States A↵ected by Transnational Interests in the
city of Guayaquil. While it was organized in the framework of ALBA,169 Ecuador
invited other countries from the region with ISDS experience.170 This was a per-
sonal initiative of the Minister of Foreign A↵airs who wanted to foster a common
Latin American position beyond what South American countries were discussing at
UNASUR.171 The meeting’s final declaration insisted on the poor quality of arbitral
decisions and attributed them to the economic power of firms and to deficiencies of
the ISDS system. It also encouraged UNASUR to finalize negotiations for the cre-
and there were also problems with Bolivia because they did not believe that we should replace
Washington [that is, ICSID] for [another] supranational entity.” Interview XXIII
165Final Act. IX Meeting of High Level Experts on Investment Disputes Resolution of UNASUR.
Quito, Ecuador. 10-13 June 2014.
166Ibid.
167“We were adapting...because Brazil said ‘no’ [to arbitration] then we made it a mediation center
and becasue Colombia did ask for arbitration, then we made it mediation and arbitration.” Ibid.
168Report. II Meeting of High Level Experts on Investment Disputes Resolution of UNASUR.
Asuncion, Paraguay. 10-11 October 2011.
169Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America.
170The conference was attended by ALBA members: Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Domini-
can Republic, Venezuela and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Invited countries were Argentina,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico.
171Interview XXIII.
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ation of a regional arbitration institution. The Conference created a state-funded
international observatory that -among other things- would collect and disseminate
information about ongoing disputes, study and promote reforms to ISDS and alter-
native mechanisms, and assist in policy coordination by providing technical and legal
information.172 Ecuador had a heavy hand in making sure this initiative did not
start and end in Guayaquil. Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela would
draft the proposal for the Observatory. Moreover, the Executive Committee of the
Ministerial Conference would be headed by Ecuador. The Second Conference was
going to take place in Venezuela yet the preparatory meetings were held in Quito and
coordinated by Ecuadorian diplomats. The vision of the Ecuadorian Foreign A↵airs
Minister was ambitious; he expected member countries to foot the bill -expressly not
developed countries- and used the Inter-American Human Rights Commission an ex-
ample of what the observatory would look like.173 However, the Second Conference
was the last one to take place due to a lack of interest on behalf of the larger countries
in this group.
In 2014, Ecuador made a push in UNASUR for a final agreement on a statute for
the Regional Center that could be presented to the UNASUR Council. Five meetings
were held in 2014, all in Quito. The report from the last of these meetings recognizes
there were still a series of issues where agreement was pending and Ecuador was
tasked with circulating a new draft of the Center’s statute. The GoE, one more
time, was openly frustrated. Correa was reported questioning the consensus-based
172DECLARACIO´N DE LA I CONFERENCIA MINISTERIAL DE ESTADOS
LATINOAMERICANOS AFECTADOS POR INTERESES TRANSNACIONALES.
Guayaquil, Ecuador, 22 April 2013. Retrieved from: https://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/22abrdeclaraciontransnacionalesesp.pdf.
173Ecuador acoge reunipreparatoria sobre Estados afectados por trasnacionales. 6 May 2014. EL
Pa´ıs.
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system of UNASUR; “it is necessary to revise our statutes and for important matters
establish not consensus, but qualified majorities.”174 After this sprint of meetings
trough 2014, the group did not meet again until 2016. Two more meetings took
place in Montevideo, revived by the infamous ISDS dispute between Philip Morris
and Uruguay. The 14th meeting report states that “advances were made in the draft
text” but also recognizes “di↵erences still exist regarding fundamental issues.”175
Moreover, political tendencies started to shift in South America. Argentina elected a
center-right government and, with the removal of Dilma Rousse↵, the government of
the Workers’ Party in Brazil came to an end. This was the final blow to this process.
“There were permanents doubts and when the turn happens in Brazil everything
comes to an end, there was no possibility of making any progress.”176
In sum, the diplomatic dimension of Ecuador’s investment treaty policies shows a
country interested in fostering similar policies in other states, especially beyond the
natural ideological allies of ALBA. Opening up the decision-making process behind
these diplomatic initiatives, it becomes evident that Ecuador did not want to ap-
pear levying its criticism from the ideological fringes of the regime but voicing similar
concerns to those of emerging powers like Brazil and South Africa. However, in multi-
lateral forums, the Ecuadorian approach was considered too radical to be included in
the menu of reform options. In regional multilateral forums there was more common
ground and the Ecuadorian initiatives were discussed seriously. However, regional
power disparities ended up being determinant. Without Brazil and Argentina’s sup-
port, a South American alternative to ICSID was unlikely. When Ecuador was able to
174Correa propone cambiar estatuto de Unasur ante falta de consensos. (4 December 2014). Agence
France Presse.
175Report. XIV Meeting of High Level Experts on Investment Disputes Resolution of UNASUR.
Montevideo, Uruguay. 29-31 March 2016.
176Interview XXIII.
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find like-minded states with enough coincidence of interests to coordinate radical pol-
icy actions, as in the case of South Africa, then obstacles emerged from the moderate
actors within the government. In sum, to coordinate policy actions with countries
that had a common vision, the GoE lacked cohesion. To accomplish initiatives in
which the GoE was unified, it lacked willing partners.
5.4 The enabling factors
The domestic political conditions changed in favor of the ruling party when in the
2013 elections acquired a two-thirds majority in congress. Thus, with no real leg-
islative opposition, the decision-making power was now concentrated in the executive
and as such it depended on the balance on influence between moderates and radicals.
In this final section, I show how that what ended tipping this balance back in favor
of the radicals were external factors beyond Ecuador’s control. Part B showed how
the moderates in the GoE became more influential due to e↵ective pressures by for-
eign firms and governments. In the previous sections I also showed how radicals were
unable to counter those external pressures through a series of diplomatic initiatives.
As a small developing country with limited international influence, the viability of
those initiatives initially depended on the preexistence of a coincidence of interests
with larger partners. When that was not the situation, Ecuador was unable to gener-
ate political will in its larger regional partners. Here I explain how radicalism finally
took over after two conditions were satisfied: a waning of the limiting external factors
and the emergence of an enabling international environment. Ecuador was unable to
create an enabling international environment for itself. Teh radicals within the GoE
had to wait for the threat of reduced market access to lose power and for similar
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challenges to the investment regime to keep emerging elsewhere.
Even with a two-thirds legislative majority, there was still caution within the GoE
about the potential e↵ects of the terminations on the negotiations for the FTA with
the EU. Even after the treaty had been signed, the moderates in the government did
not want anything to jeopardize ratification. The European Parliament finally gave
its consent for the agreement on December 2016. This neutralized the most impor-
tant external limiting factor keeping the terminations at bay.177 Domestic exporting
sectors, with access for its products secured, now had no stake in the fate of the BITs.
While the understanding was that the BITs would remain in place until an eventual
Ecuador-EU investment agreement would replace the BITs with all the individual
European countries, this was not a binding commitment.
What finished tipping Correa over the termination edge was what he perceived to
be an international recognition of the qualms that Ecuador had with the investment
regime. According to one of his collaborators, two factors were important to the
President. The first one was that around the same time India sent termination notices
to 58 BIT partners. The second one was the strong anti-ISDS climate that had
emerged in Europe during negotiations with Canada and the US. These were perceived
as a validation of reasons why Ecuador was seeking the terminations. For example, the
French Parliament had expressed concerns over investment provisions in the Canadian
deal and had requested the French Constitutional Court to block it. “We used that
to justify the termination of the BIT with France, word by word their concerns were
the same as our concerns.”178 Furthermore, these criticisms were emerging at the
center of the global economy, in one the of the largest senders of FDI and one of the
177“I have been insisting to the President and the ministers for three years. Once the agreement
with the EU entered into force there were no more excuses.” (Interview XIX)
178Interview XIX.
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largest recipients. After Correa made the decision to terminate, the process followed
easily. The GoE not only had absolute majority but also the President of the National
Assembly was from the group of radical policy-makers and she helped speeding up
the process. On 17 May 2017 -amid very disappointed EU representatives179- the
President signed the decrees terminating the remaining treaties. After ten years,
Ecuador had finally exited the international investment regime.
5.5 Conclusion
This Chapter examined the long, drawn out process of terminating Ecuador’s in-
vetsment treaties. Since no real attempts at renegotiating these treaties were made,
Ecuador exited the investment regime. Consistent with my argument, this rare out-
come was possible, in part, because a radical set of views and beliefs -namely that
Ecuador did not need BITs to attract investment and that the existing ISDS system
is biased against host states- was present in the GoE. These ideas mattered but also
did the degree of consensus around them and the strength of policy-maker’s com-
mitment to the policies that derived from those convictions. When holding on to
radical policies appeared costly, moderate sectors within the GoE tried to move the
Ecuador’s policies closer to the preferences of developed countries. When moderates
succeeded, radicals attempted to regain policy influence by fostering popular and
diplomatic support.
This case also shows that civil society actors played di↵erent roles across two
important political decisions. The mass mobilization of social and indigenous move-
179“There was a specific claim from the EU delegate for the Andean region that the previous
agreement with them had been broken.” (Interview XXI)
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ments was crucial for the GoE to expel the American firm Occidental but there was
no comparable mobilization in favor of terminating the treaties. Since I treated civil
society’s interest in treaty policy as exogenous and assumed that CSOs develop such
interest but social movements do not, an unexpected finding was the active role of
government actors in fostering this interest. It was the radical sector within the GoE
who intentionally tried to foster popular interest in investment treaties and arbi-
tration through awareness campaigns. In contrast to the role of American activists
described in the previous Chapter -where CSOs worked to capture the interest of
receptive policy-makers- it was Ecuadorian o cials who sought out civil society as a
way to convince moderates within the GoE that terminating the treaties was not an
ideologically-driven whim but a popular demand.
As a form of epilogue to this story, it is important to consider what happened
after Correa finished his second term and Lenin Moreno was elected president. While
he had been Correa’s vice president during his first term and ran as the ruling party’s
candidate, once in power he veered towards more centrist policies. Regarding in-
vestment treaties, the radical group of policy-makers that had been pushing for the
terminations had also left with Correa. Thus, the new GoE started to exhibit signs
that the prevailing position would now be that of the moderates. For example, pub-
lic remarks by the Ministry of Foreign Trade showed the strength of a conviction
the radicals worked hard to erode, that “[i]n order to secure private direct invest-
ment, we must have BITs.”180 In early 2018, the GoE announced that it was sending
renegotiation requests to the sixteen countries from the second wave of terminations,
which includes the US and the EU countries.181 The government also announced a
180Ecuador in treaty U-turn under new leader? (17 October 2017). Global Arbitration Review.
181Ecuador renegociara´ 16 tratados de inversio´n. (19 February 2018). El Tele´grafo.
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new model BIT was ready and shared with the embassies of the sixteen countries.
Although its content remains confidential, the government stressed the template “bal-
ances the rights and obligations of the state and the investors” and is inscribed in the
national legal framework.182 Even though, as of today, the GoE refuses to give details
about specific provisions, the emphasis on the compatibility of the new model with
Ecuadorian law seemed to suggest that it does not include traditional ISDS since this
would be contrary to article 422 of the constitution.
These announcements triggered a debate in Ecuador’s political and legal circles,
specially around the proper meaning of article 422. For those who want the treaties
to come back, the ban does not apply to investment matters; for those who do not
want a return to BITs, it does.183 Even though the Constitutional Court ruled on
these matters in 2009, there is room to make alternative arguments because the 2009
decisions were about the constitutional character of the specific BITs that Ecuador
had signed. That is, it was not an analysis of what alternative types of dispute
settlement mechanism could be allowed under article 422. Meanwhile, keeping with
usual practice, Canada, South Korea and the US told Ecuador that trade talks would
depend on the BITs being re-instated.184 As the GoE started talks with its former
treaty partners, the National Assembly requested the Constitutional Court to inter-
pret article 422 to determine its scope.185 Whatever comes out of this assessment, the
radical o cials from the Correa government succeeded, at least, in making it hard
for Ecuador to return to BITs as usual.
182Ecuador propone nuevos acuerdos de inversio´n que protegen al pa´ıs y defienden los derechos
humanos. (8 March 2018). Ministry of Foreign Relations and Human Mobility. Ecuador.
183See for example an article by state o cials from the Correa government (Arauz Galarza and
Pino Garrido, 2018).
184La agenda comercial del pa´ıs depende de tratados de inversio´n. (28 June 2018). El Comercio.
185La Corte Constitucional debera´ interpretar si la prohibicio´n de arbitrajes incluye a tratados
bilaterales de inversio´n. (28 June 2018). National Assembly. Republic of Ecuador.
Chapter 6
India
Historically, India’s approach to international investment law has been consistent with
its policy towards foreign direct investment. From independence until the 1990s, the
dominant economic model was based on self-reliance and industrialization via import
substitution. While FDI was welcomed, it was heavily regulated. During this period,
India did not enter into any bilateral investment treaties and, in multilateral forums,
contested some of the fundamental principles of international investment law. The
liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991 meant that, relative to its past, the
government of India (GoI) would embrace FDI. Consistently, the GoI would also
embrace BITs. In this period, India signed a large number of BITs and these were
modeled after the developed countries’ treaties. As such, these BITs provided ample,
and readily enforceable, protections to foreign investors and showed little concern
with states’ regulatory autonomy.
This historical consistency between FDI and investment treaty policies came to
an end with India’s first ISDS loss in the White Industries case and the influx of
arbitral disputes that followed. India remained open to FDI under Narendra Modi’s
government, but its BIT policy swung in the opposite direction. In the words of
the foremost scholar on India’s BITs, Prabhash Ranjan, “India’s foreign investment
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policy has become more liberal since 1991. However, India’s approach towards BITs
and international investment law, from 2011 onwards, has become quite illiberal.”
(2019, 355). After a review process that lasted multiple years, in 2015 the GoI
adopted a revisionist approach aimed at recovering a large part of its international
legal autonomy. It has, so far, unilaterally terminated 58 BITs and adopted a new
model treaty that is markedly pro-state, o↵ering limited rights to foreign investors.
This Chapter explains these changes to India’s investment treaty policy through the
argument put forward in Chapter 2.
6.1 The argument
In previous Chapters, I argued that ISDS experience ignites di↵erent political pro-
cesses in the developed and the developing world which in turn leads to alternative
policy outcomes. I showed that negative experiences with ISDS resulted in di↵erent
policy-making processes in the United States and Ecuador. In this Chapter, I analyze
the relationship between ISDS experience and investment treaty policy-making in the
case of India. India o↵ers the possibility of a nuanced evaluation of the argument;
against the backdrop of an emerging economy that increasingly resists categorization
as either a developed or developing country. Unlike the US and most Western Eu-
ropean nations, India still receives substantially more foreign investment than what
it sends abroad. For this reason, the Government of India (GoI) will predominantly
read its first negative ISDS outcome from the position of a host state. Yet overseas
direct investment has increased substantially in the past decades, from less than $1
billion in 2000 to more than $21 billion in 2016.1 Thus, I expect the perspective of
1Reserve Bank of India, Data on Overseas Investment.
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India as a sender of capital to become more salient over time in relation to investment
treaties, with home state considerations moderating final policy choices.
To explain India’s reaction to ISDS experience, my argument looks at both policy-
makers’ ideas and the strategic environment in which they pursue them. While India
opened up its economy to foreign investment in the early 1990s, it did not do so
completely. Liberalization was significant mostly in relation to the insularity of the
Indian economy up to that point. As I later show, Modi came to power in 2009 still
stressing the need to make access easier to foreign capital. Pockets of protection for
perceived strategic sectors amid a process of wider economic liberalization are tied to
the resilience of nationalist ideas among Indian policy-makers. A strong commitment
to nationalist ideas in the post-Independence period produced a highly interventionist
state and managing such a state at India’s scale required large bureaucracies (Kohli
et al., 2004). Nationalist legacies are still observable today. As “the most revered
nationalist leaders came to power through struggles for independence and postcolonial
nationalist narratives, successively elected government leaders assess strategic value
based on national institutional legacies” (Hsueh, 2012, 50). Despite a commitment to
economic liberalization, India’s political economy still remains quite statist by global
standards. In this ideational context, the GoI’s would be expected to view to ISDS
disputes as unacceptable a↵ronts to India’s sovereignty, and more importantly, to the
state’s ability to intervene in the economy.
Independently of their convictions, policy-makers face constraints and opportuni-
ties in pursing their preferred course of action. The argument suggests that, for less
a✏uent countries, external pressures make radical policies less likely. Foreign firms
and their home governments will warn host states about the economic fallout that
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will follow from such policies. At the same time, like-minded states and international
CSOs could make radical policies more likely as sources of political and technical sup-
port. Given India’s status as a rising power, after nationalist policy-makers propose
radical policies I expect external factors to have limited impact on their decision-
making, either as limiting or enabling factors. The size of India’s manufacturing and
services sectors make it an attractive destination for FDI, as well as one of the largest
markets for industrial and consumer goods. Moreover, the domestic reforms that
Modi implemented to attract FDI were successful in turning the downward trend in
FDI flows that followed the financial crisis, even from countries that India had no
investment treaty with. Most notably, the US.2 In a reverse of the argument that
developing states were more likely to sign BITs when they experienced economic dif-
ficulties (Elkins et al., 2006), India had reasons to believe that implementing radical
changes -even when multinational companies and their home governments were warn-
ing against it- would not diminish its standing as an attractive destination for FDI.
This should weaken the capacity of foreign investors and their home governments
to make threats about foregone investment and reduces market access thus reducing
incentives to mobilize for India’s exporting firms. Moreover, since limiting external
factors are relatively weak, India should appear uninterested in coordinating policies
with like-minded states. Thus, in these regards, India appears to be more like the US
and less like Ecuador. However, since indigenous expertise on international invest-
ment law was not available in India, I should expect international CSOs to have a role
as suppliers of technical expertise while policy-makers consider alternative policies.
In this regard, India is closer to Ecuador that to the US.
2U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
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Regarding alternative explanations, New-New Trade Theory would explain this
change in BIT policy by looking at the relative influence of firms. If the GoI adopted
a policy that foreign investors resisted, then this would be explained by the rising
influence of domestic firms that compete with foreign multinationals. Yet, as noted
in the introduction to this Chapter, as India’s treaty policy experienced a major
overhaul, FDI policy remained unchanged. If the GoI was catering to domestic firms,
then it is di cult to explain why similar changes were not observed in India’s overall
FDI policy.
On the contrary, throughout this period the Indian state appears fairly autonomous
from non-state actors: domestic firms, foreign firms and civil society. Unlike points in
the US and Ecuador Chapters, mostly when policies were discussed in the legislature,
there were few access points in the Indian process for interested actors. The entire
policy-making process was managed by mid-level bureaucracies mostly behind closed
doors. That said, the resulting policy outcome cannot be fully explained by reference
to the autonomy of the Indian bureaucracy. That is, external influence is not the
only source of policy variation. States are complex machines; agencies have di↵erent
mandates and their domains often overlap. Thus, even when bureaucrats do not take
cues from outsiders, inter-agency rivalry can still emerge (Chibber, 2002). Without
much outside interference, Indian ministries still developed di↵erent proposals for how
to rekindle BITs. This relate to arguments that see the resulting policy change as the
product of a (bounded) rational learning process. By focusing solely on the outcome
of learning and not the process, it is di cult to explain where these disagreements
come from.
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides the background
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leading to the creation of India’s treaty program in the 1990s. Section 6.3 covers
India’s first experience with ISDS. Since India was able to negotiate its way out of
these disputes, concerns with BITs did not emerge within the government. Section 6.4
examines the origins and significance of the first arbitral defeat in the White case as
well as the various reactions to it. Section 6.5 looks into the review of India’s treaty
network launched after White to show that government agencies -while in general
critical of BITs and ISDS- had di↵erent policy preferences for the way forward. In
Section 6.6 I explain how the arrival of the Modi government impacted the review
process and analyze the new model treaty that emerged shortly after. I compare the
draft and the final versions and asses reactions to both documents. While the final
model was significantly toned down from its draft version, observers still considered
it a radical departure from the past. Finally, Section 6.7 covers India’s decision to
terminate 58 of its existing treaties and re-interpret the remaining 25. Available
evidence suggests that, so far, India’s has had mixed success in rebuilding its treaty
network on the basis of its new model.
6.2 Background
After its independence in 1947, India adopted a series of import-substitution policies
including high tari↵s and import quotas. The government eventually understood the
potential for growth was limited if India was to rely purely on indigenous technol-
ogy and skills. Thus, the GoI started to o↵er incentives and concessions to foreign
investments. Given the protection o↵ered to local industries, India was an attractive
location to firms serving the Indian market from the outside through exports. As
some of these firms established themselves in the country, by the late 1960s the trans-
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fer of profits, royalties and other exits of capital associated with FDI had made their
mark on the balance of payments. As a result, the GoI adopted a more restrictive
attitude towards FDI. Among many regulations, some industries remained o↵ limits
to foreign investors and there were restrictions on investments with no prospect of
technology transfer or where foreign investors were seeking more than 40% ownership.
Regulations started to loosen in the 1980s. For example, the GOI introduced
exceptions to foreign ownership caps and streamlined the approval processes for new
foreign investments (Kumar, 1998). The true paradigm shift, however, came in 1991
with the adoption of the New Industrial Policy (NIP). The NIP opened up Indian
industries to FDI to unprecedented levels. It abolished the old system of industrial
approval and made approval automatic for certain high-priority industries. It elim-
inated the 40% foreign ownership cap and, seeking to boost energy production, it
allowed 100% foreign equity in the energy sector. It also allowed the use of foreign
brand names for goods produced in India by foreign-owned firms (Nagaraj, 2003).
On the diplomatic front, India joined the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
and started to aggressively sign bilateral investment treaties (Ahluwalia, 1994). In-
dia’s approach to investment treaties was initially that of an FDI recipient, trying to
signal to foreign capital that India was a secure location. Addressing the Federation
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao
declared “we intend to sign bilateral investment treaties to show our firm commitment
and assurance to foreign investors.”3 During the first five years of its treaty program,
India signed 35 BITs, including with large capital-exporting countries like the UK,
Germany, The Netherlands, and Mauritius. The latter became an important treaty
3RAO SEEKS TO CALM FOREIGN INVESTOR FEARS. (1993, September 29). Financial
Times.
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partner for India since many multinational firms, especially Americans, would route
their investments to India through Mauritius.4
The division of labor among government units in terms of international invest-
ment agreements evolved in an unusual manner. Traditionally, the Ministry of Fi-
nance (MF) was in charge of negotiating stand-alone BITs with the Ministry of Com-
merce & Industry (MCI) -the unit handling WTO negotiations- managing free trade
agreements. However, from 2005 onward, India started to enter into comprehensive
economic agreements that not only regulated trade but also investment. Since these
larger ‘trade+investment’ treaties remained in control of the MCI; two di↵erent agen-
cies garnered authority to negotiate India’s obligations regarding foreign investment.
It is important to note that the MCI also handles aspects of inwards FDI policy, thus
their perspective was that of India as a recipient of foreign capital. At the same time,
the MF is the unit in charge of overseas direct investment policy. Thus any concerns
with the potential e↵ects of alternative treaty choices over Indian investors abroad
would emerge from Finance. This division of labor will give rise to alternative views
about the extent to which India should revise its existing policy.
During the early years of India’s treaty program the prevailing view was that of
the time; that BITs would serve as a “major catalyst for investment flows.”5 Acting
on that understanding, in 1993 India adopted a pro-investor treaty template modeled
after its first BIT with the UK, which itself followed the model the UK had developed
in the 1970s. The 1993 Model granted Fair and Equitable (FET)6, Most Favored Na-
4Indian BITs are specifically termed Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements
or BIPAs. I use the term BIPA and BIT interchangeably.
5Foreword to the BIPA between Germany and India, Ministry of Finance. Available at:
https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Germany.pdf (Last accessed: January 17th, 2019).
6The FET standard is the most frequent clause invoked in ISDS disputes. Its the vague and
expandable nature has allowed investors to use it to challenge a variety of regulatory measures by
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tion (MFN) and National treatment, though only in the post-establishment phase.7
It had an open-ended, asset-based definition of investment with a non-exhaustive
list including direct investment, portfolio investment and intellectual property rights
(IPRs).8 The 1993 model also gave investors direct access to ISDS with no require-
ment to exhaust local remedies (Ranjan, 2014).9 This template was the basis from
which India approached all subsequent negotiations. In 2003, the Ministry of Finance
introduced a change to the Model in response to a new trend in India’s BIT program.
Treaties started to be signed with countries where India was sending FDI to, rather
than receiving FDI from. That is, India was concerning itself with the level of pro-
tection that its investors would receive abroad and as a consequence, treaty drafters
from the MF introduced provisions regarding indirect expropriation.10
The main di↵erence between MF’s BIPAs and the investment chapters in the
MCI’s comprehensive agreements was that the latter included pre-establishment obli-
gations, although consistently with India’s FDI policy, they were generally accompa-
nied by lists of sectors where the pre-establishment rights would apply (Ministry of
their host states (UNCTAD, 2012a).
7This will be a contentious issue during negotiations with the US -whose model provides rights
during both pre- and post-establishment stages- given India’s various restrictions to entry for foreign
capital.
8Broad asset-based definitions with open-ended lists o↵er more protection to investors than the
alternative enterprise-based definition or definitions that explicitly exclude specific assets -like portfo-
lio investment- or are accompanied by closed lists of protected assets. As arbitral tribunals interpret
the treaty, a broad definition carries the risk of bringing into the scope of the treaty elements that
were not considered to be protected at the time of the drafting (UNCTAD, 2011a, 6).
9While India was not a member of ICSID, investors could still lodge disputes either using UNCI-
TRAL or ICSID Additional Facility rules.
10According to an o cial from the Ministry of Finance, the addition of indirect expropriation was
closely related to India’s growing position as a capital exporter: “When we started signing bilateral
investment agreements, 21 out of our first 25 BIPAs were concluded with developed countries.
Subsequently, almost all of our BIPAs have been concluded with emerging countries, particularly in
Asia, Africa and South America. Therefore, in 2003, ten years after we have operated the model
text, we decided to make several modifications in our model and we introduced a side letter on
indirect expropriation. So the notion of creeping expropriation was included into the model text for
the first time in 2003.” (OECD and UNCTAD, 2010, 20)
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Commerce, 2011, 3). Regarding the post-establishment phase, BITs and investment
chapters in comprehensive agreements did not di↵er in substantial ways (Ministry
of Commerce, 2011, 4). However, di↵erences between both ministries will eventually
emerge once India starts to rethink its investment treaty policy as a result of its first
ISDS loss.
In sum, the period analyzed so far shows a treaty program designed solely for the
purpose protecting investors with little consideration for the impact of such provisions
on India’s regulatory autonomy. Moreover, the emergence of India as a sender of
investment overseas reinforced this view, as the only change to the Indian model was
presented in 2003 as an improvement on the level of protection enjoyed abroad by
Indian firms.
6.3 The first encounter with ISDS
This section examines the origins and consequences of the first ISDS claims ever
lodged against India by foreign investors. Here I show how, even after the Dabhol
cases, concerns with the potential impact of ISDS on India’s regulatory sovereignty
only emerged from a few voices outside the government, specifically from academia
and CSOs, with no impact on treaty policy. I also analyze negotiations between India
and the US for a bilateral investment treaty to show that at this point, India’s model
treaty was the more unbalanced in favor of investors than the American model, which
reflected the US’ reckoning with ISDS.
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6.3.1 Disputes emanating from the failed Dabhol Power project
India’s first ISDS experience came in 2003 and it emerged from a dispute involving
the Dabhol Power project in the state of Maharashtra.11 Dabhol was a product of
state e↵orts to grow India’s energy output by liberalizing and privatizing the sector,
hoping these new opportunities would in turn attract foreign investment. The main
investor in this project was the American firm Enron. After completion, it was to
be the largest foreign investment project in the history of the country. Dabhol’s eco-
nomic significance was matched by the level of controversy surrounding it.12. Public
opposition to the project was a major factor in the 1995 state elections and the new
Maharashtra government terminated the project. As a consequence, Enron lodged an
arbitral suit in the arbitration facilities of the London-based International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC). This was not an ISDS dispute. Enron’s access to arbitration
was not based on an international investment treaty. This was arbitration arising
from the dispute settlement provisions of the specific contract between the Dabhol
Power Corporation (DPC) -a subsidiary of Enron- and the Maharashtra State Elec-
tricity Board (MSEB) -an organ of the Maharashtra state. More importantly, unlike
in ISDS disputes, this arbitral claim was specifically against a sub-national unit -the
Maharashtra state and its electricity board- as a party in the said contract and not
against the Republic of India (Choudhary and Kulkarni, 2011, 222).
Litigation at the ICC ended in 1995 when Enron and the Maharashtra Govern-
ment agreed to renegotiate the deal. Problems eventually re-emerged during the
second phase of the project. The MSEB defaulted on the payments to DPC because
11For a detailed account of the dispute see Salacuse (2013).
12For an account of the project’s lack of transparency, human impact, threat to villagers livelihoods
and potential for environmental damage see Human Rights Watch (1999)
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demand for electricity had not grown as expected and the price of energy from Dabhol
was more than what consumers in the area were able to a↵ord(Kundra, 2008). As a
result, MSEB cancelled the contract in May 2001. Three American energy compa-
nies involved in the project -Enron, General Electric (GE) and Bechtel- had obtained
insurance against political risk from the Overseas Private Investment corporation
(OPIC), a US government agency.13 Thus, after MSEB terminated the contract they
filed insurance claims against OPIC. Enron was at the time dealing with larger prob-
lems than Dabhol (see McLean and Elkind, 2013), thus after it declared bankruptcy
in December 2001, it agreed to drop the insurance claim and transfer its full interests
in the project to OPIC in exchange for $16 million. The other two investors -Betchel
and GE- also filed insurance claims against OPIC and in 2003 each of them received
$27.5 million (Salacuse, 2013).
GE and Betchel also sued India directly, this time through ISDS, seeking $600
million in damages. Although there was no BIT between the US and India, the
American firms invoked the ISDS provisions in the the India-Mauritius BIPA through
their a liates incorporated in Mauritius.14 After they lodged their claim, a number
of European banks from the UK, The Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Austria
also sued India under various bilateral investments treaties for its failure to protect
loans they have made for the Dabhol project.15
13OPIC is a development finance institution that helps American firms enter into emerging mar-
kets by, among other services, providing coverage up to $350 million against losses resulting from
expropriation, regulatory risk, political violence and breach of contract.
14Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc. and GE Structured Finance (GESF) v. The Government of
India; Press release: Bechtel and GE File Arbitration Over Dabhol Power Company. (2003, Septem-
ber 22). Bechtel. Available at: https://www.bechtel.com/newsroom/releases/2003/09/bechtel-ge-
file-arbitration-dabhol-power-company/ (Last accessed: January 17th, 2019).
15ABN Amro N.V. v. Republic of India; ANZEF Ltd. v. Republic of India; BNP Paribas v.
Republic of India; Credit Lyonnais S.A. (now Calyon S.A.) v. Republic of India; Erste Bank Der
Oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG v. Republic of India; Standard Chartered Bank v. Republic of
India. Investment Policy Hub, UNCTAD.
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However, before these ISDS disputes advanced past the notification stage, the US
government got involved. As a result of subrogation, once OPIC paid damages to GE
and Bechtel it acquired their interests in the Dabhol project and was then allowed to
make its own claim against Indian under the 1998 Investment Incentive Agreement
between the US and India. This agreement regulated the functioning of the OPIC
political risk insurance program and was not a BIT, thus did not create legal rights
for private investors. Disputes could only emerge between the India and the US.16
After the parties filed to reach a satisfying outcome, OPIC filed for arbitration in
November 2004. This constitutes -until today- the only time the US government
has initiated an arbitral dispute against another state for claims arising from OPIC
insurance (Crook, 2005). Ultimately, the parties arrived at a settlement in 2005 which
also led GE, Bechtel and the foreign banks to drop their ISDS claims.17
The Dabhol experience raises two important points. First, there was little legal
expertise available domestically and the GoI had di culties preparing its response to
the large number of disputes. The government changed the Indian legal team that had
been representing the state and hired a UK firm which then resigned two weeks prior
to the deadline for filing the defence statement (Papa, 2012). Second, consistent with
my expectations, the US government interceded before the GoI on behalf of its firms
trying to find a solution to the dispute. Answering a question in the upper house of the
Indian Parliament in 2003, the Minister of Power recalled a visit from the US Assistant
Secretary of Energy in the previous year during which she brought up the problems
16The Agreement provides for dispute resolution mechanism for disputes between the two Gov-
ernments in relation to claims arising out of acts attributable to the governments of India or the US
involving questions of liability under public international law and includes recourse to international
arbitration.
17DABHOL POWER PROJECT (Lok Sabha Debate 16 December 2005 question no 3500). All
rights previously possessed by GE, Bechtel and the European banks were transferred to state-owned
Indian banks (Salacuse, 2013, 293).
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with the Dabhol project. According to the Minister’s recollection, Assistant Secretary
Bailey told him “there was an erosion of confidence within the US Power Business
Community about the Power Sector in India on account of certain contractual and
payment problems...The main issue relates to the Dabhol Power Project.”18 That
firms and banks dropped ISDS disputes as a result of political negotiations between
the US and India contributed to an understanding in the GoI that BITs were not a
problem per se and that any eventual disputes could be handled in the same way.19
This lends support to the bounded rationality argument since Indian policy-makers
failed to realize that the treaty provisions invoked by the energy firms and the banks
could easily be invoked by other firms in the future. In Poulsen’s terms, the Dabhol
claims did not have enough perceived impact to warrant a change in treaty policy.
Third, the dispute highlights the complicated relationship between federalism -
especially in a large democracy like India- and international investment law. The
decision to terminate the contract that gave rise to the disputes had been made by
the state government of Maharashtrat; yet the respondent in the ISDS claims was the
Republic of India. The government downplayed the extent to which India had been
put on trial before international tribunals. In a question to the Finance Minister in
the lower chamber about the potential liability that could follow from terminating
the Dabhol contract, his response was that “No liability has been incurred by the
Government of India so far on account of the Dabhol Power Company.”20 Yet the
measures taken as part of the agreement between the parties indicate the GoI was
18Rajya Sabha debate, (2003, March 12), p. 179-180.
19An Indian CSO o cial portrays the attitude of the Indian government to the issue as follows:
“Before [the first ISDS loss] it was ‘we are di↵erent, we are India, 1.2 billion people, nobody can dare
to sue us.’ That kind of thinking was there. And India [was] not very much open in the economy, in
the sense that government thought it could remain in control.” Interview with Indian CSO o cial.
20FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DABHOL (Lok Sabha Debate 19 December 2003 question no
2705). Emphasis mine.
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trying to avoid having to respond for actions of sub-national units in the future. India
enacted a new electricity law that reduced the power of states in the energy sector and
created an appellate tribunal to review decisions by state governments and energy
boards (Kundra, 2008).
6.3.2 Between Dabhol and White: negotiations with the US
The GoI signed twenty more BITs between the Dabhol settlement in 2005 and its
next ISDS claim in 2010. Durig this time, Parliament was not interested in finding
out details about how the disputes were handled. Over the years, members of either
chamber of the Parliament asked only one question about the Bechtel and GE arbitral
dispute. Indian civil society had little interest and, as a consequence, expertise on
investment treaties and ISDS. There were a few exceptions to this trend. Most no-
tably, a large development organization -Madhyam- was active on investment treaties
and developed a fair amount of expertise on the subject. This was facilitated by link-
ages with Northern CSOs. Initially, as a member of transnational campaigns against
the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) negotiated at the OECD in the late
1990s and -after MAI failed- against attempts to pursue the same agenda within the
WTO.21 Later on, as ISDS became more controversial in Europe, Madhyam developed
a partnership with the Dutch organization SOMO.
However, for the most part, Indian civil society cared about investment provisions
only insofar it would relate to intellectual property rights (IPRs) and their impact on
the capacity of Indian companies to produce generic drugs at low prices. They sent
21“[w]e were part of a larger global civil society campaign...We played a critical role in educating
the Indian government to take a firm stand on this MIA under the WTO framework.” Interview
with Indian CSO o cial. For a discussion of MAI negotiations see Chapter 4.
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letters to Indian o cials22, organized demonstrations23 and published op-eds in the
Indian media.24 This means that Indian civil society, for the most part, would only
mobilize during prospective treaty negotiations with developed countries where IPRs
tend to be more salient.
At this point, India launched BIT talks with the US. The United States was
India’s largest investment partner, representing 13% of India’s FDI.25 Although the
US was already the largest foreign investor in India, American firms were interested in
getting this treaty to improve their level of protection. The US India Business Council,
gathering 275 of the biggest American companies investing in India, had made it a
top priority for 2008 to “actively advocate” for the adoption of an investment treaty.26
It was argued that a treaty would also lead to further investment by American firms.
Speaking before the Confederation of Indian Industry and the American Chamber
of Commerce in Chennai, the Under-Secretary for International A↵airs of the US
Treasury -David McCormick- noted that concerns over “regulatory environments,
dispute settlement and investor protection in India inhibit foreign investment.”27 It
is impossible to estimate whether -and if so how much- US investment was not taking
22Letter by the President of the Delhi Network of Positive People. (2011, Decem-
ber 7). Available at: https://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/dec-
2011-letter-to-ec final pdf.pdf (Last accessed: January 22nd, 2019); Letter to Primer
Minister Singh from Medecins Sand Frontieres. (2012, February 8). Available at:
https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF assets/Access/Docs/Access Letter MSFtoIndian-
PMFTA ENG 2012.pdf (Last accessed: January 22nd, 2019)
23For example, on March 2011 3,000 people protested New Delhi against the
EU - India FTA’s impact on the supply of a↵ordable medicines. Available at:
https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/story/hivaids-eu-india-free-
trade-agreement-protest (Last accessed: January 22nd, 2019).
24Column: Why trade pacts are not working. (24 June 2013). Financial Express;
25STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES BACKGROUND NOTE ON INDIA. (2008, June 1). US Fed
News. This does not include American FDI routed into India through Mauritius.
26US, India eye bilateral investment treaty. (2008, January 10). Agence France Presse.
27UNDER SECRETARYMCCORMICK SPEAKS TO CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS-
TRY AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. (2008, April 23). US Fed News.
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place due to absence of a treaty but it was nonetheless known that some American
FDI was being re-routed through Mauritius who had a BIT in place with India.28
Each party approached the negotiation with its own template. The most problem-
atic aspect of the US model for India was that -unlike all treaties signed by India at the
time- it would regulate the treatment of investors both before and after they establish
in the country. The US insisted on providing national treatment relating to pre- and
post-investment regulations which would have meant that American firms would be
allowed to invest in the same sectors as Indian companies. India had come to great
lengths in opening up its economy but certain sectors that American companies were
interested in -like retail and insurance- retained limitations to foreign ownership.29
Since restrictions were not country of origin specific, India wanted to provide MFN
treatment, rather than national treatment, in relation to pre-establishment issues.30
Regarding ISDS, the US model BIT was more progressive than the Indian template
in terms of protecting the host state’s regulatory autonomy. The American 2004
Model BIT reflected the early US experience with ISDS in NAFTA. Its newest text
still granted investors direct access to international arbitration but reduced the scope
of ISDS and limited arbitrators’ interpretative freedom.31 India was negotiating on
the basis of its 2003 Model which had not been revised after the first ISDS disputes
coming out of Dabhol. Thus, ISDS was not a concern for India, even though a few
CSOs insisted on it. According to a representative of Madhyam, “we raised this issue
28According to an o cial from the Ministry of Finance, “[i]f we lift the veil of investments coming
from Mauritius– maybe US is our largest investor, despite the fact that we don’t have a bilateral
investment agreement so far” (OECD and UNCTAD, 2010, 21).
29Some of these restricted sectors were oil refining companies, print publishing, defence production,
courier services, the tea industry, a range of broadcasting services, retail and satellites. India risk:
Legal regulatory risk. (2008, July 28). Economist Intelligence Unit - Risk Briefing.
30US bats for easier investment norms with India. (2008, May 8). The Economic Times.
31See Chapter 4.
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with the Indian authorities. But at this time, the response was...‘Fine, you are raising
a very valid question but ‘look’, our treaties are balanced otherwise investors would
have sued us many times.’32 Although foreign investors had in fact lodged disputes
against India, that these did not moved passed initial stages had convinced Indian
o cials that whatever problems emerge between foreign investors and the GoI could
be solved through direct negotiations with no need for international tribunals weighing
in. With major disagreements regarding pre- and post-establishment provisions and
Presidential elections in the US taking place at the end of 2008, bilateral negotiations
eventually lost steam.
In sum, India’s first encounter with investment arbitration was not perceived
negatively by the Indian government who, it the end, was able to find a negotiated
solution to the dispute. For this reason, no changes were made to India’s BITs. The
GoI did not order a review of its existing treaties and, as the negotiations with the US
show, did not bring up ISDS’s impact on states ability to regulate in relation to future
BITs either. This first ISDS experience provides an opportunity to analyze India’s
response in light of the rational or bounded rational alternative explanations. The first
problem with these arguments is that it becomes di cult to a priori establish what a
response consistent with the (bounded) rational expectations would be. Indian BITs
remain unchanged but the GoI did implement changes that curbed the discretion of
state governments in the energy sector and created an instance to review decisions by
state governments and energy boards. It is unclear, then, whether this is a rational
response to a dispute arising from decisions by a state government or whether it falls
short from pure rational expectations.
32Interview with Indian CSO o cial.
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6.4 Rethinking India’s investment treaties
That not all investment disputes could be negotiated away became clear for India
in 2011. When the tribunal decided in favor of the claimant in White Industries v.
India, it set in motion a process that would result in one of the most significant events
for the international investment regime in recent years. This section examines the
origins and significance of White Industries as well as the reactions to it from within
and outside the GoI.
6.4.1 The turning point: White Industries v. India
For the single arbitral dispute that overturned India’s entire approach to international
investment treaties, almost nothing was known about this dispute as it was happen-
ing.33 Luke Peterson -a journalist specialized in investment arbitration and founder of
‘IA Reporter’34- was the one to break the story on 7 July 2011. The article noted the
secrecy surrounding the dispute calling it an “unpublicized treaty-based arbitration”
whose details “remain shrouded in some mystery.”35 As the tribunal issued its deci-
sions and both media and academic attention turned to this claim, detailed accounts
emerged of the events leading to the dispute. White Industries (hereinfater White)
was an Australian mining firm. Its operations in India began in 1989 when in entered
into a join-venture with a domestic firm -Coal India Ltd.- to develop a coal mine in
33A search in the three largest news databases -Factiva, Nexis Uni and ProQuest Global
Newsstream- shows no record of the dispute taking place until 1 August 2011, that is three months
before the final award.
34The ‘Investment Arbitration Reporter’ is a news and analysis service founded in 2008. It is
regarded in the investment arbitration field as a thorough source of information about new and
ongoing disputes.
35India sued by foreign investor for investment treaty breac; complaint stems from willingness
of indian courts to consider set-aside of an earlier commercial arbitration ruling. (2011, July 7).
Investment Arbitration Reporter.
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Piparwar, Eastern India. According to the contract, White would provide the equip-
ment and technical services and was to be paid approximately A$206.6 million plus
or minus various bonuses and penalties, for example in case production exceeded or
fell short from the agreed upon targets. The contract also contained an international
commercial arbitration clause in case of a dispute arose between the partners.36
This was, up to the time, the largest investment ever made by an Australian com-
pany in India and both governments had been involved in seeing it through, especially
on the Australian side. It was the Australian Trade Commission who had loaned Coal
India the funds to import the Australian-made technology.37 Disagreements eventu-
ally emerged between the partners over who deserved bonuses and penalties. In the
late 1990s, Coal India withheld funds from White arguing the quality of the coal did
not meet the standard established by the contract. To recover this money, White
filed for arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 28 June
1999 and in 27 May 2002 the tribunal decided that White was entitled to A$4.08
million. Stemming from a contract between two firms, the dispute had been managed
privately with no participation from the GoI. However, this changed later in the year
when White sought to enforce the ICC award in Indian courts and Coal India applied
to the High Court of India to get the award set aside. By December 2009, seven years
after the ICC award, the issue was still tied up in the courts. White sent a letter to
the GoI arguing that Coal India’s actions and the way in which domestic courts have
handled the issue amounted to a breach of several provisions of the Australia-India
BIT. Initially, in accordance with article 12.1 of the BIT, White attempted to solve
the dispute amicably and sent a second letter on 30 March 2010 seeking negotiations.
36White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30
November 2011), p.16.
37Ibid., p.14.
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The GoI did not respond to either of these letters. Moreover, by June 2010, White’s
lawyers in India informed the firm that their claim was number 93 on the list of issues
to be addressed by India’s Supreme Court. There was no date or estimate of when
the claim would be heard.38 With no resolution in sight, White filed an ISDS suit
against India in 27 July 2010.
The tribunal published its final award in November 2011. The panel did not agree
with White in that court delays constituted a denial of justice. While it recognized
the duration of domestic proceedings was “unsatisfactory in terms of e cient admin-
istration of justice,” it saw no bad faith on behalf of Indian courts and considered to
be relevant that “India is a developing country with a population of over 1.2 billion
people with a seriously overstretched judiciary.”39 Yet, the tribunal did find that
the delay showed India did not provide White with ‘e↵ective means’ of asserting its
claim and enforcing its rights. Although the Australia-India BIT did not include an
‘e↵ective means’ provision, article 4.2 provided for the MFN standard.40 This allowed
White to invoke the ‘e↵ective means’ standard that was provided for in the India-
Kuwait BIT and to argue that, by not providing such a standard, India had violated
the MFN clause in the applicable treaty. The Tribunal agreed with the reasoning and
awarded White A$4 million in addition to approximately $600 thousand towards the
costs of the proceedings and legal counsel. India was not happy with the use of an
MFN clause to import provisions that were not included in the treaty. Indian o cials
argued “[t]he award is an interesting read as one wonders on which exact clause in
the India-Australia BIT did the tribunal rely.”41
38Ibid., p.25.
39Ibid., p.103-5.
40“A Contracting Party shall at all times treat investments in its own territory on a basis no less
favourable than that accorded to investments of investors of any third country.”
41Department of Economic A↵airs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Transforming
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The significance of this outcome does not come from the size of the award, which
is actually relatively low for ISDS disputes. Rather, more important was the fact
that this was not a dispute arising from an extraordinary event.42 It was the slow
speed with which cases progressed in the Indian judiciary. That meant that the tri-
bunals decision could inspire other investors who found themselves in the middle of
protracted legal disputes to seek a way out via ISDS. Thus, following the decision
in White Industries, arbitration notices started to proliferate. After the Supreme
Court of India cancelled 122 telecommunication licenses over grounds that state o -
cials committed irregularities when they granted them, foreign companies that were
operating under those licences started arbitration proceedings against India under
BIPAs with Germany, Russia, Singapore and Mauritius.43 A British hedge fund that
held 2% of shares in Coal India sent the GoI a formal notice of a dispute under the
India-UK BIT because of a dispute over energy prices.44 As did so the mobile com-
munications giant Vodafone, challenging the legality of a retroactive tax under the
India-Netherlands BIT.45 Many of these disputes, however, did not progress beyond
the International Investment Agreement Regime: The Indian Experience (Presentation at UNC-
TAD Expert Meeting, 25 February 2015), Available at: unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/India side-event-Wednesday model-agreements.pdf (Last accessed: Jan-
uary 23rd, 2019)
42Unlike, for example, the ‘Argentina cases’ that emerged out of the emergency measures taken
during 2001 economic crisis. See Chapter 5.
43Firms from the US and the UAE were major shareholders in the Mauritius-based firms that
initiating disputes. AS DUST SETTLES ON ADVERSE ARBITRATION RULING AGAINST IN-
DIA, A RUSSIAN INVESTOR PUTS INDIA ON NOTICE OF A TREATY CLAIM. (2012, Febru-
ary 28). Investment Arbitration Reporter; WITH INVESTMENT ARBITRATION THREATS
MOUNTING, INDIA TAKES A DECISION AS TO WHETHER IT WILL COMPLY WITH UN-
FAVOURABLE BIT AWARD. (2012, July 26). Investment Arbitration Reporter; DEUTSCHE
TELEKOM MAKES GOOD ON THREAT AND SUES INDIA OVER SATELLITE; REPLACE-
MENT ARBITRATOR IS NAMED IN CC/DEVAS CASE. (2013, October 22). Investment Arbi-
tration Reporter
44ARBITRATION THREATS CONTINUE TO MOUNT IN AFTERMATH OF FIRST SUC-
CESSFUL TREATY CLAIM AGAINST INDIA. (2012, March 28). Investment Arbitration Re-
porter.
45In a decision heavily criticized by organizations representing foreign investors in India, the
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initial notifications as the GoI embarked on conciliatory talks with the a↵ected firms
in an attempt to avoid reaching the arbitration stage (Karadelis, 2013).
6.4.2 Reactions to White Industries
One outcome from the dispute was that the media started to pay a lot more attention
to investment treaties. Articles proliferated explaining what BITs are, quoting aca-
demics and CSOs from Europe, Canada and the US and referencing the experience of
others countries with ISDS disputes.46 Unlike it had been the case with White, the
leading up to new ISDS claims, specially the one involving Vodafone, was reported
in detail. Civil society organizations also mobilized more intensely. After the White
verdict and with a series of new claims mounting, CSOs were now talking about a
real danger, not a hypothetical scenario or a bad outcome that happened to others
but would not happened to India. According to one organizer, “even before [White]
we organized workshops...we would not then discuss an Indian case because there
was no Indian case to discuss so we used to discussed international arbitration cases.
After 2012...there was a lot of evidence that was particularly related to India and
that helped our campaign...people could relate and say ‘ok, this could also happen to
us.’47 In June 2012, a collective of CSOs sent a letter to Prime Minister Singh raising
GoI imposed a retroactive tax on Vodafone’s acquisition of an Indian mobile phone business five
years before. WIRE REPORTS: NEW ARBITRATIONS LOOM FOR ALGERIA, INDIA AND
ARGENTINA. (2012, April 19). Investment Arbitration Reporter; Vodafone demands justice in tax
dispute. (2012, April 17). The Times.
46For example, see: Revisiting India’s bilateral treaties. (2012, February 23). Financial Express;
Bilateral investment pacts: How MNCs sue governments to secure their investments. (2012, April
7). The Economic Times; Investment deals that BITe Business Line. (2012, April 23). The Hindu;
Treaties that gave away the store. (2012, April 27). The Hindu; Taking notice of investment treaties.
(2012, June 14). Business Standard; Column: BIT of a problem. (2012, June 29). Financial Express;
Need to align bilateral investment treaty regime with global reality. (2013, Jauary 7). The Hindu.
47Interview with Indian CSO o cial.
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their “concerns based on how the already existing [treaties] and their enforcement
through Investor-state mechanism already undermine the domestic policy space and
the justice system in our country” and citing the ongoing disputes with Vodafone
over taxes, with a British hedge fund over coal price regulations, and with telecom
companies over a Supreme Court decision. CSOs requested the GoI to turn its at-
tention to the “urgent task of re-examining the existing BITs signed in the 90’s with
the objective of [assessing] available options for India to re-assert the domestic policy
space”48 (Last accessed: January 25th, 2019) However, as I show in the next section,
at this point the GoI had already ordered such a review process.
Parliament also started to discuss investment treaties and investment arbitration
more frequently after White, although except for the MPs from the Communist Party
of India, there were no expressions of concern or demands for policy changes.49 For
example, MPs asked various questions regarding the status of negotiations with the
EU for a comprehensive agreement but they did not raise the issue of how to assure
investor protections would not infringe on India’s regulatory space. The only excep-
tion being the Communist Party, whose general secretary wrote an op-ed about the
EU treaty warning “[t]he investment protection provisions proposed would render any
future regulation or law adopted in India susceptible to international arbitration if
a foreign company perceives it to be infringing on its interests.”50 MPs asked on a
few occasions about new disputes and how was the government handling them but
48‘Concerns Regarding Proposed US-India Bilateral Investment Treaty’, Letter to the
Prime Minister of India from Manmohan Singh (2012, June 13). Available at:
https://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/civil-society-letter-on-us-india-bit.pdf
49MP Rajeeve from Kerala said of the White case, “It is very shocking that investors can sue the
Government of India under a bilateral treaty,” and criticized the executive for its silence regarding
the dispute: “The Government is not ready to make any public statement on this issue.” Finally he
urged “upon the Government to revisit all the bilateral treaties.” PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,
RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 22 May, 2012, Vol. 225, No.35, p. 275
50A treaty for the rich. (2012, May 25). Morning Star Online.
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they were not discussed during open debates. When asked specifically about new
disputes, the GoI recognized it had received notices from several investors.51 But the
Government was also minimizing the risk of reaching a stage of arbitral disputes.52
The reaction from the Law Commission of India (LCI) is worth noting given the
role the Commission would play in moderating the 2015 draft model BIT. The Law
Commission of India is a public institution that is part of the Ministry of Law and
Justice. However, members are appointed on the basis of their legal expertise, not
their partisanship. Commissioners tend to be former judges and legal scholars and
they serve for three-year periods, during which they focus on di↵erent thematic areas
and propose legal reforms. The government can direct which areas the LCI should
work on during each term by giving it a specific mandate, but the Commission can also
take on any issue it considers relevant and make recommendations to the government.
In 2014, the LCI published a report on a proposal from the Ministry to amend the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. In its recommendations, the Commission
recognizes the validity of White’s claims. “The award of the Arbitral Tribunal,” the
report notes, “serves as a reminder to the Government to urgently implement reforms
to the judicial system in order to avoid substantial potential liabilities that might
accrue from the delays presently inherent in the system.” (2014, 18). Thus, the view
of the Commission appears to be that India’s problems with investment arbitration
are not solely a product of the terms of treaties and the workings of ISDS. Rather, the
51Cabinet members mentioned these were now being handled by an “Inter-Ministerial Group
(IMG)...constituted ...to evolve a coordinated response of the Government to the legal notices to
Government from foreign investors.” PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL
REPORT, 30 November, 2012, Vol. 227, No.6, p. 129.
52“The notices are handled under the provisions of the applicable BIPAs, including, inter-alia,
through negotiations with the foreign investors for an amicable settlement of the issues.” PARLIA-
MENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 22 August, 2012, Vol. 226, No.8,
p. 72.
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report indicates that had White not experienced judicial delays, the dispute would
have not existed in the first place. This is a very di↵erent assessment than what was
emanating from other sectors within and outside the government and it foreshadows
the moderate position the Law Commission will take in its assessment of the 2015
draft model BIT.
6.5 The review process
This section traces the di↵erent positions of government ministries during the review
of India’s investment treaty policy. The two main actors in this process were the
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) in the Ministry of Commerce
& Industry and the Department of Economic A↵airs (DEA) within the Ministry of
Finance. These were the two ministries responsible for negotiating India’s investment
obligations under international law, respectively under BITs and FTAs
The first indication that the government was undergoing a review of India’s in-
vestment treaties can be found in an internal paper prepared by the DIPP in 2011.53
The paper mentions a proposal to revise the model text from the DEA who had circu-
lated a version for comments.(Ministry of Commerce, 2011, 7) Later reports confirm a
revision process was in motion.54 The plan was to proceed in stages: first, all ongoing
negotiations would be put on hold.55 Meanwhile, an inter-ministerial group coordi-
53The paper is not publicly available but an Indian CSO requested through the Right to Informa-
tion Act. It is not dated but it is understood to have been produced in 2011 (Ranjan, 2014).
54The Secretary of Commerce (MCI) said in April 2012 “[r]ight now the entire process is in the
preliminary stage and it will be premature to say more on the issue.” India to Revisit Investment
Pacts to Keep Vodafone-Like Cases at Bay. (2012, April 26). The Economic Times.
55GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, LOK SABHA, UNSTARRED QUES-
TION NO: 4322, ANSWERED ON: 22.03.2013. The only treaty signed during the entire review
process was a BIT with the UAE. The conclusion of this treaty had been holding up the largest
ever foreign investment in the Indian aviation industry involving the purchase of 24% of India’s Jet
6.5. The review process 328
nated by the DEA would review existing treaties and put together a new draft model
text.56 The draft would then be submitted for public consultations. After receiving
feedback, changes would potentially be made to the draft, resulting in a new Indian
model treaty.
Even before the White dispute became publicly known, there were disparities be-
tween DIPP and DEA’s views regarding investment treaties. DIPP seemed more
attuned with ISDS developments elsewhere and with critical work coming out of
UNCTAD and international CSOs. Di↵erently, DEA did not show much concerns
with potential arbitral disputes. After the GoI lost the case, DEA’s position became
much closer to that of DIPP. Both agencies were highly critical of BITs and of invest-
ment arbitration but there were still significant di↵erences around three main points.
First, whether investment treaties were necessary in the first place. Second, if India
was going to sign treaties, whether it should provide for ISDS. And third, how to go
about modernizing India’s stock of old treaties.
In October 2010, only three months after White had filed for arbitration, the
head of the DIPP gave the inaugural speech at a forum for international investment
treaty negotiators organized by the International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment (IISD).57 During his remarks, he posed two questions for the forum: “Should
developing countries enter into agreements on investment at all?” and “To what ex-
tent have these agreements achieved the intended benefits?”58 He also referenced a
Airways company by Etihad. FDI-hungry govt defers bilateral treaties review. (2013, March 21).
Financial Express.
56India to Relook 82 Investment Treaties. (2013, April 5). The Economic Times - Bangalore
Edition.
57The Canada and Switzerland-based IISD is one of the largest organizations working on IIA
reform. It organizes annual encounters of state o cials from Developing Countries working on
Investment treaties. Available at: https://www.iisd.org/story/annual-forum-developing-country-
investment-negotiators/ (Last accessed: January 23th, 2019)
58Inaugural Address, Mr. R.P. Singh, Secretary, Department of Indus-
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newly lodged dispute between Uruguay and Philip Morris.59 He noted,
“This case has important repercussions for many developing countries, as
it has brought to fore the ability of large corporations from developed
countries to take advantage of investor protections that are available un-
der trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties. It highlights the
limitations on policy space that countries may be entering into through
these treaties, without full awareness of the implications”60
In December, the OECD and UNCTAD organized a symposium on international
investment treaties in Paris. This time India was represented by a Secretary from
the DEA whose views contrasted with those expressed three months earlier by the
DIPP. The DEA o cial noted that “[s]o far, we had very little–I would say neg-
ligible exposure to international arbitration. But this is now widely believed that
sooner or later, we may also face the heat of international arbitration.” (OECD and
UNCTAD, 2010, 19). Yet there was no acknowledgement of any constraining e↵ects
these treaties might have on host sates’ policy space, only a mention of the need
to achieve “predictability and consistency” in arbitral awards (p. 22). In fact, the
o cial said that when trying to negotiate with developed counties, especially the US
and Canada, di culties came from their insistence on provisions related to labor and
the environment and non-party submission before arbitral tribunals (p. 22). These
provisions, which were a consequence of the American and Canadian experience in
trial Policy & Promotion. IV Annual Forum for Developing Country Invest-
ment Negotiators. New Delhi, October 27, 2010. P.1-2. Available at:
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/dci2010inauguraladdress.pdf(Lastaccessed :
January23th, 2019)
59In a now infamous arbitral claim, Philip Morris argued that restrictions to branding on cigarette
packaging amounted to expropriation of its intellectual property and a violation of the Uruguay-
Switzerland BIT.
60Ibid., p. 4.
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NAFTA, were much more moderate than what India will include in its own model
later on. Moreover, the DEA still recognized the value of BITs for boosting foreign
investors’ confidence. In relation to a treaty with the US, he said “investors will defi-
nitely feel more comfortable if the legal framework of investment agreement is there”
(21). Unlike the DIPP o cial’s remarks, the representative of DEA also talked about
India’s mixed status as both a receiver and sender of FDI: “This is the background
against which our model text progressed...We are now having outward investment
which is as important as inward” (20). From this position, India has competing inter-
ests; to protect its right to regulate but also to provide strong investment protections
for its companies. Unlike DEA, DIPP had was not concerned with India’s interests
regarding BITs as an FDI exporter.
In 2011, the DIPP produced an internal paper on international investment agree-
ments that would inform its position during the review process. The views of DIPP’s
o cials appeared to have been influenced by their participation in the IISD Forum.
The paper cites presentations made at the Forum by o cials from other countries
and by international CSOs. The work of UNCTAD’s Investment division and other
governments’ experiences with investment arbitration -i.e. South Africa and Latin
American states- also impacted the thinking of the DIPP (2019, 276). Both of these
elements figure prominently in the internal paper.
The document begins by establishing -as the paper labels it- the “traditional
theology” regarding investment agreements: they reassure foreign investors they will
not be subject to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment; they are “the only e↵ective
way to address the ‘dynamic inconsistency problem;’61 and they are “essential to
61The paper defines the theoretical concept of dynamic inconsistency problem as the situation
when “a state, is incentivized to change the rules to extract greater benefits (including expropriation)
after the relatively immobile investment has been made by the foreign investor.” (Ministry of
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promote and protect foreign investment” (Ministry of Commerce, 2011, 4). It then
goes on to debunk this theology by referencing a number of studies by academics
and international organizations that find no evidence of a link between investment
treaties and increased FDI inflows. Similarly, it mentions the fact that while India
has no treaty with the US, American firms are the third largest foreign investor. The
paper notes similar outcomes in South Africa and Brazil (6). The examples of South
Africa -who had put all its negotiations on hold- and Brazil -who had never ratified
any of the treaties containing ISDS it had signed- figure prominently throughout the
paper.62 Providing a definite answer to the questions posed by DIPP during the
IISD forum, the paper asserts, then, treaties “are neither necessary nor su cient for
promoting FDI” (5).
The paper goes on to identify what are ‘areas of concern’ in Indian treaties:
the definition of investment, Fair and Equitable treatment, expropriation provisions,
reservations and exceptions, conflicts with domestic laws and ISDS.63 For each of
these topics, the paper discusses the intended purposes of such provisions as well as
the ways in which they can lead to undesired outcomes. In doing so, it provides ex-
amples from Indian or other treaties and from ISDS disputes against other states. For
each topic, the paper delineates ‘worst case scenarios’ for India per its exiting treaties
and provides recommendations for how to better draft them. For example, regarding
expropriation provisions, the paper recognized that while including a clause on expro-
priation without adequate compensation is ‘de rigueur’ for investment agreements,
Commerce, 2011, 4).
62There are indications the DIPP sought out information from its Brazilian colleagues. The paper
cites a consultation with Brazil’s chief negotiator from the Ministry of Foreign A↵airs as a source
(19).
63Interestingly, the paper does not find the most favored nation provision to be of concern. After
White, MFN will become a toxic provision for India.
6.5. The review process 332
it could nonetheless trump legitimate policy objectives. Thus, expropriation clauses
should “include carve outs for legitimate implementation of state policy trough reg-
ulation.”64 The paper notes that -unlike the existing Indian model treaty- many
countries do include such carve outs in their templates and names US and Canadian
model BITs as examples.65 Given the lack of protection that Indian treaties o↵er to
its regulatory sovereignty, the worst case scenario describes the GoI issuing a com-
pulsory licence66 of a drug whose patent belongs to a foreign company. In this case,
the patent holder could file an ISDS dispute claiming indirect expropriation of its
intellectual property (11-2).
The paper devotes an entire section to the “Perverse Incentives in Investor State
Disputes Settlement (ISDS).” Data on India’s record of ISDS disputes at the time
came from UNCTAD’s database, which shows the DIPP had no direct information
on this matter (16). All the listed cases are related to the Dabhol project, suggesting
the DIPP was not aware of the ongoing White dispute. The paper decries the lack of
impartiality and objectivity on behalf of arbitrators who are members of a ‘closed club’
and appoint each other to tribunals thus leading to a ‘revolving-door arrangement’ and
to double-hatting, that is, “where an arbitrator in one case represents and investor
against the same state in another arbitration” (17). Finally, the paper does not
recommend a single policy course regarding the existing treaties, that is, renegotiation
v. unilateral termination. Rather, it encourages the GoI to first decide whether
investment treaties are needed in the first place. The DIPP’s view was that they
64As the paper explains, “This will ensure that such actions are not deemed to be indirect expro-
priation and thus do not carry the liability to pay compensation” (11).
65The suggested carve outs included: regulations for the protection of public health, safety and
the environment, compulsory licences and government actions that could lead to defaulting on the
debt of a foreign investor (11).
66Compulsory licenses are state authorizations enabling a third party to make, use, or sell a
patented product without the consent of the patent holder.
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were not. That is, the Department wanted India to exit the investment regime. But
if India decided to continue entering into BITs, then it recognized that it was necessary
to develop a new model treaty that better protects policy goals like security, public
health and environment protections and to renegotiate existing BITs to amend the
‘vulnerable’ clauses the paper identifies (21). The view from DIPP was that India
should try to recover as much of its lost legal autonomy as possible from a deeply
flawed regime.
Di↵erently, DEA never considered the possibility of foregoing BITs. Nonetheless,
they expressed concerns with the current situation:
“We believe in e cacy of bilateral investment protection agreements. We
want such international agreements,” said the Minister of Finance, “[b]ut
we want to guard against [them being] ingeniously interpreted to enlarge
the jurisdiction of international arbitrations. And you would agree with
me that there are numerous cases of jurisdiction hopping and jurisdiction
shopping in international arbitration today.”67
In fact, as the Commerce paper notes, Finance kicked o↵ the review process with a
proposal for a new template already on the table. Thus the DIPP’s goal was then to
influence the new template as much as possible.68 In terms of a new model, the main
discrepancy between DIPP and DEA was regarding ISDS.69 The DIPP wanted future
67Intl arbitration is hijacking domestic judicial system: FM. (11 October 2013). Business Stan-
dard.
68According to the Secretary of Commerce “Both the commerce department and the department
of industrial policy & promotion are looking at existing investment treaties to see if there are any
provisions which are di cult in terms of causing us problems later on or leading us to disputes.”
India to Revisit Investment Pacts to Keep Vodafone-Like Cases at Bay. (2012, April 26). The
Economic Times.
69In a 2016 contribution to an edited volume, DEA o cials acknowledged the early rift between
those pushing for the abandonment of ISDS and those arguing that enforceable treaties improve the
institutional environment for investors (Garg et al., 2016, 71-2).
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investments treaties to exclude investors’ access to arbitration while the DEA wanted
to keep it, although in a revised form. When an MP asked the Minister of Finance
whether “Government has decided to erase a key clause in bilateral investment treaties
that allows for international arbitration,” the answer was a a plain “No, Sir.”70.
Similar to the competing incentives facing the US, which were not present in
Ecuador, DEA was balancing its interest in protecting India’s regulatory autonomy
with the protection of a growing number of Indian companies investing abroad. “With
the growing clout of Indian companies investing in countries around the world, in-
cluding the less stable countries in the African and South American regions, we are
not in favour of reviewing this clause,” said a DEA o cial,71 In spite of Finance’s
stand, Commerce & Industry had already started to make moves to exclude ISDS
from the agreements it had authority over. Regarding investment chapters within
FTAs, Commerce was taking “a two-level approach on the issue of the dispute reso-
lution clause in these treaties,” that is, ISDS provisions. The approach di↵erentiated
between FTAs in force and FTAs that had not been signed yet. For those in force, the
GoI would ask its partners -and it is reported to have made that request to Singapore-
to amend dispute resolution clauses to only allow domestic courts to hear eventual
claims. Those agreements on the pipeline would have their provisions revised so that
ISDS is excluded.72
A third area of disagreement was what to do about the old treaties. The DIPP
-backed by the ministries of coal and telecommunications-73 wanted to terminate all
70PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 15 May, 2012, Vol.
225, No.3, p. 125
71India may exclude clause on lawsuits from trade pacts. (2012, January 29). Live Mint.
72India seeks treaty revisions to deal with corporate suits. (2012, April 4). Financial Express.
73Unsurprisingly, since the two most controversial ISDS suits against India emerged from those
two sectors.
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existing treaties. “They should be revoked at the earliest,” DIPP o cials said. The
DEA preferred to seek the consent of India’s partners to a renegotiation, rather than
forcing it by unilaterally terminating treaties.74 Given the incompatibility between
statements and actions from di↵erent GoI units, there was confusion about the fate
of India’s treaties. Moreover, during the first years of the review process the coalition
supporting the government was weak. Small parties weighed considerable influence
under the threat of leaving the coalition and bringing down the government. With
the formation of a new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government under Narendra
Modi in May 2014, a definite policy will eventually emerge.
6.6 The adoption of the new model BIT
This section examines the first product of the multi-year review process explained
before: the new model BIT. I first explain how the arrival of the Modi government
impacted the policy-making process. The new government did not bring a new vi-
sion for India’s BIT policy; if anything, the BJP government was more focused on
attracting FDI than its predecessors. As I have shown so far, critical views have
been present in India for years. The arrival of Modi mattered mostly becasue -due
to its pro-business orientation and its strong mandate- foreign firms saw it as an
opportunity to use ISDS disputes to gain leverage with the new government. This
new wave of disputes, however, confirmed views entrenched in the Indian bureaucracy
that BITs were seriously flawed. In less than a year, the GoI prepared a draft model
BIT that was released to the public so that interested sectors could make comments
74Ministries for scrapping of bilateral investment pacts. (2014, July 14). Financial Express; Fixing
BIPAs. (2014, August 1). India Business Journal; Finance ministry to move Cabinet for clearing
new BIPA text. (2014, June 25). The Times of India.
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and recommendations. A few months later, a final model was approved. In the rest
of this section I examine the most salient characteristics of the draft model, trace
the wide variety of reactions to it and gauge the extent to which those views were
incorporated in the final model.
6.6.1 The Modi government and a new wave of disputes
The BJP campaign made a big theme of encouraging FDI, employing slogans like
‘Red carpet, not red tape’ in relation to bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles to
setting up foreign investments.75 Early on in his term, Modi launched the ‘Make in
India’ program, which allowed 100% FDI in 22 new sectors.76 Unlike Rafel Correa in
Ecuador, Modi did not make an issue of BITs and ISDS disputes during his campaign.
In general, he paid little attention to international politics and institutions (Ganguly,
2017). Reports from the aftermath of the election suggest the pro-investment tone
of the campaign was taken as a sign that the new government would “not likely to
send foreign investors negative signals by threatening to withdraw or weaken BIPA
protections.”77 Thus, given the BJP’s friendly attitude towards FDI, it could have
been expected that the new government would have settled for neither the exit policy
recommended by the DIPP or the more revisionist policy preferred by the DEA and
would have put in place a much tenuous reformist policy instead. Furthermore, Modi
was considered to have received a strong mandate in the election, with the BJP
winning the highest number of seats by any party on its own since 1984. With this
75Red Carpet, Not Red Tape. May 10, 2014. Available at: https://www.narendramodi.in/red-
carpet-not-red-tape-3160 (Last accessed: January 31th, 2019).
76Make in India. Governemnt of India. Available at: http://www.makeinindia.com/home (Last
accessed: January 31st, 2019).
77Indian government unlikely to weaken investment treaty protection for foreign investors. (18
June 2014). IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis.
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amount of political capital, Modi could have imposed an alternative to the already
set preferences of the bureaucracies.
This was precisely the view of a large number of foreign firms who saw the ar-
rival of Modi as an opportunity to make their own issues a priority for the incoming
government. As mentioned before, many foreign firms had notified the GoI about
the possibility of arbitration if specific policies and regulations remained in place.
The most notorious of these polices was the imposition of retroactive taxes. This
had started as a conflict specifically with Vodafone but after the previous Congress
retroactively amended the Income Tax Act so that it would apply to o↵-shore trans-
actions, it became a thorny issue with other firms as well.78 The measure was heavily
criticized in India, including by the BJP then in the opposition. In its election man-
ifesto the BJP had criticized the tax policies as ‘tax terrorism’ and had promised a
solution to the disputes.79
Assuming the new government would find a solution to these problems if pressed,
Vodafone formally filed the long-threatened arbitral claim against India under the
India-Netherlands BIT.80 It did so only days before the o cial electoral victory of
the BJP was to be announced. According to a London-based arbitration lawyer
representing another investor a↵ected by the retroactive tax, “the rationale for the
78In December 2006, the Dutch Vodafone subsidiary acquired 67% interests in an Indian company
(Hutchison Essar Ltd) from its parent firm, which was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, for $11
billion. The Indian tax authority considered that Vodafone had to pay capital gains tax on the
transaction amounting to $2.2 billion. Vodafone disagreed, claiming the transaction involved two
foreign firms, and brought the issue to Indian courts. The Supreme Court of India held that Vodafone
did not owe any tax to the Indian government because the Income Tax Act, as it stood then, did not
apply to those kinds of transactions. Right after the Supreme Court decision, the GoI introduced a
bill in Congress to amend the Income Tax Act to clearly say that the type of o↵-shore transaction
that Vodafone had made was taxable. Moreover, the amendment would apply retroactively to the
date which the Indian Income tax had been enacted, that is, 1 April 1962 (Ranjan, 2019).
79Full text: BJP manifesto for 2014 Lok Sabha elections. (7 April 2014). News 18.
80Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Government of India [I], PCA Case No. 2016-35.
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likes of Vodafone was ’nobody can settle this case and walk away from this tax except,
maybe, a very strong prime minister who was representing a new party, with a strong
power base and political capital at the beginning of his premiership.’ That is the
rationale, not just in tax but in other areas. ‘Maybe he can settle them so I should
start a BIT claim in order to give him something to settle.”’81 A few days later, the
Finnish firm Nokia announced its intention to file a similar claim under the Finland-
India BIT.82 More claims followed in the coming months.
It turned out that the assessment of the foreign firms was wrong. The government
did not roll back the o↵ending policies and the claims were not settled.83 This influx
of new cases gave salience to the voices within the Indian bureaucracy that had been
working on thus issue for years. Under Modi, the review process continued with the
same format. The work was managed by an inter-ministerial body housed within
the Finance Ministry.84 Under the chairmanship of the DEA, representatives from
the Commerce & Industry, Coal, Telecommunications, Revenue and Law & Justice
ministries would prepare a draft for a new model treaty.85 The GoI enlisted the help of
legal experts from abroad, including the Columbia Centre for Sustainable Investment,
Victoria University, National University of Singapore, IISD and UNCTAD.86 But at
the same time, local CSOs and academics criticized the entire review process for a
lack of transparency.87 The group completed its task in September 2014 and the
81Interview XXIV.
82Nokia invokes treaty in Indian tax battle. (14 May 2014). Global Arbitration Review.
83Vodafone claim still on after India rules out tax law change. (15 July 2014). Global Arbitration
Review. Most of these claims are now arriving to the hearing stages.
84Bilateral trade agreements: Foreign investors may not be treated on a par with locals. (2015,
July 27). The Economic Times.
852391, UNSTARRED QUESTION, 25.07.2014, FINANCE, Panda Shri Baijayant Jay.
86New BIT text introduces ‘obligation against graft.’ (2014, December 16). Financial Express.
87Column: Make BIT reviews transparent. (2014, May 29). Financial Express; Decoding India’s
New Model BIT (I). (2015, May 11). Madhyam.org.in.
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DEA sent the new draft to the Committee of Secretaries for approval (Department
of Economic A↵airs, Government of India, 2015, 31) By December, the Committee
of Secretaries had approved it and forwarded it to the Cabinet. Up to this point, the
DIPP kept insisting on foregoing investment treaties altogether. The DEA attached
to the draft a note with the DIPP’s recommendation.88 The Cabinet, however, was
not going to approve the draft yet. First, it would submit it to public consultations
to receive feedback from investors, experts and CSOs. To this end, the MF unveiled
the new draft model on 24 March 2015 and invited public comments to be submitted
online.89
6.6.2 Characteristics of the draft model treaty
The new draft was a radical departure from the previous model. The spirit of the
text is captured in one paragraph:
“This Treaty shall be interpreted in the context of the high level of defer-
ence that international law accords to States with regard to their devel-
opment and implementation of domestic policies.”90
While the GoI would insist the draft strikes a balance between investor protection
and state regulatory autonomy; many commentators disagreed. It “tightens the reins
so much,” one commentary said, “that it loses its identity as an investor protection
treaty” (Rai et al., 2015, 8). While the draft di↵ered from its predecessor in multiple
88India to Revise Text for Bilateral Investment Treaty. (2014, December 16). The Economic
Times - Bangalore Edition.
89Draft Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Text. Available at:
https://www.mygov.in/group-issue/draft-indian-model-bilateral-investment-treaty-text/ (Last
accessed: January 31st, 2019).
90Draft Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty [hereinafter, Draft Indian Model
Treaty], Art. 14.9 (i).
6.6. The adoption of the new model BIT 340
ways, there are seven elements that deserve attention. From here onward, I use the
term ‘draft’ to refer to the draft model treaty published in May 2015 and the term
’final model’ to refer to the final treaty template approved in December 2015.
1. Definition of investment: the draft abandoned the open-ended, asset-based
definition included in the previous model for an enterprise-based definition of in-
vestment.91 Open-ended asset-based definitions o↵er a maximum of investment
protection because the treaty individually protects specific assets, for example
shares or claims to money, rather than all of them together (UNCTAD, 2011a,
113). This can lead to a proliferation of claims, for example, by individual
shareholders or by banks that were only tied to an investment as financiers.
The enterprise-based definition included in the draft seeks to minimize the risk
of claims by limiting protection to investors that have ‘real and substantial
business operations’ in India and are under ‘control’ of foreign investors. Look-
ing to maximize precision, rather than leave it to arbitrators to determine, the
draft provided an exhaustive list elements that constitute ‘real and substan-
tial business operations’, for example having made a substantial contribution
to the development of the Host State including the transfer of technological
know-how. But it also included a list that excludes certain types of business
operations that are not ‘real and substantial’, for example the passive holding
of stock or land. The draft also defined ’control’ as the ability of the investor to
appoint senior management in the company. The definition of foreign ownership
was also geared towards limiting the scope of the treaty, defining the termed
’owned’ as more than 50% of the enterprise’s capital. This limitation is all the
91Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 1
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more significant given that India still maintained 49% caps to foreign ownership
in some sectors.
2. Scope of the treaty: The extent to which this draft is a direct reaction to the
ISDS claims brought against India is evident in the exclusion of taxes from the
substantive scope of the treaty. As mentioned before, the retroactive imposition
of taxes gave way to a series of arbitral disputes. Furthermore, the draft made
this issue non-reviewable. That is, in any dispute in which India claims that
the actions being challenged by an investor are a matter of taxation policy, the
tribunal would not be able to question the host state’s decision.92 The draft
also put the issuance of compulsory licenses in relation to intellectual property
rights outside the scope of the treaty.93
3. Standards of treatment: The draft does away with two traditional stan-
dards of treatment in international investment law; fair and equitable treatment
(FET) and most favored nation (MFN) treatment. FET provisions appear in
most BITs, often with very little guidance as to what constitute fair and eq-
uitable treatment of investors.94 Tribunals have interpreted in multiple and
inconsistent ways, making FET breaches the most commonly found breach in
ISDS jurisprudence (see Picherack, 2008). The draft does not included an FET
clause and instead provides a guarantee not to subject investors to “denial of
justice under customary international law”, “un-remedied and egregious viola-
tions of due process”, or “manifestly abusive treatment involving continuous,
922015 Draft Indian Model BIT, art. 2.6 (iv).
93Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 2.6 (v).
94Only 126 out of 2571 BITs mapped by UNCTAD do not contain an FET provision. UNCTAD,
IIA Mapping Project.
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unjustified and outrageous coercion or harassment.”95 These standards set a
higher threshold for a treaty breach than the traditional FET standard. It is
even interesting to think what kind of coercion or harassment would an arbitral
tribunal not consider unjustified.
In addition, the draft completely drops the MFN clause. This is in direct re-
sponse to theWhite award. MFN was the provision that allowed the Australian
investor to invoke a clause absent from the Australia-India BIT that was present
in the India-Kuwait treaty. The complete elimination of this provision is rare.96
The drafters could have chosen the many ways in which the MFN clause can be
restricted to avoid treaty shopping, for example, specifying its scope is restricted
to the application of domestic measures and not treaty provisions (UNCTAD,
2010; Nikiema, 2017).
4. Investor obligations and counterclaims: This was one of the most ground-
breaking aspects of the draft. Regarding investor obligations, much like most
agreements of their time, India’s existing treaties equipped the host state with
“a small shield and a short sword” (Leikin et al., 2018, 7). A small shield
because they did not impose any obligations on investors beyond the common-
place requirement that investments are made in accordance with the laws of the
host country. And a short sword because treaties were silent regarding coun-
terclaims. Tribunals have interpreted silences to allow for counterclaims only
for violations of specific contracts or treaty provisions and not domestic laws.
With virtually no investor obligations contained in the treaties, the possibility
95Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 3.1 (i to iii).
96Of the 2571 investment treaties coded by UNCTAD, 2527 include some type of MFN clause.
UNCTAD, IIA Mapping Project.
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of investors violating treaty provisions is thus minimal.
Much di↵erently, the draft provided a long list of detailed investor obligations
and an expanded scheme for counterclaims. It devoted an entire chapter to
investor and home state obligations.97 The draft required that investments
should comply with domestic laws, which included, among others, laws con-
cerning conservation of natural resources, human rights, consumer protection
and fair competition. In addition to the domestic law compliance obligation,
the draft also set out requirements in relation to corruption, disclosure of in-
formation and taxation.98 Moreover, compliance with all these obligations was
necessary for the investment to enjoy the protections provided by the treaty.99
More radically, the draft also provided that in the framework of an ISDS dispute
initiated by the investor, the host state could bring a counterclaim for alleged
violations of any investor obligation.100 Considering the scope of those obliga-
tions and how much of domestic law they encompassed, the draft practically
elevated to the level of international law a series of requirements provided for in
domestic legislation and made them enforceable under international arbitration.
5. Expropriation: like the old model, the draft included provisions against direct
and indirect expropriation.101 However, the draft did so in a radically di↵erent
97Draft Indian Model Treaty. Chapter 3. Although most of the articles refer to investor obli-
gations, the draft required the courts of the home state to recognize the liability of their firms in
situations where an investment causes damages or loss of life in the host country. This provision was
modelled after the IISD model treaty and its inclusion is tied to the lasting impact of the Bhopal
disaster in 1984. An eventual civil case against the company in the US was dismissed by a District
Court on grounds of forum non conveniens, that is, that another court was better suited to hear the
case.
98Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 8 to 12.
99In fact, the draft required that investors demonstrate compliance with the law the moment they
notify the host state of a dispute.
100Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 14.11.
101“Measures having an e↵ect equivalent to expropriation.” Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 5.1.
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way. To qualify as such, expropriation needed to be both economic and legal.
That is, it had to result in a permanent and total deprivation of the value of the
investment and in the deprivation of the investors’ control over the enterprise.102
In addition to this double test, the draft included a requirement never seen
in any other treaty. To qualify as expropriation, the host state or one of its
agencies must have appropriated the investment.103 Such a requirement makes
the indirect expropriation clause unworkable under the treaty, since the entire
notion of a regulatory taking requires that state measures deprive the investor
of the value of her investment without transferring its ownership to the state.
The draft included a common provision in recent treaties that clarifies that
public measures taken for the protection of legitimate public goals like public
health, safety and the environment will not be considered expropriatory.104 Yet
the draft also put the decision of what constitutes a measure taken for such
purposes outside arbitral review.105 According to an MF o cial, “[e]ach na-
tion has a separate criterion for what constitutes a public purpose...that is why,
in India’s case, a foreign arbitration authority or tribunal cannot question In-
dia’s decision to deem any expropriation of a foreign investor’s assets as public
purpose.”106
102Arbitral tribunals, in their assessment of indirect expropriation, have tended to focus on either
approach to expropriation, legal or economic, but not both. If one is proven, the other one is
presumed.
103“an appropriation of the Investment by the Host State which results in transfer of the complete
or near complete value of the Investment to that Party or to an agency or instrumentality of the
Party or a third party.” Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 5.2 (iii).
104Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 5.4.
105An arbitral tribunal “shall not have authority to review the Host State’s determination of
whether a Measure was taken for a public purpose or in compliance with its Law.” Draft Indian
Model Treaty. art. 5.5.
106Cabinet note on proposed bilateral investment treaty in a month. (2015, August 21). Business
Standard.
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6. Exceptions: An entire chapter in the draft was devoted to exceptions. Ex-
ceptions describing government actions that will not be considered violations of
the treaty are not uncommon and have been on the rise.107 Yet the draft went
further than other treaties in specifying new types of policy goals that give rise
to exceptions, i.e. remedying balance of payments or exchange rate problems,
improving working conditions and protecting the privacy of individuals.108 In
addition to specifying various policy objectives, the draft made those exceptions
self-judging. Moreover, the draft excepts from the treaty measures “taken by a
local body or authority at the district, block or village level.” 109
7. Dispute settlement provisions: against the wishes of the DIPP, the draft
provided for investor-state arbitration. However, ISDS provisions were so di-
luted that it is hard to envision a situation in which an investor could have
used them successfully. The dissatisfaction with past cases is evident from the
inclusion of an unusual article delineating what the purpose of ISDS is not :
“An Investor shall not use or threaten to use [ISDS] in order to obtain
money, property, or any other thing of value from the Host State, or
otherwise compel the Host State to act or refrain from acting.”110
The goal of shielding the Indian state from ISDS went beyond a statement
of purpose. There were two provisions that in combination made the whole
107Of all treaties coded by UNCTAD’s IIA Mapping project signed since 2010, 61% include a
security exception; 51% include an environmental or public health policy exception; and 40% include
other types of public policy exceptions. 34% include all three. UNCTAD, IIA Mapping Project.
108Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 16.1.
109Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 16.3.
110Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 14.1. Given that the point of an arbitral claim is to eventually
obtain monetary compensation from the state, this a strange addition. However, the choice of ‘shall’
instead of ‘must’ suggests the goal is to reassert a principle against extortion through ISDS.
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treaty practically toothless. The draft barred a tribunal from re-examining a
case settled by a judicial authority of the host state. And it also required the
investor to exhaust all judicial and administrative remedies before the relevant
domestic courts of the host state before initiating an arbitration.111 That is,
the treaty would require the dispute to first be tested in a local court. This
could be decided in favor or against the investor. If the investor wins, then she
has no interest in pursing international arbitration. Yet if she loses, she would
be barred from doing so because, per the treaty, arbitral tribunals could not
review decisions from domestic courts.112
In general, the draft went beyond the incremental reforms seen in the more recent
treaties of countries like the United States and Canada. The concern with protecting
India’s regulatory autonomy is palpable in virtually every article. Direct reactions
to India’s own ISDS experiences are evident in elements like the exclusion the MFN
clause or the carving out of tax measures and decisions by local governments. Unsur-
prisingly, the draft generated strong and mixed reactions, from CSOs, scholars, firms
and the legal profession. Those are presented in the next section.
6.6.3 Reactions to the draft model treaty
Domestic and international CSOs working in investment treaty reform praised the GoI
and saw the draft as a good “balance between legitimate public welfare objectives
111Draft Indian Model Treaty. art. 14.2 to 3.
112The only way out from this is article 14.3 (ii.a) which includes a “futility exception” according
to which the investor can initiate an arbitral dispute if she demonstrates “there are no reasonably
available domestic legal remedies capable of providing any relief for the dispute concerning the
underlying Measure.” The burden to show that there is no reasonably available relief falls on the
foreign investor.
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and investor rights.”113 Yet most of the reactions were negative and coalesced around
the view that the treaty was not balanced at all, and it had rather gone too far in
favor of the state. Two main groups voiced strong critiques. One were foreign firms.
The US National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), representing the interests of
hundreds of American firms investing in India, lamented the draft “deviate[d] substan-
tially from global standards, providing much lower and in some cases no protections
on core issues” (National Association of Manufacturers, 2015, 1). NAM warned the
draft would make India unattractive to foreign investors114 and that insisting on this
model it would make it impossible for India and the US to conclude a BIT.115 While
NAM commended the decision to review the model treaty, all its recommendations
involved reverting to the previous template. Regarding the investment definition,
it recommended an asset-based definition that would cover all forms of investment
(National Association of Manufacturers, 2015, 2). It considered the carve-outs un-
necessary and inappropriate (National Association of Manufacturers, 2015, 4) and it
urged for the FET and MFN standards to be re-introduced (National Association of
Manufacturers, 2015, 5). It also recommended the entire chapter on investor obli-
gations to be dropped from the final model (National Association of Manufacturers,
2015, 7). In relation to ISDS -seen as “critical to the operation of a successful BIT”-
113Decoding India’s New Model BIT (V). (2015, September 17). Madhyam.org.in; Similarly, ac-
cording to CCSI: “India’s new model BIT makes clear that its goal is to accomplish more than mere
investor protection...The model BIT is a step in the right direction.” Next generation treaty. (2015,
November 12). Indian Express
114“In a world where there is substantial competition for investment flows to promote economic
growth, India’s proposed movement backwards in investment treaty practice sends precisely the
wrong signal to manufacturers in the United States and other investors.” National Association of
Manufacturers (2015, 8)
115“If the Government of India is interested in improving its investment relationship with the United
States and negotiating a BIT that would promote investment and economic growth, India would
need to revise its draft BIT to include broad, strong and fully enforceable protections.” (National
Association of Manufacturers, 2015, 2)
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NAM criticized virtually all the innovations of the draft: the exhaustion of local
remedies, the impossibility to challenge domestic judicial decisions, the inability of
ISDS tribunals to review the government’s invocation of the various exceptions and
the possibility of counterclaims (National Association of Manufacturers, 2015, 7).
The second source of criticism was the legal profession. Legal scholars, practicing
lawyers and members of the Indian judiciary saw the treaty as a political, knee-
jerk reaction to ISDS cases that resulted in a legally unworkable template; one that
would be very hard to convince partners to sign and that could hurt Indian investors
abroad.116 This was the position of the Law Commission of India. It should be noted
that while the Commission generally works with thematic mandates from the Ministry
of Law and Justice, it decided to examine the draft model BIT on its own initiative
(Ranjan, 2019, 286). The Commission convened a sub-committee of experts to write a
report on the new draft. The sub-committee was comprised of legal scholars, justices
and practicing lawyers who -unlike the representatives of foreign firms- agreed with
the GoI in that the previous model was seriously flawed, sacrificing India’s right to
regulate in favor of investor protection.117 Yet they saw the draft as swinging too far
in the opposite direction. Dissecting the draft article by article, the Commission’s
report warns the treaty fails to do what it is supposed to do, which is to provide a
modicum of investor protection.118 In relation to the long list of investor obligations,
the Commission saw them as unreasonable. The draft was demanding too much
116See, for example: Bidhuri et al. (2015); Rai et al. (2015); Ranjan and Anand (2017)
117See two op-eds by sub-committee members: Prabhash Ranjan (Indias draft BIT policy could end
up scaring foreign investors: Heres why. (2015, September 21). The Indian Express) and Anirudh
Krishnan (A bit for the state, a bit for the investor. (2015, September 8). The Hindu).
118Regarding the complete absence of the MFN, the report says “foreign investors will be exposed
to the risk of discriminatory treatment by the Host State in application of domestic measures” (Law
Commission of India, 2015, 24) and that the many self-judging exceptions included “could result in
possible abuse by the Host State” (53).
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and o↵ering to little to foreign investors. This could be harmful for Indian investors
abroad (Law Commission of India, 2015, 12) and it would be unlikely that potential
treaty partners would accept it (40).
The Commission suggested changes to almost all articles in the draft. Regarding
the ISDS provisions, the report did not recommend eliminating the requirement to
exhaust domestic measures but rather suggested dropping the provision that would
bar arbitral tribunals from reviewing any decision from domestic courts. When a
member of parliament asked the Minister of Finance about the report, he replied all
suggestions “have been considered in the final version of the model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty text.”119 Many recommendations made by the LCI did not make it to
the final draft, though the report is believed to be the main reason for the relative
moderation of the final model.120
6.6.4 The final model treaty
The Cabinet approved the final model treaty in 16 December 2015. The e↵ects of
the criticism were notable since, in comparison to the draft, the final model was
substantially toned down. It was, nonetheless, a fundamental break with past. Next
I analyze how the previous seven elements from the draft fared in the final text.
1. Definition of investment: The final definition was not as narrow as the
draft’s. It lost the requirements of having its management in the territory of
the Host State, employing a substantial number of employees and having made
contributions to development specifically in the form of technological transfers.
119PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 22 December, 2015,
Vol. 237, No.19, p. 183.
120Interview XXIV.
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However, it remained an enterprise-based definition and did not include portfolio
investments.121
2. Scope of the treaty: tax matters and compulsory licences regarding intellec-
tual property rights remained outside the scope of the final model. The final
text also excluded measures taken by local governments from its scope.122 Taken
together, the provisions delineating the substantive scope of the treaty exclude
the three most controversial areas in the debate around BITs and ISDS. Taxes
and local government measures were the sources of India’s most debated ISDS
disputes-White Industries and Vodafone I. The possibility of patent holders us-
ing ISDS disputes to combat the production of generic drugs was the main focus
of Indian CSOs during negotiations with the US and the EU.
3. Standards of treatment: both FET and MFN standards remain outside the
treaty, although it softens some of the language by dropping the requirement
that coercion and harassment need to be ‘continuous, unjustified and outra-
geous’ to qualify as abusive treatment.123
4. Investor obligations and counterclaims: The largest di↵erence between
the draft and the final model was in relation to investor obligations and the
possibility of counterclaims. The long list of specific obligations morphed into
a requirement that investors “shall comply with all laws regulations, adminis-
trative guidelines and policies” and that they will not engage in corruption124.
121Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty [hereinafter, Indian Model Treaty]. art.
1.
122The draft also included a carve-out for local governments’ measures but it was included in the
chapter regarding exceptions. Indian Model Treaty. art. 2.4. (i).
123Indian Model Treaty. art. 3.1. (iv).
124Indian Model Treaty. art. 11.
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It also includes a very soft aspiration that investors would try to “voluntar-
ily” incorporate standards of corporate social responsibility.125 Moreover, the
final text makes these requirements unenforceable, since the entire article on
counterclaims is removed.126
5. Expropriation: Like the draft, the final model establishes that adverse eco-
nomic impact as a consequence of a public measure is not enough to constitute
expropriation.127 Yet the additional elements that need to be taken into account
di↵er drastically from one text to the other. The final model removed the need
for public measures to result in permanent and complete value deprivation and
the transfer of the value to the Host state. It simply stated that, in making a
determination about an act of expropriation, tribunals need to consider other
elements besides economic loss, such as the duration of the measure or its intent.
Like in the draft, measures taken for the protection of legitimate public interests
will not constitute expropriation but their self-judging quality is removed.
6. Exceptions: The list of public measures that cannot be challenged as violations
of a treaty is much shorter in the final draft and replaces public goals like
improving working conditions, remedying serious balance of payments problems
and protecting the privacy of individuals with a general “law and regulations
that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”128 Unlike
in the draft, the determination of whether a measure was necessary for the
attainment of those purposes can be reviewed by an arbitral tribunal.
125Ibid. art. 12.
126According to some observers, the final model even takes away the small room for counterclaims
India enjoyed under the previous model (Leikin et al., 2018).
127Indian Model Treaty. art. 5.
128Indian Model Treaty. art. 32.1. (iii).
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7. Dispute settlement provisions: Regarding ISDS provisions, the final text
follows the draft in that arbitral tribunals do not have jurisdiction to review
decisions by domestic courts. But the final model drops the requirement that
investors exhaust local remedies before starting an arbitral claim and replaces
it by a complex temporal scheme. First, an investor can notify the host state
about a dispute only after pursuing domestic remedies for at least five years.129
After notifying the host state, a period of six months starts for negotiations and
amicable settlement. If the parties cannot settle the dispute amicably, then the
investor can lodge an arbitral claim provided four requirements: a. no more
than six years have passed since the investor first knew of the public measure
giving rise to the dispute. b. no more than twelve months have passed since
domestic remedies were concluded. c. the investor gives notice to the state of
her intention to lodge the claim ninety days in advance. d. the investor waves
its right to continue any domestic proceedings.130
If that was hard to follow, that is precisely the point. The result is a very
small time window during which investors can submit claims before arbitral
tribunals. As an illustration, if on 1 January 2021 the GoI adopts a regulation
that a foreign investor considers to be in violation of an applicable treaty, then
it is obliged to seek a domestic solution for at least five years. That is, until
31 December 2025. If at that point the matter is still pending and the investor
wants to pursue arbitration, it has to notify the GoI about the existence of
a dispute. Assuming the investor does so right away, on 1 January 2026, the
next six months should be spent seeking an amicable solution. That is, until 30
129Indian Model Treaty. art. 15.2.
130Indian Model Treaty. art. 15.4 to 5.
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June 2026. At that point, the investor can notify the GoI about its intention to
lodge a arbitral claim but has to wait ninety more days before actually doing
so. That is, until October 2026. However, the investor can only do so before
six years have passed since she first knew of the measure. That means there is
a three months period -until 31 December 2026- to submit the claim before an
international tribunal.
Reactions to the final text were, again, mixed. Norther CSOs lamented that some
provisions included in the draft did not make it to the final text.131 For the govern-
ment, the entire process was a continuous search for a middle path between the inter-
ests of investors and the rights of governments. According to DEA o cials, writing in
their personal capacity, “[n]owhere is this delicate balancing act more evident than in
the retaining of the ISDS system” They recognize that more radical options were on
the table -most notably excluding ISDS- but, in their view, such changes would have
risked “alienating the strong foundations of investment regime built over a number
of years. Without ISDS, investment treaties will have no enforceability.”(Garg et al.,
2016, 72-3). Observers strongly disagree with this assessment and still considered the
model too much in favor of the state.132 According to a scholar part of the committee
that authored the LCI report, the final model is so unbalanced that “a more truthful
approach would then be to walk out of the BIT system altogether, instead of having
your cake and eating it too.” (Ranjan, 2019, 350) Most commentators also noted that
-as much as a novelty as the new model was- the real test was whether the govern-
131“[M]any of the more noteworthy and progressive provisions regarding investor and home
state obligations were either removed from or diluted” (Coleman and Gupta, 2017; Kelsey, 2016;
Choukroune, 2016). Also, see The Whole BIT. Business Today, February 28, 2016.
132For media commentary, see As India’s New Bilateral Investment Strategy Sputters out, the
Secrecy and Opaqueness Must Go. (2017, May 1). The Wire; An own-goal on FDI. (2016, September
16). Business Standard. For scholarly critiques, see Raju (2016); Sharma (2015)
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ment would find any takers, especially among countries with substantial investments
in India.133.
6.7 The 2015 Model in action
The GoI decided the new Model treaty would not only be the basis for the negoti-
ation of all future investment treaties and FTA chapters; but also that all existing
agreements shoud be renegotiated according to the new template.134 Striving for
consistency, the responsibility for negotiating all future investment treaties and in-
vestment chapters was now under the Ministry of Finance. This marked a victory for
the approach of Finance, solidifying the position that India would not forego invest-
ment treaties or ISDS. This section includes three vignettes into recent negotiations
undertook by India on the basis of its new model, with the US and the EU and also
with Brazil. These are fairly recent events, and negotiations are ongoing in some
cases, thus not a lot of information is available. Yet these processes are indicative not
only of the extent of the changes in India’s position but also the mixed success it has
so far found in rebuilding its treaty network.
6.7.1 Modernizing existing treaties
Once India had a clear idea of what its treaties should look like, it could have gone
about modernizing its old treaty stocks in two ways. They could have approached
133Why the new BIT may not work. (2016, May 25). The Hindu: Business Line; Substantial
changes introduced in new Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. (2016, February 18). International
Law O ce; “Bad for India Inc”? Modi’s BIT recast causes concern. (25 August 2016). Global
Arbitration Review. Also see Jandhyala (2015)
134PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 16 December, 2015,
Vol. 237, No.15, p. 88
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each of their partners individually and asked for a renegotiation on the new terms. In
this case, the partner can accept or decline and if it declines, the old treaty remains
in place. The other way would have been to force the negotiation of a new treaty by
unilaterally terminating the old one. The partner could decline to negotiate a new
agreement but in this case, there would be no more treaty in place. India decided to
o↵er the former and threaten with the latter.
Once the new model was ready, the GoI o↵ered treaty partners the chance to
renegotiate the agreement on the basis of the new model. If they refused, the treaty
would be terminated. According to the Minister of Finance, “[w]e are entitled to ask
for a renegotiation, in terms of the new terms, of the changed agreement that we have
drafted. And these will all be subject to negotiation with our foreign partners.”135
Up to this point, India had signed BITs with 83 countries but only a subset of
those could be terminated because they were past their initial duration period or
were close to it.136 Thus by May 2016, India started to send termination notices
to 58 countries, including the UK, France, Germany, Mauritius, The Netherlands,
Spain and Sweden.137 For the remaining 25 treaties the GoI sent proposals for a
joint interpretative statement with the goal of guiding eventual tribunals towards a
preferred interpretation of those treaties.138 By June 2017, the Cabinet reported 11
countries had accepted to renegotiate their treaties.139
135India wants new foreign investment pacts to limit lawsuits. (2016, July 11). The Financial
Express (Bangladesh).
136Most investment treaties have an initial duration period during which parties cannot terminate
the treaty. After the initial period, treaties generally remain in place unless either party decides to
terminate them.
137Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge, Remodeling India’s Investment Treaty Regime. (2016, July
18). Madhyam.
138For example, the statement would say that if the treaty is silent on whether tax issues are within
the scope of the treaty, then it is implied that the treaty does not apply to those. Kavaljit Singh
and Burghard Ilge, Remodeling Indias Investment Treaty Regime (II). (2016, July 20). Madhyam.
139Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Switzerland, Oman, Qatar, Belarus, Thailand,
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6.7.2 Negotiating new treaties: the European Union
Among the countries receiving renegotiation/termination notices there were 22 EU
members. The response from many of them, according to the GoI, was that they could
not make independent decisions about renegotiating investment treaties because the
authority to negotiate them had been transferred to the European Commission.140
However, the EU and India had been in talks for a comprehensive economic agree-
ment that would include an investment chapter and a new round was going to take
place after India adopted its new model.141 Thus, three new issues emerged: how
compatible were the Indian ad European preferences; how willing was either party
to stall trade negotiations due to disagreements over investment; and how would the
prospect of terminating existing treaties with individual EU members lure over the
negotiations. Much like in the case of Ecuador, this section shows how European
Union o cials interceded in favor of their home firms. The EU wanted to avoid the
cancellation of the BITs and was using trade issues as an incentive to keep India from
going forward with the terminations. Unlike Ecuador, however, India was not willing
to wait.
The Indian model was fundamentally di↵erent from the European approach of
the time, represented by the investment chapter of its comprehensive treaty with
Canada (CETA). Among other elements, it included an MFN provision and it did
not require investors to litigate in domestic courts for five years. According to Indian
negotiators, the exhaustion of local remedies was one of the toughest points to sell to
Armenia, UAE, and Zimbabwe. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL
REPORT, 28 March, 2017, Vol. 242, No.20, p. 109
140PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, RAJYA SABHA, OFFICIAL REPORT, 28 March, 2017, Vol.
242, No.20, p. 109
141Negotiations had seen 16 rounds of talks at the level of chief negotiators until they stopped in
2013.
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developed countries.142 Moreover, the EU had recently launched its proposal to create
a multilateral investment court and treaties signed from then onward would establish
that once the court is created, disputes between investors and host states would be
solved there. India had expressed its apprehension to the EU Court proposal.143
The termination notices were not well received in Europe. During an Indo-German
business summit, the President of the Federation of German Industries expressed Ger-
man firms in India were careful about further investments because if the termination
of the BIT.144 The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry
sent a letter to the European commissioner for trade -Cecilia Malmstrom- to express
concern with the decision by India to terminate its standing BITs. They warned the
termination “could severely damage both European investment and trade flows, given
that current legal protection in India is insu cient for foreign investors” and noted
“the Indian o↵er still falls far short of the required level of ambition.”145 Malstrom
passed the message in a letter to the GoI, warning the terminations could “have
serious consequences,” and that she “truly hope[d] that India will not opt for such
a radical policy shift with regard to investment from the EU.”146 The EU wanted
the old treaties to remain in place until a the comprehensive agreement that would
replace those treaties was adopted. According to the Commission’s vice president
142Report from the 11tˆh Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators, IISD,
February 2018. Available at: https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/11th-annual-forum-
report-en.pdf (Last accessed: February 6th).
143“We rejected it completely...If we want anything to do with investment we want it bilateral. We
don’t believe in making investment as a subject of multilateral disputes,” said the Indian Minister
of Commerce. India rejects bid for making investment a multilateral issue. (2017, January 23). UNI
(United News of India).
144Better framework conditions required in India. (2017, May 31). BDI.
145Letter to Cecilia Malstrom from the President of Eurochambres, Arnaldo Abruzzini. 21 March
2016. Available at: http://www.eurochambres.eu/custom/Commissioner Malmstrom India BITs-
2017-00058-01.pdf.
146India wants new foreign investment pacts to limit lawsuits. (2016, July 11). The Financial
Express (Bangladesh).
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“[c]ompanies from the EU need protection and are worried about the period between
the two treaties.”147 In the words of the Indian Minister of Commerce -Nirmala
Sitharaman- “[t]he Finance Ministry refused to extend the treaties and now the EU
is upset.”148 India wanted to renegotiate on a clean slate since the GoI would have a
better chance to get concessions if Europe’s choices were ‘no treaty or Indian treaty’
rather than ‘old treaty or Indian treaty.’ India -unlike Ecuador- was not willing to
wait until the entire treaty was agreed upon before getting rid of the old treaties.149
6.7.3 Negotiating new treaties: the United States
Over the years India and the Unites States have held many rounds of talks for an
investment treaty to no end (see section Section 6.3.2). The US was still interested in
concluding a treaty. Addressing the Society of Indian Law Firms, the US Ambassador
to India -Richard Rahul Verma- said “[t]he absence of a bilateral investment treaty
between our two countries is an impediment to growing our trade and investment.”
He recognized the Modi government had made substantial advancements by lower-
ing restrictions to foreign ownership and improving the ease of doing business but
that the investment climate was also “about access to courts” and “about embrac-
ing international arbitration.”150 Representatives from US firms confirmed this view.
According to the President of the US-India Business Council (USIBC), “[w]e need to
147Expiring bilateral treaties holding up Indo-EU trade talks, says o cial. (2016, November 12).
Business Standard.
148Peeved EU delays talks on FTA with India. (2017, January 20). Business Line (The Hindu).
149The chair of a delegation of EU Parliamentarians to India recognized “[T]he termination of
bilateral investment treaties by India is a problem...right now it is a hurdle in the FTA discussions.”
EU wants bilateral treaties extended, India not keen. (2017, February 21). The Times of India.
150Absence of BIT with India an impediment to bilateral trade: US. (2016, February 18). Press
Trust of India.
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make progress on the India-US bilateral investment treaty.”151
However, both firms and the US government were aware the new Indian model
made the chance of an agreement more di cult. Ambassador Verma was “afraid
things have become a bit more di cult.”152 Similarly, the USIBC’s President noted
“[t]he gap between positions adopted by the two countries is huge. Expectations from
the US side were very high, very di↵erent from India’s.”153 Yet, much like in the EU
talks, India was not willing to compromise, especially on the ISDS issue. India and
the US “continue to have di↵erences over who will get the right to arbitrate in case
of an investment dispute,” said an Indian negotiator, “we have swallowed bitter pills
in the past.”154
6.7.4 Negotiating new treaties: Brazil
As most developing countries in the world, Brazil had signed many BITs containing
ISDS in the 1990s. Yet unlike many of its peers, it never ratified them. In 2015,
the Brazilian government started to sign new agreements -only with Latin American
and African nations- and the Brazilian Congress has even ratified some of them. The
main di↵erence between these BITs and the previous ones was the dispute settlement
mechanism. Among other characteristics, the Brazilian model does not include ISDS
and only allows for state-to-state dispute settlement, it does not provide Fair and
Equitable Treatment and it excludes tax issues (Maggetti and Choer Moraes, 2018;
151Undoing the Damage. (2016, August 14). Business Today.
152He continued, “unfortunately those gaps do prevent us from moving forward and putting in
place the kind of structural protections that investors in both our countries have come to expect in
international commerce.” U.S. wants progress in investment pact talks with India: Envoy. (2016,
June 28). The Hindu.
153Undoing the Damage. (2016, August 14). Business Today.
154Treaty with US faces delay. (2016, August 6). The Telegraph.
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Campello and Lemos, 2015, see). During a meeting of the BRIC group in late 2016,
India and Brazil initialized a treaty that, in some ways, rests at the lowest com-
mon denominator of investor protection between both treaties. Like the Brazilian
approach, it does not include ISDS, not even with the complex temporal scheme of
the Indian model. Like the Indian model, it also completely excludes the MFN clause
even though other recent Brazil treaties do include it. It also excludes taxation and
labor matters from the scope of the treaty.155
6.8 Conclusion
My theoretical framework expects that, at varying levels of economic development,
controversial ISDS disputes will provoke di↵erent political dynamics. As explained in
Chapter 2, this is not due to a direct causal relationship between wealth and policy
outcomes. Rather, I argue, policy reactions to ISDS in developed and developing
states are subject to di↵erent limiting and enabling factors. Put briefly, in designing
and implementing their preferred policies, developed country governments are caught
between home firms and domestic CSOs while developing countries are limited by
foreign firms and their governments while they can draw support from like-minded
states and international CSOs. The reason for including a study of India was to test
the argument in the case of an emerging economy that cannot easily be classified as
a developed or a developing country.
A major factor limiting the tone of policy reactions in developed countries is the
fact that, as much they would want to protect their regulatory autonomy from future
155BRAZIL AND INDIA CONCLUDE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY. (2016, November
28). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
6.8. Conclusion 361
disputes, their own multinational firms want strong protections for their investments
abroad. Outflows of FDI from India have increased in recent years but its exposure
to ISDS has been mostly as a respondent. This makes India’s ISDS experience closer
to that of Ecuador than that of the US. As of today, only 6 ISDS disputes have
been brought by Indian investors against foreign states. American and European
businesses, on the contrary, have accrued vast experience in the matter and are more
likely to pay ’live’ attention to developments in the area of international investment
law. While a lot of negative commentary revolved around the impact of the new model
treaty on Indian investors abroad, it came from scholars and legal practitioners.156
There were no signs of Indian multinational firms lobbying the government regarding
the draft model treaty or even expressing their views openly. However, this might
change in the future. According to a London-based counsel specialized in India, “from
my experience, Indian corporations are increasingly aware of the existence of BITs
and we are seeing Indian corporates with interests in other parts of the world come
to us and ask us to look at claims under BITs.”157 My argument would suggests
that as Indian multinational firms grow in size and number and gain experience with
investment treaty protections, India’s treaties will start to show more deference to
the interests of foreign investors.
For developing countries, the argument focuses on the external constraints and op-
portunities that policy-makers face in pursing their preferred course of action. Given
its status as an emerging economy, in this regard, India is closer to the experience
156“[T]he protections available to Indian investors stand to decrease if the 2015 Model BIT provides
the template for future Indian BITs” (Triantafilou and Menezes, 2018, 3) See also Nishith Desai
Associates (2018).
157Interview XIV. Similarly, according to a counsel at one of the largest Indian legal firms, “Indian
clients with significant investments abroad have privately expressed concerns about the revised text.”
“Bad for India Inc”? Modi’s BIT recast causes concern. (25 August 2016). Global Arbitration
Review.
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of the US than that of Ecuador. In designing and implementing its desired policy,
external factors did not play much of a role. However, the GoI was not subject either
to the domestic interest groups that mobilized in support or against strong treaty
protections in the case of the US. As said in the previous paragraph, Indian multi-
national firms did not yet develop an interest in India’s BIT policy. Indian CSOs
did not appear to have much influence either; the review process was not open to
the public and was open to consultations mostly as a formality. This highlights a
particularity of the Indian case: relative to the other cases, the Indian state is fairly
autonomous. At high levels of state autonomy is where ideas held by policy-makers
become more salient for informing policy reactions to negative ISDS experiences. The
importance of both policy-makers’ own inclinations as well as the capacity and au-
tonomy of the state to see them trough has implications for plurality in international
law; as alternative centers of power assume leadership and advance alternate norms
(Burke-White, 2015).
After India adopted its new model, the question was whether there would be
any takers. Two years have passed since renegotiation/termination notifications were
sent and there have been reports that “negotiations are going nowhere.”158 That
is partially true. Focusing only on the EU, the US and Canada159, then the home
countries to the largest multinational firms in the world are definitely non-takers of
158India’s proposed investment treaty terms leave foreign partners cold. (2018, January 19).
Reuters. This was also the view of my interviewees from India. Interview XXIV and XXV. Also see
Ranjan (2019)
159In 2007, long before the review process, Canada and India had agreed on the text of a BIT but
it was never signed. After the new model, India wanted to revise the draft to reflect these changes
but Canada refused, alleging there was already a text in place. Given how controversial ISDS is in
Canada after NAFTA cases (see Chapter 4), the Canadian Minister of International Trade said “we
are talking with India about progressive elements in our pacts. That is what people expect from us.”
However, there was still a concern from the Canadian side about the exhaustion of domestic remedies
requirement in the Indian model. Lets talk investment treaty before free trade pact, Canada tells
India Business Line. (2017, March 4). The Hindu.
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the Indian model. The question that follows is, then, who loses from this stalemate.
The US and Canada have no treaty with India and the sunset clauses in treaties with
EU members will eventually end, with no EU-wide replacement treaty in sight.
With other partners, albeit slowly, India has been rebuilding its network. These
are countries that have no problems with the Indian red lines, either because they
share them (i.e. Brazil) or because they would be capital importing countries in
relation to India and thus they would benefit from them (i.e. Belarus, Cambodia
and Kyrgyztan) or because India remains an attractive investment location even (i.e.
Taiwan).160 India has also successfully negotiated joint interpretative statements with
Bangladesh161 and Colombia.162
Not enough time has gone by to make a final judgment about the success of failure
of India’s new policies. An entire treaty network is not re-built in a day. That said,
independently of how much time passes, the di↵erences between the preferences of
the core capitalist countries and the Indian template are simply too large. What will
happen with India’s investment treaty program in the coming years has enormous
implications for the future of the investment regime. It will show whether revisionist
policies can be accommodated as stable modes of participation or not. If the latter
is true, two scenarios might be possible. India could retract towards tamer reformist
160Although with Taiwan, India agreed to a four year, rather than five year, period for exhaustion
of domestic remedies. INDIAN BIT NEGOTIATOR CLARIFIES COUNTRYS STANCE ON EX-
HAUSTION OF REMEDIES, AND OFFERS UPDATE ON STATUS OF COUNTRYS REVAMP
OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES. (2017, March 31). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
INDIA AGREES NEW INVESTMENT TREATY TEXT WITH COLOMBIA, BELARUS AND
TAIWAN, ADVANCING SOME OF ITS KEY CONCERNS SUCH AS PARTIAL EXHAUSTION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS. (2019, January 1). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
161UNABLE TO UNILATERALLY TERMINATE A 2011 BIT, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
PERSUADES COUNTER-PARTY TO AGREE JOINT INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO CLARIFY
BITS IMPLICATIONS. (2017, July 17). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
162INDIA AGREES NEW INVESTMENT TREATY TEXTWITH COLOMBIA, BELARUS AND
TAIWAN, ADVANCING SOME OF ITS KEY CONCERNS SUCH AS PARTIAL EXHAUSTION
AND HUMAN RIGHTS. (2019, January 1). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
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policies, perhaps due to concerns with harming FDI inflows or because India’s own
multinational sector starts demanding more protection. Or it could also be the case
that, as India continues to struggle to find treaty partners, what was intended to
be a revisionist policy might turn into a de facto exit. Either way, India will have
recovered at least part of its international legal autonomy.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
NAFTA -‘the worst trade deal in the history of trade deals’- was a central theme of
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. Thus, after assuming o ce he formally noti-
fied Congress and the other two NAFTA parties that the US was seeking a renegotia-
tion. As talks were ongoing, progressive Democrats in Congress and CSOs repeatedly
told the executive that ISDS had to be dropped in the new deal.1 At the same time,
Republican lawmakers and business groups made clear that ISDS had to be included
in NAFTA 2.0 if they were going to support it.2 Thus, much like the George W. Bush
administration in Chapter 4, the Trump government was caught between pleas from
the left and CSOs and demands from American multinational firms and their allies in
Congress. However, unlike Bush, Trump eliminated ISDS with Canada and severely
limited it in relation to Mexico.
It is impossible to understand this shift without paying attention to the ideas
motivating policy decisions. It was not only the nationalist tenor of the Trump
White House that had little love for international institutions, but more important
1HOUSE DEMOCRATS ENCOURAGED BY USTR MEETING; PATH ON ISDS STILL UN-
CLEAR. (13 October 2017. Inside U.S. Trade.
2U.S. BUSINESS GROUPS TIE SUPPORT FOR NAFTA 2.0 TO THE INCLUSION OF ISDS.
(1 September 2017). Inside U.S. Trade; Lighthizer, Brady square o↵ over ISDS at Ways Means
trade hearing. (22 March 2018). Inside U.S. Trade.
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were the views of the US top negotiator, Robert Lighthizer. In June 2017, a little
over a month after being appointed US Trade Representative, Lighthizer testified
before the Finance Committee of the Senate about the new administration’s trade
policy agenda. Naturally, much of the conversation revolved around NAFTA. When
questioned particularly about the fate of the ISDS provisions, his response was that
“clearly our investors have a right to have their properties protected.”3 By itself, this
comment would have signaled a continuation of the traditional Republican support for
strong investor protections. After all, Trump himself holds many businesses overseas4
and he had also appointed Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State. Tillerson had been the
head of the oil giant Exxon-Mobil, a firm that sued Canada on two occasions under
NAFTA’s ISDS rules.
However, Lighthizer was not done talking:
“on the other hand, there are, in my judgment, sovereignty issues, I’m
always troubled by the fact that non-elected, non-Americans can make
the decision that the United States law is invalid, this is a matter of
principle, I find that -I find that o↵ensive...We have two interests, both of
which are valid. But as I say, personally myself, the most troubling part
of all this, is that...it attacks our sovereignty.”5
These remarks fit well with the story told in the previous Chapters. Policy-makers’
ideas color their understandings of ISDS exposure. In the case of Lighthizer, he had
3SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE PRESIDENT’S TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND F.Y. 2018 BUDGET - COMMITTEE HEARING
4In fact, in April 2018, news broke that Trump’s lawyers threatened with investment arbitration
under the US-Panama bilateral investment treaty in a letter to the Panamanian President requesting
his intervention in a dispute over a hotel. Trump lawyers invoke BIT in Panama hotel dispute. (10
Apul 2018). Global Arbitration Review.
5Supra note 3.
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consistently expressed his displeasure with international institutions overruling US
policy.6 Yet he also recognized that, for the US, investor protections and ISDS go
both ways. That ‘non-Americans can make the decision that the United States law
is invalid’ is only a problem if one takes the perspective of the US as host to foreign
firms. From the perspective of the US as a home for multinational firms, arbitrators
would be making decisions about other countries’ laws for the benefit of American
investors. His political views, however, led him to make policy decisions based on the
former.
The renegotiation of NAFTA suggests the debate around investors’ rights in inter-
national agreements is far from settled. In tune with the argument made throughout
the dissertation, it also shows that policy-makers’ ideas are an important part of the
explanation for why governments’ preferences regarding this issue vary over time and
across states amid competing demands from economic and civil society actors. In
the rest of this Chapter, I dive further into the theoretical, policy and normative
implications of my findings about the role of ideas, economic actors, civil society and
power in the current backlash against investment treaties. To conclude, I engage with
a pressing question posed by my findings: if states pursue alternative policies in re-
action to their ISDS experiences, what is left for multilateralism in the international
investment regime? I examine this question in light of ongoing ISDS reform talks at
the UN and I argue that, in the coming years, the regime will be characterized by
increasing pluralism.
6In August 2007, then as a trade lawyer at a DC legal firm, Lighthizer told the Subcommittee on
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee that “one of the biggest threats to our trade laws
is from the dispute settlement system at the WTO.” Partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, &
Flom Lighthizer testifies on legislation related to trade with China before House panel. (2 August
2007).US Fed News.
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7.1 Theoretical and normative implications
7.1.1 The role of ideas
In Chapter 2, I used the analogy of ideas as lenses through which political actors
filter their country’s experience with investment arbitration. I also discussed alterna-
tive arguments that explain post-ISDS policies as the result of rational and bounded
rational learning processes. In the rational world, policy-makers do not need glasses;
they are perfectly capable of assessing the situation and deriving policies for the way
forward. In the bounded rational approach, policy-makers are equally myopic and
miscalculate the situation until the costs of the current behavior becomes su ciently
vivid. Rather, I argued that policy-makers’ ideas are analogous to wearing colored
glasses. The same picture looks di↵erent when looked at through di↵erently colored
lenses; some elements are highlighted and others are obscured. Comparably, ideas
give meaning to an observable situation, provide a standpoint from which to critique
it and allow actors to develop blueprints for a desired future. For example, in the
Ecuadorian case, members of the constitutional assembly attributed the ongoing set-
backs in investment arbitration to di↵erent causes. For conservatives, Ecuadorian
o cials did not have enough expertise to negotiate good treaties or to defend the
country e↵ectively during disputes. For the leftist lawmakers, the treaties were not a
result of a lack of expertise but of political pressures from wealthy countries. More-
over, the legal defeats were not a matter of poor strategy. Di↵erently, they believed
that the system of ISDS is rigged in favor of investors from the start.
Of course ideas alone do not explain treaty policy outcomes. As important as the
presence of particular ideas is their distribution. That is, the degree of consensus
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around them. And when there is plurality of views, which is almost always the case,
it is the ideas of those with veto-power that are most important. In the Indian
case, two state agencies with treaty-making competences -the Ministries of Finance
and of Commerce- had di↵erent views about what India’s policy should be. While
both proposed policy courses aimed at recovering India’s legal autonomy, Commerce
wanted to exit the investment regime while Finance preferred a revisionist policy.
The Ministry of Finance, which is considered to be relatively more powerful and was
coordinating the review process from the start, ended up winning the day.
Without paying attention to the role that beliefs and principles play in motivating
some actions rather than others it is di cult to understand the plurality of approaches
to investment treaties and arbitration that constitute the current ‘backlash’ in the
international investment regime. What is at stake in rea rming the role of ideational
elements within the theoretical toolbox of IR scholars is not simply a more valid
explanation of real-world outcomes. Scholars, observers and journalist often make a
loaded distinction between pragmatism and ideology in the study of foreign policy.
The former is charged with positive value; while the latter is lamented. Pragmatists
tend to make decisions ‘sensibly and realistically’ in a way that is based on practical
considerations. Ideologues do the opposite. They are ‘stubborn’, ‘strident’, and base
their decisions on principles (that is, ideas) rather than ‘facts’. Especially from the
perspective of smaller countries, pragmatism tends to be equated with internation-
alism and the embracing of open markets while ideology is associated with political
and economic nationalism (Castan˜eda, 2006). Because less powerful nations have
to adapt to the world that surrounds them -a world that is shaped by the interests
and actions of larger states- the most reasonable thing to do is not resist, open up
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and operate in the world as is. If the opportunity arises, positive change should be
attempted but through incremental reforms and without major disruptions.
In this mindset, radical policies like Ecuador’s would be dismissed as ideologically-
motivated and thus exceptional; while others’ would be explained by reference to
factors other than ideas, for example, structural forces, domestic coalitions, or the
e↵ects of international institutions. Rather, by highlighting the role of ideas across
the di↵erent cases, my goal was to show two things. First, political actors are not
more motivated by ideas in the South than in the North. Second, political actors
trying to radically alter the status quo are not more motivated by ideas than those
trying to preserve it. The di↵erence is whether one’s ideas are already embedded in
existing institutions or not.
7.1.2 The role economic actors
But ideas do not have abstract influence on policy outcomes. Thus, I argued that the
implementation of the policy preferences that ideas inspire takes place within par-
ticular international and domestic contexts that impose constraints on and provide
opportunities for policy-makers. One source of constraints comes from the prefer-
ences and mobilization of domestic and foreign firms. My findings confirm insights
from New-New Trade Theory (NNTT) in the sense that policy preferences appear
to crystallize across types of firms rather than industries or sectors. Multinational
firms generally mobilize to keep strong investor protections and access to ISDS both
in their home countries and in the countries they invest in. The di↵erent business
groups that appear throughout the Chapters represent firms from multiple industries
that are united, at home, by being present in multiple countries or, abroad, by a
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common national origin.
Di↵erently, domestic firms that produce locally but place their products in foreign
markets are not primarily concerned with investment treaties. However, one aspect
that NNTT overlooks is the possibility of linkages between the issues that di↵erent
firms care about and, more importantly, the ability of political actors to exploit those
linkages in their favor. For example, Ecuadorian domestic exporting firms mobilized
against revoking the contract of an American oil company when that would jeopardize
preferential market access to the US and they were critical of the termination of the
BITs when it would put a Free Trade Agreement with the EU at risk. Thus, against
NNTT predictions, domestic exporting firms ended up caring about international
investor protections, albeit indirectly through the explicit use of trade threats by the
US and European governments for the protection of their own multinational firms.
7.1.3 The role of civil society
I also theorized about the role of civil society, whose main interest is to avoid public
regulations being inhibited or rolled back because of investors’ ability to invoke in-
ternational treaty protections before ISDS tribunals. Drawing from the contentious
politics framework, I made an important distinction between civil society actors as
social movements and as civil society organizations (CSOs). They have common agen-
das but di↵erent resources to mobilize in furthering those. Social movements have the
gift of numbers and thus they can carry on disruptive actions. In contrast, CSOs have
the gift of technical expertise, both in the subject matter as well as in interest group
politics. Most civil society actors have single agendas -environment, health, consumer
protection, etc.- but CSOs are more likely to expand their interests from their par-
7.1. Theoretical and normative implications 372
ticular issue to the way in which investment treaties inhibit regulatory controls in
that area. Chapters 4 and 5 showed how this distinction mattered for civil society’s
impact on the policy-making process. American CSOs lobbied legislators e↵ectively
and provided valuable information about the potential impact of a multilateral in-
vestment agreement that was being negotiated at the OECD based on actual NAFTA
cases. Di↵erently, Ecuadorian indigenous and environmental movements carried out
intense actions against oil firms due to the social and environmental consequences
of their operations but they did not have equivalent interest on investment treaties,
even though those firms invoked treaty protections against Ecuador.
That said, an unexpected finding from the Ecuadorian case was the active role
of government actors in fostering civil society’s interest on international investment
treaties. In my theoretical framework, the interest of civil society actors is exoge-
nous. They either have it or not. However, Ecuadorian o cials with a radical agenda
appeared to have been, in a way, trying to tie the governments’ own hands by man-
ufacturing a public demand for the termination of the BITs. This motivation can
be seen behind the creation of a commission to conduct a public audit of Ecuador’s
investment treaties.
The issue of uneven technical expertise across civil society actors from di↵erent
parts of the world has important implications for reform options that seek to enhance
the transparency and democratic quality of ISDS by making documents and proceed-
ings public and allowing civil society, especially from a↵ected communities, to make
presentations before arbitral tribunals. It is unclear how citizens from less a✏uent
countries will be able to derive benefits from greater access to legalistic proceedings
that take place in Washington DC, London or The Hague, and generally in English
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or French.
Even the most resourceful CSOs find it hard to influence policy when conditions
are not in their favor, that is, when they lack access points to the policy-making
process. They need allies in positions of power and they need openings to reach
them. Chapters 4 and 6 showed this clearly. In the United States, the CSOs were
more e↵ective in Congress than before the executive. They found a strong ally in John
Kerry and other Democrats during the passing of the Trade Act yet they were not
able to get additional concessions during the drafting of the 2004 Model BIT because
the process was controlled by the Republican administration of George W. Bush.
The India case showed a di↵erent type of obstacles to the influence of civil society. In
the US case, there were institutional openings -i.e. the negotiation guidelines of the
Trade Act were discussed in Congress and the US State Department and the USTR
had to submit the draft model BIT to a public consultation- thus CSOs’ influence
depended on the receptiveness of policy-makers in those positions. However, Indian
government agencies conducted their review of India’s BITs and the drafting of the
new model fairly autonomously. That is, there were not as many openings for civil
society in the first place. Indian CSOs and scholars that had a marked interest in the
issue complained about the opaqueness of the process and their inability to provide
inputs. In the end, the revisionist policy that India adopted was a product of the
government’s autonomous preferences.
7.1.4 Power and international law
My findings also have implications for the way the relationship between power and
international law is understood. Three approaches to these relationship can be iden-
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tified. Classical legal thought believed that as international law developed, the world
would see less displays of unilateralism, power politics and coercion (Steinberg and
Zaslo↵, 2006). This is what Ian Hurd terms the ’enchanted’ view of international law
as inherently good, morally and politically (2016). Realists contest this and argue,
much di↵erently, that international law cannot have any e↵ects on the world -good
or bad- because it has no independent power and that compliant behavior is merely a
coincidence; states follow the rules when doing so happens to be in their self-interest
(Goldsmith and Posner, 2005). Yet another view comes from critical and third world
approaches to international law. Here, international law is anything but powerless.
It enables, perhaps, an even more powerful type of domination. In (re)producing po-
litical and economic inequality, legal institutions cloak the fundamental relationship
between compliant behavior and the interests of powerful Western states or domi-
nant classes who get a larger say in the content of the rules (Anghie, 2007). In this
framework, the logical consequence of power made law is that those in the receiving
position of power will come to resist it (Rajagopal, 2003, 416).
The preceding Chapters have something to say to each of these three approaches.
An ‘enchanted’ view of the regime still exists, and it is strong among arbitration
practitioners and the legal scholars supplying them with commentary. For example,
according to the renowned German arbitrator Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, by empowering
private entities to sue states before international tribunals, the significance of ISDS
is comparable to that of human rights courts:
“[c]ritics have forgotten what things were like without investor-state arbi-
tration, when a foreign investor could only rely on diplomatic protection
from its home state, which for political reasons often wasn’t given. Now,
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an individual can sue a state directly under human rights treaties and
investors can defend their rights under investment treaties. These are two
major legal milestones and you can’t turn back the clock.”7
Yet, growing dissatisfaction with the international investment regime among states,
civil society and scholars from all over the world does not suggest that investment
law is considered much of a force for good. For most critics, the fundamental problem
is that rather than checking the power of sovereign states to treat foreign investors
unfairly, international investment law has come to constrain their ability to regulate in
the public interest. Thus, a juxtaposition of international law and state power cannot
be sustained. Abuses of power cannot exist outside the legal rules that constitute
them. That is, outside the laws that cast a state policy as unfair treatment rather
than as a legitimate government act.
My findings on the limits and possibilities of exiting the regime are most relevant
for Realist views of international law as epiphenomenal to states’ interests and their
power to tolerate the costs of non-compliance. Here, there would be little reason to
expect states to comply with treaties when their interests and power change. Yet, as
much of the evidence from the previous Chapters suggest, even when states’ prefer-
ences change and they perceive their interests are no longer served by participating in
investment treaties and ISDS, the various ways in which states attempt to disengage
from previous commitments is still ‘in compliance’ with international law. Even the
proponents of the most radical of the three policies examined, Ecuador’s exit, made
sure the cancellations were done according to each treaty’s termination provisions.
That is, states manage their degree of commitment to specific rules they like or dislike
7Portrait of the arbitrator. (6 May 2014). Global Arbitration Review.
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in accordance to, rather than outside of, international law (Hurd, 2018, 269).
Lastly, this dissertation’s findings have a lot to contribute to the third view of the
relationship between international law and power. The move towards treaties and
arbitration and away from diplomatic protection has been interpreted as attempts
by those in positions of power -multinational corporations and their home states- to
preserve their privilege trough law rather than through acts of force (Miles, 2013;
Maurer, 2013). Furthermore, that power made law generates resistance is palpable in
investment law (Sornarajah, 2015). However, I find that dominance is not only evident
in the preservation of the status quo nor that change only happens when resistance
is successful. Power is also observable in the ability to make a choice about whose
resistance merits change and in controlling the terms of that change (Rajagopal, 2003,
9). Reforms in the US and Europe were not a reaction to Third World resistance,
even though that is where the brunt of ISDS’ impact is felt. Rather, they emerged
out of the political dynamics triggered by their own experiences with ISDS and the
persistent resistance of their own civil society. In this sense, this relates to an ‘inside-
outside distinction’ that Critical scholars place at the center of international economic
law. “Across international legal regimes past and present we see the interests of
the powerful applied under the legitimating shelter of law to the detriment of other
peoples -laws or their application that would categorically be rejected at home: law
for others” (Linarelli et al., 2018, 5). For example, trade agreements facilitate the
free flow of goods and this results in unsafe labor practices elsewhere that would not
be tolerated at home. Similarly, investors’ use of ISDS against developing countries
largely exceeds their use against wealthy states. Moreover, legal fees and awards take
a much bigger portion of the former’s budget. If this inside-outside distinction is
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fundamental to the origin of these agreements, it is only natural that it should also
govern the way they evolve and change.
7.2 Amid the rage, what is left for multilateralism
in the investment regime?
The rest of this concluding Chapter deals with the implications of these findings for
the future of the investment regime, particularly in its multilateral dimension. In
his highly praised book, Stephan Schill made the argument that the thousands of
existing BITs and FTA investment chapters constitute a multilateral system (2009).
The distinction between multilateral and bilateral is not simply about numbers. For
Schill, bilateralism puts sovereignty and state consent at the center and seeks to ad-
vance only the interest of the concerned states. Conversely, multilateralism “assumes
the existence and legitimacy of interests of an international community beyond the
interests of States” (p. 362). Because the international community has an interest in
“the functioning of the global economic system” (p. 373) the multilateral investment
regime seeks to eliminate state behavior that is contrary to that goal.
While investment treaties are mostly bilateral or plurilateral, Schill’s argument
goes, it is their content that makes the regime multilateral. International investment
law “is not based on specific reciprocity, but orders investment relations objectively
on the basis of general principles” (p. 17). Of these principles, the most ‘multilater-
alizing’ of them all is the most favored nation (MFN) treatment because it expands
the terms of a treaty to all investors whatever their home countries are. Furthermore,
ISDS has a multilateralizing e↵ect as well because it “e↵ectively removes the power of
7.2. Amid the rage, what is left for multilateralism in the
investment regime? 378
States to both unilaterally defect from investment treaties and bilaterally negotiate
around the consequences of breaches of such treaties” (p. 242). Schill also assumes
that because of the multilateral e↵ects that treaties have, dissatisfied states will find
it very hard to change the system. Plus or minus some adjustments, BITs and ISDS
are the end of investment legal history.
The findings from the previous Chapters challenge some of Schill’s arguments,
especially the extent to which state sovereignty and consent have been put aside to
create a multilateral legal order for the protection of the international community’s
interest in the functioning of an open global economy. After controversial experi-
ences with the enforcing of these treaties, states have attempted to reassert their
international legal autonomy in di↵erent ways and to varying extents. These are not
necessarily moves to become closed-o↵ to foreign investment but to recover choice over
how the costs and benefits of those investments are allocated and the ability to decide
when the goal of economic openness becomes secondary to other concerns. Against
this backdrop, an important question is how much space remains for multilateralism
in the international investment regime. The ongoing reform talks at UNCITRAL
provide an opportunity to explore this.
ISDS reform talks at UNCITRAL
That the investment regime evolved to be something more than a collection of
bilateral and plurilateral agreements is observable in the ongoing deliberations for a
possible multilateral reform of ISDS at the United Nations Commission On Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL). ISDS does not exist independently of the specific
treaties that create it yet states recognize that reforming the way in which bilateral
and plurilateral investment treaties are enforced is a matter of concern for the entire
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international community. UNCITRAL is the core legal body of the United Nations
system in the field of international trade law and works for the modernization and
harmonization of rules on international commercial transactions by preparing legal
texts and providing technical assistance to states seeking to reform laws. In June
2017, the Commission entrusted Working Group III (WG3) to explore the possibility
of a reform of ISDS.
In late November 2017, governments from all regions got together in Vienna to
begin debates about a potential reform. WG3 did not have a highly ambitious man-
date. That is, to avoid alienating unconvinced states, it was not assumed that there
was a need to reform ISDS. Rather, that was something yet to be determined. Ac-
cording to its mandate, WG3 was supposed to do three things: (i) first, identify and
consider concerns regarding ISDS; (ii) second, consider whether reform was desirable
in light of any identified concerns; and (iii) third, if the Group were to conclude that
reform was desirable, develop any relevant solutions to be recommended to Commis-
sion.8 Whatever emerges from this UNCITRAL process will come to a vote in the
UN General Assembly. While the mandate started from the lowest common denom-
inator, in its procedural aspects it already reflected some of the core concerns with
investment arbitration. First, it specifically required for the process to be fully trans-
parent. All sessions are public, recordings are available online and non-governmental
organizations were invited to participate as observers. Second, the process would be
government-led. This was a big change from the way in which business is normally
conducted at UNCITRAL. As a legal body working on economic law, the Commission
often covers relatively apolitical, technical issues and thus many states have been con-
tent to delegate their representation in whole or in part to arbitration practitioners.
8https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draftreportofwgiiiforthewebsite.pdf
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The worry was that arbitration practitioners would attempt to stall, thwart or water
down any reform attempts on the basis that they have a vested financial interest
in maintaining the status quo. That governments reclaimed UNCITRAL from the
experts is symptomatic of the larger issue at stake: the recovery of state authority
from the apolitical experts tasked with keeping public power in check so that eco-
nomic forces can operate freely. That said, some delegations, like Switzerland and
the United States, included lawyers with experience as arbitrators or counsel in ISDS
disputes.
Yet that states were willing to discuss a solution to the various problems associated
with investment arbitration in a multilateral setting should not lead to overstate
the degree of consensus. A running theme through this dissertation has been that
di↵erences across policy reactions to ISDS are politically meaningful and reflective of
alternative understandings of how much state policy autonomy should be sacrificed
so that foreign investors operate in a free and predictable environment. Thus, these
di↵erences are likely to emerge any time states come together to debate the future
of investment arbitration. That consensus would be hard to come by was evident in
the Group’s inaugural session in Vienna in November 2017. Regarding procedural
matters, WG3 was unable to keep with UNCITRAL practice of appointing its chair
by consensus. In previous working groups, the chair have been agreed upon ahead
of the meeting, such that someone would have been elected by consensus on the
first morning. In WG3, the debates around the election of the chair went for a day
and a half, which is considerable since the entire session would last only five days.
Moreover, for the second known time in UNCITRAL’s history, delegates had to vote
in order to break the deadlock, resulting in the election of a Canadian o cial. 9
9UNCITRAL MEETINGS ON ISDS REFORM GET OFF TO BUMPY START, AS DELE-
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In more substantial terms, delegations expressed marked disagreements with respect
to which concerns about ISDS are, in fact, legitimate. For example, many states
lamented that ISDS is too expensive and cases take too much time but others -
including Russia, Chile, and Mexico- disagreed. Regarding claims about duration,
they asked whether arbitral disputes were notably slower than domestic courts or
other international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice or the WTO
panels.10 Similarly, many delegations mentioned the lack of consistency in arbitral
awards as a major problem, commenting on the frequency with which arbitrators
reach divergent readings of similarly or identically-worded provisions. Argentina was
vocal about this issue since the tribunals deciding on the many disputes that emerged
from its 2001 economic crisis made diverging interpretations of the same clauses. The
US, South Korea and Israel downplayed the degree to which inconsistency was a
problem and attributed the divergent interpretations to the fact that they stem from
di↵ering treaties and/or di↵erent facts (Roberts and Bouraoui, 2018a).
Working Group III met three more times so far, in April 2018 in New York, in
October 2018 in Vienna and in April 2019 again in New York. As the latest Working
Group session got underway, it soon became clear that it would be di cult, if not
impossible, to agree on any single way forward. Thus, it was ultimately agreed to
work on multiple tracks so as to accommodate the wishes of governments that were
sharply divided. In future WG3 sessions, delegations will work on a variety of reforms,
some being more structural in nature -like the EU proposal for an investment court-,
other reforms fitting within the current system -like an arbitrator code of conduct-,
GATIONS CANT COME TO CONSENSUS ON WHO SHOULD CHAIR SENSITIVE PROCESS
ENTAILING A RARE VOTE. (9 December 2017) Investment Arbitration Reporter.
10ANALYSIS: WHAT DID GOVERNMENTS AGREE (AND DISAGREE) ON AT RECENT
UNCITRAL MEETINGS ON INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REFORM?. (2 Jan-
uary 2018). Investment Arbitration Reporter.
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and others seeming to straddle these categories -like a permanent appellate body for
ISDS decisions that states could opt-in to.
The discussions at UNCITRAL illustrate how states exercise power by controlling
the scope and limits of possible change. Yet, UNCITRAL also shows that wealthy
capital exporters are deeply divided on this issue. A division appeared between some
states that seem inclined toward incremental, bilateral reforms -such as the US and
Japan- and others that openly embrace systemic, multilateral reform -such as the
European Union and Canada. As ISDS became politically unworkable in Europe,
the EU proposed the creation of a multilateral investment court. That is, the EU’s
solution to the legitimacy crisis of treaty arbitration is to make the regime more
multilateral, moving from ad-hoc arbitral tribunals to a single permanent court open
to any state. This court, however, would still be a form of ISDS. Investors would
bring claims against their host states under the applicable treaties. The US and
Japan, among others, prefer to deal with ISDS’ problems on a treaty-by-treaty basis,
pointing at the reforms included in revised versions of TPP and NAFTA as examples.
However, that the options seem to be contained between a court system or targeted
reforms to the current ISDS system leaves aside the views of states, and of civil society,
that reject the need for international tribunals for investors in the first place.
Moreover, while UNCITRAL has gone out its way to emphasize how inclusive and
transparent this process is, developing countries and CSOs have criticized the degree
to which this has been true so far. The last meeting in New York was character-
ized by the presence of a larger than usual amount of states present: 400 delegates
from 106 states. Importantly, a significant number of countries from the develop-
ing world, particularly Africa, joined WG3 for the first time. This was partly due
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to the UNCITRAL travel fund, newly replenished courtesy of the European Union
and Switzerland. It was also due to the active role of CSOs encouraging attendance
by these states. The International Institute for Sustainable Development and the
Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment, the two most influential international
CSOs who featured prominently in the previous Chapters, were active in getting de-
veloping states to show up. However, as many interventions praised the inclusive
quality of the process, several state delegations from smaller countries lamented they
were left out from informal consultation breaks where compromises have been ham-
mered out.
Similarly, around 70 observer organizations representing various non-state stake-
holders were present in the last New York meeting. However, CSOs have noted that
the vast majority of the organizations are directly or indirectly linked to the private
arbitration industry with only a minority representing wider public interests. The
Dutch CSO SOMO calculated the break down of each sector to 85% and 14% re-
spectively for the first two UNCITRAL sessions.11 Moreover, the powerful American
CSO Public Citizen, along with other CSOs, applied to be observers at the April 2018
meeting and were rejected by UNCITRAL on grounds they would not be bringing
su cient unique experience. The decision seemed arbitrary given that, after criticism
ensued, they were accepted to attend the following WG3 meeting. Arbitration prac-
titioners are also linked to the process through an academic forum set up to study the
desirability of reform and examine possible options. Early discussions at the Work-
ing Group revolved around the framework set by papers produced by the academic
forum. In terms of membership, of its 103 members, at least 26 members have acted
as arbitrator in ISDS. Lastly, the process also provides informal opportunities for the
11The limitations of the UNCITRAL process on ISDS reform. (30 October 2018). SOMO.
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Figure 7.1: The UNCITRAL process according to CSOs. Source: SOMO.
arbitration community to be involved. Attendees from the approved organizations
reported that during the UNCITRAL meeting, a member of the US delegation took
the floor and invited all the government delegates to an evening event hosted by his
law firm, King and Spalding. This is the law firm that, among other claimants, rep-
resented Chevron in its infamous case against Ecuador.12 Noting these events with
concern, CSOs have defined the heavy involvement of the arbitration community as
‘letting the foxes guard the hen-house’ (Figure 7.1).13
The next meeting of WG3 is scheduled to take place in Vienna in October 2019.
Successive sessions will be crucial because government representatives will start work-
ing on the substance of the various reform proposals. Given that it was agreed in
New York to work on multiple tracks and that consensus is virtually non-existent,
the process is likely to take a long time. Inequality of resources tends to be an issue
in drawn out diplomatic processes. That more developing countries than ever before
12Corporate Lawyers Hijack UN Meeting, While Civil Society Is Sidelined. (24 May 2018).
Truthout.
13Supra note 11.
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attended the last WG3 meeting was commendable but there is no guarantee that
donors will continue to foot the travel bills of these delegations. Moreover, given
that the universe of possible reforms stretches between improving the current system
and setting a permanent court, it is unclear what and how CSOs can contribute to
the process. As stated in a letter to UNCITRAL from over 300 civil society groups,
governments “should put their e↵orts into discussing how to move away from the cur-
rent investment treaty system altogether.”14 That said, findings from Chapter 4 on
the di↵erent strategies pursued by civil society during the negotiations of the OECD
multilateral agreement on investment suggest that CSOs will likely have more impact
when they attempt to influence international negotiations indirectly, by promoting
awareness and interest on the issue among policy-makers at home, rather than trying
to intervene in international processes directly.
7.3 Pluralism ahead
The positions of developed countries are set for the moment. The European Union
and Canada, two countries where civil society has mobilized strongly against ISDS,
think that disputes between foreign investors and host states should be resolved before
a permanent multilateral court, with a pre-existing bench and an appellate stance.
The court would be open to any countries who would establish in their treaties that
all eventual disputes would be settled there. In fact, their latest FTA provides for
a bilateral investment court system which should be replaced by an eventual mul-
tilateral one. During the renegotiation of NAFTA, Canada pitched the idea to the
14Global Civil Society Sign-on Letter on UNCITRAL’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform Discussions. 30 October 2018. Available at: http://www.s2bnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/UNCITRAL-Global-Letter-Oct-30-2018.pdf.
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US unsuccessfully but the EU has been able to get Singapore, Mexico and Vietnam
to accept the court system in their respective agreements. The United States and
Japan, much di↵erently, prefer to deal with this matter bilaterally. This does not
necessarily mean that they will choose more pro-investor arrangements, as shown by
the US position in NAFTA 2.0. However, without relatively less domestic pressure
than in Europe, it does mean that these governments will be able to make decisions
on a partner-by-partner basis. That the perspective from which the US enters a ne-
gotiation matters for the resulting investor protections included in a treaty matters is
already evident in the retooled NAFTA. With substantial FDI coming from Canada
but mostly unidirectional investment flows going into Mexico, the US decided that
ISDS would remain in place only for the latter, albeit it would be seriously scaled
back, even though the stock of American FDI in Canada is three times larger than
in Mexico.15 Moreover, the US has not attempted to renegotiate its existing BITs
with other developing countries and the presence of arbitration lawyers in the Amer-
ican delegation to UNCITRAL talks suggests the US is not done with investment
arbitration.
At the same time, some emerging powers have taken alternative positions that do
not fit well with what those of the core capitalist countries. Brazil has traditionally
rejected ISDS and considers disputes should be resolved between states. India, as
shown in Chapter 6, has a adopted a markedly pro-state new treaty template that,
even though still includes it, imposes severe limitations to investors’ access to ISDS
and reduces the substantive protections o↵ered to investors. While these countries
have had moderate success convincing other countries to sign BITs -for the most
part, only smaller states have accepted their templates- they do present yet another
15According to 2017 values. O ce of the United States Trade Representative.
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model for governing relations between foreign investors and sovereign states. The
space between the preferences of these emerging economies and the preferences of
developed countries is too big for any mutually acceptable treaty to be concluded.
However, what needs to be remembered is that, since Brazil never ratified a BIT and
India terminated all of them, foreign investors in these countries will not enjoy the
same level of protection they do in smaller countries. Unlike in most of the developing
world where unbalanced treaties signed during the 1990s and early 2000s are still in
force, the status quo does not benefit multinational firms with investments in India
or Brazil. The crucial question regarding revisionist countries like India and Brazil is,
as their economies continue to grow and so do their FDI outflows, whether their own
firms will start to demand their governments to approach investment treaties from
the position of a home state, rather than a host, and thus provide them with stronger
protections in their dealings abroad.
Given the variety of positions that developed and emerging economies have adopted,
smaller states that want to enter into economic agreements with them will have to
accept pluralism in their own treaty networks, with some agreements enforced via
ISDS, others before an international court, some through state-to-state mechanisms
and others in domestic courts. In negotiations with the US or the EU, states con-
cerned with giving investors a right to challenge their policies before international
tribunals, independently of their type, might not have much of a choice but refusing
to sign treaties altogether. Yet, as states move away from stand alone BITs and
FTAs towards more encompassing economic agreements, this might make it harder
for smaller states to leave the negotiation table over concerns with investment when
market access is also on the line. Their best bet, thus, would be to focus on getting
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concessions in terms of substantial provisions that better preserve their regulatory
autonomy or conditioning treaty protections to specific goals, like a substantial eco-
nomic contribution of the investment to the host state.
Another approach for smaller countries could be to write in contracts with foreign
investors a provision requiring firms to resign to applicable investment treaty pro-
tections and operate only according to the terms of the contract (Arato, 2016). As
mentioned in Chapter 5, Ecuador attempted to bar oil firms from taking disputes be-
fore ICSID by writing this limitation in their contracts. In November 2017, Argentina
passed a law on public-private partnerships, or PPPs, that established a legal frame-
work to govern new investments in infrastructure. In the case of foreign investments,
each individual contract could, if both parties agree, include access to international
arbitration for any eventual dispute. However, this would also mean that investors
are barred from invoking protections under bilateral investment treaties and that the
applicable law for the arbitration proceedings would be the PPP law.16 That is, in-
stead of the generally broad definitions and open-ended provisions found in BITs,
arbitrators would be applying Argentine law. Of course, nothing precludes govern-
ments from passing pro-investor laws and entering into bad contracts. Foreign firms
are not necessarily the weaker party in negotiations with states. That said, scholars
of international investment law should not dismiss the potential for the system of
investment treaties to be hollowed out by a move towards contract protections.
The discussion so far has been future-oriented. Yet the truth is that 1,703 invest-
ment agreements are in force today that were signed before 2000, that is before states
started to incorporate lessons from ISDS experience into their drafting choices. Old
16Signed contracts. Ministry of Transport of Atrgentina. Available at:
https://ppp.vialidad.gob.ar/contratosfirmados/.
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treaties ‘bite’, 84% percent of all ISDS cases had been filed under treaties concluded
before 2000. Furthermore, only two investment treaties that are in force today were
signed before 2000 by more than one country from the G7: NAFTA and the Energy
Charter. At the same time, 434 pre-2000 treaties are still in force between members
of the G7 and other countries.17 While investment disputes born out of NAFTA and
the Energy Charter have led to major changes in the treaty policies of the US and
the EU, their consequences has been mostly forward-looking. The adoption of the
2004 US model BIT, as examined in Chapter 4, is directly linked to the early ISDS
disputes under NAFTA. Similarly, the European proposal for a permanent investment
court came out of the popular mobilization against ISDS in TTIP and CETA which
emerged from a series of controversial disputes against Germany under the Energy
Charter. Regarding past-oriented changes, wealthy countries have only been keen to
revise these two treaties. ISDS has been partially dropped from NAFTA 2.0 and a
reform of the Energy Charter is being debated in 2019. Yet they have not shown
much interest in modernizing the rest of their treaties.18 There is little to fear from
their remaining BITs because they regulate fairly unidirectional flows of investments.
American, Canadian and European companies will keep invoking them against other
states but not the other way around.
Thus, the modernization of old, pre-ISDS experience BITs is unlikely to take place
unless developing countries put pressure on their wealthier partners. According to
UNCTAD calculations, by the end of 2019, 1,154 investment treaties would have
17International Investment Agreements Navigator. Division on Investment and Enterprise. UNC-
TAD.
18The exception is a recent declaration by the EU issued on 15 January 2019 where they announced
their intention to terminate all intra-EU BITs. The reason behind this is a decision from the
European Court of Justice in March 2018 that ISDS between EU members states is incompatible
with EU law.
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reached a stage where they could be unilaterally terminated (UNCTAD, 2017). This
number will only grow in the coming years. Yet, as the previous Chapters suggest,
this is not an easy endeavour. When countries announce their plans to unilaterally
terminate treaties, foreign firms and their home governments are quick to warn that
reputational and economic losses will follow and not all countries that have su↵ered
under these BITs are equally inclined to tolerate those costs. As ISDS disputes con-
tinue to emerge from these treaties and the various ongoing e↵orts fail to deliver on
past-oriented reforms, more states might be willing to unilaterally cancel their old
BITs. Although cases of large-scale terminations are too recent to asses whether
countries have actually incurred economic losses as a result, the experience of these
countries will be important for those considering similar actions in the future. Op-
portunities to coordinate terminations with other like-minded countries at regional
forums or at UNCTAD could also encourage undecided states.
In any case, developing countries looking to get rid of ‘the BITs that bit them’
should remind their wealthier partners of their own trajectory. When the renego-
tiation of NAFTA concluded, the Canadian Minister of Foreign A↵airs celebrated
that ISDS would not be in place between Canada and the US. “One of the achieve-
ments I’m most proud of is that the investor-state dispute resolution system, which
in the past allowed foreign companies to sue Canada, will be gone,” she said, “[t]his
means that Canada can make its own rules.”19 It should not be hard to imagine that
developing countries might want to make their own rules too.
19Chrystia Freeland: The USMCA is a good deal for Canadians. (October 29, 2018). Vancouver
Sun.
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Appendix A
Chapter 3
A.1 Measuring international legal autonomy
To create this country-year measure, I first assigned an individual score to each rela-
tionship between a given country and all other countries in the world per year. That
is, I started with a country-partner-year score that represents the legal status of each
individual relationship. Each country-partner-year can obtain a score ranging from 0
to 1. A pairing only gets a 1 if there is no investment treaty in force between the two
countries. This could be because the countries never signed one; they signed one but
it never entered into force; or the treaty was terminated. If there is treaty in force
between the two countries in a given year, the score for the pairing is determined by
the content of the treaty in place, which can be more protective of foreign investors
or of states’ regulatory sovereignty.1 For an indicator of treaty content, I calculated
a measure of State Regulatory Space (SRS) applying the coding guidelines developed
1In cases where more than one treaty applies to the investment flows between two countries in
a given year, the corresponding score for that particular country-partner-year is the lowest. For
example, since 2007, economic relations between the United States and Uruguay have been covered
by two treaties, the 2005 US - Uruguay BIT and the 2007 US - Uruguay TIFA. The rationale for this
is that investors can treaty shop thus they will chose the more favorable set of rules among those
available.
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by (Broude et al., 2017). This produces a score that after normalized ranges from
0 to less than 1; with 1 being reserved to absence of treaty and thus, maximum le-
gal autonomy. Unlike the available literature on investment treaties (?Manger and
Peinhardt, 2017; Allee and Peinhardt, 2014), my focus is not pairs of countries that
had already signed a treaty but on economic relationships that can be legalized or
not. For this reason, a single treaty provides information for the measure at multiple
points and in di↵erent ways. For example, the content of NAFTA determines the
ILA score for all Canada-US and US-Canada observations from 1994 onward. For
all observations before 1994-when the treaty was not in force- it is the absence of
NAFTA which makes the ILA score take the value of 1. After the treaty enters into
force, the score becomes that accorded by the SRS coding guidelines, which in the
case of NAFTA is .55.
The second stage of constructing this measure involves collapsing all country-
partner-year scores into one country-year ILA score. To do so, I calculated a weighted
average of all country-partner-year scores. A weighted average results from the mul-
tiplication of each component by a factor reflecting its importance. Each component,
in this case each country-partner-year score, is multiplied by the partner’s share of
world GDP in the observation year. This is necessary because, otherwise, averaging
all ILA scores in their raw, un-weighted form would make the ultimate country-year
score equally informed by the legal status of the relationship with a large economic
partner than by the legal status of the relationship with a small partner from which
a country is unlikely to receive any FDI. To take this into account, each country-
partner-year score is multiplied by the share of world GDP corresponding to that
economic partner (Partner GDP / World GDP).2
2Ideally the measure would be weighted by FDI inflows from the partner country but such measure
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For example, in 1993, Canada and Argentina were bound by the 1991 Argentina
- Canada BIT but NAFTA between Canada, Mexico and the US has not had not yet
entered into force. The unweighted score for Canada-Argentina 1991 comes from the
treaty’s SRS score based on its content, 0.27 while the unweighted score for Canada-
US 1991 is the maximum possible because there is no treaty, that is, 1. However, given
the di↵erent in size between Argentina and the US, when it comes to aggregating all
the scores per partner into one ILA score for Canada in 1991, the score for the US
counts for 22% of the total Canadian ILA score while Argentina counts for 0.8%,
according to each partner’s share of total GDP.
A.1.1 Steps to create the International Legal Autonomy mea-
sure
1. I started with the COW dyadic trade (COWDT) database as the basis for a
country-partner-year dataset. That is, each country will have a score in its
relationship with any other country in the world each year.
(a) Drop all years before 1957. The year of my earliest treaty.
(b) Drop countries with less than 300,000 population.
(c) COWDT stops at 2014. I need up to 2017. I added rows for these three
years.
(d) In COWDT, each dyad appears once. I need it twice (US-CAN and CAN-
US). I copied the dataset, switched who is country 1 and country 2 and
does not exist except for a few countries that collect it for their own purposes. The next best choice
would be dyadic trade volumes, since mutual trade tends to correlate with mutual FDI. While this
indicator is available there is a significant amount of missing data.
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then bound them.
(e) I excluded intra EU dyads. Investments are subjected to EU laws. Added
2 indicators that take a 1 if country1 and country2 are EU members in
that year. Dropped observations with a 1 in both.
2. Prepare treaties dataset. I need to know if a dyad is covered by a treaty or not
in a given year and for that I need to merge the dyads with the treaties.
(a) I converted my treaty dataset to country-treaty-party. That is, US-NAFTA-
CAN; US-NAFTA-MEX; CAN-NAFTA-US; CAN-NAFTA-MEX.
(b) Added COW codes for all
3. Merge dyads and treaties. Each treaty appears as many times as parties it has.
E.g. ‘US Poland BIT’ appears for POL-USA and USA-POL.3
4. Clean the country-partner-year data
(a) For those dyads that never sign a treaty, added a no treaty treaty title.
(b) Some dyads are covered by more than one treaty. These dyads will appear
twice. Eventually if in a given year a dyad has two treaties in force, I will
select the treaty with the lowest score to be the score of the dyad, since
investors can invoke either treaty.
3If a country-partner pair signed a treaty at any year, the treaty will appear for all years, even
before they signed it. Later I will add signature, force and termination years to establish the status
of the treaty each year.
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Country1 Country2 Year Treaty
MEX CAN 2015 NAFTA
MEX CAN 2016 NAFTA
MEX CAN 2015 TPP
MEX CAN 2016 TPP
5. Added treaty attributes. I needed years of signature, force and termination
to determine the status of the treaty and thus which country-partner-years it
applies to and which ones are not covered by any treaty. Each treaty has a
unique title. I merged by title and import signature year, entry into force
year, termination year and termination type (unilateral, expiration, consensual,
replaced).
6. Added State Regulatory Space score to each treaty. Each treaty has a unique
title. I merged by title.
7. Transformed SRS scores to be used to calculate the country-partner-year score.
Made the scores range from 0 to 1. 1 will eventually be ‘no treaty’ thus I created
a fake treaty with a score higher than any observed score. That way no observed
treaty will reach 1 after converting.
8. Assigned a ILA measure to each country-partner-year. For this I first needed
a status variable for each country-partner-year to determine the corresponding
score.
(a) Never treaty: those country-partner-year that never signed one. ILA=1
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Title Country Partner Year Sign.year Force.year Termination.year SRS status ILA
Afghanistan - Germany
BIT (2005)
Germany Afghanistan 2004 2005 2007 Not terminated .11 No treaty yet 1
Afghanistan - Germany
BIT (2005)
Germany Afghanistan 2005 2005 2007 Not terminated .11 Just signed 1
Afghanistan - Germany
BIT (2005)
Germany Afghanistan 2006 2005 2007 Not terminated .11 Just signed 1
Afghanistan - Germany
BIT (2005)
Germany Afghanistan 2007 2005 2007 Not terminated .11 In force .11
(b) No treaty yet: observation year less than signature year. ILA=1
(c) Just signed (not in force): observation year larger or equal than signature
year less than entry into force year. ILA=1
(d) In force: observation year larger or equal than entry into force year less
than termination year ILA=SRS score4 terminated: observation year larger
or equal than termination year. ILA=1
9. Weighted average by share of World GDP.
(a) The share of World GDP of the partner is calculated yearly using PENN
tables RGDPE.
(b) ILA weighted = ILA unweighted * (RGDP partner / World RGDPE)
10. Collapse into one country-partner-year row. Some pairs of countries are covered
by more than one 1 treaty.
(a) Collapsed by country code, partner code and year. I keep the smallest
SA value. This represents the least favorable treaty for states, assuming
investors will treaty shop.
11. Collapse into one country-year measure.
4569 treaties of 3310 do not have an SRS score. For those, the SA score will be NA in the years
in which the treaty is in force.
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(a) Added all weighted scores for each country per year.
(b) They have already been multiplied by a proportion (Share of GDP) so just
adding is enough to complete the weighted average.
(c) Thus, the resulting score can be calculated with the resulting formula
where i is the observation country, t is the observation year, f is the other




ILAi,f,t ⇤ ( GDPf,t
WorldGDPt  GDPi,t )
A.2 Additional figures


























































Figure A.1: Histograms by period
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A.3 Variation in investment treaty content
International investment treaties generally comprise three sets of provisions: defini-
tions; substantive obligations; and dispute settlement provisions.
A.3.1 Definitions
The way in which a treaty defines what constitutes an ‘investment’ and who counts
as an ‘investor’ determines how much foreign economic activity that takes place in
a given country is protected by international law. If definitions are broad and open-
ended, virtually all flows of capital sent by any type of foreign actor will enjoy the
same level of protection. Alternatively, states might choose to di↵erentiate between
types of investments and only provide protections to the kind of investment they
value most. One way to do this is by introducing requirements and limitations in
definitions of what and who is protected.
Definitions of covered investments are generally broad, including loans, cash, con-
tractual rights and minority shareholdings; which is beyond what generally counts as
FDI.5 One way in which states can limit the scope of a treaty is by explicitly exclud-
ing portfolio investments from the protection o↵ered. Whether portfolio investment
should be o↵ered the same protections as FDI is a controversial question. This type
of capital movement does not carry any of the positive aspects associated with FDI,
such as technology and skills transfers (UNCTAD, 2011b, 29). Additionally, it is
considered that that purely financial investments are not exposed to the same type of
risk given that investors can withdraw their capital more easily.6 A few high-profile
5FDI implies a degree of control over the operations of the foreign enterprise, either through
acquiring a or merging with a preexisting foreign company or establishing a new one.
6Capital controls means that portfolio investors might not be completely free to withdraw their
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ISDS cases have arisen from portfolio investments. For example, in 2007 a group
of 180,000 Italian bondholders lodged an ICSID claim against Argentina under the
Argentina - Italy BIT after its decision to default on the payment of its privately-held
external debt (Kabra, 2015). In 2015 Deutsche Bank sued Sri Lanka for violations
of the Germany - Sri Lanka BIT for failure by a state-owned oil company to pay a
hedging contract with the German bank (Anghie, 2015).7 As most treaties, both of
these agreements do not exclude portfolio investment from the scope of the treaty,
yet-except for a dip in 2013-the proportion of treaties doing so has increased in recent
years (Figure Figure A.2).8
Other ways to limit the scope of the treaty is through the investor definition. In
Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, a Japanese corporation brought a claim
against the Czech Republic for violations of the Netherlands - Czech Republic BIT
through a shell company incorporated in the Netherlands. At the time, Japan and
the Czech Republic did not have an investment treaty in place. Shell companies, also
known as mailbox companies, are enterprises that have no connection with the state
in which they are incorporated beyond an interest in taking advantage of a particular
regulatory environment and are controlled by a di↵erent company based in another
state. While the tribunal in that case expressed “some sympathy” with the idea
that a shell company with no substantial economic activities in a country should not
investments, in this respect they can be considered to be in a better position than foreign direct
investors.
7Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2
8For example, the Ethiopia - Nigeria BIT of 2008 established in Article 1 that ““investment”
means assets invested or acquired by an investor of one Party in the territory of the other Party,
through the total ownership of enterprise or the participation in the ownership of an enterprise
which gives a significant grade of influence to the investors in the management of the enterprise. Such
assets...shall exclude assets not acquired in the expectation, or not used for the purpose of, economic
activity or other business purpose and shall also exclude portfolio investments such as stocks or shares
of companies in a Party acquired for speculative purposes and held for a short-term by investors of
the other Party.” Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5160.
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Figure A.2: Proportion of treaties signed excluding portfolio investment
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be able to invoke provisions in treaties signed by that state and warned about the
potential for “abuses of the arbitral procedure, and to practices of treaty shopping”,
the arbitrators held the final view that they were nonetheless bound by the language
of the treaty and could not impose a narrower definition of investor than what the
text provides.9 As a consequence, the arbitration continued and the tribunal found
the Czech government liable for 281 million dollars. To avoid such outcomes, states
can include in their treaties a provision that requires investors to carry on substantial
business operations in their formal home country.10
A di↵erent way to avoid shell companies claiming treaty protections is through the
inclusion of a ‘Denial of Benefits’ (DoB) clause. DoB clauses are generally designed
to exclude certain subjects from treaty protections. Through this clause, host states
may deny treaty benefits to shell companies constituted in the territory of the other
party by individuals from a third country that has no treaty with the host state or
from the host state itself (UNCTAD, 2011b). Both of these strategies, the inclusion of
a substantial business operation requirement and the DoB clause, have been increas-
ingly popular in recent years (Figure Figure A.3). In sum, definitions can qualify the
resulting degree of policy space that a treaty provides by expanding or reducing the
scope of the treaty. Investors and investments falling outside the definition cannot
claim the protections o↵ered by the treaty and thus have to rely solely on domestic
legal protections.
9Saluka Investments B.V. v. the Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award, 17 March 2006,
paras. 240-241.
10For example, the Argentina - Qatar BIT of 2016 in its Article 1.1.d states that “A company
formed under the legislation of one of the Contracting Parties which has its principal place of business
within the territory of such Contracting Party shall not be deemed an “investor” under this Agree-
ment where it is controlled by nationals of a third State or of the host State. Furthermore, a company
formed under the legislation of such Contracting Party shall not be deemed an “investor” under this
treaty where it does not conduct substantial business activities within the territory of such Con-
tracting Party.” Available at:http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5383.
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Figure A.3: Proportion of treaties signed with investor definition limitations
A.3. Variation in investment treaty content 424
A.3.2 Substantive obligations
Substantive obligations determine what kind of treatment must the host state provide
to foreign investors. These obligations can be general standards of treatment like Most
Favored Nation Treatment, National Treatment of Fair and Equitable Treatment but
can also be specific guarantees like the prohibition of expropriation or the freedom to
transfer funds outside the host state.
Treaty drafters can refine and qualify these obligations in di↵erent ways so that
host states are more or less restricted by them. For example, expropriation clauses
could only cover direct expropriation, that is, situations in which the state takes a title
of property away from the private investor without proper compensation. However,
full on direct expropriation is nowadays less common. More frequently, investors
claim that hosts states engage in indirect expropriation. These acts leave property
titles untouched but nonetheless a↵ect the capacity of investors to enjoy the benefits
of such property. For example, an arbitral tribunal found that Poland had committed
indirect expropriation when a state-owned enterprise in control of Polish airports took
various measures that deprived an Indian company from the use of its investment in
a duty-free store at the Warsaw airport. The unlawful measures-including preventing
the delivery of goods to the stores, scheduling arbitrary safety inspections, and cutting
o↵ electricity supply-did not nullified the investors’ ownership of the store but made
it virtually impossible to operate.11
To protect investors against this kind of taking, treaties generally include particu-
lar obligations against indirect expropriation. In this regard, a long-standing concern
with investment treaties is that they may allow investors to portray legitimate gov-
11Flemingo DutyFree Shop Private Limited v the Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL. Award.
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ernment regulation in the public interest as indirect expropriation. To avoid this,
drafters can specify which state actions may or may not be challenged as indirect
takings. Treaties can include precise definitions of what constitute such an unlawful
act or can carve out from it an array of regulatory measures undertaken to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives.12 That is, if claims arise under treaties including
these provisions, arbitrators cannot make a decision that indirect expropriation has
taken place if the regulation being challenged by the investor was adopted towards
a public interest goal, such as protecting public health, security or the environment.
These types of provisions were virtually absent from treaties signed during the first
part of the considered period but have been increasingly popular in recent years
(Figure Figure A.4).
A.3.3 Dispute settlement
The dispute settlement mechanisms included in IIAs are what sets them apart from
most other economic treaties. Most investment treaties include an investor-state dis-
pute settlement (ISDS) system that provides investors with the right to start disputes
regarding alleged treaty violations before international arbitral tribunals composed
of three private lawyers.13 These tribunals are generally created under the auspices
12In the Canada - Guinea BIT of 2015, the drafters added interpretative guidelines refining
the definition of indirect expropriation: “except in rare circumstances, such as when a mea-
sure or a series of measures is so severe in the light of its purpose that it cannot be reason-
ably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, a non-discriminatory measure
of a Party that is designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
health, safety and the environment, does not constitute indirect expropriation.” Available at:
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent/treaty/3578
13Each party to the dispute selects one member of the tribunal and the two selected arbitrators -
in agreement - choose the third one, who presides the tribunal. If they fail to reach an agreement,
the institutions under which the tribunal is constituted appoints the third member. The selection of
individuals to serve as arbitrators is one of the most controversial procedural aspects of ISDS. As a
lawyer with experienced representing states in ISDS disputes notes, the “unfortunate reality is that
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Figure A.4: Proportion of treaties signed refining the definition of expropriation
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of one of the following institutions: the International Centre for Settlements of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID); the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL); the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); or the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
ISDS has become the most controversial aspect of investment treaties. Critics
of this system argue that it allows foreign investors to “frame questions of domestic
constitutional and administrative law as treaty claims, and take those claims to a
panel of private international arbitrators, circumventing local, state or federal domes-
tic administrative bodies and courts.”14 Moreover, investors are not generally using
ISDS to challenge instances of direct expropriation in states with weak institutions,
which historically has been the ultimate goal of international investment law. The
majority of known disputes is concerned with regulations adopted by governments in
democratic states (Pelc, 2017). Moreover, arbitration is extremely expensive, both
in terms of damages awards and litigation fees.15 It is argued that the prospect of
multi-million fees and awards has a deterrent e↵ect on states who end up foregoing
regulations when they expect a challenge before arbitral tribunals. This phenomenon
is often referred to as ‘regulatory chill’ (Tienhaara et al., 2009).
States might decide to exclude this controversial dispute settlement system and
rely on a state-to-state mechanism, as Brazil has decided to do in recent years or as
the pool of candidates with a clear track record favoring investors in investor-state arbitration is far
wider and deeper than the pool of candidates having sensitivity to the interests of states” (Kahale,
2018).
14“220+ Law and Economics Professors Urge Congress to Reject the TPP and Other Prospec-
tive Deals that Include Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” September 7, 2016. At:
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-sept-2016.pdf
15As of today, the largest award granted by an arbitral tribunal was in the Occidental v. Ecuador
case in which the American claimant received $2.36 billion. In terms of litigation costs, on average,
costs involved in each claim, including legal fees and tribunal expenses, have exceeded $8 million
per party (Gaukrodger and Gordon, 2012, 43-51).
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Australia did during the Labor government that followed a controversial suit by the
tobacco giant Philip Morris.16 The complete exclusion of ISDS, however, is still un-
common (Figure Figure A.5). Yet, when parties decide to keep the ISDS mechanism
in their treaties, there are still ways to limit the scope of disputes covered. For exam-
ple, treaties can allow investors to only initiate claims for alleged breaches of specific
treaty obligations only, rather than any breach of contracts between the state and
investors from the other treaty party. This is an important question for establishing
the tribunal’s jurisdiction, as contractual claims can only be brought before domestic
courts. Thus, by portraying those as violations of international law, investors have
recourse to another layer of jurisdiction that might be more beneficial to them. By
establishing clear distinctions between treaty and contract breaches, states attempt
to reduce the array of actions they could be brought to arbitration for. Under this dis-
tinction, a claimant cannot simply argue that because they are foreign investors and
their investment required them to sign a contract with the state, then any breaches of
that contract would automatically be considered violations of the investment treaty
between their host state and their home country. They would have to establish in
their claim how is it that the breach of the contract results in a violation of any of
the specific rights provided for in the treaty.
Treaties could also exclude either a particular policy or certain economic sector
from the ISDS scope. Excluding policy decisions or economic areas from ISDS is
similar to reservations except they are only excluded from the dispute settlement
mechanism; the substantive obligations are still valid for these provisions or sectors.
That is, certain state actions cannot be challenged trough arbitration, like decisions
16Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2012-12
A.3. Variation in investment treaty content 429
about the admission of foreign investments17 or whether investors in certain areas
cannot bring their claims to arbitration, for example, investments in real estate or
financial institutions.18
Di↵erently, limitations can be temporal. Treaties can impose a time limit for the
submission of the arbitral claim. This period is often 3 or 5 years from the date
on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of
the treaty violation. As shown in Figure Figure A.5, while states have increasingly
resorted to the mentioned ways to limit their exposure to ISDS in their recent treaties,
some are more common than others. States concerned with the negative e↵ects of
ISDS seem to prefer limiting -rather than eliminating- investors’ access to arbitral
tribunals.
A.3.4 State regulatory space: coding guidelines
Preamble
1. Preamble - cumulative
(a) Right to Regulate = 0.25
(b) Sustainable Development = 0.25
(c) Social Investment Policy = 0.25
(d) Environmental Investment Aspects = 0.25
Scope and Definition
17The Italy - Mexico BIT of 1999 establishes that decisions made by the parties’ that deny an
acquisition by investor from the other party for national security reasons cannot be challenged as
violations of National Treatment or Fair and Equitable Treatment.
18The Cameroon - Turkey BIT of 2012 establishes that disputes related to real state are solely
under the jurisdiction of the parties’ courts and cannot be submitted to arbitration.
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Exclusion of policy areas
Time limits
Figure A.5: Proportion of treaties signed including limitations to ISDS
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2. Definition of investment
(a) Asset vs. enterprise based - ordinal
i. Asset based = 0
ii. Enterprise based = 1
(b) Limitations - cumulative
i. Excluding portfolio investment = 0.2
ii. Excluding other specific assets = 0.2
iii. Characteristics of investment = 0.2
iv. Host state laws = 0.2
v. Closed list = 0.2
3. Definition of investor - Specifying a natural person - cumulative
(a) Exclusion (no mention of) of Permanent Resident = 0.25
(b) Exclusion of dual nationality = 0.25
(c) Substantial business activity required = 0.25
(d) Owner and Control defined = 0.25
4. Limiting substantive scope of the treaty - cumulative
(a) Taxation = 0.25
(b) Subsidies grants = 0.25
(c) Government procurement = 0.25
(d) Other subject matters = 0.25
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Non Discrimination and other Standards of Treatment
5. Most Favored Nation
(a) Establishment ordinal
i. Pre and post establishment = 0
ii. Post Establishment = 0.5
iii. No MFN = 1
(b) Exceptions - cumulative
i. Taxation = 0.25
ii. Procedural ISDS = 0.25
iii. No MFN = 1
6. National Treatment
(a) Establishment - ordinal
i. Pre and post establishment = 0
ii. Post Establishment = 0.5
iii. No NT = 1
(b) Like Circumstances - ordinal
i. No = 0
ii. Yes = 0.5
iii. No NT = 1
7. Fair and Equitable Treatment
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(a) International law qualification - ordinal
i. Non-qualified FET = 0
ii. International law = 0.25
iii. Customary IL = 0.5
iv. CIL + minimum standard of treatment = 0.75
v. No FET = 1
(b) FET elements listed - ordinal
i. No = 0
ii. Yes = 0.5
iii. No FET = 1
8. Full protection and security - ordinal
(a) Unqualified FPS = 0
(b) FPS with reference to domestic laws = 0.5
(c) No FPS = 1
9. Prohibition on unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory measures - ordinal
(a) Yes = 0
(b) No = 1
Expropriation and other Substantive Obligations
10. Expropriation
(a) Scope of expropriation clause - ordinal
A.3. Variation in investment treaty content 434
i. Direct and indirect expropriation = 0
ii. Only direct expropriation = 0.5
iii. No expropriation clause = 1
(b) Limitations on expropriation - cumulative
i. Indirect expropriation defined = 0.25
ii. General regulatory measures = 0.25
iii. Compulsory licenses = 0.25
iv. No expropriation clause = 1
11. Compensation
(a) Relative rights to compensation - ordinal
i. MFN NT = 0
ii. MFN or NT = 0.5
iii. No Compensation clause = 1
(b) Absolute right to compensation in certain circumstances - ordinal
i. Absolute rights to compensation = 0
ii. No Compensation clause = 1
12. Prohibition on Performance Requirements - ordinal
(a) Clause exists (TRIMs or list) = 0
(b) No clause = 1
13. Umbrella Clause ordinal
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(a) Clause exists = 0
(b) No clause = 1
14. Entry and sojourn of Personnel - ordinal
(a) Clause exists = 0
(b) No clause = 1
15. Senior Management and/or Boards mandatory clause - ordinal
(a) Clause exists = 0
(b) No clause = 1
16. Free Transfers - cumulative
(a) BOP exception = 0.33
(b) Other specific exceptions = 0.33
(c) No free transfers clause = 1
17. Subrogation clause - ordinal
(a) Clause exists = 0
(b) No clause = 1
18. Non-derogation clause - ordinal
(a) Clause exists = 0
(b) No clause = 1
Good Governance
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19. Good governance - cumulative
(a) No good governance provisions = 0
(b) NO transparency clauses directed at States = 0.15
(c) Transparency clauses directed at investors = 0.15
(d) Health Environment = 0.14
(e) Labor Standards = 0.14
(f) Corporate Social Responsibility = 0.14
(g) Corruption = 0.14
(h) Not lowering standards = 0.14
Flexibility
20. Denial of Benefits - cumulative
(a) Substantive business operations = 0.33
(b) Diplomatic relations = 0.33
(c) Unilaterally discretionary DoB = 0.33
21. Scheduling Reservations - ordinal
(a) No S R = 0
(b) Reservations (negative list) = 1
22. Essential security exception - cumulative
(a) ESE clause exists = 0.25
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(b) ESE defined = 0.25
(c) ESE self-judging = 0.50
23. Public policy exceptions - cumulative
(a) Public Health and environment = 0.5
(b) Other = 0.5
24. Prudential carve-out - ordinal
(a) No clause = 0
(b) Clause exists = 1
25. Right to regulate - ordinal
(a) No clause = 0
(b) Clause exists = 1
Institutional Issues and Final Provisions
26. Mechanism for consultations between State parties - ordinal
(a) No = 0
(b) Yes =1
27. Institutional framework (Committee) - ordinal
(a) No = 0
(b) Yes =1
28. Limiting temporal scope of BIT - ordinal
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(a) Silence or pre-existing investment = 0
(b) Post-BIT investment only = 1
29. Preexisting disputes covered - ordinal
(a) Silence = 0
(b) No = 1
30. Treaty duration - ordinal
(a) No duration specified = 0
(b) 15 years or more = 0.33
(c) 10 years = 0.66
(d) Less than 10 years = 1
31. Automatic renewal - ordinal
(a) Yes, indefinite = 0 (or if initial duration is indefinite)
(b) Yes, fixed term = 0.5
(c) No = 1
32. Modalities for denunciation - ordinal
(a) No = 0
(b) A year or more = 0.5
(c) Less than a year = 1
33. Survival Clause Length - ordinal
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(a) 15 years or more = 0
(b) 10 years = 0.33
(c) Less than 10 years = 0.66
(d) No survival clause = 1
Procedural provisions (ISDS)
34. Alternatives to Arbitration - ordinal
(a) No clause (compulsory ISDS) = 0
(b) Clause exists - voluntary recourse to alternatives = 0.25
(c) Clause exists - mandatory recourse to alternatives = 0.75
(d) No ISDS = 1
35. Scope of claims - ordinal
(a) Any dispute relating to investment = 0
(b) Listing specific basis of claim beyond treaty (e.g. contractual disputes) =
0.33
(c) Limited to treaty claims = 0.66
(d) No ISDS = 1
36. Limitation on provisions subject to ISDS - ordinal
(a) No Limitations = 0
(b) Limitation of provisions subject to ISDS = 0.75
(c) No ISDS = 1
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37. Limitation on scope on ISDS - cumulative
(a) No Limitations = 0
(b) Exclusion of policy areas from ISDS = 0.33
(c) Special mechanism for taxation or prudential measures = 0.33
(d) No ISDS = 1
38. Type of Consent to Arbitration - ordinal
(a) Expressed or implied consent = 0
(b) Case-by-case consent or no ISDS at all = 1
39. ISDS rules: domestic courts forum selection - ordinal
(a) No mention of domestic courts or investor option = 0 (*collapsed two
categories*)
(b) Yes, pre-condition for international arbitration = 0.5
(c) No ISDS = 1
40. Particular Features of Investor-State Dispute Settlement - cumulative
(a) None = 0
(b) Limitation period = 0.25
(c) Provisional measures = 0.25
(d) Limited remedies = 0.25
(e) o ISDS = 1
41. Interpretation - cumulative
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(a) None = 0
(b) Binding interpretation = 0.25
(c) Renvoi = 0.25
(d) Rights of non-disputing contracting party = 0.25
(e) No ISDS = 1
42. Transparency in Arbitral Proceedings - cumulative
(a) Making documents publicly available = 0.25
(b) Making hearings publicly available = 0.25
(c) Amicus Curiae = 0.25
(d) No ISDS = 1
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A.4 Additional models
A.4.1 Additional models for ILA di↵erence
Table A.1: Results - Additional models including FDI
Dependent variable:
ILA di↵. ILA di↵. sign
OLS logistic
(1) (2)
ISDS resp t-5 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.036⇤⇤
(0.0004) (0.018)
ISDS claim t-5 -0.0002⇤ 0.008
(0.0001) (0.012)
GDP t-1 -0.003 -0.290
(0.003) (0.216)
Polity2 t-1 0.0005 0.061⇤⇤⇤
(0.0003) (0.022)
Population t-1 -0.00002 0.0002
(0.00005) (0.003)
FDI inwards stock 0.001 -0.135
(0.001) (0.093)





Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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A.4.2 Additional models for treaty signature




(Full sample) (OECD) (Non-OECD)
ISDS resp t-5 -0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.125⇤⇤⇤ -0.288⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.048) (0.046)
ISDS claim t-5 -0.067⇤⇤⇤ -0.079⇤⇤⇤ -0.373⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.016) (0.122)
GDP t-1 -0.287 -2.857⇤⇤ -0.195
(0.175) (1.278) (0.187)
World treaties t-1 0.0002⇤ -0.0001 0.0002⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Country treaties t-1 -0.005 0.023⇤⇤ 0.009
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
Inward FDI t-1 0.00004 0.0002⇤ 0.00004
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004)
Polity2 t-1 0.048⇤⇤ 0.113 0.035⇤
(0.019) (0.143) (0.020)
Govt. majority 0.412⇤⇤⇤ 0.493 0.529⇤⇤⇤
(0.134) (0.309) (0.158)
Constant 2.516 37.343⇤⇤ 1.367
(1.641) (16.891) (1.736)
Observations 3,181 710 2,471
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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A.4.3 Additional models for treaty content
Table A.3: Results - Moving average
Dependent variable:
Regulatory space score
ISDS resp t-5 home 0.003
(0.003)
ISDS resp t-5 host 0.003
(0.005)
ISDS claim t-5 home 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
ISDS claim t-5 host -0.003
(0.006)
GDP t-1 home -0.001
(0.002)
GDP t-1 host 0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
Inward FDI t-1 home -0.00000
(0.00000)
Inward FDI t-1 host -0.00000
(0.00000)
Polity2 t-1 home -0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0004)










Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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(Full sample) (North-South) (South-South)
Pro-Inv sum t-1 home 0.003 0.040⇤⇤⇤ -0.004
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
Pro-Inv sum t-1 host -0.001 0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
ISDS claim t-5 home 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤ 0.013⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
ISDS claim t-5 host -0.002 -0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
GDP t-1 home -0.001 -0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP t-1 host 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Inward FDI t-1 home -0.00000⇤⇤ 0.00000 -0.00000⇤⇤
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Inward FDI t-1 host -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Polity2 t-1 home -0.001⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤⇤ -0.001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Polity2 t-1 host 0.0001 0.0002 0.00002
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Americas 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.054⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Constant 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 0.251⇤⇤⇤ 0.347⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.051) (0.087)
Observations 1,269 672 484
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.354 0.373
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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(Full sample) (North-South) (South-South)
Combined ISDS resp t-5 0.002 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.0003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Combined ISDS claim t-5 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤ 0.011
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
GDP t-1 home -0.002 -0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP t-1 host 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Inward FDI t-1 home -0.00000⇤⇤ 0.00000 -0.00000⇤⇤
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Inward FDI t-1 host -0.00000⇤⇤ -0.00000⇤⇤ -0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Polity2 t-1 home -0.001⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤ -0.001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Polity2 t-1 host 0.00005 0.00000 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Americas 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.052⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
Constant 0.262⇤⇤⇤ 0.250⇤⇤⇤ 0.350⇤⇤⇤
(0.039) (0.051) (0.087)
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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A.4.4 Additional models for treaty termination





Pro-Inv t-1 home 0.024 -0.041
(0.033) (0.154)
Pro-Inv t-1 host 0.044 -0.006
(0.028) (0.048)
Claims under treaty t-1
GDP t-1 di↵. -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.322⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.050)
ISDS claim t-5 home -0.0005 0.015⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.006)






Treaty age 0.025⇤⇤⇤ 0.032⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.012)





Log Likelihood -1,040.159 -490.903
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,100.318 1,001.805
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Pro-Inv t-1 home 0.042
(0.036)
Pro-Inv t-1 host 0.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.034)
Claims under treaty t-1 0.074
(0.061)
GDP t-1 di↵. 0.032 -0.166⇤⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.037)
ISDS claim t-5 home -0.030⇤⇤ -0.002
(0.014) (0.006)






Treaty age 0.018 0.026⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.009)





Log Likelihood -532.477 -1,041.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,082.954 2,100.001
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Appendix B
Chapter 6
B.1 Interventions during constitutional debates
The table includes a quote from every legislator that made remarks on the issue.
Some legislators intervened multiple times.




[T]he spirit of this article is to reject
arbitration between the state and legal
subjects like companies, corporations,
transnational firms...in controversies derived




Instruments like the famous ICSID...should
be rejected for the people. If at any time a
government that was not committed to its
people, but to other interests, signed it we
need to terminate the treaty. These are not
ideological dogmas, but concrete facts...70%
of claims at ICSID lodged by transnational
enterprises against states, fundamentally,
from the third world...has been ruled in
favor of the enterprises (038-146)
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Normal Wray PAIS
Up to what point can Ecuador a↵ect an
investment that has come to Ecuador to
damage the environment, contaminate
water sources, damage people’s lives or even
eradicate indigenous populations, as history
has shown here? Up to what point a
country has the possibility to make
sovereign decisions about that withouth
being sued befire an international instance?
(038-158)
Abel A´vila MPD
I would rather invest 25 million [the cost of
a referendum for the approval of a treaty]
rather than be tied to the possibility of
transnationals like OXY, before an
international organization like ICSID,
taking 3,000 million dollars for having not
considered the decision of singing a treaty
in light of the national interest (038-165)
Martha Roldo´s RED
...that would allow us, Ecuadorians, to
recover our sovereignty, be able to say no
and not have international arbitrations that
force us to accept investment conditions
that are harmful for life, health and nature
(038-170)
Gerardo Nicola PAIS
...what emerged is the pressure inflicted on





what [article 422] means is that companies
that go to a country need to respect the
laws of that country, it is not that hard...let
me read a list of all the international
treaties the US has not signed...and they
want us to sign treaties...and they want us
to not control them when they come to loot
our country (038-173)




there are several bilateral investment
treaties that are not beneficial for our
country. This government is reviewing all of
them, because it cannot be allowed for our
few resources to be looted through
international treaties...it has been talked
this will a↵ect legal security...they should
see that we are including an article saying
controversies...will be resolved according to
the laws of the country (038-176)
Leo´n Roldo´s RED
I am against international arbitration that
starts from the assumption that investors




What should not happen is that others
pretend to take us before jurisdictions that
manage a di↵erent type of law...that
manage other rules within which we have to
defend ourselves in foreign languages, with





What country or businessman will sign a
contract to litigate in Ecuador, without the
guarantee of international arbitration?
That is why international arbitration was
invented (038-133)
Catalina Ayala PSP
The fear of international companies of the
Ecuadorian justice is fair. What is going to
happen with the treaties, the contracts we
have already celebrated? (038-138) The
problem is not the arbitration clause...it is
how treaties are negotiated...we do not
know how to defend ourselves during
arbitrations, we do not always hire the best
lawyers (038-139)




People around the world will not care that
Ecuador doesn’t like arbitration, what they
will say is ‘Sirs, if you don’t like arbitration
we won’t establish relations with you.’ The
world is not going to change in order to
please us...we lost against Occidental after
using all international instances, not just
arbitration we went to the Queen’s
courts...we cannot pretend all those
places...are sold in favor of multinational
companies. We lost because we did things
wrong (038-143)
Mae Montan˜o UNO
When we have di culties, we go to the
other extreme...This means closing the
doors to possibilities of having advantageous
commercial agreements in a country where
tat is what is needed most (038-157)
Ce´sar Roho´n PSD
Arbitration is not an attack against
Ecuadorian sovereignty, it is an asset for the
country when it signs these documents for
avoiding conflicts (038-157)
Cristina Reyes PSC
Forbidding judicial institutions that operate
within the law makes us go backwards as a
country...the state policy should be to
choose the center and rules that would
govern each arbitration carefully in each
investment treaty negotiation...The solution
is not to bury judicial tools, but to perfect
them and professionalize their application.
Please, let’s not isolate Ecuador from the
world (049-132)
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